How EU Laws are Made

How EU Laws are Made

Dr Lee Rotherham

© The Bruges Group 2010
Published in October 2010 by
The Bruges Group, 227 Linen Hall, 162-168 Regent Street, London W1B 5TB
www.brugesgroup.com

Bruges Group publications are not intended to represent a corporate view of European and
international developments. Contributions are chosen on the basis of their intellectual rigour
and their ability to open up new avenues for debate.The Author
Dr Lee Rotherham is a veteran from behind the stage scenery of European Union politics.
After researching for the “Westminster Group of Eight” Eurorebels, he advised three successive
Shadow Foreign Secretaries, a role part-based within the European Parliament. This expertise
led to his appointment as ‘Chief of Staff’ to the Rt Hon David Heathcoat-Amory MP, British
parliamentary delegate to the Convention on the Future of Europe, and a central role behind
delegates opposing the European Constitution and the drafters of the Minority Report. He has
also advised ministers and frontbenchers on a peculiarly wide array of fields.

A freelance media and political consultant, he has been closely involved in a number of
grassroots EU campaigning organisations over the years, most notably the Bruges Group,
CAFE, the TaxPayers’ Alliance, and as a columnist for the European Journal.
He has been extensively and internationally published on a broad range of subjects, perhaps
most notably as co-author of the two hit Bumper Books of Government Waste, which won an
innovation award from Washington DC’s Atlas Foundation.

An army reservist, he has served in Iraq and Afghanistan; has stood for the Conservative
primaries for the London Mayoral selection on a ticket of localism and abolishing waste; and
is a fluent French speaker.4
Table of Contents
Basic Terminology ................................................................................................................................................... 5
Legislative Process.................................................................................................................................................. 6
Roles and Power ................................................................................................................................................... 12
Parlimentary Dynamics...................................................................................................................................... 16
Decisions of the Council  ................................................................................................................................. 23
Trends and Tendencies  .................................................................................................................................... 265
HOW EU LAWS ARE MADE
EU governance takes place in a landscape of complex, half-hidden structures that in other
societies would suggest the ossified residue of centuries of struggle and compromise. This
paper offers a sketch of this landscape.
BASIC TERMINOLOGY
It is best to start, perhaps, with the most basic terms, such as those in the chapter title.
Having driven away the dull fog we can then turn to the analysis proper.
1.1 EC versus EU
Before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, in December 2009, the European Communities
(EC, formerly the EEC) and the EU had different voting rules. The Treaty of Maastricht added
the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs
(JHA) to the existing EC. Central decisions in the CFSP and JHA “pillars” required unanimity,
so that each member state had a veto, and the balance of power therefore rested with the
governments of the member states. In the EC, on the other hand, Qualified Majority Voting
(QMV) dominated. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the trend was for the CFSP and JHA to
be communitarised”: that is, for more decisions to become more subject to QMV. The EU
Constitution (in its new guise as the Treaty of Lisbon) took this process a major step further,
so that the EU and the EC are essentially the same.
1.2. “Laws”
What is often described as “EU law” — and what will be meant by that term in this chapter
— comes in a variety of shapes and forms.
Regulations have full legal force in all member states. They do not need to pass through
national parliaments to acquire this status.
Directives do require enactment by the governments of member states and come into force
only after their passage through a state’s parliament. Moreover, the exact wording bringing
directives into force is left to national governments. The enactment of Directives, however, is
subject to a strict schedule. Delays in passing these into national law, or drift from the intent
of the original source directive, leaves a government open to legal challenge.6
Decisions do not require approval by the parliaments of the member states, but are binding
on the entity or agency to which they are addressed.
Finally, there are Recommendations and Opinions.  These do not have the force of law,
though they might be referred to provide moral support for the legislative and legal actions
of others.
1.3 The ECJ
Another form of legal process also plays a key role in the development of European law. This
is the interpretation of laws by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has the power, for
example, to strike down national legislation that is not consistent with the treaties.
2. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Three key institutions affect the path of new legislation. They are the Commission, the
Parliament, and the Council. The relationship between them changes over time, and,
generally, each institution tries to increase, or at least maintain, its own role.
2.1 The Commission
The Commission views itself as the arbiter of the Union and the guardian of the European
project. The European Parliament (which has been steadily gaining powers along with a
directly elected membership) views itself as the sole Communities entity with a democratic
mandate. Meanwhile, the ministers or heads of government attending meetings of the Council
claim that it is they, as representatives of the governments of member states and responsible
to national parliaments, who have the true democratic mandate.
As a rule of thumb, the Commission alone has the power to propose legislation, and to draft
it. The European Parliament and the Council have the power to amend the Commission’s
proposals, and to accept or reject them.
Which institution has what power, however, is not a straightforward matter. The nature of
the legislation being proposed, and the basis of the Communities Treaty, will determine the
powers the institutions have over the adoption process.
The Commission’s first task is to define issues in which there is an EU interest to act. This
might be something that has appeared on the political radar, or it may be the result of 7
in-house observation. There must be a readily-identified legal basis for the Commission to
act. Fortunately for the Commission, however, the treaties contain three “rubber articles” (94,
95 and 308 Treaty Establishing the European Community in old parlance) that provide it with
a considerable amount of leeway. The Commission also has something of a track record in
interpreting treaty clauses loosely in order to initiate legislation in areas in which it sees an
interest. Perhaps the most famous instance of this was its move to bring in working time
legislation, which the UK had legally opted out of, through the health and safety clauses,
where the UK had no opt-out.
The Commission must also act consistently with the principle of subsidiarity, which says,
in basic terms, that the EU shouldn’t act where national or regional governments could do
the job as well. In practice, however, as former Commissioners have privately admitted the
Commission too often merely pays lip service to this principle.
The Commission’s first drafting role is to consult, in order to better identify the limits and
practicalities of the legislation, and to precisely frame the wording. Problems often arise at
this point. A poorly worded or vague text can create havoc.
An example is the longstanding debate over whether the pipes of church organs are covered
by legislation regarding industrial waste. The issue was effectively settled only when the
Commission, with a nod and a wink, allowed an exception to legal terminology which was
itself more binding. This approach, which some criticise as bending the rules, is an occasional
feature of the European process that can be either disconcerting or frustrating to observers,
but is described by supporters as ‘realpolitik’ or statesmanship where so many lobbies may
be involved. Nevertheless, since the terminology remains open to legal challenge by parties
before the European Court of Justice, there remains ultimately an element of ambiguity and
potential cost hazard (especially to business) from this process.
