Foundations of Insurgency

Chapter 2

Foundations of Insurgency

“It is certainly easier to launch an insurgency than it is to repress it.”

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare.

An insurgency and the operational environment must be understood before the insurgency can be defeated. Tools that assist the counterinsurgent in understanding and predicting the insurgent’s actions are the five elements of an insurgency, the eight dynamics of an insurgency, the six insurgent strategies, insurgent tactics, and the strengths and vulnerabilities of insurgents. Together these tools, known as the components and manifestations of an insurgency, provide leaders at all levels a means to comprehend and defeat the insurgent.

Section I—OVERVIEW

This section introduces the relationship between the components and the manifestations of an insurgency. If a counterinsurgent understands both the components and manifestations of the insurgency, then the unit can correctly apply pressure along the seven counterinsurgency lines of effort (Chapter 3) to defeat it.COMPONENTS

2-1. The components of an insurgency are comprised of the five elements, the eight dynamics, and six strategies. The elements are the five groups of people—leaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliary, and mass base—that form the insurgency’s organization. The dynamics are the eight categories that define an insurgency—leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, organizational and operational patterns. Finally, the six insurgent strategies are the urban, military focused, protracted popular war, identity focused, conspiratorial, and the composite and coalition. Together, the components—the five elements, the eight dynamics, and the six strategies—are tools of analysis that allow the counterinsurgent to fully grasp the nature of the insurgency.

MANIFESTATIONS

2-2. The manifestations are the visible outputs of the insurgency. Made up of the insurgent’s tactics, strengths and vulnerabilities, the counterinsurgent will be able to track, categorize, and develop the insurgency’s pattern, and a means to defeat it. Figure 2‑1 shows the relationship between the components and manifestations of an insurgency.



Figure 2‑1. Insurgency.

HISTORICAL INSURGENCY

2-3. With an understanding of the components of an insurgency, a counterinsurgent unit can identify, describe, and categorize any insurgency. Figure 2‑2 shows the components of an historical insurgency.





Figure 2‑2. Components of Malaysian Insurgency (circa 1950).


Section II—ELEMENTS

Insurgent organizations vary considerably, but are typically made up of five elements supported by a military wing and a political wing. The proportions of each element depend upon insurgent strategy and the degree of active support obtained from the populace. If the existing government presence is eliminated in any particular area, these elements can exist openly. If the HN government presence is strong in a particular area, the elements of an insurgency will maintain a clandestine existence. The five elements of an insurgency are—leaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliaries, and mass base (Figure 2‑3 ).



Figure 2‑3. Organizational elements of an insurgency.

LEADERS

2-4. Leaders provide direction to the insurgency. They are the “idea people” and the planners. They usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas, and personal charisma. Generally, they convey the ideology of the insurgency into objectives and direct the military efforts of the guerrillas. In some insurgencies, they may hold their position through religious, clan, or tribal authority.

2-5. Leaders who form the political core of the insurgency are often called the political leaders. They are actively engaged politically in the struggle to accomplish the goals of the insurgency. They may also make up a formal political party to signify their political importance. These political leaders are the driving force behind propaganda. Insurgencies based on religious extremism usually include religious and spiritual advisors among their political cadre.

2-6. At a tactical level, units may identify leaders as IED cell leaders; political, religious, or social leaders who direct the propaganda and nonviolent efforts of the insurgency; or as business leaders who provide extensive resource support to the insurgency, and other roles.



GUERRILLAS

2-7. A guerrilla is any insurgent who uses a weapon of any sort and does the actual fighting for the insurgency. They may conduct acts of terror, guerrilla warfare, criminal activities, or conventional operations. They are often mistaken for the movement or insurgency itself; but they are merely the foot soldiers of the movement or insurgency. Guerrillas vary widely in size, make‑up, tactics, and methods from one insurgency to another. They even vary widely within an insurgency, especially in each of the three phases of an insurgency.

2-8. Guerrillas may continue in their normal positions in society and lead clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Guerrillas tend to organize themselves based upon the activity they will be conducting. Those focused on using terrorism usually operate individually or in small cells and are often armed with explosives instead of weapons. Guerrilla bands, historically, have lived in remote areas and conducted raids on HN government infrastructure. Historical examples of guerrillas include the Maquis in World War II France, the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War and the Mahdi Army in Iraq.

UNDERGROUND

2-9. The underground is a cellular organization of active supporters of the insurgency which may contain an element that works in the HN government. Keeping the nature of their work for the insurgency secret is often paramount to them. They are more engaged than the auxiliaries are and may at times be guerrillas, if they use weapons or conduct combat operations. They operate in all areas; especially in areas denied to any established guerrilla force and where operations are not suitable for guerrilla forces. They conduct clandestine, covert, and overt operations, sometimes infiltrating the HN government. Members of the underground often continue in their normal positions in society, but lead second, clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Some insurgencies are unique in that they conduct most of their political activities inside the underground while a different section trains recruits, maintains propaganda, and helps in population control. The underground may—

· Spread propaganda.

· Support sabotage, assassination and subversion.

· Support intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

· Run safe houses.

· Provide transportation.

· Manufacture and maintain arms and explosives.

AUXILIARIES

2-10. An auxiliary is the support element of the insurgency. Auxiliaries are active sympathizers who provide important logistical services but do not directly participate in combat operations. If they participate in guerrilla activities, they become guerrillas. Auxiliaries may work full time or part time for the insurgency and generally conduct safer activities than the underground. They often include women, children and other individuals that tend to be less scrutinized by counterinsurgent forces. Examples of auxiliaries include shepherds or street merchants that may openly operate near a counterinsurgent base and provide intelligence on that site. Examples of support that auxiliaries provide include—

· Store weapons and supplies.

· Perform courier operations.

· Provide passive intelligence collection.

· Give early warning of counterinsurgent movements.

· Acquire funds from lawful and unlawful sources.

· Provide forged or stolen documents.

· Promote and facilitate desertion of security forces.

· Recruit and screen new members.

· Create and spread propaganda.

· Provide medical support.

· Manufacture and maintain equipment.

MASS BASE

2-11. The mass base consists of the population of the state who are sympathetic to the insurgent movement. This sympathy varies between the specific elements within the population such as religious and ethnic groups and within those specific elements themselves. This mass base, by default, passively supports the insurgency. As occasions arise, they may provide active support. Leaders often recruit members of the mass base, who are more actively oriented, to serve as auxiliaries, underground or guerrillas. Mass base members are the true silent supporters of the insurgency and are often the most available for the HN government to positively influence.

EXAMPLE

2-12. Although no two insurgencies or insurgent organizations are alike, they still have elements that can be identified and some form of hierarchy. Figure 2‑4 shows an example insurgent organization with a developed structure. In this insurgency, the underground finances the insurgency.





Figure 2‑4. Example insurgent organization.


