LeRoy A. Stone, Ph.D., ABPP
Harpers Ferry, West Virginia
Recently, a rather frightening idea was raised which suggested that spies (at least those of U.S. citizenship who intend to aid enemies of their country) can be best understood simply as merely being some kind of ‘white-collar’ criminal (Stone, 1989). Most white-collar criminality seemingly is motivated based on simple greed. There seems to be no shortage of individuals in the general population who are not above engaging in behaviors that are illegal but very profitable. For those individuals, the decision to behave illegally for profit purposes is heavily based upon perceived risk for such being seen as low. Most white-collar criminality seems to be associated with perceptions of low risk for this class of crime. According to a description made by Allen and Polmar (1988, p. 3), "Spying has become profitable part-time work for faceless, unglamorous people who, in their routine jobs, have access to their nation’s secrets."
Although governmental counterintelligence authorities continue to search for a spy profile, none seems to emerge, except for the fact that most (but not all) tend to be males and this is about the only characteristic which reliably seems to be seen. As was pointed out in Stone (1989), any kind of systematic study of spies seems to be one which has not been very much formally addressed in the professional and scientific psychological literature. This seems a bit remarkable as the crime of espionage, defined as treason, is given special notice in the U.S. Constitution as a very serious crime (Article III, Section 3); in fact, it is the only specific crime form except for impeachment, mentioned in that portion of the Constitution which defines the judicial power of the United States. In the last two sentences of Stone’s (1989, p. 221) closing paragraph, his argument stated that: "Psychologically speaking, if espionage is in fact nothing more than occupationally-opportunistic white-collar type crime, then one would expect to learn of a growing number of those involved (and hopefully caught) in acts of spying. Unfortunately, based upon what one hears, reads and sees in the news media, in the last couple of years, such a growing trend is quite evident." About four years ago, President Reagan (1985) in a radio speech stated that "Some of you may be wondering if the large number of spy arrests in recent weeks means that we’re looking harder or whether there are more spies to find. Well, I think the answer to both questions is yes." If white-collar criminality has been the motivational basis for these spies who have been apprehended in the past few years, is there evidence to support an argument that they may have perceived a low risk for being eventually caught and punished for their illegal activities? One can easily argue that there exists sufficient evidence. Based upon a study of 54 cases of traitorous espionage, Jepson (1987) concluded that the majority clearly rationalized that their criminal behavior would never be detected. Financially motivated individuals who desire to engage in espionage certainly have this kind of impression or else why would they ever start.
The ‘popular press’ (including radio and television) frequently put forth the general idea that there are many more spies operating than are indicated by the numbers being detected and caught. For example, Polgar (1986, p.16), a popular writer with extensive intelligence community background, has commented that: "Known spies are only the tip of the iceberg. No one can say how many spies remain concealed and continue activities against U.S. national security interests." This same "tip of the iceberg" analogy is also used in the same descriptive fashion by the editors of the Security Awareness Bulletin published by the Defense Investigative Service/Defense Security Institute (1986, p. 3).
Another part of perceived risk has to do with what are seen as the most likely penalties if one is ever caught, tried and punished. What kinds of impressions does the general public (and more particularly, potential espionage agents) have regarding punishment for being caught in the act(s) of espionage? In our open society what is generally known about such a subject? Information gleaned from the popular press seems to be rather clearly suggest that, in recent years, some individuals (U.S. citizens) caught in traitorous espionage seem not to receive severe punishment and sometimes appear not to be punished at all (except for the negative publicity associated with having been apprehended and accused). Minimal or even no punishment at all for apprehended traitors seems to have almost been the modal consequence during the 1960’s and 1970’s decades. What information supports the just made statement? A recent book (Kessler, 1988) describes in detail, information which document pertinent life histories of a fairly large group of U.S. citizen spies, who have been caught. A sizable number of whom received very light punishment, and in fact, many seem to have escaped punishment entirely.