With a draft settled, the proposal will go forward under one of three procedures: co-decision;
assent; or consultation. The route taken depends on the legal base of the proposed
legislation, as set out by the treaties. When a measure could be justified under two articles,
the Commission has to choose which is the more appropriate.
2.2 Parliament and Council
Under Co-decision, a proposal goes first to the Parliament and then to the Council. If there
is a difference of minds on aspects of the proposal, a joint Conciliation Committee is formed
to try to agree a compromise. This agreement then goes back to the EP and to the Council
for a third reading for final adoption. Co-decision is today the main modus operandi, and is
styled the “ordinary legislative procedure” in the Lisbon Treaty.8
The  Assent Procedure follows a different line. Under it, the Council has to obtain the
Parliament’s assent before the legislative process is confirmed. The Parliament, however, has
only the power of veto. It has no legal power to amend the proposal.
The  Consultation Procedure gives the Parliament much weaker powers. Here, the
Commission passes its proposals to the Parliament, which produces an Opinion that is
forwarded to the Council. But the amendments contained in the Opinion have no legal force,
and the Council can ignore them or adopt them, in part or in whole, as it so chooses.
A form of Consultation Procedure operates with other two Communities bodies – the
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), and the Committee of the Regions. These
have no real powers of amendment, and so critics correspondingly see these institutions as
expensive talking shops.
In the Council phase, representatives from COREPER, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives’ discuss the proposals. Each national government has a pool of delegated
civil servants based in Brussels, whose task it is to attend such committee meetings.
The FCO has historically taken the lead within the UK delegation (also known as UKREP),
though other departments have over the years increased their voice. Furthermore, the
devolution of certain powers, in particular to Scotland, means that at Council level, discussion
is taken under a devolved lead. This is particularly the case in fisheries matters given the
decline of the English fleet relative to that of the United Kingdom as a whole.
COREPER is the main venue for the national bartering that takes place in specialist working
groups. When the civil servants can come to an agreement on the text, a measure becomes
“Ready for Adoption”. It is then listed as an “A list” agenda item on the next Council meetings,
where national ministers accept it without further debate.
A “B List” agenda item is one on which the civil servants cannot agree and that ministers
will discuss between themselves. If a ministerial meeting reaches agreement, the proposal is
accordingly amended, and the legislation becomes effective.
A proposal that is directly binding then becomes law as soon as it is published in the
Official Journal of the European Union. The OJ, containing information on all EU legislation,
is regularly and frequently published. This act of publication signals the end of the direct
Brussels process. The final text is published in all the official languages of the EU. Each
linguistic version usually carries the same legal weight as any other.
1
1 This incidentally sets it apart from internal communications, where the informal de facto
requirement is that one of the three working languages of the Community (English, French, and to
a much lesser extent, German) are used.9
2.3 “Comitology”
The role of committees in legislation is little known, even to some professional observers
of the EU. Committees are important, however, and they deserve more attention. The very
number of these working groups (they run into the hundreds) provide some hint as to their
importance, much of which is based upon their very positioning in the legislative process –
right at the very outset, well before MEPs begin their own committee reviews, and often with
issues resolved considerably before any ministerial input is provided.
Participants in these committees fall into two categories. The first is the traditional appointee
to the British-style ‘quango’, typically either a subject matter specialist such as an academic,
or someone nominated for having sat in similar committees in the past. The second form
of nominee is a government official, perhaps working in the civil service or a branch of
government touched by the work of the committee.
There are three types of management committee:
Advisory Committees  mostly cover aspects of the single market, and are made up of
national government representatives with a Commission official in the chair. The Commission
official puts forward a draft, and the committee provides an opinion. There is no legal
obligation for the Commission to act on the opinion, although it is considered bad form to
simply ignore it.
Legislative Committees are working groups that look into draft material on a massive
range of subjects. A Legislative Committee is made up of national delegates, and reaches its
decision by qualified majority voting (QMV).
This type of committee has strong powers. If it rejects or sits on a proposal, the Commission
has to go directly to the Council in order to revive it. After first asking for MEPs to assess
whether the proposal passed the ‘proportionality test’, the Council would follow this up with a
vote by QMV. Positive responses would authorise the Commission to continue, as also would
inaction by the Council following the initial challenge.
The third type of committee, Management Committees, are used particularly for handling
established but developing policies such as the CAP and the CFP, or where large budgets
are already allocated. Again, national representatives are consulted, and they give an opinion
by QMV. The European Parliament may have a role depending on the nature of the primary
legislation, which is potentially significant if the Commission is using this process to expand
its activities, and so requires Council approval.
Comitology, as it is known, remains very much part of the substrata for those involved in
monitoring the legislative process. While the number of these committees is surprisingly high, 10
it is worth noting that at any one time, scores of Committees remain on the books but do not
actually meet, because the Commission is not currently considering legislation in their area
of competence.
Committees may, however, be spurred into action by crises. A classic example of this is the
legislative spurt that has come from the Commission since 9/11. The Council had blocked
many of the proposals that have since emerged.
One reason for the lack of awareness of committees lies in their very nature. At the best of
times, the Commission is less than public in explaining its early drafting intentions. This can
be attributed to a variety of obvious reasons. Historically, a number of contentious items have
leaked to newspapers and caused damage to the integrationist cause have been from early
on in the process. Furthermore, it is not the habit of the civil servants themselves to publicise
their role (or non-role) in the procedure.
It may help to list some of these committees in order to provide a cross section of the areas
of competence each might face. Here are twenty historic examples drawn at random:
• Advisory Committee on protection against dumped imports
• Quota Administration Committee
• Committee on economic aid to the countries of central and eastern Europe and for the
coordination of aid to the candidate countries under the pre-accession strategy (Phare)
• Advisory Committee on the special system of assistance
to traditional ACP suppliers of bananas
• Standing Committee for the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to lifts
• Standing Committee on medicinal products for human use
• Advisory Committee on employment
• Advisory Committee on the implementation of the Community
action programme to combat social exclusion
• Committee for the implementation of the action programme to promote gender equality
• Regulatory Committee (possible joint meeting with management) in
the field of agriculture, subsection agrimonetary questions
• Advisory Committee on Transport11
• Advisory Committee on measures to be taken in the event of a crisis in the market
in the carriage of goods by road and for laying down the conditions under which the
non-resident carriers may operate national road haulage services within a nation state
• Committee on the reciprocal recognition of national boat masters’ certificates
for the carriage of goods and passengers by inland waterway
• Committee on the driving licence
• Committee for the adaptation to technical and scientific progress of
the Directive on the protection of the environment, and in particular
of the soil, when sewage slush is used in agriculture
• Committee on the Community action programme in the field of civil protection
• Banking Advisory Committee
• Insurance Committee
• Advisory Committee on the training of dental practitioners
• Committee on the movement of air or sea passengers’ baggage (principles)
Several points emerge from this random assortment. The first is the very mixed nature of the
legislation being covered, indicating to what extent laws ostensibly passed in Westminster,
and for which our national government claims credit, are actually sourced (and legally have
to be sourced) in Brussels.