Section III—DYNAMICS

Insurgencies are political movements that result from real or perceived grievances, or neglect that leads to alienation from an established government. Eight dynamics are common to an insurgency. Knowing and understanding these dynamics helps to understanding the insurgency. The eight dynamics are leadership, objectives, ideology, environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, organizational and operational patterns.



LEADERSHIP

2-13. Insurgent leaders provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, organization for an insurgent movement. Successful insurgent leaders use, interpret and shape the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace into the insurgent strategy. They often provide solutions to grievances by advancing alternatives to existing conditions that support the insurgency. Effective insurgent leaders make their cause and solutions known to the people to gain popular support. Individual leaders of an insurgency are often members of the elite of society who have been somehow alienated from the power structure. Their education, background, family connections, social standing, and experiences contribute to their ability to organize and inspire the people who makeup the insurgency. To be successful, they must break the ties between the people and the government and establish credibility for their movement.

STRUCTURE

2-14. In general, there are three categories of leadership found in insurgencies. They are—

Single person

2-15. One person may be the overall leader of an insurgency. This leadership structure has one person who provides cohesion, motivation, and direction for the insurgency. Cuba’s Fidel Castro is an excellent example of a single person leadership structure. However, this single leader may centralize power or decentralize decision‑making and execution, leaving decision‑making and execution to subordinates. At the local level, most units will see organizations controlled by a single person.

Single group or party

2-16. The insurgency may be headed by a ruling council that makes and executes policy. This leadership group or party may also control other groups involved in the insurgency. China’s Communist Party, before the ascendancy of Mao, is an example of a group leading an insurgency.

Group of groups

2-17. Different groups that have different concepts of how the country should be governed make up the leadership. Under this kind of leadership, there will be many leaders, possibly unified only by their opposition to the government. They compete with each other and the government. Example: The partisan forces in Yugoslavia and Greece during World War II were united in their fight against the German occupation, but ranged from monarchist to democratic to communist. Sometimes, they fought each other more violently than they did the Germans.

2-18. As a group, insurgent leaders operate in either a decentralized or centralized manner.

Decentralized

2-19. The power base of some insurgencies is collective and does not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. These insurgencies are easier to penetrate, but recover rapidly when they lose key personnel. Decentralization restricts an insurgency in its ability to function as a coherent body and to create a viable counter state. However, decentralized insurgencies are very hard to destroy and can continue to sow disorder, even when degraded. For example, Al Qaeda in 2008 is a loose, decentralized organization held together by an ideal of re‑establishing the Caliphate.

Centralized

2-20. Other organizations depend on a single, often charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and direction. Centralized insurgencies make decisions and initiate new actions rapidly. However, they are vulnerable to disruptions if key personalities are removed, co‑opted, discredited, or eliminated. These insurgencies are often led by traditional authority figures such as tribal sheikhs, local warlords, and religious leaders. For example, Tecumseh was the major factor in the creation of Shawnee confederation. After he was killed in battle, the confederation fell apart.

IDENTIFICATION OF KEY LEADERS

2-21. Identifying leaders can be critical in determining an insurgency’s organizational structure, strategy, and tactics. Understanding the basic beliefs, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of known key leaders is extremely important to countering insurgency. Removing these key leaders will normally degrade an organization’s capabilities. Che Guevara was a well‑known, centralized leader that counterinsurgents effectively targeted, when he was killed, his insurgency fell apart. Alternately, in the case of the decentralized leader Abu Musab al‑Zarqawi, his organization, Al‑Qaeda in Iraq, although severely disrupted, continued as a functioning organization after his death. The following information is vital to understand and target an insurgent leader:

· Role.

· Activities.

· Associates.

· Personal background.

· Personal beliefs, motivations, and ideology.

· Education and training.

· Temperament.

· Position within the organization.

· Public popularity.

OBJECTIVE

2-22. Insurgencies normally seek to achieve one of three objectives: to overthrow the existing government in order to reallocate power, to expel whom they perceive to be “outsiders” or “occupiers," or to seek to create or maintain a region where there is little or no governmental control that they can exploit. Insurgents’ objectives include struggles for independence against colonial powers; the rising up of political, ethnic, or religious groups against their rivals; and resistance to foreign invaders. The central issue in an insurgency is the reallocation of power. Usually, an insurgency mounts a political challenge to the existing state through the formation of a counter state, which is promoted as an alternative to the existing state.

2-23. Understanding the root causes of the insurgency is essential to analyzing the insurgents’ objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires knowing its strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. These objectives can be psychological in nature, physical in nature or a combination of the two.

STRATEGIC

2-24. The insurgent’s overall political goals are their strategic objectives. The set of required conditions that define achievement of the insurgents’ objectives are their desired end state. Examples of strategic objectives include—

· Overthrow an established government.

· Establish an autonomous national territory.

· Cause the withdrawal of a foreign occupying power.

· Extract political concessions.

OPERATIONAL

2-25. Insurgent operational objectives are those that insurgents pursue to destroy government legitimacy and progressively achieve their political end state. These are the means they use to link tactical goals with strategic end states. They often target the government’s inability to address the root causes that lead to the insurgency. The insurgent’s operational objectives define their overall plan, although most insurgents will not have a formal plan. These objectives are based on the insurgent’s strategy across political, military, economic, and social objectives. Examples of operational objectives include—

Political

2-26. Disrupt elections; develop or strengthen an insurgency’s political wing, attack government legitimacy; gain recognition of their political party by the government; attack the legitimacy of the government; or gain ability to run candidates for elected office

Military

2-27. Disrupt operational lines of communication and supply routes; force US or HN units out of an area; keep government forces in their bases; draw US or HN forces into fight; or provoke over‑reaction from US or HN forces, which result in media‑reported civilian casualties.

Economic

2-28. Disrupt reconstruction and attack infrastructure; thereby preventing the government from addressing root causes; prevent government from addressing the populace’s issues.

Social

2-29. Spark sectarian violence; subvert education system; cause population to question the government; highlight corrupt or oppressive police; or establish a regular means for mass communication (radio or paper).

TACTICAL

2-30. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts such as disseminating propaganda such as posters, compact discs and handbills, killing individuals, or the attack and seizure of key facilities. Tactical objectives can be both physical and psychological aspects. Counterinsurgents can often gain insight into tactical goals by analyzing the insurgent propaganda. Examples of tactical objectives include—

Political

2-31. Intimidation of a local official or the dissemination of propaganda products.

Military

2-32. Attack a US or HN government convoy or checkpoint or random indirect fire attacks on bases.

Economic

2-33. Attack manufacturing centers, stores and markets; sabotage roads, bridges, electrical lines and pipelines. Threaten violence against storeowners, employees and customers.

Social

2-34. Attack a police station or directly interact with the population in order to communicate directly to the populace.

