Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations

FM 3-05.201
Special Forces
Unconventional Warfare
Operations
APRIL 2003
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other
means. This determination was made on 15 March 2003. Other requests for this document must be
referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,
ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE:
Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
Headquarters, Department of the ArmyFM 3-05.201
Field Manual  HEADQUARTERS
No. 3-05.201  DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                                                                                                              Washington, DC, 30 April 2003
Special Forces
Unconventional Warfare Operations
Contents

Page
 PREFACE ..................................................................................................................iv
Chapter 1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................1-1
Unconventional Warfare Aspects............................................................................1-1
Resistance and Insurgency.....................................................................................1-3
Dynamics of Insurgencies .......................................................................................1-4
United States Sponsorship....................................................................................1-11
Information Operations in UW...............................................................................1-18
Psychological Operations in UW...........................................................................1-19
Civil-Military Operations in UW..............................................................................1-20
Special Operations Imperatives ............................................................................1-21
Chapter 2 PREMISSION ACTIVITIES.....................................................................................2-1
Mission Analysis ......................................................................................................2-1
Procedures ..............................................................................................................2-2
Products ..................................................................................................................2-5
Staff Activities ..........................................................................................................2-7
Subordinate Operational Elements .........................................................................2-9
Mission Planning ...................................................................................................2-12
Deliberate Planning Process .................................................................................2-12
Feasibility Assessment Process............................................................................2-14
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical
or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other
means. This determination was made on 15 March 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to
Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of
the document.
iFM 3-05.201
Page
Postfeasibility Assessment Activities .................................................................... 2-16
Mission Preparation .............................................................................................. 2-22
Premission Training .............................................................................................. 2-23
Intelligence............................................................................................................ 2-23
Personnel .............................................................................................................. 2-24
Logistics and Communications ............................................................................. 2-24
Preemployment Preparation ................................................................................. 2-25
Time-Sensitive (Crisis-Action) Planning Process ................................................. 2-25
Emerging Missions................................................................................................ 2-25
Detailed Mission Preparations .............................................................................. 2-26
Chapter 3 EMPLOYMENT....................................................................................................... 3-1
Infiltration................................................................................................................. 3-1
Area Assessment .................................................................................................... 3-1
Development of the JSOA ...................................................................................... 3-3
Guerrilla Bases ..................................................................................................... 3-10
Development of the Resistance Organization ...................................................... 3-15
Elements of the Resistance .................................................................................. 3-18
Training the Resistance Organization................................................................... 3-34
Training the Guerrilla Force .................................................................................. 3-35
Training Staff and Auxiliary or Underground Personnel ....................................... 3-38
Combat Employment ............................................................................................ 3-43
Defensive Operations ........................................................................................... 3-48
Offensive Operations ............................................................................................ 3-48
Raids ..................................................................................................................... 3-49
Battalion (Large) Raids ......................................................................................... 3-56
Ambushes ............................................................................................................. 3-58
Categories of Ambushes....................................................................................... 3-60
Support and Sustainment ..................................................................................... 3-88
Indicators of Counterguerrilla Operations............................................................. 3-89
Chapter 4 POSTMISSION ACTIVITIES .................................................................................. 4-1
Transition ................................................................................................................ 4-1
Demobilization......................................................................................................... 4-2
Dangers of Demobilization...................................................................................... 4-5
iiFM 3-05.201
iii
Page
Appendix A UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT......................A-1
Appendix B COMMUNICATIONS...............................................................................................B-1
Appendix C MEDICAL ASPECTS ............................................................................................. C-1
Appendix D LEGAL PRINCIPLES............................................................................................. D-1
Appendix E LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS ...........................................................................E-1
Appendix F INFILTRATION........................................................................................................F-1
Appendix G SPECIAL FORCES AREA ASSESSMENT...........................................................G-1
Appendix H AREA STUDY OUTLINE FORMAT....................................................................... H-1
Appendix I ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ........................................................................ I-1
Appendix J EXAMPLE OF TRAINING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
 FOR RESISTANCE FORCES................................................................................. J-1
Appendix K SPECIAL FORCES CACHING...............................................................................K-1
Appendix L LINKUP OPERATIONS ..........................................................................................L-1
Appendix M DEMOBILIZATION OF GUERRILLA FORCES ....................................................M-1
 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................Glossary-1
 BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................Bibliography-1
 INDEX............................................................................................................... Index-1Preface
Field manual (FM) 3-05.201 provides the  doctrinal basis for the conduct of
unconventional warfare (UW) missions  across the operational continuum. It
continues the doctrinal education process  that begins with Joint Publications
(JPs) 3-05,  Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; 3-05.1,  Joint Tactics,
Techniques, and P ocedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations;
3-05.5,  Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning P ocedures;
and FMs 100-25,  Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, and 3-05.20,
Special Forces Operations. This manual informs and guides Special Forces (SF)
commanders, staffs, and operational personnel primarily at battalion and lower
echelons (Special Forces operational detachments [SFODs] A, B, and C) in their
planning for and conduct of UW.
r
r
This manual provides historical examples to highlight key points throughout the
text. It offers tactics, techniques, procedures, and references to support future SF
operations. It also provides general  UW guidance, mission procedures, and
information ordered chronologically from receipt of the unit mission letter
through postmission activities.
Users of this manual should adapt its content to meet their situation and mission
requirements. The SFODs use the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops
and support available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC)
analysis system.
Examples of specific UW techniques  and procedures are provided in the
appendixes. The appendixes let the users of this manual review the basics of UW
mission performance from beginning to end. For users interested only in the
details of specific techniques, the appendixes provide reference material keyed to
the generic activities in the text.
Commanders and trainers should use this information and other related
manuals to plan and conduct rehearsals of mission-specific training. They should
also use command guidance and the Army Training and Evaluation Program
(ARTEP). The key to assuring success is  planning UW-related training before
being employed with a specific UW mission.
The proponent of this manual is the  United States Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and
recommended changes to Commander,  USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD,
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.
iv Chapter 1
Overview
FM 3-05.20 defines UW as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary
operations, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or
surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in
varying degrees by an external source. UW includes, but is not limited to,
guerrilla warfare (GW), sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, and
unconventional assisted recovery (UAR).
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ASPECTS
1-1. UW also includes interrelated aspects that may be prosecuted singly or
collectively by predominantly indigenous or surrogate personnel. An external
source usually supports and directs  these personnel in varying degrees
during all conditions of war or peace. The intent of United States (U.S.) UW
operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and
psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to
accomplish U.S. strategic objectives.
1-2. Regardless of whether UW objectives are strategic or operational, the
nature of resistance and the fundamental tactics and techniques of UW
operations remain unchanged. UW includes the following interrelated
activities.
1-3.  Guerrilla warfare consists of military and paramilitary operations
conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces against superior
forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an
insurgency.
1-4.  Sabotage is an act or acts with intent to injure or obstruct the national
defense of a nation by willfully damaging or destroying any national defense
or war materiel, premises, or utilities, including human and natural
resources. It may also refer to actions taken to injure or obstruct the military
capability of an occupying power. Sabotage may be the most effective or the
only means of attacking specific targets beyond the capabilities of
conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or
neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum of manpower and material
resources. SF conducts sabotage unilaterally through indigenous or surrogate
personnel. Sabotage is also a form of effects-based targeting performed by SF
personnel. FM 3-05.220, (S) Special Forces Advanced Special Operations (U),
Volumes I and II, provides detailed information on sabotage.
1-5.  Subversion is any action designed to undermine the military, economic,
psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. All elements of the
resistance organization contribute  to the subversive effort, but the
clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground will do the
1-1 FM 3-05.201
bulk of the activity. Subversion is a form of effects-based targeting on human
terrain.
1-6. Effective SF targeting demands  accurate, timely, and well-organized
intelligence. SF personnel must develop good intelligence skills for overt
collection, tactical reconnaissance, and the assembly of available intelligence
for mission planning packets. Sound target analysis uses the criticality,
accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability (CARVER)
matrix; provides options to planners; satisfies statements of operational
requirements (SOR); meets the commander’s objectives; and reduces the risk
to operators. FM 100-25 provides more detailed information on targeting.
1-7.  Intelligence activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and
military personalities to the military  capabilities of friendly and enemy
forces. SF must perform intelligence  activities ranging from developing
information critical to planning and conducting operations, sustaining and
protecting themselves and the UW force, to assessing the capabilities and
intentions of indigenous and coalition forces. These activities may be
unilateral or conducted through surrogates. SF intelligence activities may
require coordination with other government agencies (OGAs) and may
involve national-level oversight.
1-8.  Unconventional assisted recovery is a subset of nonconventional
assisted recovery (NAR) and is conducted by special operations forces (SOF)
(Department of Defense [DOD] Directive 2310.2). UW forces conduct UAR
operations to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other
selected personnel as they move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive
area to areas under friendly control. UAR includes operating unconventional
assisted recovery mechanisms (UARMs) and unconventional assisted
recovery teams (UARTs). The UARM refers to an entity, group of entities, or
organizations within enemy-held territory that operate in a clandestine or
covert manner to return designated personnel to friendly control and most
often consists of established indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. UARTs
consist primarily of SOF personnel directed to service existing designated
areas of recovery (DARs) or selected  areas for evasion (SAFEs) to recover
evaders.
1-9. UW has taken on new significance for several reasons. Historically, SF
units have focused on UW as a part of general war. Now, the U.S. policy of
supporting selected resistance movements requires SF to focus on UW during
conflicts short of war. Also, global  urbanization provides for a shift in
emphasis from rural guerrilla warfare to all aspects of clandestine resistance
including urban and border operations. Training and support for these
operations may come from the joint special operations area (JSOA) or from
an external training or support site. Some scenarios may dictate a traditional
role reversal—the urban guerrilla may conduct most of the operations while
supported by the rural guerrilla.
1-10. UW is the most challenging of SF missions because it involves
protracted operations with joint forces, allied forces, indigenous or surrogate
forces, U.S. agencies, or elements of all of these entities. UW involves
detailed, centralized planning and coordination from the SFODA through the
Secretary of Defense, and ultimately, decentralized execution. UW requires
1-2 FM 3-05.201
proficiency in other SF principal missions (foreign internal defense [FID],
direct action [DA], and special reconnaissance [SR]) since, once deployed, the
UW mission may include portions of those missions. Before the conduct of SF
UW operations, a resistance potential should exist. SF personnel  do not
create this resistance potential. It is already present and  has usually
developed into a resistance movement or an organized effort by some portion
of the civil population to resist the regime.
1-11. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the
focus shifts to primarily military objectives. When a conventional force is
committed and its area of interest nears the JSOA, resistance operations may
expand to help the tactical commander. In addition, there are times
(Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) when  the introduction of conventional
forces does not take the main effort away from unconventional operations; in
fact, the conventional forces may support the unconventional forces. UW
operations can—
•  Delay and disrupt hostile military operations.
•  Interdict lines of communication.
•  Deny the hostile power unrestricted use of key areas.
•  Divert the hostile power’s attention and resources from the main battle
area.
•  Interdict hostile warfighting capabilities.
RESISTANCE AND INSURGENCY
1-12. A government’s inability or unwillingness to meet the legitimate needs
of its people may cause widespread frustration and dissatisfaction. People
may lose their faith and confidence because the government lacks legitimacy.
They may also simply recognize that the government is incapable of
effectively providing internal security and development.
1-13. Resistance may be either nonviolent or violent. Nonviolent resistance
involves acts such as ostracism, tax evasion, boycotts, strikes, or other types
of civil disobedience. Violent resistance includes sabotage, subversion, and
guerrilla warfare. People usually resist nonviolently at first. However, they
may willingly take up violent resistance if a subversive cadre provides them
with a cause they perceive to be both worthy and achievable. If the
sociopolitical conditions are oppressive enough, resistance may develop into
an organized resistance movement.
1-14. A resistance movement is an organized effort by some portion of the
civil population of a country to oppose or overthrow the established
government or cause withdrawal of an occupying power. The center of gravity
in any resistance movement is the people’s will to resist. The people bear the
brunt of the established authority’s retaliatory measures. Although armed
resistance may be stability operations and support operations from the U.S.
perspective, it is total war for those who take up arms.
1-15. An insurgency is an organized resistance movement that uses
subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. It is a
protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control
and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy—the
1-3 FM 3-05.201
central issues in an insurgency. Each insurgency has its own unique
characteristics based on its strategic objectives, its operational environment,
and available resources. Insurgencies normally seek to overthrow the
existing social order and reallocate power within the country. They may also
seek to—
•  Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social
revolution.
•  Establish an autonomous national  territory within the borders of a
state.
•  Cause the withdrawal of an occupying power.
•  Extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent
means.
1-16. The structure of a revolutionary movement can be compared to a
pyramidal iceberg, the bulk of which lies submerged with only its peak
visible. In building a resistance structure, insurgent leaders give principal
attention to the development of a support infrastructure—a task done by
specially trained personnel. The resistance cadre organizes the support
infrastructure, which in turn supports the guerrillas. This infrastructure
works among the citizens in rural villages, towns, and urban cities; within
the military, police, and administrative apparatus of government; and among
labor groups and students.
DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCIES
1-17. Insurgencies arise when the  government is unable or unwilling to
address the demands of important social groups. These groups band together
and begin to use violence to change the government’s position. Insurgencies
are often a coalition of different forces united by their common hostility for
the government. To be  successful, an insurgency must develop unifying
leadership, doctrine, organization, and strategy. Only the seeds of these
elements exist when an insurgency begins. The insurgents must continually
nurture and provide the necessary care if the insurgency is to mature and
succeed. Insurgencies succeed by mobilizing human and materiel resources to
provide both active and passive support for their programs, operations, and
goals. Mobilization produces workers and fighters, raises funds, and gets the
necessary weapons, equipment, and supplies. Mobilization grows out of
intense popular dissatisfaction with existing political and social conditions.
In an insurgency, the active supporters consider these conditions intolerable.
The insurgent leadership articulates the dissatisfaction of the people, places
the blame on government, and offers an alternative. The insurgent
leadership then provides organizational and managerial skills to transform
disaffected people into an effective force for political action. Ultimately, the
insurgents need the active support of most of the politically active people and
the passive support of the majority.
1-18. A successful insurgency is the most important political power in a
newly liberated country. Guerrillas, existing and fighting under conditions of
great hardship, develop extremist attitudes and become very jealous of their
prerogatives to determine the postwar complexion of their country.  These
attitudes may make it difficult or impossible to establish a government
1-4 FM 3-05.201
sympathetic to U.S. national interests. However, a nation that sponsors a
successful insurgency generally has a political advantage  at the close of
hostilities.
1-19. There are seven dynamics that are common to most insurgencies.
These dynamics provide a framework  for analysis that can reveal the
insurgency’s strengths and weaknesses. Although the analyst can examine
the following dynamics separately, he must study their interaction to fully
understand the insurgency.
LEADERSHIP
1-20. Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and
focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction,
guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. The insurgency leaders
must make their cause known to the people and gain popular support. Their
key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government, and
to establish credibility for their movement. The leaders must  replace the
government’s legitimacy with that of their own. Their education, background,
family, social connections, and experiences shape how they think and how
they will fulfill their goals. These factors also help shape their approach to
problem solving.
1-21. Leadership is a function of both organization and personality. Some
organizations deemphasize individual personalities and provide for
redundancy and replacement in decision making. These mechanisms produce
collective power and do not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be
effective. They are easier to penetrate but more resilient to change. Other
organizations may depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion,
motivation, and a focal point for the movement. Organizations led in this way
can produce decisions and begin new actions rapidly, but are vulnerable to
disruptions if key personalities are removed or co-opted by the enemy.
IDEOLOGY
1-22. To win, the insurgents must have a program that explains what is
wrong with society and justifies its actions. They must promise great
improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency
accomplishes this goal through ideology. Ideology guides the insurgents in
offering society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms
for ease of focus. The insurgents’ plans must be vague enough for broad
appeal and specific enough to address important issues.
1-23. The ideology of groups within the movement may suggest differing
views of strategic objectives. Groups may have ideological conflicts that need
to be resolved before an opponent can capitalize on them. Ideology may
suggest probable goals and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgent’s
perception of his environment. This perception of the environment in turn
shapes the movement’s organization and operational methods.
1-5 FM 3-05.201
OBJECTIVES
1-24. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpreting strategic,
operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent’s
desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has
it. The replacement of the government in power is only one step along this
path; however, it likely will be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the
strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be
the only clearly defined goal the movement presents.
1-25. Operational objectives are those that the insurgents pursue as part of
the total process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively
establishing their desired end state.
1-26. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts. Some
examples include the dissemination of psychological operations (PSYOP)
products or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish
tactical objectives that will lead to operational goals. Tactical objectives can
be psychological and physical in nature. For example, legitimacy is the center
of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is
largely a product of perception; consequently, it can be the principal
consideration in the selection and attainment of tactical objectives.
ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY
1-27. Environment and geography, including cultural and  demographic
factors, affect all participants in a conflict. The manner in which insurgents
and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and
disadvantages for each. The effects of these factors are most visible at the
tactical level where they are perhaps the predominant influence on decisions
regarding force structure, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
1-28. UW in an urban environment presents a different set of planning
considerations than in rural environments. These planning considerations
impact directly on structure, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Appendix A describes characteristics of cities and urban tactical operations.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT
1-29. Historically, some insurgencies have done well without external
support. However, examples such as Vietnam and Nicaragua show that
external support can accelerate events and influence the outcome. External
support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that
might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. The types  of external
support involve the following:
•  Morality—acknowledgement of the insurgents as just and admirable.
•  Political issues—active promotion of the insurgents’ strategic goals in
international forums.
•  Resources—money, weapons, food, advisors, and training.
•  Sanctuary—secure training and operational or logistics bases.
1-30. Accepting external support may affect the legitimacy of both
insurgents and counterinsurgents. It implies the inability to sustain oneself.
1-6 FM 3-05.201
Also, the country or group providing support attaches its legitimacy along
with that of the insurgent or the counterinsurgent group it supports. The
consequences can affect programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated
to the insurgent situation.
PHASING AND TIMING
1-31. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development.
Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all
phases is not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may
be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can
also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development
when favorable conditions return. The three phases of insurgency are
explained below.
Phase I - Latent or Incipient Insurgency
1-32. During this phase, the resistance leadership develops the movement
into an effective clandestine organization. The resistance organization uses a
variety of subversive techniques to psychologically prepare the population to
resist. These techniques may include propaganda, demonstrations, boycotts,
and sabotage. Subversive activities frequently occur in an organized pattern,
but no major outbreak of armed violence occurs. In the advanced stages of
this phase, the resistance organization may establish a shadow government
that parallels the established authority. Also during this phase, the
resistance leadership—
•  Recruits, organizes, and trains cadres.
•  Infiltrates key government organizations and civilian groups.
•  Establishes cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks.
•  Organizes or develops cooperative relationships with legitimate
political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front
organizations. This approach develops popular support for later
political and military activities.
•  Solicits and obtains funds.
•  Develops sources for external support.
Phase II - Guerrilla Warfare
1-33. Phase II begins with overt guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla in a ruralbased insurgency will normally operate from a relatively secure base area in
an insurgent-controlled territory. In an urban-based insurgency, the guerrilla
operates clandestinely using cellular organization. Subversive activities can
take the form of clandestine radio  broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets
that openly challenge the control and legitimacy of the established authority.