Second, the “sexiness” of the committees varies massively. Some have a focused remit
with an extremely narrow impact. Others can be much more wide ranging, impacting upon
a number of business, social and governmental interests, with cost effects potentially in the
billions of pounds.
Third, it is worth noting again that all of this process is in the main decision taking by a
committee, chaired by a Brussels-based civil servant who is unelected, around whom
sit national civil servants, also unelected. So this part of the decision-making process is
somewhat different from that of the minister-inspired process of national governments.
John Redwood, who as a member of the Cabinet was occasionally required to attend Council
of Ministers’ meetings, recalled once encountering a reference to ongoing work being done
by one particular committee. Taking an interest in the agenda, he insisted on turning up for
the meeting as the national representative, in place of the civil servant. Those attending were
astonished a minister was both so interested and so presumptuous.
It makes sense to avoid the centralisation of an Escorial-style system. It also makes sense
to avoid the situation James Callaghan once found himself in, when he noted the absurdity 12
of Western European Prime Ministers gathered round a table for hours on end arguing over
where the mirror should go on a tractor. But by the same token, the system does lack a
degree of early ministerial awareness of the political agenda in Brussels. With that lack
comes a greater gap in accountability before parliament, and consequently, a higher degree
of alienation from the electorate.
3. ROLES AND POWERS
A full account of the EU legislative process would contain massively more detail than is
contained in the brief description above. It would, for example, say which majority triggers
what result down the chain. Rather than piling detail on detail, though, more is to be gained
by looking at the legislative process from alternative vantage points, and at the motivations
and drives of the various participants.
3.1 The Commission
The Commission, as already suggested, is very much in the driving seat. Technically, it has
three roles. First, it is the initiator of legislation. Second, it monitors the application of EU
law by the member states. In this second role, it is a kind of public prosecutor, and it has
on a number of occasions taken member-states to the European Court of Justice when it
perceives them to have transgressed EU law.
Third, when agreed policies fall within its management remit, it carries out those policies
through its agents and representatives. This includes its burgeoning foreign affairs entity,
since Lisbon has given actual legal form in the shape of the External Action Service. It also
includes representing the EU in areas of international trade. This explains why, for instance,
the President of the Commission attends G8 meetings.
But there remain many areas of contention over the respective powers of the Commission and
national governments. This was most patently observed in the crossover of responsibilities
at the Rio Earth summit, where national delegations and the Commission representatives did
not see eye-to-eye over primacy, resulting in a clash over delegation rights and access. Also,
at international conferences in areas covered in part of the Communities Treaties (Health, for
example), there have been arguments over whether the Commission or the member states
should take the lead role.
These arguments are likely to increase over time. A key pointer lay in the failed EU
Constitution. The UK government refused to acknowledge - despite apparently clear treaty 13
language - that the proposed EU Foreign Affairs supremo would have the authority to dictate
the UK role in international meetings on subjects that ministers have agreed (by unanimity)
were areas of common concern, even if specific policies have not yet been adopted (by QMV).
Whether that means that a British prime minister would have to make way for a delegate from
the Commission in a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, or read from a script
prepared by the Commission at a NATO meeting, remains a matter of dispute and controversy
given that this part of the text survived into the Lisbon Treaty. The ambiguity remains even
though the EU post officially came into existence in December 2009.
The workings of the Commission, however, are complicated by internal stresses and tensions.
There is, for example, the question of nationality. Incoming Commissioners are required
to swear an oath of neutrality. The intent, of course, is to prevent national loyalties from
subverting a Commissioner’s role as a neutral civil servant, without national allegiances and
immune to behind-the-scenes string-pulling by former colleagues in national governments. A
measure of the importance placed upon this in certain quarters lies in the challenge to British
Commissioners – for example, Kinnock, Mandelson and Patten  — that in taking the oath of
neutrality, they breached the oath of allegiance to the Crown that they made on being sworn
in as Privy Councillors.
The oath of neutrality, of course, is not a total protection. Individual Commissioners have
come under specific criticism. This tends to happen to the holders of high-profile portfolios,
where strong national interests clash with Commission or with majority Council positions,
and when the Commissioner is a national of the minority. When such a person has personal
advisers who share his nationality and is reported to have been in private contact with
his Prime Minister or President, suspicion is likely. Examples have included fisheries (the
Spanish), trade (Germany and later the UK), and Agriculture (the French). In 2009, the question
of the appointment of a French Commissioner to the portfolio overseeing the City of London
highlighted the issue again. Further, reports that the new EU Foreign Affairs supreme received
regularly briefings from the FCO were raised by the French as part of a challenge to her
impartiality in January 2010.
Personal factors are an additional complicating factor. Personal interactions, vanities,
and ambitions can enter decision-making. The issues may be trifling or it can be more
serious, threatening operational efficiency, as in the pre-Lisbon Treaty conflict between the
Commissioner for External Affairs and Xavier Solana’s former role as would-be EU Foreign
Minister.
A final element is the Commission’s role is as a motor of integration. It is in the Commission’s
interest to legislate and to expand. Its staff is typically chosen from the more integrationist
element of the European elite, so there are few in-built internal brakes. As guardian of the
treaties, it is predisposed against the surrender of the acquis communautaire (the Community’s 14
accumulated powers). As inheritor of the Treaty of Rome, it was set up under the principle of
“ever closer union”. The Commission, by its very nature, is subject to “competence creep”,
which sets it at odds with the Council, composed of national governments; and a European
Parliament, which, although its members by and large share the Commission’s zeal for
piecemeal integration, views itself, in the light of its perceived democratic credentials, as the
sole legitimate power among the EU institutions.