GENERAL INSURGENT GOALS FOR TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

2-35. Insurgents typically work toward achieving ten general objectives as they gain the support of the population. Insurgent activity, like all other aspect of the insurgency, develops and evolves over time.

Obtaining Popular Support

2-36. Insurgent operations are normally focused directly or indirectly at decreasing support to the existing government. Simultaneously, competent insurgents try to gain support for the insurgent movement through propaganda, coercion, or by causing terror. If they cannot gain active support, they will seek passive support such as silence.

Undermining Host Nation Legitimacy

2-37. Insurgent efforts can damage or destroy both real and perceived economic and political targets. The loss of government services, overreaction by government forces, or the belief that the government is powerless against the insurgency contributes to the population’s dissatisfaction with the government.

Lessening Government Control

2-38. By defeating small government forces, remaining government forces can be forced to consolidate in larger size elements or bases. This can reduce the overall presence of the counterinsurgent forces and allow an insurgent force to operate openly where counterinsurgent forces are not, if even for a short amount of time. This can create the perception that the insurgency is increasing its control or the government is losing control and legitimacy.

Providing Psychological Victories

2-39. The guerrilla seeks to gain small psychological victories. These victories do not need to be significant in terms of material damage to the government or its armed forces. These tactical victories show that a small guerrilla force can defeat the much larger government force.

Tying Up or Blocking Host Nation Government Resources

2-40. By forcing the HN government to expend resources on military operations against guerrillas, the insurgency seeks to tie up resources that could best be used by the government to provide services and development programs to the populace.

Weakening Host Nation Government Resolve

2-41. By defeating small elements of the HN’s security forces and attacking government agencies, the guerrilla weakens the resolve of government employees and forces. Small government forces and agencies become aware of their vulnerability. Desertion, absence from work, willingness to compromise, difficulty in recruiting, or limitations on services to dangerous areas all benefit the insurgency’s purpose.

Intimidating the Population

2-42. By attacking vocal opponents and certain types of individuals, such as teachers, the insurgents seek to frighten the population.

Acquiring Supplies and Equipment

2-43. Guerrillas seek to acquire government weapons, uniforms, equipment, supplies, or vehicles.

Infiltrating Host Nation Government and Government Forces

2-44. Insurgents will often attempt to infiltrate various government ministries and security forces by emplacing sympathizers and by converting existing members of those agencies. These infiltrators are used to gather intelligence and to subvert operations.

Causing COIN Security Force Overreaction

2-45. Since a COIN fight is the fight for the population, often the intent of insurgents using terrorism or guerrilla warfare is to cause a heavy‑handed response to attacks on the part of the COIN force or HN security force. These responses will often drive the population to support the insurgency.

IDEOLOGY

2-46. Insurgents often use their ideology to show the population how they can address the root causes that the government cannot provide or is not providing. Insurgent ideology attempts to provide a vision of how a society, including a political and economic system, should be structured. Ideology should not be confused with the insurgent strategy, which is the way that the insurgents intend to achieve their end state. Two of the most identifiable insurgent ideologies have been communism and religious extremism.

2-47. Ideology is a motivating factor in insurgent activities. Insurgencies can gather recruits and amass popular support through ideological appeal, which includes religious or other cultural factors. The insurgency’s ideology explains its followers’ difficulties and provides a means to remedy those ills. The most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional concerns of the populace. Tactical units could see ideology expressed in the propaganda and recruitment techniques of local insurgents.

COMMUNISM

2-48. Communism is a political system where private property is eliminated and controlled by the state. Historically, it has been advocated in countries where wealth is unevenly distributed among the classes. Communism was once the most typical form of insurgent ideology and often experienced success. With the fall of Soviet Union, communism has not been a successful motivation for insurgents, especially since there is currently little or no external support for communist‑based insurgency.

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

2-49. Religious extremism, often a byproduct of religious fundamentalism, can be defined by strict adherence to a set of religious principles and the rejection of compromise. These ideologies are often energized by inequities in social, political or economic development and further helped by counterinsurgent attempts to marginalize religious issues. Globalization creates opportunities for an increase in religious extremism based on both real and perceived inequities. Insurgencies based on religious extremism want their values incorporated into the nation’s governmental structure. This fulfills the frustration and dissatisfaction of the religious extremists. Adherents often receive formal instruction on the religion’s fundamentals and use adherence to these fundamentals as a recruiting tool. Religious leaders are often leaders of the insurgency and nonextremist leaders are often replaced. Characteristics of insurgencies motivated by religious extremism that differ from traditional insurgencies are—

· Individual duty with an indifference to popular support.

· Use of violence that maximizes shock, awe, and casualties.

· Disinterest with governance and lack of a practical political objective in organizations with global reach or establishing a theocracy in local cases.

· Ability to regenerate guerrillas without popular support.

NARRATIVE

2-50. The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is a narrative. A narrative is when a story is used to display the benefits of a certain ideology. Narratives are often central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions. Insurgent organizations use narratives and religious‑based concepts very effectively in developing, spreading, and mobilizing followers.

2-51. In the Al Qaeda narrative, Osama bin Laden shows himself as a man purified in the mountains of Afghanistan who is gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. In the collective imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, they are agents of Islamic history who will reverse the decline of the umma [Muslim community], reestablish the Caliphate, and bring about its inevitable triumph over Western imperialism. This image mobilizes support for Al Qaeda among some of the most traditional Muslims.

ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY

2-52. Environment and geography, including cultural, religious, tribal affiliation, and other demographic factors along with terrain and weather, affect all participants in an operational environment. How insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages for each. In Chapter 1, this manual stressed the importance of understanding an AO’s civil considerations (ASCOPE). Considerations for environment and geography include—

· Population density and distribution, especially degree of urbanization

· Root causes of the insurgency within an urban population, such as lack of basic services, security, markets, governance, municipal council representation, or schools.

· Root causes that lead to the insurgency within a rural population, such as lack of land ownership, grazing rights, water rights, isolation or inclusion in political process, access to markets, or schools.

· Growing seasons, rainy/dry seasons, planting/harvest time (key events). These may influence level and type of insurgent activity.

· Use of structures and infrastructures by both the insurgent and population.

· Tribal, religious, or other affiliations, which may have tremendous effect on the local populace’s willingness to support an insurgency, or where people and insurgents can expect sanctuary or will avoid.

· Proximity to international borders that may provide sanctuary or support.

· Rugged, inaccessible terrain with often hostile populations to outsiders that may provide sanctuary or support.

· Economic enclaves, such as slums, market areas, middle class areas, and wealthy areas.

· Geographic divisions along ethnic, tribal, religious, political or other factors.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

2-53. External support includes moral support, political support, resource support, or sanctuary support. External support can come from any entity outside of the Host Nation—not just neighboring states. Countries from outside the region seeking political or economic influence can also support insurgencies. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal elements for funding or use the Internet to create a support network. Ethnic or religious communities in other states may also provide a form of external support and sanctuary, particularly for transnational insurgencies. Access to external support influences the effectiveness of insurgencies.