Recruiting efforts expand as the people lose faith in the established authority
and decide to actively resist it.
1-7 FM 3-05.201
Phase III - Mobile Warfare or War of Movement
1-34. The last phase starts the transition from guerrilla warfare to
conventional warfare. If successful, this phase causes the collapse of the
established government or the withdrawal of the occupying power. Without
direct intervention, a Phase III insurgency takes on the characteristics of a
civil war. The resistance organization could achieve legal belligerent status.
As it gains control of portions of  the country, the resistance movement
becomes responsible for the population, resources, and territory under its
control. Based on the conditions set earlier, an effective resistance movement
will—
•  Establish an effective civil administration.
•  Establish an effective military organization.
•  Provide balanced social and economic development.
•  Mobilize the population to support the resistance organization.
•  Protect the population from hostile actions.
Failure to achieve these objectives may cause the resistance movement to
revert back to an earlier phase.
1-35. Some insurgencies depend on proper timing for their success. Because
of their limited support, the insurgents must weaken the government’s
legitimacy so that it becomes ineffective. Then an opportunity to seize power
exists. When the insurgents move to seize power, they expose their
organization and intentions. If they move too early or too late, the
government may discover their organization and destroy it.
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS
1-36. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the
interaction of various factors. The interactions cause each insurgency to be
unique. The three general patterns that emerge—foco, mass-oriented, and
traditional—are explained below.
Foco Insurgency
1-37. A foco (Spanish word meaning “focus” or “focal point”) is a single,
armed cell that emerges from hidden  strongholds in an atmosphere of
disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this cell is the nucleus around which
mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and
establish control based on that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed,
government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The
foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and
before any alternative appears. An infamous foco was led by Castro in Cuba.
The strategy was very effective because the Batista regime was corrupt and
incompetent. The distinguishing characteristics of a foco insurgency are
the—
•  Deliberate avoidance of preparatory organizational work. The rationale
is based on the premise that most peasants are intimidated by the
authorities and will betray any group that cannot defend itself.
1-8 FM 3-05.201
•  Development of rural support as shown by the ability of the foco to
strike against the authorities and survive.
•  Absence of any emphasis on the prolonged nature of the conflict.
Mass-Oriented Insurgency
1-38. The mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed
mobilization of a large popular movement. Mass-oriented insurgencies
emphasize creating a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing
system. They challenge that system and then destroy or supplant it. These
insurgents patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular
guerrillas and construct a base of active and passive political supporters. The
insurgents plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the
government and its institutions from the outside. Their political leadership
normally is distinct from their military leadership. Their movement normally
establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy.
Insurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only
after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct
military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and
guerrilla action. Examples of this pattern include—
•  The communist revolution in China.
•  The Viet Cong insurgency.
•  The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru.
The following excerpts cite the success of the Sendero Luminoso and
their heavy influence in the rural areas of Peru.
The government’s failure to change conditions in the southern highlands
made peasants question the relevance of the distant, culturally alien
government which has little understanding of rural life. Sendero played
on the frustration of the Andean  peasants by proposing to entirely
overthrow the “fascist” government in Lima. Not only did peasants have
no viable alternative, but in fact, Sendero genuinely focused on their
marginalized concerns.
Andrea Curtis, “Sendero Luminoso, A Study in Paradox,”
Latitudes, Volume 1, 1991-1992
The peasants support Sendero Luminoso because the movement
supports their historical aspirations:  for local control and for the right to
pursue subsistence agriculture through ownership of plots of land.
Ronald Berg, “Sendero Luminoso and the Peasantry of Andahuaylas,” Journal of
Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 28 (1986-1987)
The slow and inadequate state response to the Sendero threat was
augmented by the failure of military intelligence to comprehend the
nature of the guerrilla movement. Sendero has a tight administration and
its intelligence network is extensive and flexible. Sendero’s guerrilla units
are composed of cells of no more than five senderistas, thus creating a
tightly controlled unit impervious to infiltration.
“War in Peru Gets Bloodier,” Latin American Weekly Report,
25 October 1990
1-9 FM 3-05.201
1-39. There are distinguishing characteristics of a mass-oriented
insurgency. These characteristics include—
•  Political control by the revolutionary organization that assures priority
of political considerations.
•  Reliance on organized popular support to provide recruits, funds,
supplies, and intelligence.
•  Primary areas of activity, especially in early phases, in the remote
countryside where the population can be organized and base areas
established with little interference from the authorities.
•  Reliance on guerrilla tactics to carry on the military side of the
strategy. These tactics focus on avoiding battle, except at times and
places of the insurgents’ choosing. They also focus on employing stealth
and secrecy, ambush, and surprise to overcome the initial imbalance of
strength.
•  A phased strategy that first focuses on organizational structure in
which the population is prepared for its vital role. Secondly, an “armed
struggle” is launched and the guerrilla force gradually builds up in size
and strength. The third phase consists of more mobile conventional
warfare. Conceptually, this phase is accompanied by a popular
uprising that helps overwhelm the regime. It is a concept of
“protracted” war.
Traditional Insurgency
1-40. This insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances. At first
it has limited aims. It springs from tribal or factional, racial, religious,
linguistic, or other similarly identifiable groups. The insurgents perceive that
the government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work
to establish or restore them. They frequently seek withdrawal from
government control through autonomy or semiautonomy. Insurgents seldom
specifically seek to overthrow the government or control the whole society.
They generally respond in kind to government violence. Their acts of violence
can range from strikes and street demonstrations to guerrilla warfare. These
insurgencies may cease if the government agrees to the insurgents’ demands.
However, the concessions the insurgents demand are so great that  the
government concedes its legitimacy along with them. Examples of this
pattern include the—
•  Mujahideen in Afghanistan before the Soviet withdrawal.
•  Ibo revolt in Nigeria (Biafra).
•  Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka is a diverse nation. Sinhalese make up 74 percent of the
population and are concentrated in the more densely populated
southwest. Ceylon Tamils, whose South Indian ancestors have lived on
the island for centuries, form  around 12 percent of the population and
live in the north and the east. Indian  Tamils, a distinct ethnic group,
represent about 6 percent of the  population. Other minorities include
Veddas, Muslims (both Moors and Malays), and Burghers who are
descendants of European colonial settlers. Most of the Sinhalese
1-10 FM 3-05.201
community are Buddhist, most Tamils are Hindu. Most of the Muslims
practice Sunni Islam. The different groups tend to lead highly segregated
lives and live within their own communities, apart from in the capital,
Colombo. Although Sinhalese are the  clear majority they fear the
influence of the huge Tamil population  across the Palk Straits in the
southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
The British colonial policy of divide and rule sowed the seeds of renewed
tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities after
Independence. Tamils, although well educated, were given a disproportionate number of top jobs in the civil service by the British. Once the
Sinhalese majority held sway, its politicians sought to redress the
balance with populist but discriminatory policies against Tamils. In 1956,
the victory of SWRD Bandaranaike on a platform of Sinhalese
nationalism led to him declaring Sinhala to be the country’s  official
language among other anti-Tamil measures. Communal tension and
violence increased from 1956 onwards  as Tamils became increasingly
frustrated. By the mid-70s, Tamils were calling for a separate state in the
north and east of the country. In the 1977 elections, the separatist TULF
won all the seats in Tamil areas, while groups such as the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began to use violence for the same ends.
Barry N. Stein, “Tigers Seize Key Town as Death Toll Soars,”
1 October 1998
UNITED STATES SPONSORSHIP
1-41. The United States cannot afford to ignore the resistance potential that
exists in nations or countries that are our potential enemies. In a conflict
situation or during war, SF can develop this potential into an organized
resistance movement capable of significantly advancing U.S. interests. The
strategic politico-military objective of UW during wartime is  normally to
influence conventional military operations. However, in stability operations
and support operations the goals may range from interdicting  foreign
intervention in another country, to  opposing the consolidation of a new
hostile regime, to actually overthrowing such a regime.
1-42. When directed, SF personnel support selected resistance organizations
that enhance U.S. national interests. During a limited or general war,
SFODs normally infiltrate hostile areas to organize, train, equip, and advise
or direct an indigenous resistance organization. They may conduct UW
internally in a JSOA or train an insurgent force at an external training site.
The external element may be an indigenous force that will conduct UW
inside its country or act as a surrogate for another internal or external
mission.
1-43. There are seven phases to a U.S.-sponsored insurgency (Figure 1-1,
page 1-12). They are preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization,
buildup, combat employment, and demobilization. Although each insurgency
is unique, U.S. sponsorship of a resistance organization generally passes
through the seven phases. Each phase may not occur sequentially or receive
the same degree of emphasis. The phases may occur concurrently or not at
all, depending on the specific situation. A large and effective organization
1-11 FM 3-05.201
may only require logistics support, while a small or disorganized
organization might require more attention.
Figure 1-1. Seven Phases to a U.S.-Sponsored Insurgency
PHASE I - PREPARATION (FORMERLY CALLED PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION)
1-44. The preparation phase must begin with a complete intelligence
preparation of the battlespace (IPB). UW operations need to include, but are
not limited to, a thorough analysis of the resistance force’s strengths,
weaknesses, logistic concerns, level of  training and experience, political or
1-12 FM 3-05.201
military agendas, factional relationships, and external political ties. Along
with this data, a thorough area study should be done of the target area. The
area study should include, but is not  limited to, political issues, religion,
economics, weather, living standards, medical issues, education, and
government services. This study is required to develop strong PSYOP and
Civil Affairs (CA) plans that are crucial in the support of a strong UW plan.
1-45. The preparation phase includes CA and PSYOP support. CA units
support SF in UW missions by providing advice and assistance relating to
social, economic, and political considerations within the JSOA. PSYOP units
prepare the resistance organization and civilians of a potential JSOA to
accept U.S. sponsorship and the subsequent assistance of SFODs.
1-46. The nature of UW may limit the use of supporting CA units to outside
the JSOA. CA personnel may accompany  deploying SF units depending on
mission requirements or METT-TC. CA personnel train insurgent military
and political elements in CA activities and civil-military operations (CMO).
The training focuses on the civil centers of gravity and gains momentum to
mobilize the civilians towards the insurgents’ goals. These activities must be
coordinated with the JSOA PSYOP plan.
1-47. The United States Government (USG) begins PSYOP as far in
advance as possible. PSYOP units prepare the resistance organization and
the civilian population of a potential  JSOA to accept U.S. sponsorship.
PSYOP objectives in a UW operation include—
•  Creating popular support for the insurgency movement.
•  Developing support of the populace  to allow the insurgents to avoid
detection and move freely.
•  Promoting the recruitment of others into the resistance movement.
•  Discrediting the existing government and its programs.
•  Informing the international community of the goodwill and intent of
the United States and insurgents.
•  Gaining support of the indigenous populace for U.S. support and
presence.
•  Countering hostile propaganda.
•  Training members of the indigenous population or force in PSYOP
(target audience analysis, local  product development, targeting,
dissemination, and analysis of impact indicators).
•  Maintaining motivation among the insurgents.
•  Passing information or instructions  to the resistance organization or
its subordinate elements.
•  Providing a “link” between the resistance organization and foreign
populations.
•  Promoting reforms the insurgent organization will establish after the
hostile government’s overthrow.
1-48. CA planning teams may participate in the military decision-making
process (MDMP) and analyze the JSOA to provide the SFOD commander
1-13 FM 3-05.201
with a perspective of the nonmilitary factors—civil areas, structures,
capabilities, organizations, people,  and events (CASCOPE)—that shape the
operational environment. CA planning team functions include—
•  Establishing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) at the earliest
opportunity to facilitate collaborative premission coordination with the
nonmilitary agencies that will participate in or influence the outcome
of the pending operation.
•  Determining what, when, and why civilians might be encountered in
the JSOA, what activities those civilians are engaged in that might
affect the military operation, and how military operations might affect
the lives of the civilians.
•  Determining CA measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that generate the
definition and conditions for success.
•  Determining the orientation and requirements of a posthostilities
infrastructure.
•  Identifying and requesting United States Army Reserve (USAR) CA
functional specialists who will  provide a more comprehensive CA
capability to facilitate the transition to stability operations.
•  Developing a draft disengagement concept.
PHASE II - INITIAL CONTACT
1-49. Ideally, initial contact with the  established or potential resistance
movement should be made before committing SF units. This procedure allows
for an accurate assessment of the potential resistance in the JSOA and
arranges for the reception and initial assistance of the infiltrated element.
Other USG agencies normally conduct the initial contact. During contact, SF
personnel assess the resistance potential  in the area of operations (AO) and
the compatibility of U.S. and resistance interests and objectives. This phase
also allows assessment planners to make arrangements for the reception and
initial assistance of the SFOD. The special operations command (SOC)
should arrange to exfiltrate an asset from the AO to brief the staff and SFOD
while in isolation. Under certain circumstances, a small, carefully selected
“pilot team” composed of individuals possessing specialized skills may make
initial contact. This team’s mission is to assess designated areas to determine
the feasibility of developing the resistance potential and to establish contact
with indigenous leaders. Once the theater command or SOC has determined
the feasibility of developing the area, additional SF elements may be
infiltrated. The pilot team may remain with the SFODs or be exfiltrated as
directed.
1-50. During this phase, PSYOP units can develop themes, symbols, and
programs that support the planned resistance operations. They can also
prepare the local inhabitants to receive allied forces and actively assist in the
UW mission to follow. PSYOP begins targeting the enemy and resistance
forces with the need to adhere to the law of war, highlighting enemy
violations. CA team members may continue to support SFOD assessments.
1-14 FM 3-05.201
CA specialists can participate as members of the “pilot team” to assist in
assessing the feasibility of developing the resistance potential in designated
areas and establishing contact with indigenous leaders.
PHASE III - INFILTRATION
1-51. During the infiltration phase, the SFOD clandestinely or covertly
infiltrates into the JSOA. Mission requirements, along with METT-TC, will
determine the most desirable method of infiltration. After infiltration, the
SFOD meets the resistance organization and moves to its secure area.
Infiltration is not complete until the initial entry report is sent to the Special
Forces operational base (SFOB) or forward operational base (FOB). The
detachment submits the initial entry report as soon as possible upon
infiltration. The report must be sent even if the SFOD does not contact the
local resistance. Immediately upon infiltration, the SFOD begins a
continuous area assessment to confirm or refute information received before
infiltration. The detachment will continue to report all relevant operational
information. If the mission warrants, selected CA and PSYOP team members
may infiltrate into the JSOA with the SF detachment. Otherwise, CA and
PSYOP team members support infiltration and subsequent phases  as
reachback assets from the SFOB or FOB.
PHASE IV - ORGANIZATION
1-52. The SFOD begins to establish rapport with the resistance leadership
by showing an understanding of, confidence in, and concern for the resistance
organization and its cause. The detachment explains its capabilities and
limitations and begins to assist the resistance leadership  with the
development of the resistance organization. The SFOD must then prove its
value in actual operations. Building rapport is a difficult and complicated
process based on mutual trust, confidence, and understanding. It is not
accomplished overnight.
1-53. Before a resistance organization can successfully engage in combat
operations, the resistance leadership must organize an infrastructure that
can sustain itself in combat and withstand the anticipated hostile reaction to
armed resistance. During the organization phase, the resistance leadership
develops a resistance cadre to serve as the organizational nucleus during the
buildup phase. The SFOD assists the resistance leadership in conducting a
cadre training program to prepare for the eventual buildup of the resistance
organization.
1-54. The resistance leader and SFOD commander must agree upon
command and control (C2) arrangements. Detachment members normally
advise and assist counterpart resistance leaders. In some situations, SFOD
members may actually direct some resistance activities.
1-55. The specifics of resistance organization depend on local conditions.
UW requires centralized direction and decentralized execution under
conditions that place great demands on the resistance organization and its
leadership. Armed rebellion inherently creates an ambiguous and
unstructured environment. No two resistance organizations need the same
degree or level of organization. The SFOD commander should consider the
1-15 FM 3-05.201
following factors when advising the  resistance leadership concerning
organization:
•  Effectiveness of existing resistance organization.
•  Extent of cooperation between the resistance organization and the
local populace.
•  Hostile activity and security measures.
•  Political boundaries, natural terrain features, potential targets,
population density, and other characteristics of the JSOA.
•  Religious, ethnic, political, and ideological differences among elements
of the population and competing resistance organizations.
•  Proposed type and scope of combat operations.
•  Degree of U.S. influence with the resistance organization.
1-56. During the organization phase, PSYOP personnel can be used to
promote the resistance movement’s expansion and development by
highlighting the enemy’s weaknesses and countering the enemy’s
propaganda. PSYOP forces use themes to help the resistance organization
influence attitudes and behavior to win the populace’s support. PSYOP
programs can support damage control and assist the development of a sound
infrastructure. Such programs contribute to the overall attainment of the
resistance movement’s goals. PSYOP programs can cover the resistance
movement’s political, economic, and social goals; the resistance movement
cadre’s ideological indoctrination; the practical impact of  tactical operations
on the population; and the significance of and need for the resistance
member’s proper personal conduct with the populace.
1-57. CA team members can be used to assess the effect of the organization
efforts on the political, economic, information (social and cultural), and
humanitarian aspects of the JSOA. They can also screen the membership of
the resistance cadre for potential positions in a posthostilities infrastructure.
In future operations, CA team members may present redevelopment models
illustrating the impact of posthostilities civil-military  initiatives. CA team
members can assist by helping indigenous people and their institutions, as
may exist, and building a local capacity to survive ensuing conflicts or crises.
PHASE V - BUILDUP
1-58. The buildup phase involves expanding the resistance elements and
their activities. Their tasks include infiltration or procurement of equipment
and supplies to support the expansion and subsequent combat  operations.
During the buildup phase, the resistance cadre expands into an effective
organization that can conduct combat operations. Recruitment increases due
to successful missions. Guerrilla force missions and tactics dictate a simple,
mobile, and flexible organization capable of rapid dispersion and
consolidation in response to the tactical situation. Each unit must be
self-contained with its own intelligence, communications, and  logistics
systems.
1-59. In this phase, PSYOP units can  be used to focus on the resistance
movement’s full expansion and development. PSYOP programs enhance the
1-16 FM 3-05.201
resistance leadership’s legitimacy and  effectiveness, emphasize the rules of
engagement (ROE), and identify targets whose destruction would impact
adversely on the civilian populace. They highlight the government’s actions
taken against the population during its counterinsurgency campaign. PSYOP
units can promote the uncommitted population’s support for the  insurgency
and counter the enemy’s propaganda. Unit members continue to  stress and
assure the success of the resistance movement and allied operations.
1-60. CA team members can continually assess the effect of the buildup
efforts on the political, economic, information, and humanitarian aspects of
the JSOA. CA team members can assist the SFOD in training insurgent
military forces in CA activities and CMO. CA team members begin focusing
on planning posthostilities transition operations that capitalize on the
unique skills of the USAR CA functional specialists, to include training
potential members of the posthostilities infrastructure separately and
concurrently with the guerrilla force.