3.2 The Parliament
The functions of the European Parliament (EP) are clear-cut. The manner in which the political
tides tug and turn and affect the carrying out of those functions is not.
The EP has long argued and campaigned for more power, viewing itself as the sole EU body
with any real degree of democratic legitimacy. This legitimacy is challenged by the Council
of Ministers, is nudged by the representatives of the regions (on subsidiarity grounds), and,
while the Commission often supports a greater role for the European Parliament in a variety
of decision-making roles, this is often in tandem with those powers being taken further away
from national parliamentary control.
The EP’s first formal role is to consider legislation that comes to it as a draft from the
Commission. Its second role involves, along with the Council, surveillance of the operation of
the Community budget. It also monitors the Commission, though its powers are limited. For
instance, it confirms the nominees put forward for a new Commission. Famously, it refused to
ratify the appointment of an Italian Commissioner, Rocco Buttiglione, after he had indicated
his own support for traditional Catholic values on the family, which set him at odds with the
European Socialists over his interpretation of gay rights (notwithstanding his having made a
clear distinction between his personal views and his professional ones).
The European Parliament also has the power to dismiss the entire Commission in a vote
of no-confidence. This ‘nuclear option’ is rarely used. There are several reasons for this.
First, many MEPs are ‘pro-European’ and are mindful of the bad publicity for the European
institutions and for European integration as a whole that would follow such a step. Second,
critics might be prepared to sack individual Commissioners, but not to throw dirt on
Commissioners deemed to be blameless. Third, party politics comes into play, so that
MEPs from one party may be unwilling to condemn Commissioners from sister parties. An
example of this was the issue of British Conservative, Roger Helmer, being censured by the
leader of the EPP for attacking the EPP-affiliated head of the current Commission for alleged
improper business connections. Another example of the importance of party connections is
the collapse of the Santer Commission. It was occasioned by the actions of Hervé Fabre-15
Aubrespy, a French member of a small Euro-sceptic bloc without party chains stretching back
to the national capital, behind whom others subsequently swung.
The fall of the Santer Commission displayed a further complication inherent in the nuclear
option. In accordance with EU law, disgraced Commissioners were kept in role while a new
Commission was slowly formed.
Finally, national governments themselves have been known to lobby for the retention of
the Commission in the interests of stability. A classic case, again in the fall of the Santer
Commission, was the lobbying by Labour ministers of the Labour MEP leadership (particularly
Pauline Green) to keep the Commission in place, despite an increasing media furore.
The last element of the EP’s role comes in overall supervision. Parliamentary practise from
Westminster has been adopted to improve scrutiny. MEPs can now put down both written
and oral questions.
Although the practice of questions may be modelled on Westminster, the nature of responses
is very different. A House of Commons Parliamentary Question (PQ) is an art form in its own
right, asking in a convoluted and highly-circumscribed manner for a minister to provide a
comment or statistic relating to a set detail. Answers are often crisp, particularly when the
questions are difficult or the respondent is the Prime Minister. A Lords PQ tends to be a little
more generous, and can even be informative when the questioner is a policy expert on a
contentious area, such as Lord Avebury on overseas human rights; Lord Stoddard or Lord
Pearson on illegalities in EU actions; or Lord Tebbit on political correctness.
A European PQ (styled by some an EPQ) is a different beast. The question itself tends to
be argumentative and frequently long-winded, almost a press release in its own right. The
response can take months to come back, though the speed of the turnaround has increased
substantially over the last few years.
But at least there is a lengthy answer that provides data and a background to policy that
is often lacking in Whitehall responses. In any event, the potential importance of this
parliamentary tool have resulted in many leading news stories, giving it a prominence within
the system that may yet in the future lead to limitations on its use and the quality of responses
it yields.
The EP meets monthly in a plenary session to debate the decisions taken in committees the
rest of the time. Here, reports are voted upon that affect the legislation in passage. It is at this
point that party politics becomes most evident, though critics suggest that so much of what
happens in Plenary is stage managed between the big two political groups that real political
distinction and debate is impossible. These critics claim that so much is decided at meetings
of the permanent staff and key MEPs that the parliament is in reality a rubber stamp. 16
An example of how such compromises work is that of a British MEP who decided to put
forward a draft declaration for parliamentary agreement following harsh storms that had
caused damage in his county. The declaration simply recognised that the storms had hit his
patch hard as they passed over the United Kingdom. In itself, it was a meaningless gesture,
but it would provide a mechanism for a press release showing that he had his constituents’
interests at heart. This was fed ‘into the system’ for the next Plenary. The text later emerged
several days later, after meetings had taken place between staff members from various
delegations. Other British MEPs in the region had added their counties; Germans and Dutch
had included theirs; and the Irish staffers had replaced reference to the British Isles on the
grounds of nationalism. The final compromise text was reached without the MEP being asked
for his opinion.
4. PARLIAMENTARY DYNAMICS
The political dynamics of the parliament might be summarised as a tangled web of interests
and objectives. The most important of these are discussed below.
4.1. Bloc Power
The EP power structure is one of party blocs (or Groups) that are agglomerations of MEPs
elected on a national basis. The Groups represent the basic tenets of the national parties,
though there can be major differences in ideological opinion within a bloc. The PES, or
European Socialists, for example, is divided between old style socialists and quasi-Blairite
socialism-lite. The British Conservatives and some other allies used to be part of the EPP-ED
alliance, forming a Group, but retained their own whip.
2
This general set of circumstances creates a series of currents, dynamics, and repelling forces
within the Parliament.
2 This alliance was eventually broken, and a distinct new group formed, to fulfil a pledge to his party
by David Cameron. The pledge was controversial. On the one hand, some suggested that leaving
the EPP-ED alliance weakened the bargaining power of the Conservatives in the parliament and
that some of the new allies held extreme views. In response, supporters of the change pointed to
highly controversial partners in all Groups, and suggested that in a continental style of politics (as
opposed to the British Parliament’s bear pit approach), the style of business meant that the new
Group would still be needed to secure majorities and so would maintain its bargaining power.
Moreover, the Conservatives gained a distinct voice as an official grouping opposed to further
European integration, and with control over their own budgets and staff recruitment.17
(i) Group vs Group
Obviously, since each bloc has its own philosophy, there will be traditional political tensions.
These could be Capitalist vs Socialist, Green vs business, Marxist vs Socialist and so on.