Most of those who have been caught spying were associated in one form or another with the U.S. Department of Defense. Allen and Polmar (1989, p. 14) suggest that "within the last five years, almost 60 service members or civilian employees of the Department of Defense have been ferreted out as spies or violators of serious security regulations" and that many were associated in particular with the U.S. Air Force. Allen and Polmar partially base some of their information on the recent book by Crawford (1988) which examines 23 espionage cases which involved 22 Air Force members and one civilian employee. Actually this book was originally given wide publicity when it was reviewed and summarized in an earlier Air Force Times article (see Givans, 1988). According to Crawford, the seen primary motivator to commit espionage was money. Crawford also found that the range of punishment for having been caught as an agent of espionage was quite varied. Seemingly, some of those caught received only an administrative discharge from the service and a couple individuals seem to have received no punishment at all (except for the embarrassment of having been caught). Very recently, the Department of Defense Security Institute (1989) published a listing of summaries of 84 recent espionage cases (from 1975 to 1989), all based upon public media and/or unclassified sources of information.
I ordered (from least to most) the 23 individuals (named and described by Crawford) according to the severity of punishment they received. For one individual there is some quite definite mystery. This individual’s real name has not been released (Crawford identifies this individual with the pseudonym of Wesson) nor is the disposition of the case known. [Since most information pertaining to this individual has purposely not been released, I believe it fairly safe to conclude that it would be most difficult to ascertain whether this individual was leniently or severely punished in any fashion for his alleged espionage behavior. The writer of this paper, however, strongly suspects that Wesson most likely received lenient or possibly no punishment at all. This suspicion is based on the fact that in other cases where the government has identified an alleged spy with pseudonyms, this is usually done in association with little or no incarceration sentences being given. Actually, several of these studied 23 spies rather clearly never received any formal punishment at all. A few were never prosecuted or were granted immunity. A couple of the individuals received only administrative discharges from the Air Force. A couple more were discharged/retired for psychiatric reasons. Only four were actually given sentences that ranged from 20 years to life. The median sentence was a bit less than three years; the first and third quartile sentences, respectively, were ‘administrative discharge’ and a 30-year sentence (but with only 12 years actually served and then he was traded to East Germany in a spy swap arrangement). The individual associated with the third quartile sentence position is of a somewhat questionable origin. American authorities have continued to maintain that no native-born U.S. citizen has ever been traded in a spy exchange; such a claim seems to suggest that this particular individual (A1C Robert Glenn Thompson) may originally have been a trained spy and of foreign birth - a "legend" in espionage parlance.
The kinds of impressions, regarding punishment/sentencing, one can glean from Crawford’s book, can be somewhat seen in other prepared counterintelligence studies that have surveyed the lives of spies who have been caught. Jepson (1987) studied the nonclassified, open sources of information pertaining to the lives and spy careers of "54 individuals [since World War II] who have been involved in espionage or attempted espionage dealing with classified defense information [p. iii]." The Crawford book data in particular most certainly suggest not-overly severe levels of punishment, in general, given to agents of espionage who have had Air Force associations and involvements.
This coupled with a general (and most likely very valid) understanding that of the total number of spies operating, very few ever get caught, seems to provide a most likely basis for an individual, not above committing white-collar type crime, starting on the road to commit espionage. Perhaps at one time, the general population (including those motivated to commit white-collar type crime) did believe that caught and convicted spies would quite likely receive very long, bonafide life sentences and perhaps even death sentences. However, not since the executions of the Rosenbergs in 1953 has there been any person executed in this country for espionage/treason. In fact, since there seems to remain a good deal of doubt and controversy regarding the real guilt of the Rosenbergs, it would be difficult today, based on prevailing sentiment, to sentence a convicted spy to death. Rather interestingly, "the Rosenbergs were charged with conspiracy to spy, rather than spying itself, the identity of who passed what to the Russians was irrelevant to the charge and the proof of the charge at the trial. It was the overall plan to spy and transfer secrets, the conspiracy to do so - in legal terms - that the Rosenbergs were charged with [Sharlitt, 1989, p. 11]."