PHASE VI - COMBAT EMPLOYMENT
1-61. Combat operations increase in scope and size to support the objectives
of the area command. During the combat employment phase, the resistance
organization conducts combat operations to achieve its strategic politicomilitary objectives. The SFOD ensures that resistance activities continue to
support the goals of the area command. Interdiction is the basic UW combat
activity. These operations can drain the hostile power’s morale and resources,
disrupt its administration, and maintain the civilian population’s morale and
will to resist. Each target should contribute to destroying or neutralizing an
entire target system.
1-62. In this phase, PSYOP units can exploit successful combat operations
to attract more recruits. Unit members focus on themes and symbols of
nationalism, success, and inevitability of complete victory. PSYOP units can
also induce enemy defections or noncompliance with orders in an effort to
protect themselves. They continue targeting the population to increase their
support for the insurgency, the allied forces, and the eventual  follow-on
government. PSYOP units can assist in controlling or directing the dislocated
civilian (DC) flow to facilitate the movement of combat forces and to
minimize casualties. They continue to counter the enemy’s propaganda.
1-63. CA teams analyze the civil component of the JSOA for CASCOPE to
determine the impact of the civil environment on combat operations, as well
as the impact of combat operations on the civil environment. CA teams
anticipate, monitor, and conduct mitigating activities to reduce the negative
effect of combat operations on the civil sector and vice versa, as well as to
identify when the MOEs have been achieved. They assist the SFOD and area
commander by fulfilling the command responsibilities inherent  in CMO.
They do this directly, by conducting CA activities and indirectly, by providing
CA advisors. They assist the SFOD in continuing to apply mediation skills to
possible and actual sources of indigenous tension.
1-17 FM 3-05.201
PHASE VII - DEMOBILIZATION
1-64. Demobilization is the last, most difficult, and most sensitive phase of
UW operations. Demobilization planning begins when the USG decides to
sponsor a resistance organization and ends in the JSOA. Civilian USG
agencies, along with international organizations and agencies such as the
United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS),
normally conduct demobilization of the military groups. SF, PSYOP, and CA
units help these agencies conduct demobilization using their knowledge of
the terrain and the forces within the JSOA. The manner in which
demobilization occurs will affect the postwar attitudes of the people and the
government toward the United States. The greatest demobilization danger is
the possibility that former resistance members may resort to subversion of
the new government, factional disputes, or banditry. The new government
brings arms and ammunition under its control to ensure public security and
to return to a functional civil structure based on the rule of  law. It helps
resistance forces return to previous occupations and may integrate them into
the new reconstituted national army. The new government must make every
effort to reorient former resistance members into a peaceful society and gain
their trust.
The most important phase is the one where successful accomplishment
meets the U.S. government objectives.
COL John Mulholland, Commander,
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Afghanistan
1-65. PSYOP units help explain the demobilization process and promote the
insurgent’s orderly transition to peaceful civilian life. The primary aim is to
prevent the formation of groups opposing the recognized government.
Maintaining loyalty to the legitimate (newly established) government is the
major concern. PSYOP units also conduct many direct and indirect activities
that assist the new government’s demobilization effort. PSYOP units—
•  Help to secure lines of communications (LOCs).
•  Control rumors by publishing and broadcasting the news.
•  Assist the marshalling of available labor.
•  Help to establish law and order.
•  Continue to assist controlling DCs  by directing them to available
assistance.
1-66. CA teams support the SFOD and  area commander by implementing
well-planned and coordinated transition plans. CA teams draw upon civilianattained skills in 16 functional areas to assist the SFOD and new indigenous
civil authorities in returning affected areas to normalcy and establishing a
sustainable, durable solution to the conflict. Through the CMOC, CA teams
continue to facilitate interagency operations with USG agencies,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other nonmilitary organizations
during the transition of operations from military to indigenous authority, as
well as from former to new regime. CA teams perform various roles in
support to civil administration. They also support the conduct of DC
operations. CA teams oversee programs designed to retrain former
combatants to become productive members of civil society.
1-18 FM 3-05.201
INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN UW
1-67. Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary
information and information systems, while defending one’s own information
and information systems to achieve information superiority in support of
national military strategy. Information superiority is the capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. IO applies across
all phases of an operation, across the range of military operations, and at
every level of war. Information warfare  (IW) is IO conducted during time of
crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over
a specific adversary or adversaries. The ultimate targets of offensive IO are
the human decision-making processes. Defensive IO activities are conducted
on a continuous basis and are an inherent part of force employment across
the range of military operations. IO may involve complex legal  and policy
issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval.
Offensive and defensive IO should also be integrated with intelligence and
other information-related activities, as well as those activities leveraging
friendly information systems, including friendly decision-making processes.
The IO cell on the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) staff is a
critical element to ensure ARSOF plans and operations are integrated,
coordinated, and deconflicted across the full spectrum of IO.
1-68. IO support the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and
the effective employment of IO is essential for meeting the JSOTF’s
objectives. As appropriate, IO target or protect information,  informationtransfer links, information-gathering and information-processing nodes, and
the human decision-making process. Offensive and defensive IO are applied
to achieve synergy through a combination of elements. JP 3-13,  Joint
Doctrine for Information Operations, provides additional information.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN UW
1-69. PSYOP units are a vital part of UW operations. When properly
employed, coordinated, and integrated, they can significantly enhance the
combat power of resistance forces. PSYOP specialists augmenting the SFOD
can deploy into any JSOA and plan the propaganda themes, messages,
media, and methods to be used, based on target audience analysis. PSYOP in
contemporary and future UW become more critical as ideological and
resistance struggles increase. A temporary tactical advantage may create a
long-term psychological disadvantage.  All actions must be reviewed, based
upon their local, regional, or even international impact. PSYOP usually
involve the following major target audiences in a JSOA.
ENEMY FORCES
1-70. These elements may represent the government forces, an occupying
power, or one assisting the hostile government and may be of the  same
nationality as the local populace.  In any case, PSYOP personnel wage
campaigns against the members of the enemy forces to make them feel
isolated and improperly supported, doubtful of the outcome of their struggle,
distrustful of each other, and unsure of the morality of their cause.
1-19 FM 3-05.201
ENEMY SYMPATHIZERS
1-71. This target audience consists  of civilians in an AO who are willing
enemy collaborators, unwilling enemy collaborators (will collaborate under
duress), and passive enemy sympathizers. The goal of a PSYOP campaign
aimed at this group is to identify and discredit the enemy collaborators and
to weaken their belief in the enemy’s military strength and power.
THE UNCOMMITTED
1-72. These members of the general population are neutral during the
initial stage of hostilities or resistance movements. They may fear the aims of
the movement or are uncertain of its success. To win over the uncommitted,
PSYOP personnel must stress that the resistance shares and fights for the
political and social goals of the population. The United States and its allies,
in backing the resistance movement, support these same goals to ensure the
resistance movement will be successful.
RESISTANCE SYMPATHIZERS
1-73. This target audience includes  civilians and government, military, or
paramilitary members who support the goals of the movement but who are
not active members of the resistance  force. PSYOP directed at this target
audience stress themes that encourage the populace to support actively
(though generally covertly) or cooperate passively with the resistance force in
achieving common goals. These appeals ensure that the people, their
sensitivities, cultures, customs, and needs are respected.
1-74. PSYOP advisors and the SFODs with whom they work exploit
propaganda opportunities. The PSYOP teams attached to the SFOD help
convince the guerrillas to conduct operations that create popular support for
the resistance movement, both in and out of the JSOA. Indigenous personnel
are trained in the effective conduct of PSYOP and then integrated into the
political infrastructure and guerrilla forces. These forces then conduct
PSYOP in support of the needs of the area commander. Those needs should
relate to the goals of the unified commander, specific situation,  or UW
mission. Through face-to-face meetings with local indigenous leaders, SFOD
personnel strengthen mutual respect, confidence, and trust. They also gain
valuable insight into the guerrilla force’s problems and gain rapport by
sharing the same living and fighting conditions.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN UW
1-75. CMO are inherent to UW. The UW environment contains both
military and civilian components that are scattered and intertwined within
the JSOA. Although the SFOD generally focuses its efforts on the military
aspect of an insurgency, it must also consider the nonmilitary aspects of the
JSOA. Natural, routine, planned, or unpredictable indigenous activities may
hinder or help the activities of the  guerrilla force during all phases of a
U.S.-sponsored insurgency.
1-76. CMO are the commander’s activities that establish, maintain,
influence, or exploit relations between military (including guerrilla or
insurgent) forces, government, and  nongovernment civilian organizations
1-20 FM 3-05.201
and authorities, and the indigenous populace in the JSOA. These activities
should facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve U.S.
objectives. In CMO, military forces may perform activities and functions
normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These
activities will occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may
also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES
1-77. SOF commanders must incorporate the 12 special operations (SO)
imperatives into their mission planning and execution to use their forces
effectively. These imperatives, although developed to provide guidance to
SOF, apply to any unit, organization, agency, or activity that may be involved
in UW. They are discussed below.
1 - UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-78. In UW, there are two aspects of the operational environment that SF
must be familiar with—the internal and the external. The first aspect is
critical to applying resources and skills effectively to accomplish the mission.
The second aspect is critical to guiding actions in a very fluid and highly
unstructured environment.
Internal Factors
1-79. SFOD members must know pertinent METT-TC as in any military
operation. In addition, they must understand the insurgent movement, to
include the underlying political and social causes, demographic composition
of the movement’s membership, history, goals, claims to legitimacy, methods,
and any other pertinent information. SFOD members must have a thorough
knowledge of the government, military, and other institutions  that formally
or informally exercise power normally associated with a functional
government. This knowledge includes—
•  Strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, functions, and actual power
centers (as opposed to what appears on organization charts) of the
organizations.
•  Interrelationships between these organizations.
•  Goals and motivating factors for each organization.
•  Relationships with the United States, other governments,
international organizations, and NGOs.
1-80. The civilian population is the critical factor. SFOD members must
understand the demography, culture, taboos, beliefs, customs, history, goals,
ethnic composition, and expectations of the civilian population. Most
important, they must be aware of the dynamics of the many correlations
among these various aspects of a society. SFOD members must be aware of
who can influence whom, and how that influence is achieved and exercised.
They must also be aware of any incidental effect the actions with any one
factor have on another.
External Factors
1-21 FM 3-05.201
1-81. SFOD members must understand the U.S. Army command
relationships, both military and interagency, that affect the individual
guerrilla and the SFOD. In addition, SFOD members must understand the—
•  Scope and limitations of each agency’s influence and programs.
•  Legal and political restrictions on SF activities.
•  Sources and assistance available to SF to further assure mission
accomplishment.
•  Role of the U.S. media and the international press.
•  Intent and goals of the USG.
•  Intent and goals of NGOs, humanitarian relief organizations (HROs),
and other key civilian agencies in the JSOA.
•  Command relationships of international agencies and NGOs with
representatives of the USG.
•  Intent and goals of international  agencies (United Nations, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]).
•  Applicable ROE, to include their intent as well as the specifically
enumerated provisions.
1-82. SFOD members must also be able to visualize and act on unforeseen
circumstances. Therefore, they must have a clear understanding of the
charter and goals of the total U.S. effort. It is impossible to predict every
situation and write specific ROE or a course of action (COA) that addresses
each and every situation. When the SFOD members understand the
commander’s intent, they can respond with rapid flexibility to the apparent
unforeseen and unplanned circumstances.
2 - RECOGNIZE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
1-83. UW is essentially a political activity. Every act, from advising military
activities to informal conversation,  has a potential political impact. SFOD
members should not anticipate a conventional environment where  more
traditional military concerns predominate. Whether conducting military
operations independently or in conjunction with conventional forces, SFOD
members must consider both the short- and long-term political implications
of their acts.
3 - FACILITATE INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES
1-84. UW, by definition, is an interagency effort in which military
operations represent only one part (usually not the most important one) of
the overall U.S. program. SF must be aware of all the agencies that comprise
the UW effort. SF may also act as the liaison between the resistance force,
U.S. agencies, and other DOD components to ensure that synergy is
achieved. When participating in an interagency and often joint effort, SF
must strive for unity of effort and recognize the difficulty in achieving it. SF
must also anticipate ambiguous missions, conflicting interests and goals, and
disunity of effort. When lacking unity of command, SF can promote unity of
effort by—
•  Requesting clear mission statements and the decision maker’s intent.
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•  Actively and continually coordinating activities with all involved.
4 - ENGAGE THE THREAT DISCRIMINATELY
1-85. The SF commander must know when, where, and how to employ his
assets based on short- and long-term  objectives. This imperative contains
three messages for SF involved in a UW effort.
1-86. The first message concerns the selection and distribution of resources
for both personnel and materiel. Appropriateness, not mass, is the standard.
SF commanders must ensure that SFODs selected for the mission  are
capable, qualified, trained, and necessary for the effort. Minimizing the U.S.
presence while maximizing its impact is the desired outcome.
1-87. The second message relates to  selection of training, advice, and
assistance to be given. Resources are normally limited in a UW environment
and must be used wisely for best effect. Based on SOF’s understanding of
their operational environment and its complex internal dynamics, SF must
carefully select which particular training and advice to give. This impact is
as much a consideration in selecting training and advice as are the political
implications of the type of subject and assistance given.
1-88. The third message deals with  tactical considerations. Tactical
operations in UW must be carefully targeted to ensure success and avoid
alienating the civilian population.
5 - CONSIDER LONG-TERM EFFECTS
1-89. UW efforts are inherently long-term. Tactical victories are of little
value unless they contribute to the success of the overall operational scheme.
The operational scheme may be nonmilitary in nature. Placing each problem
in its broader political, military, and psychological context is the next
consideration. SFOD members develop a  long-term approach to solving the
problem. They accept legal and political constraints to avoid strategic failure
while achieving tactical success. They do not jeopardize the success of theater
long-term goals by the desire for immediate or possible short-term success.
Policies, plans, and operations must be consistent with U.S. national and
theater priorities and the objectives they support.
6 - ENSURE LEGITIMACY AND CREDIBILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
1-90. Significant moral and legal considerations exist in a UW effort.
Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining
international and internal support. Without this support,  the United States
cannot sustain assistance to a resistance movement. Without recognized
legitimacy and credibility, military operations will not receive the support of
the indigenous population, the U.S. population, or the international
community.
7 - ANTICIPATE AND CONTROL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS
1-91. All operations and activities in a UW environment will have
significant psychological effects. Combat operations and civic action
programs are examples of the type of  operations or activities with obvious
psychological effects. Some operations and activities may be conducted
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specifically to produce a desired psychological effect. A tactical victory may be
totally negated or overshadowed by negative psychological impact.
Recognizing that perceptions may be more important than reality in this
arena, SF must take care to ensure operations are understood by  all
audiences. Loss of control of perceptions may cause distortion of the facts and
may even diminish or destroy the difficult gains of even the best-planned and
executed missions.
8 - APPLY CAPABILITIES INDIRECTLY
1-92. The primary role of SF in UW is to advise, train, and aid resistance
forces. The resistance area commander must assume primary authority and
responsibility for the success or failure  of this combined effort. Successful
U.S.-advised operations reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility
of the area command and resistance movement.
9 - DEVELOP MULTIPLE OPTIONS
1-93. SFOD members engaged in a UW operation must be aware of and
prepared for possible contingencies and follow-on missions. The SFOD
members must plan to use their range of expertise even if not specifically
tasked to do so. A change of operational environment may dictate a change of
ROE or mission. SFOD members maintain operational flexibility by
visualizing and developing a broad range of options and concept plans
(CONPLANs). They can then shift from one option to another before and
during mission execution.
10 - ENSURE LONG-TERM SUSTAINMENT
1-94. SFOD members involved in a UW effort must avoid advising  or
training the resistance forces in techniques and procedures beyond their
capabilities to sustain themselves. U.S. tactics, techniques, and procedures
(tactical communications, medic, demolitions, weapons, and logistics) may be
modified to negate the threat. SF must recognize the need for training
programs and equipment that are durable, consistent, and sustainable by the
resistance movement and the USG.
11 - PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE
1-95. Intelligence forms the basis for all UW activities and programs. UW
operations depend on detailed and comprehensive intelligence on all aspects
of the operational environment and its internal dynamics. SFOD members
establish priority of effort when they identify intelligence requirements.
Effective operations security (OPSEC) requires an alert organization that can
assess the hostile threat, warn the unit, and take timely action to penetrate
and neutralize the hostile effort. SFOD members in a UW environment need
intelligence that identifies the enemy locations and their intentions for force
protection. However, not all threats may come from an identifiable enemy.
SFOD members should consider the nonmilitary threats posed by the civil
sector, such as criminal activities, hazardous materials, civil unrest, and
disease. The knowledge they gain prepares them to effectively advise and
train the guerrilla force.
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1-25
12 - BALANCE SECURITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION
1-96. SFOD members performing a UW mission may be in a unique position
to significantly help other SOF and  conventional forces accomplish their
missions. SO are often compartmented for security concerns, but
compartmentation can exclude key personnel from the planning process.
Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security will
almost always cause the mission to fail because of inadequate  face-to-face
coordination. SF must resolve the dichotomy of mission planning
synchronization and security. Chapter 2
Premission Activities
SF commanders conduct both deliberate and time-sensitive mission
planning and targeting. They receive their missions as a result of the joint
strategic planning process. Strategies, policies, and SF missions are
subject to continual change. This chapter describes how SF missions are
identified and how SF battalions, companies, and SFODAs conduct
mission analysis, feasibility assessments, and mission planning to
perform UW missions. Ingredients of successful irregular warfare are as
follows:
1. Patience to withstand protracted conflict. “Time works for us. Time will
be our best strategist” – Truong Chinh.
2. Political awareness on the part of all ranks.
3. Intensive “wooing” of all the “little people” to the side of the insurgent.
4. The weakening of the enemy’s morale by constant propaganda and
harassment.
5. Constant offensive action  against enemy personnel and sensitive
points, but only when tactical  advantage is on the side of the
irregulars.
6. The avoidance of pitched battles with equal or superior forces.
7. Defense only when it is essential to survival or to aid another element
to withdraw.
8. The consideration of the enemy’s supply system as your own—
making him haul the materiel to dumps, then seize it from him.
9. Constant striving to grow undercover forces into regular forces, ones
capable of meeting the enemy on his own ground when the time and
circumstances make victory certain.
Findings From BG Yarborough’s Study,
Circa 1961
MISSION ANALYSIS
2-1. In UW mission analysis, the battalion staff analysts view all sources of
mission letters and taskings. They set  priorities for resources and efforts
through a clear statement of the battalion commander’s intent and concept of
operation. Mission analysis provides the basis for the battalion missionessential task list (METL) preparation and, with the mission  letter
development, drives unit training for all the SFODs.
  2-1 FM 3-05.201
PROCEDURES
2-2. Home station mission analysis of UW follows a specific application of
the deliberate planning process. This process assumes the SF battalion has
more than one operation plan (OPLAN) it may have to execute. The
deliberate planning process allows staff analysts to allocate resources and set
priorities of effort. The analysts develop and refine draft METLs based on
METT-TC planning. The bulk of the work on area studies is completed before
beginning specific deliberate planning. Figure 2-1 summarizes the sources,
processes, and products in mission analysis.
•  Study purpose of higher headquarters mission (understand the why).