2-54. Accepting external support can affect the legitimacy of both insurgents and counterinsurgents. The act of acceptance implies the inability to sustain oneself. In addition, the country or group providing support attaches its legitimacy along with the insurgent group it supports. The consequences can affect programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent situation.

MORAL SUPPORT

2-55. Moral support is the acknowledgement that the insurgent or their cause is just and admirable. It starts as outside popular approval and can manifest with negative media attention focused towards the counterinsurgent or Host Nation. Moral support often leads to political, resource, and sanctuary support.

POLITICAL SUPPORT

2-56. Political support is the active promotion of insurgents’ strategic goals in international forums. International forums such as the United Nations, trade sanctions and embargoes, and the creation of political discussion in the Unites States can all provide political support, which negatively influences the counterinsurgent’s effort. Another form of political support can come when a legitimate state actually recognizes an insurgent group as a legitimate authority. Political support is the most dangerous form of support as it can result in an insurgency gaining international legitimacy, forcing the counterinsurgent to stop actively targeting them.

RESOURCE SUPPORT

2-57. Resource support is typically guerrillas, money, weapons, equipment, food, advisors, and training. Resource support is often the most important form of support, such as, during the French experience in Algeria. Although insurgents were numerous, weapons were not, because the French closed international borders, preventing arms smuggling.

SANCTUARY SUPPORT

2-58. Sanctuary support is a secure site to train, obtain sustainment, rest and refit. Historically, sanctuaries provided insurgents a place to rebuild and reorganize without fear of Host Nation or counterinsurgent interference. Often these were in neighboring countries or remote areas difficult to access. Sanctuaries may also include areas within a state, including neighborhoods where HN security forces cannot or will not conduct operations. The meaning of the term sanctuary is evolving. Today, insurgents can draw on “virtual” sanctuaries in the Internet, global financial systems, and the international media. These virtual sanctuaries can be used to present insurgent actions as acceptable activities worthy of internal and external support. Effective COIN operations work to eliminate all sanctuaries.

INTERNAL SUPPORT

2-59. Internal support is any support provided from inside the country. It is normally broken down into the two general categories: popular and logistical support. Together, these two form the mass base. For the purposes of this manual, one other category is added—insurgent bases.

POPULAR SUPPORT

2-60. An insurgent movement requires popular support (Figure 2‑5 ) to survive, and popular support is even more essential for an insurgency to succeed. Typically, there is also a relationship between the amount of popular support and the size of the insurgency. To grow, an insurgency needs an adequately sized mass base that will support this growth. One of the best means of defeating insurgencies is to shrink this mass bass by causing the local population to become hostile or at least apathetic toward the insurgents.





Figure 2‑5. Range of popular support.

Types of Support

2-61. Popular support can be either active or passive and may come from only a small segment of the population or from a broad base of the population. Supporters of an insurgency may also be overt or clandestine.

Active Support

2-62. Active supporters provide open sympathy to the movement, participate in legal insurgent activities, such as strikes, find new recruits, and may transition to being an active element of the insurgency such as guerrillas, underground, or auxiliary. Active supporters are usually central to the insurgency’s propaganda efforts.

Passive Support

2-63. Passive supporters vary from those who are sympathetic yet inactive to those who are not sympathetic, but who choose to remain silent about insurgent activities. Silence on the part of the populace concerning insurgent activities provides passive insurgent support.

Recruitment

2-64. Local insurgent representatives address local grievances and conduct recruiting. Elements of the population who are dissatisfied with existing conditions or those who have been marginalized through psychological alienation are prone to insurgent recruitment. The cadre often gives credit to the insurgent movement for all local successes and blames government forces for all failures and problems. Every promise and appeal made by cadre members is associated with tangible solutions and deeds. Competent insurgents and counterinsurgents both seek to mobilize and sustain popular support for their cause while discouraging popular support for their adversaries. There are five common methods, used individually or in various combinations, to mobilize popular support. Knowing these five means provides an opportunity for the counterinsurgent to identify when they are being used and then counter them. The five common methods are—

Persuasion

2-65. Political, social, religious, security, and economic promises can often entice people to support one side or the other.

Coercion

2-66. Through threat of violence or abuse, insurgents can force people to support them. Citizens seek to ally with groups that can guarantee their safety.

Reaction to Abuses

2-67. Though firmness by security forces is often necessary to establish a secure operational environment, a tyrannical government can generate resistance to its rule.



Foreign Support

2-68. Foreign governments can provide the expertise, international legitimacy, and money needed to start or intensify a conflict.

Apolitical Motivations

2-69. Insurgencies attract foreign volunteers, criminals, and mercenaries who are often motivated by money or extremism.

Measurement

2-70. The reality of insurgencies is that the support of the population fluctuates between the government and the insurgency due to many factors, but no one side will ever possess the support of the total population. Trying to quantify why the populace favors the government or the insurgency is difficult, but evaluating the issue is important. Gauging aspects such as the reaction of a local populace to the presence of troops or government leaders can help estimate popular support at the tactical level. Asking the population directly or using surveys can produce valuable insight into popular support and attitudes.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

2-71. Modern warfare is inherently resource intensive. The insurgent needs to ensure continual access to supplies, weapons, ammunition, and money, and this requires insurgents to maintain open supply lines. While logistical support may be an insurgent’s greatest vulnerability, it can be difficult to interdict. As an insurgency develops and expands, logistical support increasingly relies on external sources. In a conventional war, insurgent forces often receive significant amounts of supplies from external sources—usually from one of the opposing nations involved in the conflict. The protracted popular war strategy emphasizes mobilization of the masses and requires considerable resources to build and maintain a counter state. The urban strategy requires significantly less support.

Supplies

2-72. Once the insurgent’s on‑hand supplies are exhausted, supplies must come from the populace or an external source. In most insurgencies, initial support comes from the populace (either voluntarily or coerced). Identifying types of supplies the insurgency needs and then discovering how the insurgent is obtaining these supplies are significant steps in the process of identifying insurgent supporters and insurgent bases. Medical supplies are often the most critical supply that the insurgency requires.

Weapons and Ammunition

2-73. External sources are often required to sustain specialized arms and equipment. Insurgents can obtain these weapons through legal or illegal purchases, or from foreign sources. Another common tactic is to capture weapons from government forces.

Money

2-74. Money is essential to an insurgency for the purchase of critical supplies, especially high‑tech weapons and ammunition or bomb making materials. Money is also essential for the payment of guerrillas and the bribery of corrupt officials. Money can be obtained through many sources and in today’s electronic world, it crosses all boundaries. While money is often shipped to insurgents just like other supplies, it may also be moved and held by local financial institutions. In some cases, insurgencies develop an “underground banking” system, sometimes known as hawala, which can be used to launder money. Just like supply lines, the money path must be discovered, tracked, and disrupted. Funding greatly influences an insurgency’s character and vulnerabilities. Local supporters or international front organizations may provide donations. Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled by insurgents, confiscation or taxation might be used, especially in cases when insurgencies provide their own essential services to the population. Another common source of funding is criminal activity, especially the illegal trade of drugs.