This coupled with a general (and most likely very valid) understanding that of the total number of spies operating, very few ever get caught, seems to provide a most likely basis for an individual, not above committing white-collar type crime, starting on the road to commit espionage. Perhaps at one time, the general population (including those motivated to commit white-collar type crime) did believe that caught and convicted spies would quite likely receive very long, bonafide life sentences and perhaps even death sentences. However, not since the executions of the Rosenbergs in 1953 has there been any person executed in this country for espionage/treason. In fact, since there seems to remain a good deal of doubt and controversy regarding the real guilt of the Rosenbergs, it would be difficult today, based on prevailing sentiment, to sentence a convicted spy to death. Rather interestingly, "the Rosenbergs were charged with conspiracy to spy, rather than spying itself, the identity of who passed what to the Russians was irrelevant to the charge and the proof of the charge at the trial. It was the overall plan to spy and transfer secrets, the conspiracy to do so - in legal terms - that the Rosenbergs were charged with [Sharlitt, 1989, p. 11]."
White-collar criminality seems to be more prevalent when perceived risk, for engaging in whatever is the illegal activity, is seen as low. A perceived low-risk and perceived high-gain kind of potential arrangement is most likely the kind of perception that an about-to-be-spy has regarding the prospect of active involvement in espionage. Undoubtedly, there are many more additional idiosyncratic motivations for starting on the espionage road such as thrill seeking, anger, or revenge, family and friendship ties, etc. However, in light of most of the available open-source information today, desire for financial gain clearly is the most potent of all; which is consistent with the model for supposing that those U.S. citizens who more recently have turned to espionage are nothing more or less than white-collar criminals who are (or have been) involved in serious, security-secrets, theft behavior. As Allen and Polmar (1988, p. 49) have stated, " . . trusted Americans . . are volunteering to spy not because they hate their country but because they want to earn some extra pieces of silver."
It is easy to contemplate what would turn-around what is argued here as being partially caused by a perception of low risk for engaging in espionage behavior. In order to create a perception of high risk associated with espionage type behavior, our U.S. Government can attempt to communicate to its citizens the idea that most spies do get caught, few escape detection. The other part of the risk formula ha to do with severity of punishment for those who are caught and convicted. As a society we seem to have more real control over the latter matter of specifying sentence severity. The U.S. Congress can amend existing laws regarding sentencing limits for espionage/treason type crimes; the courts can choose to impose sentencing upper limits rather than something less. It is these kinds of strategies upon which our Federal income tax system is based; that which relies on tax payers making declarations of their own income. Most U.S. income tax payers operate on a belief system that if they arrempt to cheat significantly on their taxes they will be caught and that if caught the penalty for such is sufficiently severe. Unless this kind of perception prevails for most U.S. tax payers, the entire structure, based on self-declarations of income amounts, becomes unworkable. Such a type of societal-imposed behavioral control should be attempted anew with respect to the risks involved for those citizens who might choose to engage in espionage or treason behavior crimes.
It must be said at this point that there has been some real movement in this direction in the past several years, especially with a few of the really high-profile spy cases that have been finalized up to and including sentencing. For example, those involved in the infamous Walker spy ring, all received very long and significant sentences. John A. Walker was sentenced to two life terms plus 10 years to be served concurrently. John’s older brother, Arthur J., was sentenced to three life terms plus a 10-year term as well as a fine of $250,000. John’s son, Michael L., who was only 22 at the time of his sentencing, was sentenced to two 25-year terms and three 10-year terms to run concurrently. Jerry A. Whitworth, who was John’s out-of-the-family member of the spy ring, was sentenced to 365 years in prison and a $410,000 fine. In fact, most of the spies caught during 1985, which is now known as "the year of the spy," did receive rather heavy sentences. It is these kinds of sentences that should be given loud and wide publicity in the eventual hope that such information may act as a deterrent to those individuals who may have white-collar criminal kinds of motivations along with the employment opportunities to commit espionage. Such true and factual information regarding sentences for spying, if given loud and wide dissemination, might dissuade some from ever starting on the espionage behavioral road.