•  Determine the higher commander’s intent, two levels up. Review higher
commander’s overall deception plan.
•  Review area of operations to understand higher headquarters mission and intent:
ƒ The command.
ƒ The environment.
ƒ The threat.
•  Identify specified and implied tasks:
ƒ Consider the mission statement, purpose, and concept of the operation.
ƒ Develop a mental picture and outline the desired end state.
ƒ Consider limitations:
8
8
Constraints (what must be done) imposed by the command, the environment,
and the threat.
Restrictions (what cannot be done) imposed by the command, the
environment, and the threat.
•  Identify mission-essential tasks.
•  Review available assets.
•  Determine acceptable levels of risks.
•  Conduct detailed time analysis.
•  Restate the mission.
Figure 2-1. Mission Analysis
2-3. An SF battalion is seldom activated to execute a mission from scratch;
therefore, planning does not begin with a total absence of previous guidance
or deliberate planning. By the very nature of UW, deliberate planning is
mandated at home station due to the complexity and sensitivity of the
mission. This planning results in a mission letter. Mission analysis, METL
development, and mission letters are an integral part of the deliberate
planning process. During time-sensitive crisis action planning, a tasking
order (TASKORD) drives mission analysis and planning. Crisis action
planning is an abbreviated version of the deliberate planning process
conducted on a 96-hour timeline. The battalion normally modifies or updates
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previously completed plans developed at home station. Reviews of the
battalion METL and mission letters should be done annually or when—
•  Major changes in the political and social environment occur after
receipt of the mission letter.
•  Modified, improved, and enhanced METLs significantly alter the
mission.
•  A new or additional TASKORD is received in isolation.
•  Supported OPLANs are significantly changed.
•  Battle focus analysis (BFA), as outlined in the United States Army
Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC[A]) Regulation 350-1,
Component T aining, is conducted. Normally BFA occurs before and
after the company and battalion commanders are briefed.
r
 BFA is the process of deriving peacetime training requirements from
wartime missions. The correlation between BFA and the deliberate planning
process at home station identify the specific unit mission, target
organizations or countries, and the country study.
MISSION RECEIPT
2-4. Consistent with joint mission planning, mission analysis begins with
the transmission of the mission tasking package (MTP) in accordance with
(IAW) JP 3-05.5. Receipt of an MTP from the SOC or JSOTF, or a mission
letter from the SF group initiates planning at the battalion  level. The
battalion staffs must analyze the mission letter along with many other
documents. These documents include OPLANs, peacetime campaign plans
(PCPs), and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans (JSCPs). The staffs first look
at developed war plans (OPLANs and CONPLANs) containing or implying
mission requirements. They review the PCPs that outline major operations
such as the overall counterdrug efforts for an area or region. The staffs also
use the JSCPs to allocate missions  and resources to unified combatant
commanders. The JSCPs developed at the Joint Staff and the PCPs
developed at unified levels are basic outlines of the “big picture” for regional
U.S. efforts. In addition to external documents specifying potential missions,
the battalion commander may deduce missions based on his evaluation of the
assigned JSOA. The battalion commander must direct priority of effort first
to externally directed missions and second to deduced missions. The battalion
staff should forward mission requirements to the SF group for validation and
inclusion in tasking documents. SFODA and B commanders must have a
clear understanding of the intent of all the commanders involved, whether or
not the mission is externally or internally developed. If any staff member
notes a conflict or lacks understanding of the intent, he should resolve these
problems at the highest level before mission analysis proceeds.
INFORMATION EXCHANGE
2-5. Staff representatives and commanders exchange information critical to
initial mission analysis. Additionally, interagency information support may
be obtained through the JSOTF. The battalion staff is the focal point for
2-3 FM 3-05.201
passing information. Therefore, battalion staff must ensure that all requests
and responses are quickly and fully disseminated.
INITIAL MISSION ANALYSIS (DELIBERATE PLANNING)
2-6. The commander, selected staff representatives, and certain key support
element leaders review the documents  received during mission receipt and
identify and list the specified and implied tasks. They must consider the
relationship of UW to other missions  and its status as a mission. At this
point, they do not direct mission analysis against a specific target for
execution by a specific SFODA. Rather, they direct analysis  at allocating
resources against projected requirements to best achieve the SF group
commander’s intent. The final products are the basis for routine personnel
and administrative activities during garrison operations. These products are
also used to develop specific battalion- and lower-level plans of execution
(POEs). The result of this analysis  is the battalion commander’s restated
mission and operational planning guidance. The restated mission must
clearly identify the requirement to conduct UW, state the commander’s
intent, contain specific COAs, and provide general guidelines.
PREPARATION OF STAFF ESTIMATES
2-7. The staff may present staff estimates orally or in writing. The volume of
UW material may dictate that such estimates be briefed to the commander
orally with emphasis on the staff sections’ conclusions and recommendations.
The following paragraphs discuss the considerations that each staff section
covers in its estimate.
S-1 - Personnel
2-8. In considering the battalion’s overall UW requirement, the S-1 must
evaluate battalion personnel strengths in terms of its capability to
accomplish the mission. The S-1 presents the battalion commander with
projected shortfalls in specific military occupational specialties (MOSs);
individual qualifications; distribution of personnel; or projected losses, gains,
and absences affecting overall readiness.
S-2 - Intelligence
2-9. Thoroughly reviewing available systems and identifying required
intelligence support are keys to developing the intelligence estimate. The S-2
section identifies and produces intelligence estimate requirements as soon as
possible to ensure mission success.  As the S-2 and other staff members
review available data, such as area studies, after-action reports (AARs), and
area assets, they must also consider alternate means of gathering the
required information. These may include requesting aerial overflights,
imagery, or exploiting sources within the JSOA. S-2 personnel review all
available information related to the priority intelligence requirements (PIR),
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), and information
requirements (IRs) passed by deployed SFODs to gain current information
and adjust established POEs. They should also request and review
information gathered by other group and battalion assets such as the
military intelligence (MI) detachment and its special operations teams A
(SOT-As).
2-4 FM 3-05.201
S-3 - Operations
2-10. The S-3 section’s estimate shows the recommended number of
subordinate units needed to meet requirements. The operations estimate
must identify general requirements for UW-related schooling, such as the
Combat Diver Qualification Course (CDQC); military free-fall (MFF),
advanced special operations (ASO), operations and intelligence (O&I), and
survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training; language courses;
and training with an evaluation of the SFOD’s current status and
capabilities. Considerations for UW involvement include the—
•  Number of SFODAs and SFODBs dedicated to preparing for UW as a
primary mission.
•  Feasibility of functionally aligning SFODAs within the companies with
all UW-tasked teams in one company or the preferability of having
them decentralized.
•  Requirements to deploy an FOB, advanced operational base (AOB), or
special operations command and control element (SOCCE) and, if so,
the number required.
S-4 - Logistics
2-11. The logistics section analyzes  the logistics needs to support the
required type and number of missions. This estimate may drive the
acquisition of certain types of items, revision of the modified table of
organization and equipment (MTOE), and budgeting for expendables and air
items to support UW. Supplies may also be acquired by battlespace recovery
and through indigenous sources in the JSOA.
Other Staff Elements
2-12. Special staff sections that involve CA, PSYOP, signal, medical, and
legal personnel may also be required  to provide estimates. These estimates
must, as a minimum, enable the UW-tasked teams to—
•  Evaluate the adequacy and compatibility of the type and density of
communications systems available versus mission requirements
(Appendix B).
•  Identify special medical requirements to support the types and
numbers of missions to be performed in a given JSOA (Appendix C).
•  Evaluate the legality of the general type of missions proposed,
particularly that of battalion-generated functional requirements
(Appendix D).
PRODUCTS
2-13. Once the staff sections prepare  the estimates, they present them to
the commander. Based on the information contained in the estimates, the
commander, aided by the battalion executive officer (XO), command sergeant
major (CSM), and S-3, prepares his estimate. This estimate contains
information on UW requirements, priorities, and other missions.  The
commander then formulates a clear statement of intent or concept of
operations (CONOPS) that lists his priorities concerning UW operations
(Figure 2-2). He further translates his CONOPS into a written mission letter
2-5 FM 3-05.201
to the SFODs A and B. These products drive several activities for the
battalion staff and subordinate units. Although these actions begin during
product development, they will not be finalized until after completion of
premission activities and the deliberate planning process at home station.
Figure 2-2. Military Decision-Making Process
STAFF ACTIVITIES
2-6 FM 3-05.201
2-14. As a result of the commander’s statement of intent, mission letters,
and guidance to battalion staff sections, various actions begin. The goal of
these actions is to aid the preparation, conduct, and support of UW
operations. These actions normally parallel actions taken in support of other
missions. However, each staff element fulfills the following UW-specific
considerations.
PERSONNEL
2-15. Based on the general guidance contained in the commander’s
statement of intent and guidance to the battalion, the S-1 conducts a
comprehensive review of personnel resources, assignments, and procedures.
Working closely with the S-3, battalion CSM, company commanders, and
sergeants major (SGMs), the S-1 determines the adequacy of assigned
personnel to meet the specific mission requirements. If he identifies
shortfalls in MOSs or specific qualifications, the S-1 forwards personnel
requests to the SF group. If he finds that authorizations under the current
MTOE do not support requirements, he works with the S-3 in submitting
MTOE changes. If the S-3 detects shortfalls in training, he corrects the
MTOE or obtains schooling as required. The S-1 maps the location of
personnel with mission-essential skills, experience, and abilities. For
example, certain missions may call for a native speaker, a member of a given
ethnic group, or an individual with in-country experience.
2-16. Although identifying requirements  is not the S-1’s responsibility, he
does identify and find the assets. Based on requirements identified by the
SFODs A and B, S-3, commanders, and SGMs, the S-1 matches  available
personnel who have UW-related skills with existing mission profiles.
Working with the SF group S-1 and the battalion CSM, the battalion S-1
requests appropriate personnel and advises the commander on the  most
appropriate assignment of incoming personnel. After mission-specific
planning is completed, the battalion  S-1 and company staffs monitor the
profiles for individual positions to assign incoming personnel accordingly.
INTELLIGENCE
2-17. During all stages of the mission, the S-2 section, more than any other
staff section, must be proactive. Given the commander’s intent, the S-2
should anticipate the IRs and generate the appropriate requests for
intelligence information (RIIs) and specific requests for information (RFIs).
When a UW mission is identified, the S-2 section—
•  Collects all available information on the JSOA.
•  Supports the deployment of pilot teams to collect current information.
FM 3-05.220 provides more information on pilot team support.
•  Sends RFIs to all available sources and agencies to gain current
material and information about the JSOA.
•  Reviews on-hand information including a detailed review of the
intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) reflecting information about the
JSOA.
•  Reviews current map coverage requirements for the JSOA.
2-7 FM 3-05.201
OPERATIONS
2-18. When acting as the operations center (OPCEN) director, the S-3
reviews specific skill qualifications and asks for required school quotas.
Working with subordinate element commanders and SGMs, he sets priorities
for allocations to UW-related schools. The S-3 drafts and presents  the
battalion METL, which must reflect requirements of subordinate units. He
synchronizes specific mission planning with other elements participating in
the supported OPLAN. When missions are to be performed in support of
conventional forces, the S-3 requests  direct liaison authority during plan
development. Based on the draft METL and commander’s concept of the
operation, he drafts the battalion commander’s training guidance and begins
work on the battalion’s long-range training plan. He  matches resource
forecasts to UW-specific requirements. He coordinates plans for PSYOP and
OPSEC. He must also be alert to training opportunities that are relevant to
METL requirements.
LOGISTICS
2-19. The S-4, like the S-2, must anticipate SFOD requirements. The S-4
section orders, purchases, or identifies specialized equipment (Appendix E).
When the current MTOE does not support the requirements, the S-4 submits
MTOE changes.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
2-20. The S-5 plans section must ensure all CMO plans related to UW
missions are made readily available. CMO considerations are analyzed using
the acronym CASCOPE. The six characteristics of CASCOPE are—
•  Civil  Areas. Key civilian areas or aspects of the terrain within a
commander’s battlespace, which are not normally thought of as
militarily significant.
•  Structures. Determine the location, functions, capabilities, and
application of all structures in support of military operations, to
include weighing the cost of their use.
•  Capabilities. Determine assistance needs by evaluating the
capabilities of the populace to sustain themselves.
•  Organizations. Identify all organized groups that may or may not be
affiliated with government agencies.
•  People. Includes all civilians one can expect to encounter in an AO, as
well as those outside the AO whose  actions, opinions, or political
influence can affect the military mission.
•  Events. Analyze all events occurring in the AO, both civilian and
military, that will impact the lives of the civilians.
2-21. Based on the civil centers of gravity, the CMO section coordinates
with supporting CA elements to determine possible (positive and  negative)
impacts of the mission on noncombatants and enemy forces. It then relays
this information to the tasked SFODs. The S-5 is the principal staff officer for
all CA activities and CMO matters. Employing the principles of CASCOPE,
he supplies data on politico-military, economic, and social matters. He
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identifies possible surplus or shortage of supplies and estimates the effects of
military operations on the local populace, international organizations, and
NGOs operating in the AO. The S-5 establishes the CMO center as required.
COMMUNICATIONS
2-22. The signal section analyzes the requirements for UW-unique
communications capabilities and evaluates the battalion’s ability to support
the mission with organic assets. Considerations for UW communications are
generally the same as those for other missions; however, certain UW-specific
aspects require special consideration. Planning for UW communications
requirements is vital to mission success. Redundancy and reliability of all
communications become imperative. The section must seek the best
compromise between the equipment weight, compatibility, and capabilities
for mission support. Appendix B provides further information.
SUBORDINATE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS
2-23. The transmission of mission letters to the SF companies begins their
direct involvement in the mission analysis process. The SF battalion support
company receives a mission letter at home station. The following paragraphs
discuss each element and specific personnel duties.
SFODB
2-24. The SFODB commander is the company commander. One of the
SFODB’s missions is to support the SFODAs in their UW mission. The
SFODB begins mission analysis upon receipt of the company mission letter.
Based on the letter and deliberate planning, the battalion commander
determines the UW-related SFODB team’s missions. The SFODB
commander’s dual role is to keep  his assigned SFODAs trained for their
missions and to prepare for the SFODB mission. He may also—
•  Support an area assessment (pilot) team.
•  Support a SOCCE for a UW mission.
•  Establish an AOB to support a UW mission.
•  Establish and run an isolation facility (ISOFAC).
•  Augment and reinforce the FOB.
2-25. Based on the company mission letter, the battalion commander
designates primary missions for each SFODA and SFODB. He provides them
with a mission letter clearly stating  the commander’s intent. The battalion
commander and staff analyze the abilities of the SFODAs and SFODBs,
ensuring they can accomplish the mission.
SFODA
2-26. The SFODA manages the operations journal and monitors incoming
and outgoing message files. Detachment members continue with OPSEC
measures to include controlling entry into their working area. They identify
the tasks for which they have functional area planning responsibility by
reviewing the higher commander’s operation order (OPORD) or OPLAN and
the mission briefing. By requesting clarification and additional guidance
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from higher headquarters (HQ), the SFODA clarifies all questions  it has
about the mission concerning—
•  Risk assessment.
•  Specified and implied tasks.
•  Resistance force training and its present status.
•  ROE, which include—
ƒ Area studies.
ƒ Cross-training plan development based on METT-TC.
ƒ Other operational objectives, such as the threat and civilian
welfare.
2-27. Based on the specified and implied tasks, the SFODA selects and lists
the mission-essential tasks (to include contingencies) for each of the following
phases of the mission:
•  Predeployment.
• Deployment.
•  Employment.
•  Redeployment.
•  Postdeployment.
2-28. SFODA staff members begin initial planning estimates of tentative
COAs for the mission-essential tasks based on the commander’s intent, the
restated mission, and S-3 guidance.
2-29. SFODA staff sections list CCIR in descending order of criticality based
on their functional areas and information gaps in the higher  commander’s
peacetime OPLAN. SFODA staff sections submit their functional area CCIR
to the S-3 and submit their IRs to the S-2. The S-3 develops a consolidated
list of all CCIR by collating the CCIR submitted by other staffs and the PIR
or IRs submitted by the S-2. The staff sections coordinate with the S-2 for the
dissemination of intelligence information to all SFOD members and, as
applicable, to subordinate and attached elements.
SFODA Commander
2-30. The SFODA’s mission analysis will normally begin after it has been
alerted and received a mission briefing in isolation. The SFODA commander
leads and provides guidance during the mission analysis. He establishes his
intent, which clearly states what the SFODA is to achieve, including the
specific objectives of the mission. He states the priority of effort and the most
likely contingencies and follow-on operations. The commander restates
external command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), combat
support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) relationships for all phases of
the mission identified in the higher commander’s OPORD or OPLAN and the
mission briefing. He establishes an event time schedule for the remainder of
the mission analysis. The schedule will include—
•  Maintaining OPSEC.
•  Requesting an asset.
2-10 FM 3-05.201
•  Conducting the mission concept (MICON).
•  Performing briefback planning.
•  Performing rehearsals.
•  Performing other mission activities as per the isolation schedule.
2-31. The planning and preparation phases are based on the METL and the
higher commander’s OPLAN or CONPLAN.
Assistant Detachment Commander
2-32. The SFOD warrant officer (WO) is the assistant detachment
commander (ADC) who supervises and directs all staff functions. He is the
acting SFOD chief of staff. The ADC identifies the legal status of forces
conducting operations in the JSOA. He ensures the SFOD understands the
legal category of the armed conflict within the JSOA and the  ROE. He
ensures all detachment members understand the U.S. policy regarding
prisoners. The ADC updates the CCIR relating to operational legal questions.
He coordinates for the submission of any additional METL items to the
SFOD’s METL. He also performs all CA and PSYOP functions for the team, if
there are no attachments.
Operations Sergeant (18Z)
2-33. The SFOD S-3 restates the mission to the SFOD in concise and
accurate terms of who, what, when, and where as per the higher
commander’s OPORD or OPLAN. He submits the restated mission  to the
SFOD commander for approval. The S-3 gives the approved mission
statement to all SFOD members and subordinates. He produces a single list
of SFOD mission-essential tasks by collating the task lists submitted by the
other staff sections. He determines  the tentative contents for the SFOD’s
OPLAN to include the necessary annexes  to cover all phases of the mission
IAW FM 5-0, Staff Organization and Operations (currently published as FM
101-5), and the consolidated METL. He develops planning guidance for the
other staff members based on the tentative contents of the SFOD’s OPLAN.
This list has specified and implied tasks. From these tasks, he develops the
mission METL from other team members and distributes the developed
planning guidance to the applicable staff sections.
Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant (18F)
2-34. The SFOD S-2 reviews all submitted RFIs. He coordinates these and
any special staff section requests as  separate requests. Also he reviews the
higher commander’s PIR and coordinates with the S-3 to identify other IRs.
He develops a tentative list of SFOD PIR and IRs based on the commander’s
intent, the SFOD mission, the criticality of specific staff IRs, the higher
commander’s PIR, and anticipated intelligence requirements to  support
operations. The S-2 submits the tentative PIR and IR list to the S-3 for
incorporation into the SFOD CCIR. The CCIR are prioritized for his use in
developing his timely information management, tactical decision process, and
his actions and reactions that affect successful mission accomplishment. He
also coordinates for the inclusion of  additional mission-essential tasks into
the SFOD’s METL.