Supply Lines

2-75. In all cases, either the insurgents must go to their suppliers, or the suppliers must come to the insurgents. Discovering and tracking these supply lines can provide key information on insurgent forces and support. Although rarely overt, all insurgent organizations will have some system of supply lines, means of transportation, and storage facilities. Skillful counterinsurgents attempt to cut off the flow of supplies, especially weapons and ammunition. Often, a nation neighboring an insurgent AO is used as a depot.

INSURGENT BASES

2-76. In counterinsurgencies, there are two general types of insurgent bases: safe houses and guerrilla base camps. Insurgents will normally establish multiple safe houses of guerrilla camps based upon functioning groups or cells. Urban insurgents tend to use safe houses, while rural insurgents tend use guerrilla base camps. Additionally, training camps may be established. These training camps may be established within a safe house, however, they normally will be established either in a rural guerrilla base camp or outside the territory controlled by the existing government, often in a foreign country.

Safe Houses

2-77. Many legitimate and illegitimate organizations use safe houses. A safe house is typically occupied by a member of the auxiliary and temporarily used to hide insurgents. Normally a system of “safe houses” have been carefully selected. The occupant of the safe house has procedures to move insurgents along selected routes at the best times to avoid detection.

Guerrilla Base Camps

2-78. Like any other armed force, guerrillas have requirements for command and control, rest, resupply, refit, and training. The larger the guerrilla force and more active they are, the more they will need established bases, both semipermanent and temporary. Base camps must be relatively safe and secure in areas where insurgents can rest, eat, and plan. More sophisticated guerrilla base camps have command posts, training areas, communications facilities, medical stations, and sustainment centers. These base camps, however, are not the same as conventional bases. They are usually small in overall scope, spread out, and sometimes underground. Insurgents try to locate base camps within insurgent‑controlled areas where cover and concealment provide security against detection. In rural areas, base camps tend to be in remote areas characterized by rough, inaccessible terrain. In urban areas, base camps tend to be located in areas where the insurgent has popular support. Urban insurgents may rent houses for use as temporary base camps. Insurgents will normally avoid battling over their base camp. Once detected, they will move to an alternate location. Routes into a base camp will be constantly observed for security. Mines, booby traps, special‑purpose munitions, expedient devices, and ambushes are used as standard security enhancements. If surprised and cornered, they will vigorously defend themselves with a delaying action while evacuating key personnel and equipment.

Insurgent Training Camps

2-79. Insurgent training camps are established both in urban and rural environments. While some training is accomplished at urban safe houses or rural guerrilla base camps, most training is accomplished at locations focused on training. This may be a special urban safe house, a remote guerrilla base camp or an insurgent training center in another country.

PHASING AND TIMING

2-80. Insurgencies often progress through three phases in their efforts. While the use of these three phases is common in most writings concerning insurgencies, the titles used for these three phases vary considerably. However, what makes up each phase remains nearly identical.

Phase I—Latent and Incipient

2-81. The first phase of an insurgency tends to begin with the government having stronger forces than the insurgents do. As a result, insurgents often must concentrate on survival and building support. Insurgent efforts may include—

· Establishing and expanding the organization

· Spreading its ideology through information operations

· Starting or supporting antigovernment activity such as demonstrations and strikes

· Raising funds through illegal taxation and crime

· Organizing small, local guerrilla forces that conduct small‑scale intermittent operations

· Using terrorism and sabotage to intimidate uncooperative government officials and members of the population

Phase II—Guerrilla Warfare

2-82. The second phase of an insurgency starts when force correlations approach equilibrium and guerrilla warfare becomes the most important, pervasive activity. Insurgent efforts may include—

· Increased scale of guerrilla attacks; attempt to force government forces into the defense.

· Increased use of sabotage and terrorism.

· Intensified propaganda.

· Attempts to gain control of isolated geographic areas and develop bases for further operations.

· Government officials are being driven out of areas with strong insurgent support.

· Establishment of local shadow governments.

· Increased efforts to gain international recognition and support.

Phase III—War of Movement

2-83. The third phase of an insurgency normally begins when insurgents believe they have superior strength and their military forces attempt conventional operations to destroy the government’s military capability. Insurgent efforts may include—

· Combining guerrilla forces and training them to fight as conventional forces. Over time, these conventional forces form multiple echelons. These forces confront the counterinsurgents in conventional battle.

· Acquiring more powerful and sophisticated weapons through foreign assistance or capture.

· Obtaining support from external combat forces, such as special or conventional forces.

· Expanding areas of insurgent control and increasing political activity.

2-84. Not all insurgencies progress through all three phases, and linear progression through all three phases is certainly not a requirement for success. Insurgent success can occur in any phase. Also, insurgencies can revert to an earlier phase and resume development when favorable conditions return. Insurgent success can occur in any phase.

2-85. Movement from one phase to another phase does not end the operational and tactical activities of earlier phases; it incorporates them. Therefore, it is difficult to determine when an insurgency moves from one phase to another. In addition, a single insurgency may be in different phases in different parts of the country. Advanced insurgencies can rapidly shift, split, combine, or reorganize—they are dynamic and adaptive.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS

2-86. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. Although each insurgency organization is unique, there are often similarities among them and knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques they may employ against the government. Other considerations include the operational environment, level of success of the insurgency, and the length of time an insurgency has been operating. A counterinsurgent must learn about the insurgency and adapt to it based off its operational organizational patterns.

2-87. Insurgent organizational and operational patterns vary widely between one province or urban area and another. Different insurgent groups using different methods may form loose coalitions when it serves their interests. These groups may also fight among themselves. The result is more than just a “three‑block war”—it is a shifting, “mosaic war” that is difficult for counterinsurgents to envision as a whole. In such situations, an effective COIN strategy must be multifaceted and flexible. Insurgents gain ground by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere. Counterinsurgents lose ground by failing to maintain stability order everywhere. Insurgents normally begin substantially weaker than the established government. This sets the tone for how they operate and how they fight


Section IV—STRATEGIES

Even if modern insurgencies use more than one doctrinal model or theory for their strategy, aspects of these strategies and recognizable characteristics do exist. The six common insurgent strategies are urban, military‑focused, protracted popular war, identity‑focused, conspiratorial, and composite and coalition. At the tactical level, a counterinsurgent will deal usually only with the urban, military‑focused, and protracted popular war strategies. These insurgent strategies provide a common frame of reference for the counterinsurgent. The savvy counterinsurgent can identify if an insurgency is using one or a combination of the strategies. Knowing what strategy the insurgents are using facilitates the anticipation of insurgent courses of action (COAs).