More heavy sentencing has been the general rule, at least since the mid-1980’s, however there have been also some quite noticeable exceptions. In 1985, Karl and Hanna Koecher (Karl was a former CIA employee and contractor; he had "confessed" his spying activities to the FBI and CIA in the year previous) had his admissions "’suppressed’ or disregarded because they had been made involuntarily -- in response to threats and false promises by the governmental agents" (Kessler, 1988, p. 190). The Koechers never went to trial and in 1986 they were traded for Natan Sharansky, two spies, and a Czech citizen who had been imprisoned for providing assistance to some persons who wanted to illegally leave Czechoslovakia. Here was a case of a major spy, who had confessed his spying activities to federal authorities and who never was even tried. His going to Czechoslovakia as part of the trade was for he and his wife simply being sent home.
In the case of Edward Howard, who in 1983 was fired by the CIA, he had been identified from descriptions given by Vitaly Yurchenko in 1985 who described a former CIA officer who had been communicating with the KGB. In 1985, Howard, when learning that he was the subject of FBI surveillance, successfully eluded them and fled to Moscow. It is unknown whether sufficient evidence then existed that would have resulted in an espionage conviction if Howard had been charged and tried.
In 1984, Richard C. Smith, a former Army intelligence officer, was arrested by the FBI and charged with espionage. Although he readily admitted having given classified information to a Soviet KGB agent (and for which he admitted receiving $11,000), he was later acquitted in a rather well-publicized court trial. It would seem that Smith was able to create sufficient doubt in the jury by being seen "as the innocent victim of a renegade CIA operation" (see Kessler, 1988, p. 102).
More recently (in 1987), Marine Corporal Arnold Bracy, one of the Marines who was initially implicated in suspected security breaches at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, did seemingly admit, in a signed statement, that he had let agents of the KGB into a number of areas within the Embassy. However, shortly afterwards, Bracy claimed that he had been coerced into making and signing the statement and that it had all been made up and that it was untrue. Following this, charges were dropped against Bracy.
In another case, which has had a lot more recent publicity, Glenn Souther, who had been believed to have provided the Soviets with major intelligence information due to his having, since 1982, been in a Naval Reserve intelligence unit and had exposure to a good deal of very sensitive and highly classified information. In 1986, he seemingly was the subject of FBI and/or CIA investigation, was questioned and as a result he disappeared and later reappeared behind the Iron Curtain. In more recent news regarding Souther, involving the Soviet KGB releasing information, in June 1989, that Souther, who had made a "major contribution" to the national security of the Soviet Union, had died and that he had been "a Soviet intelligence officer and KGB employee" (Dobbs, 1989, p. A17). On the following day the Soviets released additional information suggesting that Souther had committed suicide. Souther’s old friends, in the U.S. allegedly have suggested that he had periodically, in the previous several years, expressed some suicidal ideation.
Each of the five, rather recent, above described possible espionage cases, each involving a U.S. citizen, received a good deal of press and journalistic publicity. Each case, in its own fashion, also delivers the message that U.S. citizens who commit espionage (or who are strongly believed to have committed such) are not necessarily caught and convicted and, as a consequence, spend no time in prison for their alleged criminal behaviors. It should be remembered that these particular five cases are quite recent, most certainly of the time frame period and following the "year of the spy" when seemingly the U.S. Government decided to push for maximum sentences and fines with espionage convictions. The five above described espionage cases most certainly refute the idea that U.S. citizens who are identified as being spies/traitors are always tried, found guilty, and given severe prison sentences. This, coupled with several cases in the earlier portion of the 1980’s decade which also rather dramatically portrayed the fact that a number of alleged spies/traitors who were caught and who actually confessed their wrongdoings received very minimal or no actual punishments whatsoever.