A mechanism to settle these controversies comes in the form of the Conference of Presidents,
where the heads of Groups meet to plan out agendas and discuss controversies.
(ii) National Party vs National Party
Naturally, since they compete with each other for votes in elections to the Parliament, MEPs
will take every opportunity to attack MEPs from their own country who belong to other parties.
A complicating dynamic can also play out. The Groups consist of disparate elements, so
national delegations themselves will often be at variance with the policy formulated by the
Group’s rapporteur (the individual tasked with drafting the report that will be voted on), since
this latter may come from a foreign sister party whose policies differ. In turn, this may on rare
occasions leave the Group in the paradoxical situation of being supported by MEPs from a
given country in another Group, while opposed by MEPs from that same country within its
own ranks.
(iii) Groups vs Individuals
This dynamic comes about when MEPs in a Group target Commissioners from another party.
The majority of Commissioners are party people (sometimes in both senses of the expression)
who have been nominated by their heads of government. Leon Britton and Chris Patten, for
example, were targets for Labour MEPs. Neil Kinnock and Peter Mandelson provided political
point scoring opportunities for Conservative MEPs.
The same is true of the representatives of national governments. MEPs from opposition
parties take every opportunity to highlight failings by their country’s delegate in the Council
of Ministers, and can use the visit of Government leaders to the European Parliament as an
opportunity for party politicking. Dan Hannan’s celebrated attack on Gordon Brown became
an international YouTube phenomenon.
4.2 Agendas
Sometimes politicking goes beyond policy debate. In some areas, a form of consensus
arises which unites a large number of MEPs across Groups or parties, making bedfellows of
politicians from very different ideological backgrounds. There are two classic examples.18
(i) The Anti-Extremism Agenda
This is a subject on which critics claim that there is a knee-jerk reaction amongst the parties of
the Left and Centre Left. Essentially, a number of individuals and groups have been identified
as extremists, following allegations of racism.
These allegations may, or may not, be fair and accurate. In one case, the allegations may be
pursued at least in part by elements of the national media because the party in question is a
nationalist party that threatens the unity of the state (the case in point being the Vlaams Bloc,
now superseded by the Vlaams Belang). It may be deemed a populist threat, because it is
popular. Wider foreign reporting on a party may be based on preconceptions, as revealed
by the major change in the BBC’s analysis of Pim Fortuyn’s politics and personality after
his murder. The key point for this analysis is that a perception supported by national parties
opposed to the party in question is developed by national media, and that labelling then
appears on the political scene at Brussels.
An example of this appeared when Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party was invited into a
power-sharing national government, which led to calls for the Austrian Representation to
have all of its rights suspended as per the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Freedom Party had
been described by leading politicians in Brussels as xenophobic and racist, and a consensus
emerged on the Left that the Austrian (mainly Centre Right) coalition government should be
punished by isolation.
The basic objective of such a cross-group alliance is that parties that are neo-fascists
and racists should be isolated. However, this is not without democratic risk. An attempt
to blackball the politics of hate, despite good intent, may be interpreted by many ordinary
citizens as a move to suppress their own freedom of choice in a democracy. The claim also
arises that a ‘cosy consensus’ of establishment politicians is trying to suppress opponents
who will open up debate on issues that are important to many voters, complaining that
important issues have been swept under the carpet. There is also massive controversy over
who decides whether parties are extremist (that is to say, xenophobic) or radical (with a policy
agenda vastly different from their critics): by establishing a consensus lock, divergence is
seen as radicalism and extirpated, and only extremism is left for the disillusioned. Hence,
a cross-party alliance, rather than crushing extremism, can ultimately fan it by endorsing
censorship.
(ii) The Reformist Agenda
The fight against corruption is another issue that unites politicians across the divide. Here, the
unity is one not of political groups, but rather of ideals. Paul van Buitenen is an example. He
spoke out as a whistleblower against corruption in the system, and was subsequently elected
as an MEP. There have been others like him who have come out against fraud and waste, but 19
who believe that a form of European governance or system is needed. This puts them in the
same boat as people like former MEPs Chris Heaton-Harris and Jens-Peter Bonde, both of
whom are Eurosceptic and have been heavily engaged in the anti-corruption campaign.
The activities of these campaigners has been set against the apathy or indeed collusion of a
number of MEPs (especially in the leadership) who prefer to sweep things under the carpet.
An example was the fate of an attempt to get the whistleblower Marta Andreasen to testify
to a parliamentary committee. The Centre Right members and the EPP chair blocked her
appearance. When she herself subsequently became an MEP, further collusion occurred to
block her from being appointed vice-chair of the committee charged with scrutinising the
budget, despite such nominations traditionally being accepted.
4.3 Nationality
Aside from political beliefs, there is the accident of birthplace. A small number of MEPs
have represented countries other than their own. David Steel failed in his bid to become an
Italian MEP, but Daniel Cohn-Bendit (the student leader of the 1968 Paris riots) has been
both a German and a French Green, and Marta Andreasen provides an example in a British
context.
(i) National vs National
In some political debates, MEPs from different countries are ranged against each other, and
in the process unite political parties along national lines. This is where national identity or
national interest is deeply engrained, and demonstrates how far the EU is from being a demos
(or ‘people’), divided merely by ideology.
One example of this is he issue of post-World War II expulsions, where the Poles and Czechs
oppose German MEPs, accusing them of being influenced by the Former-Sudetanlander
lobby. Another example is the Common Fisheries Policy, which unites in their respective
interest groups the Spanish MEPs, the Portuguese, and to a lesser extent the French and the
British. Other examples of divides over the national interest include the old 8/7 voting splits
over bananas (subsidised small Caribbean ex-colony bendies, versus cheaper larger Central
American US-owned), and chocolate (animal fats versus vegetable fats).
(ii) National Philosophical
As well as clashing as national groups over national interests, MEPs may also unite on a
national basis over what one might call a psychological profile. This occurs where there is a
political consensus on a fundamental tenet as to how the world should operate, which goes
beyond the narrow national interest (though it might incorporate it).20
The CAP is an example. While clearly it is in the French national interest to preserve the
CAP on financial grounds, the subsidisation of agriculture is also part of the French political
psyche. It has been since the sixteenth century and the emergence of French manpower
as a cause of French strength in Europe; it was a prime concern after the bloodletting of
the Napoleonic Wars; it was an area of worry during the population decline relative to the
German states; it was recognised as an issue after the Franco-Prussian War, and with the
mechanisation of the farming industry; and hence it was uppermost in de Gaulle’s mind
when assessing the urbanisation of France and how to find subsidies to halt rural decline.