URBAN STRATEGY

2-88. In the urban strategy, the insurgents attack government targets with the intention of causing government forces to overreact against the population. The insurgents want the government’s repressive measures to enrage the people so they will rise up, support the insurgency and overthrow the government. This strategy can be initiated without popular support. Its success relies almost exclusively on a spontaneous uprising sparked by rage at government oppression. However, an insurgency occurring in an urban area does not necessarily mean that it uses the urban strategy. On November 1, 1954, the National Liberation Front in Algeria used a form of the urban strategy when they launched a series of bombings and attacks, causing significant civilian casualties, in order to shock the French into negotiations. The urban strategy actions are often predictable and possess these characteristics—

· Insurgents often use terrorist attacks, which they hope are highly visible and produce high casualties. Their true intention may not necessarily be to cause fear or terror, but to provoke the government into overreaction.

· Insurgent propaganda tends to focus on government brutality, calling attention to specific harsh government actions such as massacres, torture of political prisoners, disappearances of individuals, and brutal responses to peaceful demonstrations.

· Insurgent political organization is minimal with no sustained effort to indoctrinate political cadre or the masses.

· Insurgents make little or no effort to subvert the government from within (however, infiltration of HN government and security forces still possible.

· Insurgents require only a small amount of popular support.

MILITARY‑FOCUSED STRATEGY

2-89. The military‑focused strategy believes that military action can create the conditions needed for success. Military‑focused insurgents often believe that a small group of guerrillas operating in an area where grievances exist can eventually gather enough support to achieve their aims. The success of this small group depends upon successful military action and popular uprising. The most iconic examples of military‑focused strategy are Che Guevara and Fidel Castro; both proposed attacks on military and government targets until they gathered the support necessary to seize power. Military‑focused strategy actions include—

· Attacks on Host Nation targets to gain popular support.

· Propaganda that incites people to join the insurgency and rise up against the government and that focuses on demonstrating the Host Nation Government’s weakness and illegitimacy.

· Little evidence of long‑term efforts at building a political base.

· Little effort to building the political wing or infiltrating legitimate organizations.

PROTRACTED POPULAR WAR STRATEGY

2-90. The protracted popular war strategy is based on Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted popular war. This strategy is broken down into three distinct phases—latent or incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement. Each phase builds upon the previous phase, and continues activities from the previous phases. The protracted popular war strategy has both a political wing and a military wing. This strategy requires a high level of organization and indoctrination, actions along multiple lines of effort, and leadership to direct the shifting of phases according to circumstances. In all the variations of this strategy, certain characteristics tend to stand out, such as—

· Continuous, long‑term efforts to build popular support, infiltrate legitimate government organizations, and establish and maintain a clandestine organization.

· Highly‑indoctrinated leadership, political cadre, and guerrilla fighters.

· Extensive, well‑organized, unarmed auxiliary.

· Leadership that is able to exert control over the insurgency.

· Ability to shift phases at the direction of its leadership; including return to previous phase if necessary.

· Attacks on infrastructure and attacks designed to wear down the government and counterinsurgents.

· Continuous operations along multiple lines of effort, although some phases will emphasize different lines of effort.

IDENTITY‑FOCUSED STRATEGY

2-91. The identity‑focused strategy mobilizes support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. In this strategy, legitimacy and popular support are tied to their identity and, often, no effort is made to garner popular support outside their identity. Rather, communities often join the insurgent movement as a whole, bringing with them their existing social or military hierarchy. External support is garnered from international elements of the same identity. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers have fought an insurgency against the government for decades in order to establish an ethnic Tamil state and, at times, have received support from India. Contemporary characteristics of the identity‑focused strategy include—

· Attacks on those who threaten the traditions and social structure of the identity.

· Little or no need to establish a shadow government; already established.

· Protects what it considers the interest of the identity.

· Willingness to use tactics of other strategies.

· Mass base easily aligns with insurgency objectives.

CONSPIRATORIAL STRATEGY

2-92. The conspiratorial strategy attempts to subvert the government from within and often involves a few leaders and a militant cadre. Although subversive activities may take place in other strategies, particularly in the protracted popular war or urban strategies, conspiratorial strategies often attempt to have its illegal political party become a legitimate political party, enter the government legitimately and then take control of the government. Insurgents using the conspiratorial strategy do not intend to integrate into the national government, but to overthrow the government. Once the insurgency succeeds in gaining legitimate political representation, the newly legitimized politicians, who may have been previously targeted by counterinsurgents, must be re‑evaluated to see if they are still legitimate targets. In the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik Party actively worked to break existing government, while being elected to serve in the administration. Distinguishing characteristics of this strategy include—

· Insurgents seeking meetings with HN government to discuss ceasefires.

· Attacks on infrastructure designed to wear down and reduce the credibility of government.

· Political cadre distancing itself from the insurgency by making public statements denouncing violence, yet the insurgent leadership still controls the cadre.

· A public breach between militant and political elements of the insurgency, although this is often a deception.

· Formation of new alliances, often with groups that seem to have little in common with the insurgency or its ideology apart from the desire for governmental change.

· An end or reduction in guerrilla activity with an increase in political activity.

· Intensive efforts to gain international moral and political support.

· Using sophisticated propaganda, aimed at specific target audiences.

· Insurgent political wing seeks recognition and entry into politics, including election to local, district, departmental, regional, or national offices.

COMPOSITE AND COALITION STRATEGY

2-93. The composite and coalition strategy applies when different insurgent groups using different strategies combine to form loose coalitions that serve the purposes of the different groups. However, the composite and coalition strategy is usually united in opposition to something, for example an occupier or specific grievance, rather than for a positive objective. Within a single AO, there may be multiple competing entities, each seeking to maximize its survivability and influence. Recently, Al—Qaeda in Iraq provides the best example of a composite and coalition strategy; they founded the Islamic State of Iraq and became an umbrella group for many other established insurgent groups. Contemporary actions of the composite and coalition strategy include—

· Unclear or vague objective.

· Multiple or disjointed strategies within a single area of operations.

· More likely to ally with criminal actors.

· Attacks on other members of the coalition.

SHIFTS BETWEEN STRATEGIES AND PHASES

2-94. Insurgencies often operate using different strategies, in different phases, in different geographical areas. These decisions are based on the operational environment and insurgent objectives. Most insurgencies eventually move to the protracted popular war or subversive strategy after another strategy proves unsuccessful.

2-95. Insurgencies can also shift both phases and strategy. Pressure from the counterinsurgent can force an insurgent to move laterally to a new strategy or return to an earlier phase (Figure 2‑6 ). For example, an insurgency in Phase I, Latent and Incipient, using an urban strategy, builds sufficient strength to progress to Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare. Once in Phase II, the insurgents may believe they are strong enough to initiate a series of attacks. Then, if counterinsurgents successfully drive out the insurgents, the insurgents will normally consolidate and reorganize elsewhere. However, this failure may force the insurgency back to Phase I in that area. Additionally, the insurgent leadership may transition from the urban strategy to a protracted popular war strategy. When the insurgent leaders believe they are ready, the insurgency will return to Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare.