In late 1980, AF Lt. Christopher M. Cooke, "on his own volition . . . began to phone and visit the Soviet embassy . . . with offers to provide classified information" (Department of Defense Security Institute, 1989, p. 4). Due to apparent bungling on the part of Air Force investigators, Cooke was offered immunity from prosecution for making a full-disclosure statement. His only punishment was that he eventually had to resign his officer commission. According to the same Department of Defense Security Institute publication, Navy Seaman Michael R. Murphy "reportedly made several calls to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in June 1981 offering to make a deal which he said ‘would benefit both the Soviets and himself’" (p. 4). Like Cooke, he was offered immunity from prosecution in exchange for cooperation. In August of 1981, Murphy was allowed to leave the Navy with an honorable discharge. Descriptions pertaining to the next three mentioned alleged spies are directly based upon information given in Allen and Polmar’s (1988) book (i.e., see pages 338-339; the following several sentences are direct quotations from the Allen and Polmar book). "David A. Hedigar, a crewman on a submarine tender, in 1982 called the Soviet Military Office in Washington. There is no public record of any action taken against him" (p. 339) "Ernest C. Pugh, a sailor stationed at the Defense Language School in Monterey, California, walked into the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco in 1982 and tried to defect. He was given a convenience-of-the-government discharge" (p. 339). In 1984, "Lance Corporal Michael R. Moore, a marine absent without leave from the Naval Air Station at Cubi Point in the Philippines, was apprehended with photographs and other material as he was alleged to be preparing to contact Soviet officials in the Philippines. Investigators said he had ‘an interest in defecting to the Soviet Union.’ He was given a convenience-to-the-government discharge" (pp. 338-339). These cases do suggest that even in the early and mid-1980’s, these U.S. citizens, caught in acts of espionage, received no real punishments (i.e., no sentences) for their alleged traitorous behaviors.
The threat of law in the United States, since World War II, regarding acts of espionage (e.g., spying) has been a rather spotty matter. In general, one could not conclude that deterrence as a rationale for sentencing has been attended to systematically. General deterrence (e.g., see Andenaes, 1968 for a discussion of general versus specificdeterrence) is not concerned with the effect of punishment or sentencing on the specific person being sentenced, but rather with the overall symbolic impact punishment has on the population as a whole. It seems to make good sense to assume that general deterrence matters have some desired effect on the population, however the rather elementary data which has been gathered thus far seems not to provide any clear-cut proof (Nagin, 1978).
In attempting to deter future espionage behavior, on the part of its citizens, our country’s counterespionage efforts should pay attention to the types of understandings commented on by Baron (1977) regarding the four kinds of conditions which have been found to significantly influence the effects of punitive threats on aggressive behaviors. Baron’s first condition involves the level of emotional arousal the perpetrator is experiencing. Baron found that under relatively low levels of emotional arousal, the impact of threatened punishment remains at full strength. If espionage is in fact a white-collar type of crime, then one would certainly expect that emotional arousal would be much lower in the perpetrator than would be expected in other kinds of criminal behavior (e.g., with crimes of passion or violence). It would be expected that espionage is generally a rational act and not primarily based upon excessive emotionality. Baron’s second condition is the apparent probability or perceived certainty that the threatened punishment will actually be delivered. In the cases involving espionage, discussed in the present paper, there certainly is not communicated any status of high certainty of such a matter. Also, as noted earlier, the press generally communicates the idea that only a small proportion (e.g., "a tip of the iceberg") of operating spies ever get caught. His third condition deals with the magnitude of the punishment expected. Such a matter seems to be associated with a good deal of inconsistency with respect to punishment of convicted spies during the past four or five decades. Baron’s fourth condition concerns the amount of gain a perpetrator can expect from prohibited behavior. If the perceived gain is very great then it is possible that regardless of the punishment severity, individuals will be willing to take the risks involved. Although it has not been discussed in this paper, the road to espionage is not really paved with riches. With only rather isolated exceptions, very few U.S. citizens caught spying have received any truly substantial amounts of money for their efforts. Foreign governments wanting classified information seem to not be overly willing to pay much for such information. This has been specifically noted before. Crawford (1988, p. 77) remarked that "Considering that money was the primary reason for committing espionage in the majority of cases, USAF spies were not well paid." It woud seem that wider publicity of the actual payment amounts received by caught spies might be a major deterrent for future espionage.