On the other hand, German farmers as a body also do well out of the CAP. But the German
government is historically more interested in trade in goods, and therefore is more likely to
range alongside the UK when reform is discussed (in instinct, at least, if not always in the
final negotiations).
Free trade is a similar issue. Certain countries are more liberal, while others have a more
Colbertist tradition. Protectionism is a part of the national psyche in traditional areas. The
Germans still view state support for their inefficient coal industry as essential, whereas in
the UK that philosophy was overturned in the 1980s. Other countries have seen their MEPs
unite over the state airline (Belgium, France, Italy), telecoms (France), postal services (the
Netherlands), or the steel industry (Spain, Italy, France, Germany), despite these industries
patently being hugely uncompetitive, demanding a market-bucking subsidy, and draining the
public purse.
Then there is the international situation. MEPs share and mirror national sentiments and
conceptions on their position in the world around them. Naturally, there may be ideological
complexities, particularly on the far left. But traditional national splits emerge among MEP
delegations from time to time; on the Atlantic alliance, for instance, which pits the more
Nordic or maritime North against the more central Europeans, famously branded together
as “Old Europe” by Donald Rumsfeld, with the post-Eastern Bloc remembering the Warsaw
Pact and uniting with the former. The Med Belt (Portugal, Spain and Italy) here are more party
orientated, a throwback to the Cold War. Similar polarisations appeared over Iraq, which
united the issues of the establishment of the EU as a global power, opposing US hegemony,
and the very different conceptions on whether the Europe Union should be a hard or a soft
power. National experiences in decolonisation have obviously carried in this latter debate.
Historically, the Israel debate has also provoked some strange alignments. So has the
question of whether Turkey should ever be admitted to the EU, uniting religious concerns with
those of immigration. Finally the principle of subsidiarity brings together British MEPs with
Germans mindful of the role of their länder.21
(iii) MEPs vs MPs
While they may come from the same political parties, MEPs and MPs sometimes operate
on different wavelengths. MEPs tend by their very background, interests and ambitions to
prefer EU-level politics than to address matters at the national level. They tend to be more
accepting of EU actions in which they are involved, leaving MPs the tail end of the process.
This can cause friction, particularly when there is a perception of a power grab that has been
taking place, or where MEPs are seen not to be following the national party line. Sometimes,
spokesmen in Brussels say things that are the complete opposite of national policy. Even
Liberal Democrats have quietly admitted that the federalism of some of their spokesmen goes
far beyond their own ambitions for integration.
4.4. Personal Dimension
Individualism can be a complicating factor in Brussels power play. MEPs have personal
opinions, and are not members of a government with collective responsibility or agents of a
civil service.
As a politician, an MEP’s primary concern (notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary)
is likely to be his reselection. At the close of play, every MEP knows he has five years in which
to make sufficient mark that his local associations reselect him or her, preferably with a very
high place on the regional list. Some MEPs focus near-exclusively on this agenda.
Other MEPs are more ambitious. While a number of MEPs are ex-MPs who have shifted to
Europe after losing their seats, many an MEP has used the position as a stepping stone in the
other direction. To achieve this calls for an element of fame, if not notoriety. Loudly pushing
an agenda is a means to an end.
As individuals, they are of course subject to rancour and personal animosity, sometimes
displayed to the point of comic extremity. But an MEP also will have personal opinions and
interests. As a rapporteur, guiding a report, his personal views will determine in part his
direction beyond party affiliation, even so far as to initiate change. A peripheral example is
Dr Charles Tannock’s activities highlighting the case of the Italian royal family under existing
human rights law, which allowed them (and others) back into their home country. The European
Parliament’s motor may in such an instance prove to be a single campaigning Member.
A politician’s opinions may even kill legislation stone dead. One MEP from the Europe des
Nations (EdN) group famously became rapporteur and deliberately sat on a text for years. He
never produced the document, so it never went to Plenary and thus never become law.22
4.5 Integration
The final set of power relations comes into play over the issue of integration and ever-closer
union.
(i) EP Supremacy
The manner by which the EP can attempt to push for a greater role in the legislative process
as an overseer to the Commission, and how it tries to set itself up as a legislative superior to
the Council of Ministers, or even move against minorities within the Council of Ministers, has
already been noted. This is through the process of ‘gold-plating’ legislation, that is to say,
adding complexities to draft legislation that expand the remit and add to the costs.
It is a misconception that gold-plating only happens when national civil servants get involved
in legislation. It is certainly true that this happens. Civil servants take opportunities to tack onto
European-sourced legislation elements that their department has sought to set in law, but has
not had the parliamentary time or the ministerial support to pass the necessary national law.
Bolting such measures on to EU legislation also makes it easier to either claim the credit for
whatever new agency has been created, or to blame the EU if it all goes wrong.
In fact, gold-plating first happens in the European Parliament. Amendments to draft legislation
obviously alter the text. They can alter the scope, the impact, and the cost. Just as with
debate in the Council, it is a perfect opportunity for pork barrelling, for grandstanding, and for
doing your constituents’ competitors in other countries out of business, whether they build
vans, make outboard motors, produce Feta cheese, create chocolate, sell artwork, or work
in the Square Mile.
(ii) The Eurosceptic Angle
The final dimension to address is that of the MEPs’ opinion on integration. This is not uniform
across the continent. Some political parties are more in favour of integration than others.
Some go with the flow. Others are hugely hostile, and organise themselves in small antiintegrationist Groups.
The main example of such cross-Group activity has been SOS Democracy. Realising that
not all MEPs are prepared to sit in the same Group because of domestic or ideological
differences, and given that some MEPs are more Euro-critical than their party colleagues, an
‘intergroup’ was formed which provided a forum for Euro-sceptic MEPs from all parties and
Groups to meet in a ‘rainbow alliance’ (excluding the Far Right).
3
 SOS Democracy acts as
a clearing-house for information sharing, and a mechanism to mobilise MEPs on particular
3 “Intergroups” may be formal or informal: there is a high threshold.23
cross-party campaigns. A smaller version, the Democracy Forum operated during the
Convention on the Future of Europe.