2-96. Insurgencies are often vulnerable when they shift between strategy or phases. These shifts may be due to fractures within the insurgent leadership or setbacks. Shifts may also occur due to time, changes in external support, changes in leadership, or counterinsurgent action. These shifts are often rapid so counterinsurgents must be able to recognize and exploit them. Indicators of a shift in strategies may be:

· Changes in propaganda message content

· Uncharacteristic increase in communications

· Unexplained pauses or sudden increases in guerrilla attacks

· Shift of effort between urban and rural efforts

· Displacement of insurgents from one location to another

· Unanticipated statements of support from external actors for an insurgency

· Increased organization, indoctrination, and secure means of communications

· Increased efforts to infiltrate legitimate organizations such as trade unions, professional or business organizations, universities, and so on.

· New advocacy for rights of peasants, farmers, or other groups

· Change of in focus of attacks, such as the targeting of a specific sector





Figure 2‑6. Shifts between strategies and phases.


Section V—TACTICS

Insurgencies employ both violent and nonviolent tactics to achieve their objectives. Nonviolent tactics attempt to achieve political goals without the use of force. Insurgent violent tactics are often accompanied by a variety of nonviolent tactics. Used together, these tactics, along with supporting propaganda, can assist in recruiting and gathering popular support. Historically insurgencies have fielded dedicated personnel to foment nonviolent action such as strikes and protests to supplement violent action. Insurgents are by nature an asymmetric threat. Asymmetric Warfare is a conflict in which a weaker opponent uses unorthodox or surprise tactics to attack weak points of a stronger opponent, especially if the tactics include terrorism, guerrilla warfare, criminal activity, subversion, or propaganda. Violent tactics by insurgents can include terrorism, guerrilla warfare,sabotage, or conventional operations. Insurgents often use terrorism and guerrilla tactics to achieve their goals, because they do not have the capability to contest the government or counterinsurgency forces in conventional operations.

VIOLENT TACTICS

2-97. Violent insurgent tactics are normally characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent action. These tactics are often divided between terrorism and guerrilla warfare early in the insurgency. In Phase III of the insurgency, it is common to see more conventional operations. There are three general tactics available to insurgents that use violence—terrorism, guerrilla tactics, conventional tactics and criminal activity. The challenge is that at any given time the insurgent could use any of them. For clarity, the term ‘guerrilla’ applies to any insurgent forces performing any of these four types of violence.

2-98. Although violence can alienate the population when not linked to a vision of a better life or the violence is indiscriminant, the commitment to use violence is a potent insurgent weapon. Targets of violence can be anything insurgents deem to be obstructions to their cause. Host nation security forces, foreign forces, aid workers, members of the population who do not accept insurgent claims, and infrastructure are typical insurgent targets.

2-99. Normally, organized groups of insurgents using terrorism or guerrilla warfare use violent tactics. The differences between these two can become blurred, especially within an urban environment or where the government exerts strong control. Although potentially nonviolent, criminal activity provides a ready source of income for an insurgency and, for the purposes of this FM, has a violent nature. Violent tactics include, but are not limited to (for more see FM 3‑24):

· Ambushes.

· Assassination.

· Arson.

· Bombing and high explosives.

· Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

· Hijacking and skyjacking.

· Hostage taking.

· Indirect fire.

· Kidnapping.

· Raids or attacks on facilities.

· Sabotage.

· Seizure.

TERRORISM

2-100. A terrorist is an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result (DOD). Insurgents may use terrorism. Terrorist attacks employ violence primarily against noncombatants as a way to increase the population's vulnerability and decrease their perception of security. Insurgent terrorism techniques include assassination, arson, blackmail, bombings, hijacking, kidnapping, threats, murder, mutilation, and torture. The insurgent using terrorism often targets economic and political symbols to undermine the legitimacy of the government. Any overreaction by government forces or other authorities adds to the population's resentment toward the government and turns its support to the insurgency.

2-101. Insurgents using terrorism generally require fewer personnel than guerrilla warfare or conventional operations. Inherently, these activities have greater security and lower support requirements. Insurgents using terrorism often select targets for their political and psychological impact. Their attacks can be effective in generating popular support within one faction when used against a competing faction. They can also be effective in forcing government reaction that alters government policies to benefit insurgent objectives.

GUERRILLA TACTICS

2-102. Guerrilla tactics are typified by hit‑and‑run attacks by lightly armed, small groups. The guerrilla is the combat element of the insurgency. Guerrilla tactics emphasize ambushes, raids, snipers, rocket and mortar attacks, and the use of explosive devices. Guerrilla tactics may also include assassination, coercion, and kidnapping to achieve support or eliminate opposition.

Principles

2-103. The principles of guerrilla tactics as stated by Mao Zedong are still valid: “Enemy advances, we retreat. Enemy halts, we harass. Enemy tires, we attack. Enemy retreats, we pursue.”

2-104. Guerrilla operations are generally offensive, not defensive, and are often harassing in nature. Guerrillas seldom attempt to seize and defend physical objectives and, in general, avoid decisive engagement. Their overall aim is often to cause confusion, to destroy infrastructure or security forces, and to lower public morale. Guerrilla harassment attempts to keep government forces on the defensive and weaken the Host Nation, which can include destroying resources and disrupting lines of communication. One advantage of harassment is that it may create the perception that the guerrilla can strike anywhere and that the Host Nation cannot prevent it. Because of this, counterinsurgents the must not only win small battles, but also win the battle of public perception. In rural areas, guerrillas may seize a remote area or conduct raids and small‑scale attacks on remote targets and lines of communications.

Numerical Superiority

2-105. While government forces outnumber the guerrilla, the guerrilla seeks to attain local numerical superiority. If guerrillas can successfully concentrate against counterinsurgents, they can attain victory over small elements of government forces. Guerrillas often use simple techniques of speed, surprise, maneuver, and especially infiltration. Near the target area, small guerrilla elements will often mass in order to conduct a specific, larger‑scale operation. The baited ambush is a favorite guerrilla technique. Guerrillas often create incidents, such as arsons, bombings, and hoaxes, as the bait. These baited ambushes can attempt to lure small government forces of all types into a mechanical or manned ambush.