Since shortly after the end of World War II, interest in punishing caught (and only sometimes, convicted) U.S. citizen spies has had its peaks and valleys. There would seem to be no doubt that interest in severe punishment existed in the early 1950’s decade as the execution of the Rosenbergs will attest. Their execution was quite a rare event in American history. Not since 1965 when Mary Surratt was hanged for taking part in the plot to assassinate President Lincoln had a woman been executed in the U.S. for a federal offense. The Rosenbergs are also the only American traitors ever to have been executed during peacetime. At that time period the Soviets recruited their spies using ideological motivation. As Allen and Polmar (1988, p. 47) have noted, "As ideology declined as a motive for espionage, the U.S. Government’s interest in counter-espionage also took a turn downward. Part of the reason was that espionage was not longer equated with American Communists." In the decade or so following this period, individuals caught in espionage activities seemed not to appear very often in American courtrooms. According to Allen and Polmar (1988, p. 47), "The U.S. Government conducted no espionage prosecutions between 1966 and 1975, chiefly for two reasons: a lack of enthusiasm by prosecutors and CIA warnings about the perils of putting spies on trial." This contrasts greatly with what William H. Webster, Director of the FBI, in December of 1984, proudly announced, "We have more people charged with espionage right now than ever before in our history" (see Allen & Polmar, 1988, p. 48; Defense Security Institute, 1986, p. 3). In the 12 months following Judge Webster’s declaration, ten more Americans were arrested for espionage and the 1985 year was given the title of being the Year of the Spy. Records kept by the author of the present paper indicate that in 1988, six Americans were caught committing espionage. To date (i.e., summer 1989), only four have been sentenced, two received 10 years, one received 12 years, and one received 40 years. When one considers that under the Federal penal system, one is eligible for parole when one has served one-third of one’s sentence, three of the sentencings seem not overly excessive. If a country is wanting to use espionage convictions and sentencing as a deterrence example for its citizens, the U.S. pattern since World War II is not of great inconsistent variation. This is not a good example of how to set an example for purposes of discouraging espionage behaviors.
At the time this paper was being completed (August-September 1989), there was given very wide publicity (TV news, newspapers and news magazines) description of an alleged spy who had had a career in the U.S. Department of State and had reached very high diplomatic rank (e.g., Ottaway & Devroy, 1989). Felix Bloch had been, since July, practically accused, tried and convicted by the press, however he actually had not yet been officially charged by the authorities with any crime. Even after several weeks of this kind of very high profile publicity, he still remained free and uncharged. After a couple of weeks the press was beginning to announce that he would most likely never be arrested unless he confessed traitorous wrong-doings to the authorities as they seemingly did not possess sufficient evidence against him to charge him with any kind of espionage activities (Trento & Trento, 1989). One of the main messages, conveyed to the U.S. public at this time by this alleged spy case publicity is that, even though one might be seemingly photographed handing a brief case to a known KGB agent, along with other possibly incriminating information, unless one confesses to the FBI (or other federal agency/office investigators), it is most unlikely that one will ever be charged with an espionage crime. This is not a message that will have any strong dissuading effect on future traitorous behaviors on the part of other Americans who have access to classified information and who are potentially motivated to convey such to foreign powers. At just about the same exact time frame there was an USAF officer, who had been stationed in Europe, who was being similarly accused, tried and convicted by the press for alleged spying, but who yet had seemingly not confessed any wrong doings to governmental investigative authorities (e.g., McGee, 1989). This particular case, as with the high-level diplomat case, does not convey any strong deterrent message to Americans potentially possessing motivation for committing espionage; in fact, just about the opposite kind of message is conveyed with respect to these two high-profile news stories.