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SF BATTALION SUPPORT COMPANY
2-35. To best support the SFODs, the battalion support company must have
a clear picture of mission requirements. The company provides intelligence
and electronic warfare (IEW) support, CSS, and signal support to an FOB
and their deployed SFODs. The first source of these requirements is the
mission letter. Working with other primary and special staff sections, the S-3
section prepares this mission letter, which the battalion commander issues.
The mission letter contains general guidance as to the types and quantities of
support the company will be required to provide. The mission letter must
alert the signal detachment to any unusual signal requirements and include
other UW-specific taskings. The mission letter serves as a basis for METL
development for the SF battalion support company commander. The second
means of identifying support requirements are the briefbacks conducted by
the employed SFODs. Representation of all concerned staff sections at this
mostly oral presentation enhances mission success more than  almost any
other briefing. The briefback is normally the last chance for the S-3 and S-4
representatives to brief the SFOD; commanders present any last  minute
changes and updates.
2-36. Upon completion of specific mission planning, the support company
commander revises the draft METL. Working with the appropriate staff
section, the support company commander issues guidance to each of his
subordinate elements in a mission letter. The letter includes a statement of
intent and CONOPS. This letter provides a start point for developing the
battalion METL. Subordinate elements then draft specific and related tasks
from this general analysis.
MISSION PLANNING
2-37. FM 3-05.20 and Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 31-1-3,  Detachment
Mission Planning Guide, outline specific SFODA mission planning
procedures to include deliberate and time-sensitive (crisis action) planning.
Deliberate (peacetime) planning is based on projected political and military
situations that are applicable to a UW environment. The objective of this
process is to develop an OPLAN with CONPLANs to provide for flexible
execution. A crisis is fluid by nature and involves dynamic events, making
flexible planning a priority. Deliberate planning supports time-sensitive
(crisis-action) planning by anticipating potential crises and developing
CONPLANs that assist in the rapid development and selection of a COA.
DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS
2-38. The deliberate planning process begins with receipt of the TASKORD
and target intelligence package (TIP).  The process (Figure 2-3, page 2-13)
will ultimately result in a completed special operations mission planning
folder (SOMPF). A mission letter and TIP are needed to begin a feasibility
assessment (FA) or develop a POE. Each TIP contains the SOC and group
commanders’ operational intent. It also contains a specification of premission
constraints and considerations that will hamper the assessment and
planning process. The group commander and staff review the TIP and
SOMPF to determine the general shortcomings and requirements inherent in
the TASKORD. They then assign a battalion to assess the mission’s
feasibility and to begin planning the mission. Although the group passes the
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action to the battalion for more detailed analysis, group staff elements must
continue their own analysis and coordinate the known and anticipated
shortfalls.
Figure 2-3. Deliberate Planning Process
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FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
2-39. Upon receipt of the TASKORD, the SF battalion begins the FA
process. This assessment determines the ability of the SFODA to perform the
mission and the abilities of the battalion or SFODB to support the mission.
The battlefield operating systems (BOS) and SO imperatives are  the guides
to use for conducting an FA. The FA process requires direct involvement of
the battalion or FOB staff, the SFODB staff, and the SFODA. Each has
specific degrees of concern and areas of responsibility (AORs) that, when
addressed, will accurately reflect mission feasibility. Reviewing these items
ensures unity of effort of all units in the JSOA and avoids conflict among
friendly units. When determining mission feasibility for a preconflict mission
assignment at home station, planners must forward to the isolated SFOB
detailed mission shortfalls in training or resource requirements that are
beyond the battalion’s capability to fix, such as school quotas and missionspecific equipment. Once completed, the FA must clearly show whether
mission feasibility is conditional upon the resolution of identified shortfalls.
The battalion commander translates training deficiencies into additions to
the SFOD METL for training. He then tasks his staff elements to coordinate
the resolution of materiel or personnel shortfalls.
BATTALION FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
2-40. The battalion commander and his staff consider the specific mission
requirements in the context of overall group and battalion plans. They must
assess the battalion or FOB staff’s ability to prepare, support, sustain,
command, and control UW elements once they are committed to an operation.
The SF battalion has two principal roles in the FA process, to  guide and
support the SFOD’s efforts. In the deliberate planning process at home
station where time is not a critical factor, the battalion will not find a mission
infeasible without allowing the tasked SFOD to conduct its assessment. If the
SFOD’s and the battalion staff’s assessments conflict, the battalion
commander makes the final determination. The battalion operations staff
serves as the focal point for coordinating infiltration and exfiltration
feasibilities. SFODs and battalion staffs must consider all methods of
infiltration and exfiltration during FA. Infeasible or inappropriate methods
of infiltration or exfiltration are excluded from future consideration. A
mission becomes infeasible when all potential infiltration and exfiltration
methods are infeasible. The battalion or FOB staff forwards to the tasked
SFODA and SFODB known constraints, available information, and the
commander’s intent, which become their basis for assessment.
COMPANY FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
2-41. A battalion gives missions directly to each of its 3 SFODBs and 18
SFODAs. This tasking does not imply that the company HQ does  not
participate in tasking its organic SFODAs. Unless there are security reasons
for compartmentalizing the mission, the company receives the TASKORD
from the battalion commander and staff. The battalion then tasks one of its
SFODAs or SFODBs and supervises its assessment activities.  The SF
battalion commander has three reasons to pass the TASKORD through the
company commander. First, the SFODB (company) manages the day-to-day
activities of the SFODA and SFODB. Second, operational experience of the
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SF company HQ normally exceeds that of the SFODA; the company  staff
mentors the SFODA. Third, after deployment, the most common missions for
an SFODB will be that it is independently deployed into the JSOA or
deployed to support the SFODA as an AOB or as a SOCCE. For UW, the
company’s FA concerns include—
•  Communications means and schedules.
•  Emergency exfiltration requirements.
•  Emergency resupply considerations.
•  Preliminary contact and link-up plans.
2-42. The SFODA or SFODB performing FAs for specific missions does not
develop plans at this time. Either  detachment can determine mission
requirements and examine applicable tactics, techniques, and procedures. It
identifies interagency coordination, required resources, training beyond its
organic capability, and augmentation needs. It must include these
requirements as conditions in the final FA. FAs are stated as either—
•  Affirmative—trained, equipped, and routinely supported.
•  Conditional—we can do it, but the following conditions or requirements
exist.
•  Negative—we cannot accomplish this mission because of a clearly
stated reason.
SUPPORTING AGENCY FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
2-43. Aviation assets conduct FAs for aircraft availability and compatibility
with mission guidelines and routes for infiltration and exfiltration. Technical
augmentees conduct FAs to ensure compatibility with the mission. This FA
should include—
•  Capability to execute the selected infiltration and exfiltration.
•  Emergency resupply.
•  Fire support.
•  Other mission-specific skills necessary for mission success.
FIRE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT
2-44. Joint fires, close air support (CAS), naval gunfire, fire support types,
availability, limitations, and requirements need to be identified early in the
mission planning sequence. During planning, the commander—
•  Establishes restricted fire areas (RFAs), no-fire areas (NFAs), and fire
support coordination lines as needed.
•  Develops fire support coordination measures that protect deployed
SFODs and are not unnecessarily restrictive on the conventional or
supporting forces.
 FM 3-05.20 and JP 3-09,  Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, provide
detailed fire support information.
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POSTFEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
2-45. Once a mission is determined feasible or conditionally feasible, the
FOB staff or SFOD anticipates actual TASKORD. The battalion or FOB staff
immediately identifies requirements for schooling, training, and equipment.
Modifying MTOEs or task-organizing early to meet mission requirements are
examples of long-term fixes that should begin during FA. The battalion staff
and the SFOD retain all documentation and working papers from the FA
since they form the basis for subsequent POE development.
PLAN OF EXECUTION DEVELOPMENT
2-46. The POE is the final element of the SOMPF. It shows how the SFODA
intends to carry out the assigned mission. Specific mission  preparation
begins when the battalion receives the tasking to prepare a SOMPF to
accomplish a tasked mission. This tasking takes the form of a SOMPF “shell”
containing all elements developed to that point. FM 100-25 and JP 3-05.5
provide information on SOMPF contents. Options for conducting specific
mission planning include—
•  Activating the FOB for training and isolating SFODAs so that they
may accomplish their detailed planning.
•  Conducting planning as part of the routine training day.
BATTALION ACTIVITIES
2-47. The battalion commander and staff plan for support of the overall
operation. In addition, the battalion has activities that  support SFOD POE
development. Building upon the analysis conducted during the FA, the
battalion staff uses the military decision-making process as described in
FM 5-0 (currently FM 101-5). For planning that is not time-critical, the staff
prepares formal written estimates that identify anticipated mission-specific
requirements of the SFODs. They also address planning options available to
the tasked SFOD. For example, the signal section addresses available
communications capabilities and procedures for transmitting data without
undue risk of compromise. At the battalion level, the commander directs the
decision-making process toward—
•  Developing estimates to be used in preparation of the battalion order
and SFOD planning guidance.
•  Developing the commander’s intent into a feasible CONOPS.
•  Planning for FOB activities required to support the employed SFODs.
Battalion Order
2-48. The battalion planning process produces the battalion  order. The
battalion order encompasses all missions the battalion’s SFODs will
accomplish. SFODAs and SFODBs will normally receive information on their
JSOA only.
2-49. Once completed, the coordinated battalion order or plan becomes a
supporting plan to the group or SFOB OPLAN. The revised or new mission
letter normally requires the staff to review previous home station analysis
and coordination.
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Commander’s Intent
2-50. The commander’s intent serves to communicate guidance in the
absence of specific orders. The commander’s intent must be stated clearly. It
must be brief and to the point. The commander must include a  separate
statement of intent for each specific TASKORD. The intent directs MICON
development at the SFOD level. The order must contain sufficient detail to
guide the SFOD commander’s mission analysis and decision-making process
without limiting the SFOD’s flexibility during the planning options.
Mission Letter
2-51. The battalion commander issues a mission letter to the SFODAs and
SFODBs. He then provides the battalion OPLAN and SOMPF to the SFODA.
The SFODA needs time to review the information before receiving the
mission briefing from the battalion commander and staff. The mission
briefing consists of battalion staff officers, mission operation cell (MOC), and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs). They summarize their specific areas and
elaborate on data or changes in the OPLAN that impact on the SFODA’s
mission. The SFODA does not leave the briefing until it understands the
commander’s intent and has asked all the questions generated by its review
of the battalion OPLAN and SOMPF. The battalion staff answers all
questions concerning, for example, infiltration platforms, support equipment
availability, and rehearsal areas available to the SFOD.
COMPANY ACTIVITIES
2-52. The SFODB may also prepare for its own follow-on area command
mission in the future. When the SFODB is not compartmentalized  from the
SFODA receiving its mission, the SF company commander and staff monitor
the mission briefing with the SFODA. This practice ensures the SFODB—
•  Is available to the SFODA during the planning process.
•  Understands the training and resource requirements related to the
mission.
•  If tasked to act as an AOB or as FOB augmentation, understands the
missions it is supporting or controlling.
2-53. Deliberate UW planning during  isolation prepares the SFODA for a
hypothetical crisis based on the most current intelligence. This assumption
allows for the preplanned use of resources and personnel projected to be
available when the plan becomes effective. The assumptions make  it
improbable that any CONPLAN the SFODA has implemented will be totally
usable without modifications. The detailed analysis and coordination that
was accomplished during the time available for deliberate planning will
expedite effective decision making  as the crisis unfolds. At this time,
assumptions and projections are replaced with hard data. Once the FOB
commander selects an SFODA to execute the mission, the detachment moves
into an ISOFAC, receives the OPORD  and mission brief, and begins its
mission preparation as follows.
2-17 FM 3-05.201
Step 1: Receive the Mission
2-54. The SFOD and its MOC receive the battalion staff’s planning
guidance. This guidance may come in a mission letter from the group during
normal peacetime operations, or it may come in the form of an OPLAN and
SOMPF during hostilities (TASKORD). The company passes command
guidance to the SFODA. The SFOD commander reviews this planning
guidance and activates the staff sections within the SFODA. Unit standing
operating procedures (SOPs) designate SFODA members for each staff
section according to their MOSs and assigned staff responsibilities. Each
SFOD member reviews his portion of the OPLAN. When review of the
OPLAN is complete, the SFOD discusses the battalion commander’s intent.
Each member voices his concerns and develops questions to be answered in
the mission briefing to the team. The SFOD develops RFIs and puts them in
writing. These RFIs address unanswered questions and unclear points in the
commander’s intent. These RFIs are forwarded to the battalion staff and a
mission briefing is scheduled. The battalion staff presents the mission
briefing, during which it answers as many RFIs as possible and provides a
working status on the others. The SFOD questions each staff member as
required. The SFODA commander ensures the perception of the commander’s
intent is correct through face-to-face discussion with the battalion
commander.
Step 2: Exchange Information
2-55. After the mission briefing is complete and all questions have been
answered or noted for further research and coordination, the SFOD
commander conducts a mission analysis session with the SFOD. This session
ensures SFOD members understand PIR, ROE, intelligence indicators, legal
and political constraints, and the role of CA and PSYOP. In this session, the
SFOD reviews all available information to ensure that all SFOD members
agree on what has been presented. SFOD members with specialized skills or
experience (either for the mission or in the JSOA) provide information on
their unique perspectives or requirements. If confusion over information or
interpretations of information exists, the SFOD develops and forwards
additional RFIs to the battalion for clarification.
Step 3: Restate Commander’s Intent and Produce Planning Guidance
2-56. After exchanging information, the SFOD commander, ADC, and the
SFOD operations sergeant (or company operations WO or SGM if an SFODB)
meet to develop the restated mission and intent to produce OPORD planning
guidance. Here, the SFOD leaders—
•  Review the specified and implied tasks from the OPORD.
•  Review the battalion mission statement and commander’s intent.
•  Consider the information received to date.
•  Review the feasible infiltration and exfiltration means.
2-57. Based on this information, the SFOD leaders review and develop a
comprehensive list of specified and implied tasks, and the commander
develops a restated mission. The wording of the task in the OPORD does not
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need to be rearranged. The restated mission specifically identifies the task as
the “what” of the who, what, when, where, and why. Based on the knowledge
of the skills, capabilities, current and achievable standards of training of the
SFOD, and available resources, the SFOD leaders develop numerous COAs
for consideration.
2-58. Planning responsibilities different from, or not covered by, unit SOPs
are also clearly stated. When the SFOD leaders have completed the analysis,
they pass the findings out to the entire SFOD. Normally, information is given
orally; however, written guidance or training aids (for example, flip charts)
are preferable where guidance is complicated. As a minimum, the SFOD
leaders must usually present three COAs in writing.
Step 4: Prepare Staff Estimates
2-59. Based on the planning guidance and unit SOPs, the SFOD members
prepare estimates for their AORs. These estimates are not limited to those of
the traditional staff AORs. PSYOP and CMO estimates will always be
prepared for UW operations. At home station, SFOD’s planning (where time
is not a factor) includes written estimates. Written estimates provide needed
continuity for replacements when  SFOD members rotate. Staff estimates
must identify support requirements for each COA. Once completed, the
detachment commander briefs the staff estimates to the SFOD. The briefing
serves the purpose of exchanging information between SFOD members.
Step 5: Prepare Commander’s Estimate and Decision
2-60. After the staff estimate briefings, the SFOD commander reassembles
the SFOD leaders and, with their assistance, prepares the commander’s
estimate. A critical portion of this step is finding and weighing the factors to
be used in evaluating the COAs. The SFOD leaders select the specific factors
for the mission based on the commander’s intent and the specified and
implied tasks. The commander’s estimate must include specific factors for
each of the functional areas in the BOS. The SO imperatives should be
translated into specific factors related to the mission. The commander’s
estimate is prepared in written form. Based on his estimate, the commander
decides which COA the SFOD will plan to execute. The product of this step is
a statement of the SFOD commander’s intent and a concept of the operation.
The SFOD commander briefs them to the entire SFOD. This briefing serves
to answer any questions the SFOD may have and serves as the  SFOD
“murder board” for the concept. After briefing the battalion, the commander
schedules an informal MICON briefing with the SFOD and the battalion
commander.
Step 6: Present MICON Briefing
2-61. The MICON briefing is an informal briefing presented to the battalion
commander to ensure the planning efforts meet his intent. The MICON
allows approval of the SFOD’s concept of the operation before expending time
in detailed planning. The goal of the MICON is to get the commander’s
approval for a COA. MICON briefings have no specific format but normally
include the—
•  Mission.
2-19 FM 3-05.201
•  Higher commander’s intent.
•  Concept of the operation.
•  COAs considered.
•  Factors used to evaluate the COA, risk assessment, and METT-TC.
•  Specific UW tasks.
•  Task organization (to include requests for required attachments).
•  Infiltration, contact, and exfiltration means.
•  Identification of external support required (such as interagency
approval of special activities and nonstandard equipment).
•  General statement of the commander’s CONOPS.
•  Mission-essential personnel and equipment problems not previously
addressed.
2-62. Visual aids should be those that the SFOD is already using for mission
planning. The MICON briefing should not be so formal the “event” hinders
the SFOD’s planning activities. The battalion commander approves the
concept, modifies it, or directs the SFOD to return to Step 3, providing
additional guidance to clarify his mission intent. Key battalion staff members
may accompany the battalion commander to the MICON briefing  and
familiarize themselves with the approved mission concept.
2-63. Based on the approved concept, the battalion staff anticipates the
SFOD’s support requirements. For example, if the MICON calls for highaltitude low-opening (HALO) infiltration of a 12-man SFOD, the S-4 does not
wait for a support request for HALO air items for the infiltration. The
selected concept drives intelligence requirements. Because of the generally
repetitious IR, intelligence personnel  can anticipate and deliver many of
their requirements. However, the SFOD is still responsible for all details of
the UW operation.
2-64. Approval of the MICON ends the concept development phase for this
planning session. Responsibility for the concept now rests with the battalion
commander, and the SFOD continues with their planning.
Step 7: Prepare OPLAN
2-65. Upon approval of the MICON, the SFOD leaders produce the body of
the OPLAN. The written OPLAN specifies tasking to subordinate elements
and individual members of the SFOD. Annexes are not included at this point;
they are produced during the detailed planning phase. The plan must be in
keeping with the battalion commander’s guidance and understood by all
members of the SFOD. When these criteria are satisfied, the battalion
commander approves the plan after completion of the briefback.
Step 8: Conduct Detailed Planning
2-66. The SFOD organizes for planning  the same as it would for mission
execution. When the mission does not require the entire SFOD, nonessential
members help subordinate elements in the mission planning process.
Compartmentation within the SFOD is generally counterproductive. Each
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SFOD member or element completes a detailed plan for the execution  of
assigned tasks. Members of the SFOD brief their respective areas, while
other members provide an appropriate critique. The battalion staff should be
available to provide the same service with the added advantage of greater
experience and objectivity.