Often, politicians, journalists and commentators consider European legislation from the
viewpoint of the European Centre Right and the Centre Left. But the Euro-sceptic versus
Integrationist angle is always there as well, questioning whether Brussels should be passing
the legislation at all, whatever its impact on social conditions or the marketplace.
5. DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL
After its passage through the European Parliament, legislation goes to the national ministries.
Since Council meetings have historically been held behind closed doors, the debates and
arguments that betray the shifting alliances operating within are far from transparent.
It is necessary to again underline the distinction between what is being argued about (the
B Points), and that which the civil servants have already settled between themselves (the A
Points).
Another example offered by John Redwood from his time in Cabinet and attendance at these
meetings is illuminating. He recalls how the all-male provisions of Mount Athos, a monastery,
were set to be outlawed by a draft directive against sex discrimination. The Greek Minister
was isolated. However, Redwood offered his support by saying that he didn’t himself wish to
live in an all-male monastery, but thought it wrong of the EU to ban them. This helped mobilize
the support needed to grant an Athos exemption. Thereafter he could always say to the Greek
Minister when he needed help, “Remember Mount Athos”.
5.1 National Inputs
5.1.1 Media
As already noted, the Fourth Estate plays a massive role in the legislative process. On
numerous occasions, the British Government has been stung into action by negative
reporting of proposals under discussion. A veto or a stronger negotiating position has been
forced even though civil servants would otherwise have been able to settle – even though in
a way that would, from a Euro-sceptic position, have been less satisfactory. From the vantage
point of political opposition, such an event constitutes a victory.
An example was the massive outcry in the Express, Mail, Sun, Telegraph and other papers
at the time the Convention on the Future of Europe was about to finalise its draft. The son 24
of an extremely senior official travelled over to Brussels to meet his father, bringing the
latest newspapers with him. The official was reportedly shocked by this massive backlash
against the proposals, which somehow had not been included in the Convention’s own press
clippings. It certainly fed into the system, and seems to have alerted some people to the crisis
that was set to hit the Constitution, even if the lessons were not learned in time to avoid the
shocks that followed at the ballot box.
5.1.2 National parliaments
National parliaments, on the other hand, play only a small role. Their input is minor. Their
power is negligible. They have committees dedicated to monitoring legislation, where material
goes through practically on the nod.
Owen Paterson MP once recalled how as a member he had turned to address a colleague,
turned round again, and in the meantime a piece of legislation he had wanted to object to had
already gone through along with three or four others.
But even if MPs objected (and with a government majority, that is unlikely), the outcome would
merely be that the measure was discussed on the floor of the House, where a Government
majority typically reigns. MPs would be debating material which had already been agreed in
international negotiations, and which the Government was obliged to get through the House.
Under the Ponsonby Convention, if the Commons voted down such a measure, it would still
become law, but the Government would fall. Few government MPs are likely to back such a
vote.
There are also those elements of EU law that come into force notwithstanding the position of
Parliament. Typically, these are witnessed through the passage of the Statutory Instrument, a
shady type of administrative legislation that is increasingly used and that deserves far greater
scrutiny.
There were attempts in the Convention on the Future of Europe to redress the balance, but
these were watered down. An attempt to introduce a Red Card procedure, or veto by a
national parliament, was blocked. In its place, a Yellow Card/Orange Card hybrid solution
was offered. A Yellow Card is created when one third of national parliamentary chambers
unite in opposition to a measure. This power they already had in any event, and the fact
that such a coming-together would be extraordinarily difficult, plus the fact that there is no
requirement for the Commission to do anything in response, makes it a weak substitute.
An Orange Card would be triggered if a majority of national parliaments carried on with
the action. Given that this would mean a majority of Governments in the Council would be 25
opposing the Commission’s activity already, it is hard to envisage the circumstances where
that would come about.
National Parliaments could in any event do more individually. Some of the Nordic countries
regularly append a ‘scrutiny reservation’, meaning that laws would only come into force if
consented to by parliament. Clearly, governments dislike this form of restriction, so this is not
as widely used as would be useful for democratic purposes.
A final complication here comes in the form of devolved or federal governments, where
regional representatives (in the UK’s case, MSPs in particular) and their committees have an
end-process and monitoring role.
5.1.3 Bit parts
Two of the institutions that drip feed into the evolution of law have already been mentioned.
The Committee of the Regions and the European Social Committee both provide a caucus
for interested parties to supply opinion and input, which may or may not be accepted. But
there are other official EU institutions whose publications may indirectly be taken up by
legislators as sources for proposals, or whose experts may be drafted to provide input. These
are the Community Agencies, set up as arms of policy enablement, such as the European
Environment Agency, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, the
European Food Safety Authority, the European Defence Agency, or the European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (now called the Fundamental Rights Agency). Like the
European Central Bank, these are elements of EU policy in action whose activity and research
indirectly feeds back into the legislative programme. Their powers and influence are likely to
increase over time. EUROPOL is a case in point.
Three other agencies within the European system can impact more directly. The first, and
most important, is the European Court of Justice. Books could be written – and are written
— on how decisions made by the judges of the ECJ have modified policy by interpreting law,
or equally have circumvented attempts by the Commission to make exceptions by rigorously
upholding it. A number of Bruges Group papers cover examples in depth.
4
 The key is that
there is a permanent tension between the Council of the Ministers and the Commission
on the one hand, and the ECJ on the other, in drafting legislation that means what it says
so that future cases do not lead to surprises. Critics sometimes accuse certain supporters
of integration of using the ECJ’s decision-making process to push integration further than
ministers have agreed.
4 The reader is invited to dip into past publications on www.brugesgroup.com26
5.1.4 Sharks and Dolphins
Not all players in the EU actually belong to the institutions of the EU. A number of active
groups impact directly and indirectly upon the process. Regions, for instance, are increasingly
setting up offices to lobby in Brussels, bypassing their national representation. Then there
is the influence wielded by NGOs, lobbying for particular causes and campaigns. They are
increasingly being accepted into the mainstream as negotiating partners in the early drafting
process. The Convention on the Future of Europe co-opted a number of NGOs into a parallel
process, though it was subsequently and embarrassingly discovered that a number of them
were financially supported by the Commission, and so looked like an instance of “Brussels
talking to Brussels”.
Then there are the trade organisations, representing for instance Japanese car manufacturers
or British beer or small businesses or the club of mega-corporations. Other interested
companies hire professional lobbyists to do their lobbying for them. Occasionally, academics
might be brought in to discuss and debate policy developments. The contentious Corpus
Juris proposals for a European Public Prosecutor were first floated at one such conference.