As a final comment to the very broad subject of this paper, psychological and motivational aspects of traitorous spying, it should be noted that this general topic has been seen to be almost nonexistent in the nonclassified behavioral science literature. Bloom (1986, p. 37) has commented regarding "statistically deviant and socially stigmatic traits such as homosexuality and mental disorders," that "there is no unclassified research or data base linking these traits with the act of espionage." In one of the very few formally reported investigations, actually a rather tangential study in this general subject area, Stone (1988) found results which indicate that psychometrically measured psychopathology seems not to be empirically related to adjudicated decisions to grant or not grant high-level security clearances to defense industry contractor personnel. When actual empirical research in this general area is truly conducted, rather surprising findings, when compared to almost sacrosanct, traditional personnel-security belief and policies, are usually uncovered. For example, McDaniel (1988), on the research staff of the newly created Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center, found that there had been very little prior research which examined the value of pre-employment drug-use information in the prediction of post-employment suitability. His large-sample research showed that "to minimize selection errors . . . [those] who at present rely solely on drug-use measures for screening applicants for suitability should consider supplementing or replacing their drug-screening programs with selection systems that more optimally predict employee unsuitability" (p. 10). Unfortunately, these kinds of investigations pertaining to psychological measurement in the evaluation of individuals for positions of trust (i.e., having been granted high-level security clearances) are very few and far between in the formal behavioral science literature. Almost nonexistent in this literature are research investigations directed towards the psychological study of espionage and spies.
Allen, T. B., & Polmar, N. (1988). Merchants of treason. New York: Delacorte Press.
Allen, T. B., & Polmar, N. (1989, April 10). Air Force traitors: What drove them to spy
for the Eastern Bloc? Air Force Times, pp. 14-15, 26.
Andenaes, J. (1968). Does punishment deter crime? Criminal Law Quarterly, 11, 76-93.
Baron, R. A. (1977). Human aggression. New York: Plenum Press.
Bloom, R. W. (1986). A psychological analysis of counterespionage. In G. E. Lee (Ed.),
Proceedings of the Tenth Symposium on Psychology in the Department of Defense.
(pp. 36-40). (USAFA Publication TR 86-1. Colorado Springs, CO: Department of
Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United State Air Force Academy.
Crawford, D. J. (1988). Volunteers: The betrayal of national defense secrets by Air
Force traitors. Washington , DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Defense Investigative Service/Defense Security Institute. (1986). Espionage in the ‘80’s:
A spate of spies. Security Awareness Bulletin, 2, 3.
Department of Defense Security Institute. (1989). Recent espionage cases. Richmond,
VA: Author.
Dobbs, M. (1989, June 28)). U.S. Navy defector dies in the Soviet Union. The
Washington Post, p. A17.
Givens, D W. (1988, May 16). OSI officer chronicles service spy history. Air Force
Times, p. 18.
Jepson, L. P., Jr. (1987). Counterintelligence study: Espionage directed against U.S.
military interests since World War II. (DOS-2400-21-87). Washington, DC:
Counterintelligence Division, Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence,
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Kessler, R. (1988). Spy vs. spy. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
McDaniel, M. A. (1988). Does pre-employment drug use predict on-the-job suitability?
Personnel Psychology, 41, 1-13.
McGee, J. (1989, August 5). Electronics officer investigated: Classified documents
reportedly found in Berlin residence. The Washington Post, pp. A1, A10.
Nagin, D. (1978). General deterrence: A review of the empirical evidence. In A.
Blumstein, J. Cohen, & D. Nagin (Eds.), Deterrence and incapacitation: Estimating
the effects of criminal sanctions on crime rates. Washington, DC: National Academy
of Sciences.
Ottaway, D. B., & Devroy, A. (1989, July 23). Investigators delving into diplomat’s
past. The Washington Post, pp. A1, A16.
Polgar, T. (1986, Sept.). How the Soviets steal our secrets. The American Legion, pp.
16-17, 52-53.
Reagan, R. (1985, Nov. 30). Radio speech delivered by President Ronald Reagan.
(Reprinted in Security Awareness Bulletin, 2, 1-2.