2-67. In UW, certain aspects of the mission may be beyond the experience of
any of the planners. In these circumstances, rehearsals are excellent mission
planning tools. New or unfamiliar employment techniques may be tested by
realistic rehearsals of portions of the plan during its development. Often,
walking through an action will reveal the need for changes to  the plan. In
any case, before an SFOD briefs a POE to its battalion commander, SFOD
members should physically confirm the viability of the plan under the most
realistic circumstances possible. Formats for specific subelements of the
detailed plan that support the POE vary with the mission. Some portions of
the POE may require annexes; others  only require mention in a larger
section. The POE should relate how the exceptional activity contributes to
collecting and reporting requirements or how it enhances the survivability of
the SFOD. Alternate plans and CONPLANs are also considered. The POE
lists all mission-essential equipment and accounts for the disposition of that
equipment in SFOD packing and resupply plans. The SFOD leaders ensure
that all supporting subplans are consistent and mutually supportive. They
also must ensure that specialized equipment used for one activity can also be
used for another. Upon completion of all supporting subplans, the SFOD
leaders supervise the preparation of the formal POE. It includes all the
annexes, notes, narratives, and graphics essential to conduct the mission.
Step 9: Conduct Briefback
2-68. The briefback serves a distinct purpose. Although the POE details
what an SFODA intends to accomplish, the briefback explains to the
battalion commander how the SFODA will execute the assigned tasks. All
information is contained in the commander’s folder and must be able to stand
alone. The SFODA is now ready to accomplish its mission. The battalion
commander’s last effective influence on  these activities is through guidance
given at the briefback.
2-69. The briefback format is driven  by the plan, not the reverse. Several
mission briefback formats are available that provide general guidance. There
is no “best” format or checklist for UW. The SFODA prepares the briefback
using the completed detailed plan. Existing formats are useful as a means to
organize the presentation (in general terms) and as a checklist to look for
obvious areas that were overlooked during planning. Briefback preparation
often reveals gaps in planning. In  adapting the format, the following
principles apply:
•  The format must provide a detailed description of the activities of each
SFODA member throughout the execution of the mission. This
description provides a mental picture of the operation for the
commander receiving the briefing.
•  The briefing uses visual aids only if they help to clarify the briefing.
2-21 FM 3-05.201
•  Briefers must avoid constant reference to the commander’s folder as it
denies the staff access to necessary information (use charts instead).
•  The briefing must provide the commander with adequate information
to judge the efficacy of the plan.
2-70. The SFODA presents its briefback in the ISOFAC where the planning
was conducted. This practice enhances OPSEC and reduces both
administrative and support requirements. Each SFODA member briefs his
own responsibilities. The staff members focus questions on areas where they
did not hear adequate information to  judge the completeness or viability of
the plan. However, all staff elements  should have thoroughly coordinated
their input during the mission-planning phase. The traditional habit of
quizzing SFODA members’ memory of mission-essential details is
appropriate for this briefback since mission preparation and  training will
continue. The purpose of the briefback is for the commander and staff to
judge the merits of the plan. For example, if the battalion communications
representative hears reference to a  communications system that he cannot
personally verify as available, he questions the SFODA on the availability of
that system. If he hears discussion on the use of an antenna that appears
inappropriate, he confirms the reason  for that selection. The briefback is
intended to show any weaknesses in the plan while they can still be
corrected. If the SFODA cannot justify any action, no matter how minute,
that action needs to be reconsidered, corrected, and then implemented.
2-71. Once the battalion commander is confident the plan is workable and is
delegated the authority by the group  commander, he approves the POE. If
further work is still required, he gives specific guidance and returns the
SFODA to the planning phase. The commander determines the extent of
revision and whether another full briefback is required. As a minimum, he
should require the appropriate staff officer to personally brief him on any
changes. Once the plan is approved, the SFODA commander is  responsible
only for the preparation of the SFODA and execution of its mission. The
battalion commander assumes responsibility for the viability of the plan. He
should withhold final approval of plans until all support  requests are
confirmed and the TASKORD authority approves the POE.
Step 10: Obtain POE Approval
2-72. Once the POE is completed and approved by the battalion commander,
the S-3 forwards it through the SF group to the tasking agency. The tasking
agency then compiles the SOMPF by obtaining the mission support package
(MSP) and other supporting documents. The S-2 or S-3 secures the basic
folder and returns a copy to the mission planning agent (MPA). This
procedure constitutes POE approval.
MISSION PREPARATION
2-73. Mission preparation must predate isolation and the deliberate
planning process. During mission preparation, specific mission employment
is not required. SFODs tasked to conduct a specific type of mission or use a
specific means of infiltration continue to support their METL through
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scheduled training. Mission preparation, which is best done at the unit’s
home station, includes METL, individual, and mission-specific training.
2-74. Based on the group commander’s training guidance, the  battalion
commander assigns the missions and approves the draft SFOD’s METL that
supports the assigned missions. The company commander must plan,
conduct, and evaluate company and SFOD training to support this guidance
and the approved METL for the mission.
PREMISSION TRAINING
2-75. The SFOD commander ranks the tasks that need training. Since there
will never be enough time to train in every area, he focuses on the METL
tasks that are essential for mission completion. He emphasizes building and
maintaining proficiency in those tasks that have not been performed to
standard and sustaining proficiency in those tasks that are most difficult. He
will rank those tasks during training meetings with the  SFODAs and
SFODBs.
2-76. Once the tasks for training are selected, the SFODA commander
builds a training schedule and plans on those tasks. He provides the previous
training requirements to the battalion commander. The battalion commander
approves the list of tasks to be trained, and then the SFODA commander
includes them in the training schedule.
2-77. The company commander coordinates the support and resource
requirements with the battalion S-3 well before the scheduled training to
allow S-3 personnel sufficient time to  coordinate for them. He ensures that
tasks, conditions, and standards are enforced and conducted IAW principles
outlined in FM 7-0, Training the Force.
2-78. In UW, the SFOD must know the operational environment. The SFOD
often deploys to the actual AO, even when the activities in the  potential
JSOA are not directly related to the TASKORD. The opportunity to survey
the climatic, geographic, cultural, and other environmental factors must not
be lost. Where it is impossible to deploy to the actual area and conduct offset
training, the S-3 coordinates with the battalion S-2 to identify accessible
locations for training that replicate each detachment’s AO. The SFOD trains
to exercise its mission plans as carefully and realistically as possible while
always maintaining OPSEC.
INTELLIGENCE
2-79. The battalion S-2 is responsible for all intelligence-related matters. He
is responsible for keeping the commander and his staff informed on all UW
security matters, to include hostile and indigenous force activities. Due to the
nature of UW, the battalion S-2 must play a key role in mission success. All
mission planners will understand the PIR and IR goals. The S-2 must ensure
the collection plan PIR and IRs on which the mission is based have not been
nor can be satisfied by other sources. If the S-2 identifies other missioncapable sources, he informs the battalion commander through the S-3, and
the support is requested. The SF group commander determines minimumessential preparation tasks. He then modifies the deliberate planning process
2-23 FM 3-05.201
to do those tasks in the time available. The SF group commander must
inform the SOC or JSOTF when he cannot accomplish these tasks with an
acceptable degree of risk for mission success.
TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKETS
2-80. Intelligence is perishable over time. The battalion S-2 has the primary
responsibility for keeping the intelligence database current. The S-2 requests
additional information from higher and adjacent HQ to meet and monitor
PIR and IRs. The S-2 section conveys changes to the situation and to TIPs
that affect mission accomplishment for the appropriate SFOD. The S-2
section must provide liaison with local intelligence forces to maintain the
command’s security. The S-2, with S-5 input, also provides current situation
updates and INTSUMs to the SFOD and responds to intelligence-related
questions and requests.
AREA STUDIES
2-81. At the company and SFOD level, the country area study is the
primary tool for tracking intelligence over time. The SFOD continually
updates the area study at home station. The battalion S-2 provides the
database for updating the study by using all available sources, to include the
Special Operations Command, Research,  Analysis, and Threat Evaluation
System (SOCRATES) and the open-source intelligence system.
PERSONNEL
2-82. The S-1 section provides for and coordinates personnel service support
(PSS). Its primary combat duties focus on strength management, casualty
management, and replacement operations. Other responsibilities include
mail, awards, pay, Uniformed Code  of Military Justice (UCMJ), enemy
prisoners of war (EPWs), and soldier readiness processing. The section takes
part in the operations order process  by developing administrative annex
material, preparing personnel estimates, and recommending replacement
priorities. In the PSS coordination role, S-1 serves as the focal point for
personnel, administration, financial, religious, medical, public affairs, and
legal activities.
LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS
2-83. All levels of command review the UW-specific requirements for
logistics. The S-4 must redistribute the available supplies and equipment
within the battalion and make inventory adjustments. In UW,
communications requirements are usually long term and unique. The signal
section must review the compatibility and type of equipment to  ensure all
requirements can be met. Battery inventory is particularly critical. The
annual budget must include projections for training requirements. Where
nonstandard equipment is used, the signal officer and his staff must identify
reliable internal sources for prescribed load list (PLL)  repair parts and
batteries.
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PREEMPLOYMENT PREPARATION
2-84. The S-3 must periodically review and update mission SOMPFs. This
review and update should take place whenever—
•  There is a significant change in the situation (intelligence).
•  The supported plan or basic tasking has major revisions.
•  Personnel turnover affects mission readiness.
2-85. After the battalion has been alerted to execute a mission,  it activates
the FOB. Normally, the FOB will operate from a forward secure area, but it
may also operate from home station. The deliberate planning process and
isolation procedures apply to the UW mission.
TIME-SENSITIVE (CRISIS-ACTION) PLANNING PROCESS
2-86. The time-sensitive (crisis-action) planning process continues the
sequence begun during the deliberate planning process with receipt of the
mission letter and continues with  receipt of the TASKORD and TIP.
Deliberate planning presumes that the SFOD has completed a SOMPF for
the mission and conducted its mission preparation at home station.
Time-sensitive tasks, such as reviewing the current INTSUM for changes
and confirming infiltration and exfiltration means, are critical and timely
activities. Failure to allow the SFOD to complete these activities in the
96-hour time-sensitive planning process decreases the probability of mission
success.
EMERGING MISSIONS
2-87. Emerging missions are those other missions for which a requirement
was not anticipated and no TIP or SOMPF has been prepared.  The timesensitive planning process for such missions involves a 96-hour cycle. At the
FOB, the SFOD uses the first day to prepare orders and may dedicate the
last 3 days to the deliberate planning process, rehearsals,  inspections, and
rest during the SFOD isolation. As with any such procedural guide, the time
frames are approximate and planners can adjust them as required. The 96-
hour time frame obviously does not permit the type of meticulous, METLdriven mission preparation described in the previous paragraphs of this
chapter. If, however, the battalion has done a thorough job of mission
analysis for its assigned JSOA, the  general conditions of the emerging
mission will parallel other missions for which it has previously prepared its
SFODs. The JSOA may be similar (if not the same) as will the  threat and
other factors of the operational environment. The battalion and company
commanders must make every effort to assign the emerging mission  to the
SFOD that has most closely prepared for the similar operation. During timesensitive planning, staffs must anticipate mission requirements and staff-tostaff coordination. Planners must consider the transportation  and
information needs commonly requested for the type target being considered.
Some specific areas that are particularly critical to time-sensitive planning
are communications, intelligence, operations, map coverage, logistics, and
infiltration and exfiltration methods.
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2-88. Significant planning cannot begin without adequate and current map
coverage. The FOB S-2 must supply current maps to the SFOD. Quality
imagery will significantly enhance the probability of mission success.
Detailed planning for infiltration and exfiltration is critical. Compromise of
the SFOD on infiltration can indicate the mission will be a  failure. Since
infiltration and exfiltration usually involve joint external assets, coordination
is more difficult in this short time period. Face-to-face coordination between
the SFOD and the supporting asset (for example, pilot, boat operator, or ship
captain) is crucial.
2-89. Supplies from the FOB support center (SPTCEN) are usually the only
logistic support available. This situation highlights the need for the battalion
S-4 to plan and deploy with a large  assortment of equipment and supplies
rather than just the minimum required for the preplanned missions.
DETAILED MISSION PREPARATIONS
2-90. After developing the OPLAN,  the SFOD members continue detailed
preparations for the mission. OPSEC  measures remain important. SFOD
members obtain supplies, equipment, and training materials and prepare for
infiltration and mission accomplishment. SFOD members hone their military
skills through mission rehearsals, conduct extensive area and language
orientation, obtain input from various staff elements, and receive an asset
debriefing that also enhances detailed planning.
STAFF ACTIVITIES
2-91. The SFOD staff sections follow up on previous requests for additional
resources and support not already  delivered. They contact supporting
agencies IAW established procedures to  find the status of their requests.
SFOD staff sections consider alternate COAs when supporting agencies fail
to provide the required resources and support. They route functional area
information requests to the other staff sections through the SFOD S-3 and
route IRs through the SFOD S-2. SFOD  staff sections modify previously
developed estimates and plans IAW the  latest information available. They
also update, through the SFOD S-3, the CCIR list IAW the latest information
available and their needs for additional CCIR arising from modified
estimates and plans. The actions of the SFOD staff members are listed below.
Commander
2-92. The commander commands and controls the SFOD. He ensures the
SFOD completes mission preparation  IAW the higher commander’s OPORD
or OPLAN and the SFOD’s OPLAN. The commander ensures all SFOD
members know and understand the SFOD’s OPLAN. He approves tentative
changes to the OPLAN if the changes satisfy  requirements IAW his intent,
identify mission objectives, and follow the higher commander’s  OPLAN or
OPORD. The commander ensures all legal questions have been clarified and
all operational plans are IAW applicable legal guidance and directives.
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Assistant Detachment Commander
2-93. The SFOD ADC ensures mission preparation is IAW the event time
plan. He supervises and directs all staff functions acting as the SFOD chief of
staff. He is responsible for coordinating all staff efforts, identifying critical
preparatory planning shortfalls, and evaluating all regional implications of
the mission. He assists and supervises in the areas of operations,
intelligence, CA, and PSYOP.
S-1
2-94. The S-1 ensures preparation for movement with soldier readiness
processing (SRP) and the requirements are met IAW Army Regulation
(AR) 600-8-101,  Personnel Processing (In-and-Out and Mobilization
Processing), and the unit’s SOP. He follows up all previous PSS requests IAW
the SFOD OPLAN. He informs the commander of any problems in the
administrative preparation of the SFOD for infiltration. He establishes
procedures for personnel accountability and strength reporting in support of
the SFOD.
S-2
2-95. The S-2 supervises SFOD requests for, and dissemination of,
intelligence IAW the commander’s PIR and IRs and the intelligence collection
plans. He updates the enemy situation using the latest available information
and intelligence. The S-2 informs the entire SFOD of changes in the situation
that will affect planned mission execution. He monitors the implementation
of the SFOD’s intelligence collection plans to include updating the
commander’s PIR and IRs, conducting  an area assessment, and requesting
additional intelligence support. The  S-2 also monitors the SFOD’s OPSEC
measures and plans to ensure they effectively counter the anticipated threat
IAW the current situation. He then recommends appropriate actions.
S-3
2-96. The S-3 primarily controls OPSEC as he disseminates the SFOD’s
OPLAN, or applicable portions of it, to higher HQ staff for tentative
approval. He distributes the SFOD’s plan to SFOD members and, as
required, to subordinates. The S-3 coordinates deception, PSYOP, CA, and
fire support needed in the JSOA. He incorporates any approved changes into
the SFOD’s OPLAN and disseminates all approved OPLAN changes to the
SFOD. He assigns mission briefback tasks to SFOD members. The S-3
ensures SFOD predeployment training and rehearsals are IAW the SFOD’s
OPLAN, the resistance training program of instruction (POI) in the language
spoken within the JSOA, the unit’s SOP, and the time event plan. He ensures
weapons are test fired. The S-3 coordinates the theater combatant
commander’s directives and policies for preparation and use of the Special
Forces evasion and recovery plan (SFERP).
S-4
2-97. The S-4 inspects, accounts for, and ensures the serviceability of
required supplies and equipment (less medical and communications supplies
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and equipment) in the SFOD’s custody. He stockpiles additional required
supplies and equipment IAW the SFOD’s OPLAN, to include the basic load of
ammunition to support follow-on or contingency missions. The S-4 follows up
all previous requests for additional  logistics resources or support IAW the
SFOD’s OPLAN. He informs the SFOD ADC of any logistics problems in
preparing the SFOD for infiltration.
S-5
2-98. The S-5 analyzes the civil component of the JSOA using CASCOPE
and ensures civil considerations and CA  team activities are integrated into
the plans and activities of all other  staff sections. He updates the civil
situation using the latest available information. The S-5 monitors the
activities of the SFOD and anticipates future requirements for CMO based
on current and planned operations, as well as the results of completed
operations.
Signal Section
2-99. The SFOD signal staff obtains the cryptographic materials, signal
operating instructions (SOI), and additional related materials IAW the
higher commander’s OPLAN or OPORD and the SFOD’s OPLAN. They
conduct inspections to account for required communications equipment. The
staff conducts function tests of communications equipment and systems as
required by the higher commander’s OPORD or OPLAN, the SFOD’s
OPLAN, and the unit’s SOP. The signal staff informs the SFOD XO of any
communications problems in preparing for the SFOD’s mission.
Medic (18D)
2-100. The SFOD medical staff (usually two 18Ds) ensures the SFOD
members meet medical and dental SRP requirements IAW the unit’s SOP.
They ensure the SFOD’s required immunizations are current IAW
AR 40-562,  Immunizations and Chemoprophylaxis, and the unit’s SOP
contains information published by the Center for Disease Control and the
World Health Organization. This information comes from the Armed Forces
Medical Intelligence Center. The medical staff also ensures the SFOD
members receive any required medical or dental treatment identified during
SRP. They follow up all previous requests for additional medical resources or
support IAW the SFOD’s OPLAN. The medical staff account for and inspect
the serviceability of the required medical supplies and equipment. They also
inform the SFOD ADC of any health services problems in preparing for the
SFOD’s mission.
Instructors
2-101. Each SFOD instructor prepares his training materials in the
resistance force’s language, if possible. He prepares a lesson outline for each
period of instruction IAW the POI, the tentative training schedule, and other
assigned classes. The instructor includes in each lesson outline, as a
minimum, the task, conditions, standards, performance measures, required
training aids, manuals, and handouts.
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2-29
ASSET DEBRIEFING
2-102. The purpose of an asset debriefing is to provide the SFODs firsthand
and timely information that will allow them to prepare and  plan a more
detailed mission. The asset should have comprehensive background
knowledge of the objective area. The preferred asset is indigenous to the
JSOA or AO and is the designated representative of the area commander. He
is a person who has been security-screened but is not a prisoner. U.S.
security personnel will have already cleared him. In addition, he will have—
•  Recently exfiltrated from the area.
•  Been thoroughly interrogated for any intelligence information.
•  Volunteered or have been recruited to assist in the SF mission.
2-103. The SF debriefer should quickly establish and maintain rapport, gain
the asset’s confidence, and question him as a friend, not as an enemy
prisoner. Information needed from an asset should include, but not be limited
to, the following:
•  Current background information on the asset (experience, history).
•  His method and reasons for assistance to the United States.
•  The resistance force goals (past, present, and future).
•  Local and regional combat and support power of the enemy security
force.