CONVENTIONAL TACTICS

2-106. Conventional operations are not always necessary for success; however, guerrillas may engage in conventional operations after an insurgency develops extensive popular and logistical support. When they feel the conditions are set, insurgents may generate a conventional military force that can directly confront HN security forces. These conventional operations may vary from a small regional operation to general conventional warfare. Large conventional operations are usually an attempt to obtain the strategic or operational objectives.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

2-107. Sustainment requirements, especially funding, often bring insurgents into relationships with organized crime or insurgents may turn to criminal activity themselves. Reaping windfall profits and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support makes illegal activity attractive to insurgents. Taxing a mass base usually yields low returns and alienates the population, especially in cases where the insurgency provides essential services to the population. In contrast, kidnapping or hostage taking, extortion, armed robbery, and trafficking (drug, human, black market goods, and so on)—four possible insurgent criminal activities—are very lucrative, although they also alienate the population. The activities of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) are a perfect example. The FARC often receives millions of US dollars from a single high‑profile kidnapping. Similarly, failed and failing states with rich natural resources like oil or poppies are particularly lucrative areas for criminal activity.

2-108. Devoting exceptional amounts of time and effort to fund‑raising requires insurgents to shortchange ideological or armed action. Indeed, the method of raising funds is often at the heart of internal debates within the insurgency. For example, the FARCs involvement in the drug trade has made it the richest self‑sustaining insurgent group in history; yet it continues to claim to pursue “Bolivarian” and “socialist” or “Marxist‑Leninist” ends. FARC activities have increasingly been labeled “narco‑terrorist” or, simply "criminal," by a variety of critics.

2-109. Many insurgencies have degenerated into criminality. This occurred as the primary movements disintegrated and the remaining elements were cast adrift. Such disintegration is desirable for the counterinsurgent. It replaces a dangerous, ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a less dangerous but more diverse body. This transition would mean the counterinsurgency would also transition to more of a law‑and‑order approach. Successful counterinsurgents must recognize that the ideal approach eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats.

NONVIOLENT TACTICS

2-110. Successful insurgents use nonviolent tactics in conjunction with violent tactics. Subversion and propaganda are the two most prevalent forms of nonviolent warfare. Although some subversive activities can bleed over to violent activities, for the purposes of this FM, subversion will emphasize the nonviolent activities that define the nonviolent nature of subversion. Nonviolent tactics include, but are not limited to (for more see FM 3‑24):

· Demonstrations

· Denial and Deception

· Hoaxes

· Infiltration

· Strikes

SUBVERSION

2-111. Subversion is action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime (DOD). In addition, Subversive activity is anyone lending aid, comfort, and moral support to individuals, groups, or organizations that advocate the overthrow of incumbent governments by force and violence (DOD). All willful acts that are intended to be detrimental to the best interests of the government that do not fall into the categories of treason, sedition, sabotage, or espionage are subversive activity.

2-112. Insurgents use various subversive techniques in their attempt to convince the populace to resist the government and COIN forces and support their insurgency. These techniques include demonstrations, boycotts, clandestine radio broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets. In addition, movement leaders organize or develop cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, and trade unions. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. Subversive activities often openly challenge, in an organized pattern and just short of violence, the control and legitimacy of the established government and COIN forces.

2-113. One of the most visual forms of subversion is civil unrest. The fomenting of riots, organizing of strikes, and staging of demonstrations can drain the power, presence, and capabilities of the government and conversely increase the power and prestige of the insurgency. Another means of subversion is infiltration of government organizations, political parties, labor unions, community groups, universities, and charitable organizations.

2-114. To increase public credibility, attract new supporters, generate revenue, and acquire other resources, insurgent groups may establish their own front groups. Front groups are organizations that purport to be independent, but are in fact created and controlled by the leaders of the insurgency. A historic example of a front group is the Sinn Fein. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) used Sinn Fein, their “political wing” made up of political cadre, to serve as the IRA’s respectable public face.

PROPAGANDA

2-115. Insurgent groups commonly use propaganda to increase their base of support or reduce support for COIN forces. The joint definition of propaganda is any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (JP 1‑02). In this case, the insurgents use propaganda to further their own ends.

2-116. The insurgent’s propaganda efforts use activities such as clandestine radio broadcasts, the Internet, newspapers, graffiti and pamphlets that openly challenge the control and legitimacy of the established government. Insurgents will search for any leverage they can use in their propaganda. This includes seeking support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. Additionally, insurgents often create new problems and reinforce existing problems they then can exploit. Insurgents will arrange for the “coincidental” presence of photographers or cameras where planned events occur. If the government is unwilling or unable to address these problems successfully, the insurgency can claim they will solve them. Common insurgent propaganda efforts include the following:

· Encouraging the HN populace or specific neutral parties to avoid supporting HN or other friendly government’s forces.

· Increasing insurgent will to resist by fanning hatreds, biases, and predispositions.

· Inciting riots or organizing rallies, which may include honoring “martyred” insurgents.

· Causing or exacerbating a dislocated civilian crises.

· Creating or fostering public distrust of the HN security forces.

· Undermining the support of specific HN local leaders or businessmen.

· Creating or intensifying general ethnic or religious unrest or friction.

· Supporting or revitalizing dissident or opposition organizations.

· Linking local groups with similar groups in neighboring countries or regions.

· Discrediting or ridiculing specific HN or counterinsurgent officials.

· Characterizing government leaders as puppets and tools of foreign COIN forces.

· Spreading hostile coverage of COIN personnel, especially counterinsurgent mistakes.

2-117. Effective counterinsurgents must counter insurgent propaganda. This can be accomplished by conducting information engagement (IE) to exploit inconsistencies in the insurgents’ propaganda and their excessive use of force or intimidation. Additionally, counterinsurgents must have a coherent and unified information engagement plan. This IE plan must be planned, prepared, and executed with input from all appropriate civil and military agencies, especially the HN.




Section VI—STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES

Understanding insurgents’ typical strengths and vulnerabilities allows counterinsurgents at the tactical level to work toward neutralizing or avoiding their capabilities and exploiting their weaknesses. The typical strengths and vulnerabilities of insurgents are explained below.

STRENGTHS

2-118. The recognized strengths of insurgent warfare provide a base to analyze the specific insurgent threat. No two insurgent forces are identical. Known strengths are applied against a specific situation the COIN force encounters, and are refined because of local analysis. Regardless, identified insurgent strengths must be reduced or circumvented. Table 2‑1 presents insurgent strengths and countermeasures for analysis during COIN operations.

Table 2‑1. Insurgent strengths and countermeasures.




VULNERABILITIES

2-119. The vulnerabilities of insurgents also provide a base for analysis. To gain the advantage over the insurgent and enhance effectiveness, these weaknesses must be targeted and exploited. Table 2‑2 displays insurgent vulnerabilities and considerations for analysis during COIN operations.




SUMMARY

The central struggle of the majority of insurgencies is to gain and maintain the support of the population. However, the five elements of each insurgency, the eight dynamics, the strategy, the tactics, and the specific strengths and vulnerabilities are each unique to an individual insurgent group. For the tactical leader, from the platoon to the brigade, it is imperative that they first identify and understand the insurgent group or groups that they are fighting, before determining potential insurgent COAs and friendly COAs.




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