Sharlitt, J. H. (1989). Fatal error. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Stone, L. A. (1988). Prediction of sensitive compartmented information (SCI) access
using personality information. In A. C. F. Gilbert (Ed.), Proceedings of the 30th
Annual Conference of the Military Testing Association. (pp. 417-421). Arlington,
VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Stone, L. A. (1989). On the psychological makeup of a spy. Forensic Reports, 2,
215-221; also as a summary in (1989). Bulletin of the American Academy of Forensic
Psychology, 10, 11.
Trento, J., & Trento, S. (1989, Sept. 10). What Felix Bloch can learn from the case of
Igor Orlov. The Washington Post, p. C5.
Allen, T. B., & Polmar, N. (1989, April 10). Air Force traitors: What drove them to spy
for the Eastern Bloc? Air Force Times, pp. 14-15, 26.
Andenaes, J. (1968). Does punishment deter crime? Criminal Law Quarterly, 11, 76-93.
Baron, R. A. (1977). Human aggression. New York: Plenum Press.
Bloom, R. W. (1986). A psychological analysis of counterespionage. In G. E. Lee (Ed.),
Proceedings of the Tenth Symposium on Psychology in the Department of Defense.
(pp. 36-40). (USAFA Publication TR 86-1. Colorado Springs, CO: Department of
Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United State Air Force Academy.
Crawford, D. J. (1988). Volunteers: The betrayal of national defense secrets by Air
Force traitors. Washington , DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Defense Investigative Service/Defense Security Institute. (1986). Espionage in the ‘80’s:
A spate of spies. Security Awareness Bulletin, 2, 3.
Department of Defense Security Institute. (1989). Recent espionage cases. Richmond,
VA: Author.
Dobbs, M. (1989, June 28)). U.S. Navy defector dies in the Soviet Union. The
Washington Post, p. A17.
Givens, D W. (1988, May 16). OSI officer chronicles service spy history. Air Force
Times, p. 18.
Jepson, L. P., Jr. (1987). Counterintelligence study: Espionage directed against U.S.
military interests since World War II. (DOS-2400-21-87). Washington, DC:
Counterintelligence Division, Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence,
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Kessler, R. (1988). Spy vs. spy. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
McDaniel, M. A. (1988). Does pre-employment drug use predict on-the-job suitability?
Personnel Psychology, 41, 1-13.
McGee, J. (1989, August 5). Electronics officer investigated: Classified documents
reportedly found in Berlin residence. The Washington Post, pp. A1, A10.
Nagin, D. (1978). General deterrence: A review of the empirical evidence. In A.
Blumstein, J. Cohen, & D. Nagin (Eds.), Deterrence and incapacitation: Estimating
the effects of criminal sanctions on crime rates. Washington, DC: National Academy
of Sciences.
Ottaway, D. B., & Devroy, A. (1989, July 23). Investigators delving into diplomat’s
past. The Washington Post, pp. A1, A16.
Polgar, T. (1986, Sept.). How the Soviets steal our secrets. The American Legion, pp.
16-17, 52-53.
Reagan, R. (1985, Nov. 30). Radio speech delivered by President Ronald Reagan.
(Reprinted in Security Awareness Bulletin, 2, 1-2.
Sharlitt, J. H. (1989). Fatal error. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Stone, L. A. (1988). Prediction of sensitive compartmented information (SCI) access
using personality information. In A. C. F. Gilbert (Ed.), Proceedings of the 30th
Annual Conference of the Military Testing Association. (pp. 417-421). Arlington,
VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Stone, L. A. (1989). On the psychological makeup of a spy. Forensic Reports, 2,
215-221; also as a summary in (1989). Bulletin of the American Academy of Forensic
Psychology, 10, 11.
Trento, J., & Trento, S. (1989, Sept. 10). What Felix Bloch can learn from the case of
Igor Orlov. The Washington Post, p. C5.
Δεν υπάρχουν σχόλια:
Δημοσίευση σχολίου