•  General and specific JSOA intelligence needed for initial contact,
infiltration, operations, sustainment, and exfiltration. Chapter 3
Employment
Employment of SFODs in UW encompasses several of the seven phases of
a U.S.-sponsored insurgency. The phases are preparation, initial contact,
infiltration, organization, buildup, combat operations, and demobilization.
Although each resistance movement is unique, U.S.-sponsored resistance
organizations generally pass through all seven phases. The phases may
not occur sequentially or receive the same degree of emphasis. They may
occur concurrently or not at all, depending on the specific situation. This
chapter covers infiltration through combat operations by addressing the
following steps: infiltration, area assessment, development of the JSOA,
development of a resistance organization, training the guerrilla force,
combat operations, and combatting counterguerrilla operations.
Rules of Conduct:
1. There shall be no confiscation whatever from the poor peasantry.
2. If you borrow anything, return it.
3. Replace all articles you damage.
4. Pay fairly for everything that you purchase.
5. Be honest in all transactions with the peasants.
6. Be courteous and polite to the people and help them when you can.
Mao Tse-tung, 1928
INFILTRATION
3-1. Infiltration follows initial contact with the resistance organization or
government in exile. Normally, OGAs conduct initial contact and make an
assessment of the resistance potential. Part of the initial contact phase also
involves making arrangements for reception and initial assistance of the
infiltrating SFOD or pilot team. Successful infiltration  into the JSOA
requires detailed planning and preparation at the joint level. Several
methods are considered based on METT-TC. Appendix F provides additional
information.
AREA ASSESSMENT
3-2. The SFOD members and the commander begin an area assessment
immediately after entry into the JSOA. This assessment is the collection of
special information and serves as the commander’s estimate of the situation.
The area assessment is a continuous process that confirms, corrects, refutes,
or adds to previous intelligence acquired before commitment. The area
assessment also serves as a basis for  changing premission operational and
logistic plans. There are no fixed formulas for doing an area assessment.
3-1 FM 3-05.201
Each commander has to decide for himself what should be included and what
conclusions may be drawn from the information he collects.
3-3. When making an area assessment, the SFOD commander considers all
the major factors involved, including the enemy situation, security measures,
and the many aspects of the civil component as defined by CASCOPE. The
SFOD should only disseminate new intelligence information that differs
significantly from the intelligence received before commitment. Area
assessment is either initial or principal, depending on the urgency involved.
Appendix G contains a sample format for an initial and  principal area
assessment.
INITIAL ASSESSMENT
3-4. Initial assessment includes those requirements deemed essential to the
pilot team or SFOD immediately following infiltration.  The mission of the
team is to assess designated areas to determine the feasibility of developing
the resistance potential and to establish contact with indigenous leaders.
These requirements must be satisfied as soon as possible after the team
arrives in the AO. Much of this initial assessment may be transmitted in the
initial entry report (IER) (ANGUS) or situation (CYRIL) report. Once the
theater command or JSOTF has made a determination as to the feasibility of
developing the area, additional SF elements may be infiltrated. The
assessment team may remain with the operational element or be exfiltrated
as directed. FM 3-05.220 provides further information on pilot team support.
PRINCIPAL ASSESSMENT
3-5. Principal assessment forms the  basis for all other subsequent UW
activities in the JSOA. It is a continuous operation and includes those efforts
that support the continued planning and conduct of operations. It should be
transmitted using the format planned during isolation. This format may be
abbreviated by deleting information already confirmed. This  report should
include new or changed information.
AREA ASSESSMENT IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT
3-6. What makes urban guerrilla warfare so different from rural  guerrilla
warfare or conventional military contest is the presence of a large audience to
the struggle. Unlike rural guerrillas, urban guerrillas cannot withdraw to
some remote jungle where they are safe from observation and attack. They
must be able to live in the midst  of hundreds of witnesses and potential
informers.
3-7. Appendix A provides guidance for the planning and conduct of UW in an
urban environment. The appendix describes characteristics of cities and
urban tactical operations, and provides an urban operations survey checklist.
Users of Appendix A should already have had sufficient exposure to ASO and
therefore amplifications and definitions of specific terms are unnecessary
(FM 3-05.220 provides further information).
3-2 FM 3-05.201
DEVELOPMENT OF THE JSOA
3-8. The organization and development of the JSOA or region involves early
marshalling of the resistance command structure and the subsequent buildup
of the resistance force. A well-organized JSOA allows close coordination
between the SFOD and the resistance element. The SFOD gains a thorough
knowledge of the AO through extensive area studies. These  studies include
history, economy, religion, infrastructure, ethnic groups, needs of the
populace, customs, taboos, and other data that will affect the organization;
C2; and selection of leaders within the resistance force. Appendix H provides
an area study outline format.
OBJECTIVE
3-9. After infiltration, the major task facing the SFOD is to develop all
resistance elements into an effective force able to achieve U.S. and the area
commander’s objectives. To the area command, the SFOD is the direct
representative of the U.S. Government. The SFOD members must be
diplomats as well as military advisers and establish a good working
relationship with the resistance organization. This relationship develops from
acceptance of U.S. sponsorship and operational guidance. The SFOD and
guerrillas are united with a common goal against a common enemy.
DEVELOPMENT
3-10. Politics, ideology,  topography, security, communications, and many
other factors govern the shape, size, and ultimate organization of the JSOA
or region. The operational areas of guerrilla forces must have clearly defined
boundaries. These limits simplify coordination and C2 and reduce friction
between adjacent units. The operational areas should conform to the existing
spheres of influence of the established commanders. History demonstrates
that areas with basic religious, ethnic, or political differences should not be
included in the same area command.
3-11. JSOAs should not be larger than the communication and logistics
capabilities can effectively support. JSOA is the largest territorial
organization commanded by an overall area commander who is within enemy
territory. The JSOA should include enough dense terrain for the operation,
security, training, and administration of the guerrilla forces.
3-12. A country may be divided into several JSOAs based on administrative
units or natural geographic boundaries. Administrative units include
counties, districts, provinces, departments, and states. This system is
satisfactory when guerrilla missions include sabotage, propaganda, and
espionage conducted by small cellular units. One negative aspect of this
method is that by following the present government’s established unit of
administration, the resistance is indirectly aiding the government’s control
and coordination efforts.
3-13. Countries divided by natural geographic boundaries are superior for
military and overt operations on a large scale. Each major operational area
should include difficult terrain or uncontrolled areas suitable for area
complexes and guerrilla operations. Each JSOA and subordinate sector
command may also include food-producing areas that will support the
3-3 FM 3-05.201
guerrilla force in the area. These considerations may only be ignored when
logistics support from external sources  is available regularly and on a very
substantial scale.
3-14. The establishment of rapport between the SFOD and the resistance
element is a vital first requirement for the SFOD. An effective working and
command relationship helps develop a high degree of cooperation and
influence over the resistance force. This influence is ensured when resistance
leaders are receptive to the SFOD’s suggestions to accomplish the mission.
The command structure and the physical organization of the area are priority
tasks of the SFOD. In some situations, the resistance organization may be
well established, but in others, organizational structure  may be totally
lacking. In all cases, some improvement in physical area organization will
probably be necessary. Tasks and requirements dictate the organization of
the JSOA, but organization also depends on local customs and conditions
more so than on any fixed set of rules.
GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE
3-15. A government-in-exile does not exist in every UW situation. Where it
does, the leader may be a “figurehead” for the resistance.  He may be a
deposed former leader of the country or a prominent person of  society who
commands the respect of his fellow citizens. A highly structured resistance
organization might report to a national government-in-exile or, if one does
not exist, to a shadow government in-country. The leader of the area
command may declare himself the leader of a “shadow government.” If the
enemy government usurped power against the wishes of the people, the USG
may instead recognize the government-in-exile as the official government of
the country.
AREA COMMAND
3-16. An area command is a combined (indigenous and SF) command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) structure that
directs, controls, integrates, and supports all resistance  activities in the
JSOA or region. The size of the area command is dependent on METT-TC.
The area commander is the resistance leader. Selected SFOD members serve
as advisors to the area commander and his staff. Small and mobile, the HQ
size is limited because of meager communication capabilities. Functions and
forces must be decentralized due to the ever-present possibility of the area
command being destroyed by enemy action. The area command, with the
underground, auxiliary, and other support systems, should be organized prior
to Phase II (Guerrilla Warfare). They  all conduct centralized planning but
give maximum latitude for decentralized execution to their subordinate
sector commanders. This policy supports the utmost latitude allowing
subordinate commanders to determine the “how to” in planning and
executing their missions. Mutual confidence, cohesion, and trust must exist
between the area commander, subordinate commanders, and the SFOD for
each to be effective.
3-17. The area commander should be located where he can safely control the
resistance movement and its activities. Flexibility, intelligence, mobility, and
OPSEC are the keys to survival and success. The area commander or his
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designated representatives should make frequent visits to subordinate units,
both for morale enhancement and to become acquainted with the local
situation. Where personal visits are not possible, the commanders should
communicate with each other frequently.
AREA COMMAND ELEMENTS
3-18. There are no rigid patterns for the structure and function of an area
command. The area command is compartmented but should include
representatives from all elements of the resistance movement. Regardless of
the level of organization, the basic elements of the area command are the
command group and the resistance forces. Figure 3-1 shows the JSOA
command structure.
Command Group
3-19. The command group consists of political leaders or their
representatives from the exiled or shadow government, the area commander
as the resistance leader, the commander’s staff, and key members of the
SFOD.
Figure 3-1. Area Command Structure
Resistance Forces
3-20. Sector commanders or resistance element leaders from each sector in
the JSOA represent the resistance forces. Historically, U.S. UW doctrine has
made a clear distinction among elements of the resistance movement—
guerrilla forces, the auxiliary, and the underground. The composition and
duties of these elements forming the resistance force will depend on factors
unique to each JSOA and resistance organization.
3-5 FM 3-05.201
AREA COMMAND MEETING
3-21. The area command meeting is the primary method of conducting
business within an area command. The SFOD must thoroughly plan and
rehearse its agenda for the meeting. Personnel must analyze information
from the area study, operational area intelligence study, and area assessment
to determine the main points for discussion. The meeting is not a
confrontation between the area commander and the SFOD. Seating
arrangements should integrate the area commander, his staff, and the SFOD
among each other to form a large team. Planning considerations for the area
command meeting include—
•  Security measures.
•  Key issues to be discussed.
•  Personnel who should attend.
•  Location of meeting site.
•  Length of meeting.
3-22. METT-TC is the basis for an area command or sector meeting.
Suitable locations for the  site should be in a secure and isolated location,
either rural or urban. When indigenous or enemy government-imposed
population control measures are in effect, it may be easier for meetings to be
held in rural or guerrilla-controlled territory. The initial meeting should be
conducted as soon as possible after the SFOD infiltrates. During the meeting,
SFOD members should—
•  Establish personal and professional relationships with the resistance.
• Discuss guerrilla and SFOD abilities and limitations.
• Discuss procedures for developing the resistance cadre.
•  Establish centralized planning and decentralized execution.
•  Establish security measures and discuss threat activity.
• Discuss political boundaries, terrain features, targets, density of
population, and other JSOA- and region-specific information.
•  Establish positive U.S. influence with the resistance organization.
•  Establish type and scope of combat operations.
• Organize the resistance infrastructure to survive in a nonpermissive
environment.
• Organize cooperation between the resistance and local civilians.
•  Establish necessary documentation, cover stories, and proper clothes.
• Discuss ROE.
•  Emphasize unity of effort with open dialogue.
•  Always plan for contingencies.
3-23. The SFOD advises and assists with security for the meeting in a
similar manner to that of the area complex. Outer and inner security zones
are formed. The outer security ring consists of observers strategically placed
(determined by METT-TC) away from the meeting place. Members of the
outer security zones observe avenues of approach and provide early warning.
3-6 FM 3-05.201
They may use handheld radios or telephones to provide early warning of
enemy threats, which are passed using  code words or messages. The inner
security zones surround the meeting place itself and consist of enough
personnel to allow for the escape of the resistance leadership in case of
compromise. Before the meeting convenes, those present must decide on the
actions to take in case of a compromise. They must consider escape plans and
routes. A security element, usually members of the inner security zones,
serves as a rear guard while key personnel, equipment, and documents are
removed and quickly evacuated.
Intelligence Section
3-24. During the initial organization  of an area command, the intelligence
section of the staff is given special emphasis. Throughout  all phases of the
organization of a resistance force, the intelligence net is expanded
progressively until the intelligence requirements for the area command HQ
can be fulfilled. The functions of an area command intelligence section are
to—
•  Collect, record, evaluate, and interpret information of value to the
guerrilla forces. It distributes the resulting intelligence to the area
commander and staff and to higher and lower commands.
•  Organize, supervise, and coordinate, together with the operations
section, special intelligence teams (airfield surveillance, air warning,
and coast watcher).
•  Plan and supervise the procurement and distribution of maps, charts,
photos, and other materiel for intelligence purposes.
•  Recommend intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) policies.
•  Collect and distribute information on evasion and recovery (E&R), to
include instructions for downed aircrews, evaders, and escapees.
•  Establish liaison with the intelligence staffs and lower commands.
•  Provide intelligence personnel for duty at lower commands.
•  Conduct training to carry out intelligence functions.
3-25. The intelligence section is organized into a forward and rear echelon to
provide continuous operation when enemy pressure forces the area command
HQ to move to alternate locations. When these moves are anticipated, the
forward echelon sets up and begins operations in the prepared alternate site
before the rear echelon moves. During large-scale overt operations, the
forward echelon provides an intelligence section for an advance command
post organized to direct the operations of two or more sector commands. A
guerrilla area command must produce the intelligence needed for its own
security and for local operations against the enemy. It must also gather the
information required by higher HQ. Although supervised by the area
command intelligence section, information collectors are decentralized as far
as practicable to subordinate sector commands.
Sector Commands
3-26. Large area commands may establish subordinate sector commands.
Sector command meetings are conducted after the initial area command
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meeting. Sectors are formed to simplify C4I operations and  to provide a
mechanism to promote centralized planning and decentralized execution. If
the area command is subdivided into sector commands, its component units
are the subordinate sector commands. The sector command is the command
element of the resistance in a given sector. The same factors that define the
boundaries of area complexes define the boundaries of sectors. The kinds and
disposition of facilities within a sector are the same as those for an area
complex. The sector command performs the same functions as  the area
command, except within the limits of its own boundaries. The component
elements of a sector command are the functional components of a resistance
movement.
AREA COMPLEX
3-27. An area complex is a clandestine, dispersed network of facilities to
support resistance activities. It is a “liberated zone” designed to achieve
security, control, dispersion, and flexibility. To support resistance activities,
an area complex must include a security system, base camps,
communications, logistics, medical facilities, supply caches, training areas,
and escape and recovery mechanisms. The area complex may consist of
friendly villages or towns under guerrilla military or political control.
3-28. According to Mao Tse-tung in On Guerrilla Warfare, a guerrilla base
may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can
carry out their duties of training, self-preservation, and development. The
ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of
guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function
over a long period of time without the development of base areas. There is a
difference between the terms base area and guerrilla base area.  An area
completely surrounded by territory occupied by the enemy is a “base area.”
On the other hand, a guerrilla base area includes those areas that can be
controlled by guerrillas only while they physically occupy them.
3-29. Within the area complex, the resistance forces achieve security by—
•  Establishing an effective intelligence net.
•  Using the early warning with listening posts (LPs), observation posts
(OPs), and security patrols.
•  Practicing CI measures.
•  Rehearsing withdrawals and CONPLANs.
•  Employing mobility and flexibility.
•  Using rapid dispersion techniques for personnel.
•  Camouflaging and adhering to noise and light discipline.
•  Organizing the active support of the civilian population.
3-30. The C2 base camp is in the heart of the area complex.  Specially
trained and equipped guerrilla forces control and defend this camp. A special
guerrilla security detachment provides the internal protection for the area
commander, his staff, and the SFOD. Key personnel, critical equipment, and
sensitive information are based from there and may include the following:
•  The area commander and staff.
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•  The SFOD and support personnel.
•  Communication equipment.
•  Controlled medical supplies and treatment facilities.
•  Supply caches of weapons, ammunition, and explosives.
3-31. An area complex can be subdivided into two security zones: outer and
inner (Figure 3-2, page 3-10). There  are no clear-cut boundaries between
zones, and security responsibilities can overlap. Each zone is the
responsibility of a specific guerrilla element whose mission  is to provide for
the security and defense of the zone in the area complex to achieve total and
overlapping security coverage.
Outer Security Zone
3-32. The outer security zone is vitally important to a guerrilla force. The
local guerrilla forces and the civilian support infrastructure are organized
and developed in the outer security zone. This area serves as  the primary
source of recruits for the guerrilla force. The outer zone also serves as the
first line of in-depth security and defense for the area complex. Resistance
elements in this area are responsible for providing the area command with
timely and accurate information on enemy activities within the zone. Local
guerrillas are the resistance element responsible for the zone’s control and
defense. This element is also responsible for the conduct of operations within
the zone. The local guerrilla forces organize, employ, and serve as part of the
civilian support element. The civilian support element gathers current
intelligence information and provides logistic, PSYOP, and operational
support to the regular guerrilla forces and the area command. The initial
screening, selection, and training of new resistance members takes place in
this zone. The most promising and trusted recruits are then selected for
membership in the regular or full-time guerrilla forces.
Inner Security Zone
3-33. The inner security zone encompasses the base camp of the regular or
full-time guerrilla forces. These forces defend and control the zone and are
constantly mobile within the area. The primary mission of the guerrilla forces
operating in this zone is to temporarily delay any penetration made by the
enemy. They watch trails and avenues of approach. They use OPs or LPs,
fixed fighting positions, and pre-positioned obstacles such as bunkers and
minefields to delay enemy forces. They employ harassment, ambushes,
sniping, and other interdiction tactics and practice rapid withdrawal
procedures. These tactics increase the in-depth defense of the area complex.
They should also use command-detonated antivehicular and antipersonnel
mines on a permanent basis. Guerrilla forces may place mines along probable
enemy vehicular and personnel avenues of approach, such as trails, creeks,
and riverbeds. The guerrillas must avoid, at all costs, becoming decisively
engaged while carrying out their delaying and defensive mission. Civilians do
not normally occupy the inner security zone; therefore, it may serve as an
area of food cultivation for the guerrilla population.
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Figure 3-2. Area Complex Security Zones
GUERRILLA BASES
3-34. A guerrilla base is HQ for any  size guerrilla force. A base may be
temporary or permanent, depending on the guerrilla’s stage of development.
Guerrilla C4I, support, facilities, and operational units are located within the
base. LOCs connect the base and facilities within the area  complex. The
installations and facilities found within a guerrilla base are the command
posts, training areas or classrooms, a communications facility, and medical
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services. The occupants and facilities must be capable of rapid displacement
with little or no prior warning. There is usually more than one guerrilla base
within a sector or JSOA. They are in remote, inaccessible areas and their
locations are revealed only on a need-to-know basis. Personnel must use
passive and active security measures to provide base security, employing
overhead cover, concealment, and escape routes. A mandatory requirement
for a guerrilla base camp is a source of water. Wells may be  dug where
permanent bases are established. Ideally, there will be an abundance of
water sources to choose from in the area. All base camps should have an
alternate location for contingency use. In case the enemy overruns the base,
all personnel should plan for and rehearse rapid withdrawals.