They provide the Commission drafters with a form of authoritative support, a moral casus
legisferandi.
6. TRENDS AND TENDENCIES
This paper has flown at some speed over the steel and glass structures of Brussels, providing
a brief overview of the powers at play and how they interrelate. What conclusions might be
drawn?
One is that the balance of legislative power has shifted away from the Council and into the
hands of the Commission and the European Parliament and will continue to do so. Both
of these institutions support integration, so it is likely that the process of integration will
accelerate. An important supporting element in this acceleration is the Passerelle clause,
which allows powers to shift to Brussels without formal ratification by member states, or (in
most cases at least) any referenda.
The bit players in the system – the academics, NGOs, youth parties, and so on – will play an
increased and more visible part. They will be seen as indispensable motivation for legislation,
particularly if subsidiarity is ever properly revisited. As each will argue for a law in its own area
of interest, they are collectively an integrationist factor.
The Commission will expand its competences almost by default, as various opt-outs slip
away, and ministers decide to carry out joint activities in declared areas, with designated 27
Communities representatives assuming responsibility. After each crisis, the Commission will
propose new actions, which, in a knee-jerk environment governments will accept and the
media will decline to oppose. The Council will find it impossible to halt this drain of power,
while the veto, where it remains will be criticised as an anachronism, and ministers and
especially civil servants will feel less and less confident in applying it – rather like the British
UN veto.
An illustration of this kind of voluntary abdication of power is the Hague Preferences, which
gives the UK and Ireland a right to claim a larger share of fish quota when stocks are low.
But Whitehall’s diplomats have historically declined to use it fully, on the grounds that its use
would arouse hostility among other fishing countries.
This will, however, lead to an extended period of tension as holders of new EU posts attempt
to exercise their new powers and members of national governments discover what their
predecessors signed away. It will not be a calm and orderly transfer, and it will raise questions
in some capitals as to how the balance might be redressed.
In the meantime, whistleblowers are a wild card. There will be many more Bernard Connollys,
and their revelations will unsettle all three of the main institutions, and provide brief
opportunities for critics of integration to challenge the agenda. The inevitable failure to carry
out meaningful reform will, however, lead to the growth of either unconventional or extremist
parties in countries which have a cross-party consensus on Europe-level policies such as
immigration and taxation, and where voters are looking for choice.
In an attempt to address this, EU leaders will carry on with the Convention mechanism,
using draftees from national parliaments, institutions, NGOs, youth groups, unions, and big
businesses, to try to provide legitimacy and a cloak of ‘consensus’ to further changes in the
EU structure. Having failed to identify the previous flaws, however, these hearings will still
be run by an inner core in their respective Praesidia, and will not provide the sense of public
ownership that the elite seeks.
Finally, the European lawmakers will continue to cut legal corners. Measures like the
Lisbon Agenda will be proposed and passed to look good in the papers, but such cases of
grandstanding will disappoint when they achieve nothing of practicable value, or worse, when
they are acted upon as a basis for doing something completely different.
John Redwood, one of the more open of former ministers about their time in Brussels
meetings, gives us an example already ten years in the past;
“I also remember an occasion when the Presidency decided they
wanted a Council for Retail Ministers. As the UK fortunately does not
have such a thing, I was asked to do it as well in my Single Market 28
Ministerial capacity. The aim was to get us to agree to an apparently
harmless declaration that shopping was a good thing and we should
have more of it. The problem with such apparently harmless activities
to keep Ministers for Shops amused, is that as soon as the EU starts
agreeing anything, however harmless, it starts to create a competence
– then who knows where you are going to end up?”
The answer to that, of course, is openly admitted if you ask the right people: an ever-greater
footprint for the developing United States of Europe.THE BRUGES GROUP
The Bruges Group is an independent all–party think tank. Set up in February 1989, its aim was to promote the idea of
a less centralised European structure than that emerging in Brussels. Its inspiration was Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges
speech in September 1988, in which she remarked that “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state
in Britain, only to see them re–imposed at a European level…”. The Bruges Group has had a major effect on public
opinion and forged links with Members of Parliament as well as with similarly minded groups in other countries.
The Bruges Group spearheads the intellectual battle against the notion of “ever–closer Union” in
Europe. Through its ground–breaking publications and wide–ranging discussions it will continue its fight
against further integration and, above all, against British involvement in a single European state.
WHO WE ARE
Honorary President: The Rt. Hon
the Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven,
LG OM FRS
Vice-President: The Rt. Hon the
Lord Lamont of Lerwick
Chairman: Barry Legg
Director: Robert Oulds MA
Head of Research: Dr Helen
Szamuely
Washington D.C. Representative:
John O’Sullivan, CBE
Founder Chairman:
Lord Harris of High Cross
Former Chairmen:
Dr Brian Hindley, Dr Martin Holmes &
Professor Kenneth Minogue
Academic Advisory Council:
Professor Tim Congdon
Professor Kenneth Minogue
Professor Christie Davies
Professor Norman Stone
Dr Richard Howarth
Professor Patrick Minford
Ruth Lea
Andrew Roberts
Martin Howe, QC
John O’Sullivan, CBE
Sponsors and Patrons:
E P Gardner
Dryden Gilling-Smith
Lord Kalms
David Caldow
Andrew Cook
Lord Howard
Brian Kingham
Lord Pearson of Rannoch
Eddie Addison
Ian Butler
Thomas Griffin
Lord Young of Graffham
Michael Fisher
Oliver Marriott
Hon. Sir Rocco Forte
Graham Hale
W J Edwards
Michael Freeman
Richard E.L. Smith
BRUGES GROUP MEETINGS
The Bruges Group holds regular high–profile public meetings, seminars, debates and conferences. These enable
influential speakers to contribute to the European debate. Speakers are selected purely by the contribution they can
make to enhance the debate.
For further information about the Bruges Group, to attend our meetings, or join and receive our publications, please see
the membership form at the end of this paper. Alternatively, you can visit our website www.brugesgroup.com or contact
us at info@brugesgroup.com.
Contact us
For more information about the Bruges Group please contact:
Robert Oulds, Director
The Bruges Group, 227 Linen Hall, 162-168 Regent Street, London W1B 5TB
Tel: +44 (0)20 7287 4414
Email: info@brugesgroup.com