TYPES OF BASES
3-35. There are three types of guerrilla bases. In order of development, they
are mobile, semipermanent, and permanent. Initially, all guerrilla base
camps are mobile, and as the JSOA matures, semipermanent  camps are
constructed. When the JSOA matures enough to conduct battalion combat
operations, the semipermanent camps become permanent. Normal occupation
time is based on METT-TC.
Mobile
3-36. Full-time guerrillas and local guerrilla forces establish mobile bases.
These bases are at the periphery of their zones of responsibility. Mobile bases
are normally occupied for periods ranging from 1 to 7 days.
Semipermanent
3-37. HQ elements or sector commands establish semipermanent bases in
the inner security zones. These bases are in areas that provide a tactical
advantage for the guerrilla. Semipermanent bases are normally occupied for
periods ranging from 1 to 2 weeks.
Permanent
3-38. This base is within the rear security zone of the area complex. The
guerrilla command element, SFOD, and key installations and facilities are
located here. Adequate training areas are established  to support all the
training activities. The guerrilla force protects the training areas, and an
SFOD member, who is the subject-matter expert (SME), monitors the
training. When needed, personnel secure drop zones (DZs) and landing zones
(LZs) to receive supplies and equipment. An SFOD member accounts for
supplies. These DZs and LZs must be accessible to the appropriate aircraft
and be a safe distance from the guerrilla base camp. Permanent bases may
normally be occupied for periods ranging from 1 to 2 months.
BASE SECURITY MEASURES
3-39. The defense of any base includes strict adherence to camouflage, noise,
and light discipline. Defense measures should also include  inner security
posts, LPs and OPs, security and tracking patrols, antipersonnel mines, and
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other obstacles to concentrate, impede, or stop the enemy (Figure 3-3).
Personnel should plan contingencies for rapid withdrawal from the area
before any enemy attack.
Figure 3-3. Permanent Base Security
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Inner Security Posts
3-40. Inner security posts are normally established within 100 meters of the
main body. The mission of the inner security posts is to delay a small reaction
force that has penetrated the base perimeter and is closing in on the main
body. This delay allows the main body to break out. During low visibility,
inner security posts are closer, about 25 meters from the main body. A
challenge and password system should be implemented.
Listening and Observation Posts
3-41. LPs and OPs are established in unit SOPs and based on observation
and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and
concealment (OAKOC). At a minimum, LPs and OPs will be located on the
most likely avenues of approach. They should be located on high and
commanding ground surrounding the base, as per unit SOP. The mission of
the posts is to detect and report in a timely manner enemy air and ground
movement that threatens the guerrilla base. If the enemy is detected, post
personnel may not fire on the enemy but radio a size, activity, location, unit,
time, and equipment (SALUTE) report. This tactic saves giving away their
position and possibly the position of the base. These posts are normally
within 400 to 800 meters from the base.
Security and Tracking Patrols
3-42. Security and tracking patrols may be carried out at dawn and dusk to
provide security and early warning for the base. Each patrol should carry a
frequency modulated short-range radio, similar to an AN/PRC-77, enabling
the patrol to relay information to the base in a timely manner. Patrols must
search all areas, but give priority of search to the high ground surrounding
the base and to creek and riverbeds in the area. Patrols also search roads and
trails for tracks or signs of enemy presence. If there are friendly civilians in
the area, they may be questioned regarding enemy activity.  Civilians
unfamiliar to the patrol may be a threat or sympathizer. Information
provided by the friendly civilians is critical to the security of the guerrilla
base camp. The mission of the security patrols is to detect signs or other
indicators of enemy presence or activity. These indicators include—
•  Tobacco, candy, gum, and food wrappers.
•  Human excrement or other waste products.
•  Tracks made by bare feet or boots on recently used trails.
•  Broken branches and bent twigs suggesting direction of travel.
•  Discarded rations, containers, and equipment.
3-43. Passive security measures that can be taken include camouflaging
dwellings and hutches with vegetation. Personnel should change vegetation
daily. They can also camouflage trails and erase tracks. Personnel should
avoid smoke from cooking fires, especially during daylight hours, and
maintain noise and light discipline at all times.
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Antipersonnel Mines
3-44. SFODs may temporarily use antipersonnel mines along likely avenues
of approach into the base. Creeks, riverbeds, and the surrounding elevations
are good locations for placing antipersonnel mines. Personnel will warn the
civilian population about the use of mines to preclude unnecessary civilian
casualties. They may temporarily employ antipersonnel mines in the
following areas not used by civilians:
•  Near running water sources.
•  Around fruit and shade trees.
•  On little-used roads and trails.
•  In and around abandoned fighting positions or around abandoned
uninhabited dwellings.
3-45. Minefield reports should be submitted by the fastest secure means
available and are classified Secret when complete. Exact format may be
specified by local command SOP. FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, or FM 20-32,
Mine/Countermine Ope ations, provides more information on reporting and
recording minefield information.
r
MISSION SUPPORT SITES
3-46. A mission support site (MSS) is a temporary operational and logistics
base for guerrillas who are away from their main base camp for more than a
few days. It extends the range of guerrillas in the JSOA by permitting them
to travel long distances without  support from their base camps. The
guerrillas should not occupy them for more than 24 hours. Guerrillas should
always reconnoiter and surveil the MSS before occupying it.
3-47. Personnel establish an MSS to support a specific mission and should
not use it more than once. Using the MSS only once protects the force from
setting up repeated patterns of movement. However, it may be used before
and after a mission, based on METT-TC. The MSS may contain food, shelter,
medical support, ammunition, demolitions, and other operational items. To
preclude unnecessary noise and movement in and out of the MSS, auxiliary
personnel may establish supply caches in the surrounding vicinity before the
combat force arrives.
3-48. When selecting the location for an MSS, personnel must consider the
following:
•  Proximity to the objective.
•  Level of enemy activity.
•  Cover and concealment.
•  Preplanned routes of withdrawal.
•  Tribal or factional and religious issues.
METT-TC is very important when selecting the MSS. MSSs must not be near
LZs, DZs, or any other sites of heightened activity. Further information on
MSSs is provided in Appendix E.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION
3-49. The primary technique or type of recruitment used in the early stages
of a resistance movement is selective recruitment. As security is emphasized,
recruitment is highly selective. Many tasks of the resistance force require no
qualification for its recruits beyond  a certain degree of intelligence and
emotional stability. Since some activities require special  qualifications,
recruiters must look for individuals who can perform leadership duties,
intelligence collection, and other special tasks. The screening process includes
surveillance and background checks. The recruiters use the following
methods to ensure loyalty: loyalty checks, oaths, and probationary periods.
Once the resistance cadre is established and the resistance movement is
successful, mass recruitment begins. Recruiters seek a base of support among
large segments of the indigenous population. Auxiliary members are
excellent recruiters because they can move easily through denied areas. The
resistance movement must rely on mass support if it is to survive and expand
(Figure 3-4, page 3-16). Recruiting techniques include appeals, coercion, and
suggestion, as well as playing on an individual’s feelings of governmental
alienation.
3-50. Recruitment is difficult in the early phases of the operation and easier
after the resistance establishes its credibility. If the  resistance recruits too
many civilians, enemy reprisals against the remainder of the community are
very possible. The number of base camps and the quantity of  supporting
logistics stock limit the number of potential armed guerrilla recruits.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
3-51. As development of the resistance organization progresses,
documentation and record keeping of mission functions is vital to
maintaining a well-organized force. This information also enables the SFOD
commander to conduct effective C2, pay, rewards, and eventually
demobilization measures. The SFOD must establish administrative
procedures early on to facilitate a well-organized guerrilla force. Appendix I
addresses detailed administrative issues.
COMMANDERS
3-52. The most delicate part of an SFOD’s duty is to ensure that competent
indigenous personnel occupy key leadership positions. If leaders and staff
members of the resistance organization do not appear qualified to fill
positions held, the SFOD should try to increase their effectiveness.
Increasing the effectiveness of these personnel will normally enhance the
influence of the SFOD. The personality and characteristics  of the area
commander are extremely important. His ability must extend beyond
military and technical fields. Successfully commanding a guerrilla force with
all its diverse elements requires psychological and political skills. The area
commander should have distinction among the civilian population and the
confidence of his followers.
3-53. The area commander influences others to accomplish the mission by
providing purpose, direction, and motivation. Purpose gives the guerrillas the
reason why; direction shows what must be done; and motivation gives his
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guerrillas the will to do everything they are capable of to accomplish their
mission.
Figure 3-4. Building a Resistance Movement
3-54. A combat-tested leader demonstrates his tactical and  technical
proficiency and uses initiative to exploit opportunities for success. He
accomplishes this process by taking calculated risks within the commander’s
intent. He leads by example (from the front) and not by fear and coercion.
Successful leadership in combat enables a leader to—
•  Never underestimate his enemy.
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•  Consider the civil component in all operations.
•  Understand basic weapons and demolitions.
•  Understand both conventional force and guerrilla tactics.
•  Appreciate and understand the strategy of war.
•  Respect and anticipate the objectives and campaign goals of
conventional forces.
•  Be able to task-organize himself and others.
•  Be able to recognize and appoint good leaders.
•  Improvise on short notice.
•  Allow the use of initiative.
•  Employ and exploit all types of intelligence-gathering opportunities.
3-55. Historically, the sector leaders have been recognized as  commanders
within their spheres of influence. In the organization of a command, every
effort is made to assist and recognize a local guerrilla leader as the overall
area commander. This concept must not be violated just because the local
commander may lack the requisite military service or qualifications. If he can
command the respect of the people and subordinate commanders in the area,
the SFOD should tutor him in carrying out his area commander functions.
Replacing locally developed leaders with area commanders from external
(out-of-country) sources, even though the new area commanders are nativeborn, may create personal or political rivalries and alienate the area
commanders already in existence. The recognition of commanders, especially
the overall area commander, must not be arbitrary or hasty. Recognition
should be based on a careful assessment of the existing political conditions
and social attitudes within the JSOA. If a resistance movement has failed to
develop due to serious personal rivalries or political differences, the concept
of recognizing a popular local leader as the overall commander may in fact be
violated. In this case, a leader who commands respect and can unify the
efforts of the opposing factions is then appointed or infiltrated into the JSOA.
3-56. The local area commander is responsible for the organization, training,
administration, and operations of guerrilla forces within his area.
Specifically, the duties of the guerrilla area commander are operations of the
forces under his command and coordination of operations between
subordinate forces and allied forces. He continuously determines the
resources, combat strength, dispositions, movements, and capabilities of the
enemy that will affect completion of his mission. He also—
•  Appoints or recognizes subordinate sector commanders.
•  Prepares plans to accomplish assigned missions and contemplated
missions.
•  Prepares and assigns missions to subordinate sector commanders.
•  Establishes adequate communication systems between the various
forces of his command.
•  Organizes and operates CI and intelligence nets.
•  Plans security and defensive measures within the area command and
the area complex.
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•  Guides general administrative policies.
•  Establishes morale and welfare measures.
•  Ensures the care and handling of all EPWs are IAW all the applicable
Geneva Accords and Conventions.
•  Plans, prepares, and employs PSYOP.
•  Guides training for individuals and units.
•  Requisitions and collects supplies from local sources.
•  Requisitions supplies and equipment from outside the JSOA.
•  Allocates and disburses equipment and supplies to subordinate sector
commands.
3-57. The area commander ensures the reception, support, and protection of
SFOD personnel in the JSOA. He accounts for key EPWs, prominent
civilians, and for the rescue and exfiltration of downed aircrews. He is also
responsible for the civilians in the area. Initially, his responsibilities are for
the safety and welfare of those noncombatants within the JSOA. As the
JSOA matures, he may actually supervise the organization of a civil
administration capability among the populace using promising members of
the resistance movement. The SFOD supports him in these requirements by
employing CA assets, first as planners and advisors to the SFOD (including
using reachback capabilities to CA specialists in rear areas or the continental
United States [CONUS]), then as core advisor teams to fledgling civil
administrators, and finally as fully staffed teams capable of providing
support to civil administration. The organization and employment of these
CA assets is based on U.S. policies and objectives in the JSOA and METT-TC.
ELEMENTS OF THE RESISTANCE
3-58. The resistance organization consists of three elements. They are the
guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. The guerrilla force is the
overt military or paramilitary arm. The auxiliary is the clandestine support
element of the guerrilla force. The underground is a cellular organization
that conducts clandestine subversion, sabotage, UAR, and intelligence
collection activities. FM 3-05.220 contains additional information on
resistance organization and structure.
GUERRILLA FORCE
3-59. Guerrillas are a decisive combat force. They conduct tactics,
techniques, and procedures employed in the United States during the French
and Indian Wars. They continued to have success during the  American
Revolution and during the American Civil War for both  the Federal and
Confederate troops. During World War II, a classic example of a decisive
combat force was Merrill’s Marauders and their use of raids, ambushes, and
to a lesser extent, offensive and defensive maneuvers to defeat the Japanese
in Burma.
3-60. The organization of a guerrilla force from the resistance movement or
the reorganization of existing guerrilla forces into a combat command is a
time-consuming process. The organization must follow a definite plan, phased
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and coordinated with the SFOB. Directives from outside the JSOA to the
guerrilla area commanders prescribe the general COAs. Based on detailed
reports and recommendations of the  SFOD, the commander issues more
specific orders much later to reach the desired organizational level. Then, the
highly organized guerrilla force may be employed in overt combat operations.
3-61. Guerrilla forces are organized in a similar manner to conventional
units. Since guerrilla operations normally do not exceed  the equivalent of
battalion-level operations, most guerrilla forces are organized only to that
level. In the later stages of a successful UW situation,  guerrilla forces
conceivably could conduct coordinated regimental or higher operations
against the enemy forces.
3-62. The progressive organization of a guerrilla force in  an AO works in
three general phases. These phases are not specific periods  but normally
overlap and merge into one another. The typical organization and functions of
each phase are as follows.
Organization - Phase I
3-63. In the first phase of organization, individuals band together under
local leadership (Figure 3-5, page 3-20). Their main concern is survival. They
have a basic need for shelter, food, water, and weapons. Appropriate terrain
and friendly villages on the outer limits of enemy-controlled areas offer
shelter. These small bands obtain food, water, and weapons locally. The
activities of these small bands are limited to the organization and
establishment of a support infrastructure within the local civilian population
to obtain information, recruits, and logistic assistance. They may also conduct
political work, small-scale attacks, and sabotage. The area commander
locates his HQ where he can directly influence organization and operations in
the most important sectors of his JSOA. His HQ is in a secure area where
access is limited or uncontrolled by the enemy. The surrounding terrain
should not favor large-scale, enemy-mounted, or dismounted operations.
Logistic concerns and health conditions in the area are further
considerations. Also, just in case, the area commander selects two or more
alternate sites and prepares them for emergency use.
3-64. The area commander appoints a second-in-command and organizes a
staff to accomplish military staff functions. The staff is kept small and
mobile. It places special emphasis on  the organization of the intelligence
section. HQ units carry out the administrative functions. Based on advice
from the SFOD, the area commander makes an estimate of the  situation,
formulates tentative organizational and operational plans, and issues
directives to place them into effect. This effort should focus on—
•  Division of the JSOA into sectors.
•  Appointment of sector commanders.
•  Assignment of missions to sector commanders.
•  Organization in each sector: designation of units and authorized
strengths.
•  General operating principles and procedures.
•  Communications system and responsibilities.
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3-65. In areas that have no guerrilla  forces or strong resistance movement,
the area commander may appoint a sector commander for the  exploitation
and organization of the area. This support may consist of assigning cadre
personnel for a sector commander’s HQ, combat units to provide security, and
a nucleus around which he may organize and expand his local forces. The
area commander helps the sector commanders obtain the support of the
indigenous population by visiting the sector and employing CA activities,
such as HA, emergency services, military civic action (MCA), and support to
civil administration. The effectiveness of CA activities may be enhanced by a
strong public information campaign supported by PSYOP.
Figure 3-5. Typical Phase I Organization
3-66. In areas where many independent guerrilla forces exist, the area
commander gives the appointed sector  commander the necessary support to
bring about unity of command. He gives this support through personal
contact with the various local guerrilla leaders. The area  commander may
apply drastic measures to influence independent leaders and units that resist
integration into the overall command. Withholding logistic support from
outside the JSOA to those elements  resisting integration is normally
sufficient to encourage their willing compliance. The SFOD commander
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should be prepared to advise the area commander on the possible
repercussions of the area commander’s actions.
3-67. Normally, a skeleton organization is formed during Phase  I. Also
established are—
•  A command HQ in each subordinate sector.
•  A communication system linking the area command HQ with  sector
HQ.
•  An extensive intelligence and CI net covering the entire JSOA.
Establishment of this net is extremely important.
3-68. The overall strength of the command and the component units may be
kept as low as one-third of the potential strength to be developed. Premature
expansion and buildup of strength during this phase can cause undue strain
on local resources, create hardships, and result in dissension among the
civilian population.
Organization - Phase II
3-69. In the second phase of organization, the number and size  of units
increase (Figure 3-6, page 3-22). Small units unite under common leadership;
volunteers, individual soldiers, or deserting army units further strengthen
their ranks. When a tested local leader emerges as a commander, command
and leadership improve. Personnel work diligently to establish contact with
external support sources or with a sympathetic national government. These
external support sources, along with battlefield recovery efforts, increase the
quantity of war materiel. Greater enemy pressure results in widespread
sabotage, raids, and ambushes. Political and administrative considerations,
policies of the sponsor supporting the resistance movement, and METT-TC
determine the extent to which unified commands develop. During Phase II,
the commander modifies or adopts the tentative plans prepared in Phase I
and places them into effect. He makes continuous assessments and considers
additional COAs to further expand and build up forces. The expansion that
takes place during this phase directly relates to the amount of logistic
support from sources outside the JSOA. Missions and internal functions in
the operational area also lead to expansion. This organizational expansion
may include—
•  Increasing the strength of the skeletonized command, combat, and
service support units up to 50 percent of their potential strength.
•  Organizing additional guerrilla units.
•  Expanding the communication system within the AO and with
subordinate sector commands.
•  Expanding the intelligence and CI nets.
•  Emphasizing the organization of the civilian population.
3-70. Phase II is normally the most critical period in  the organization of a
guerrilla force. The commander must ensure the guerrilla organization and
its infrastructure (supporting civilian population) is well organized and
strong enough ideologically to withstand heavy enemy political and military
pressure.
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Figure 3-6. Typical Phase II Organization
Organization - Phase III
3-71. During the third phase of organization (Figure 3-7, page 3-23), a
unified command is established over some areas, often because of a strong
and competent leader emerging as the recognized commander. Increased
communication and liaison enhance control and coordination among the
various guerrilla forces and external sources. Based on the mission assigned
by higher HQ (input from the SFOD is a critical factor), the area commander
makes an estimate of the situation and plans the mission. The decision to
conduct an operation results in an OPLAN that states requirements for the
area command staff, sector commands, and logistic elements. Portions of
these tentative plans are then sent to subordinate commands. The
subordinate commanders determine the area commander’s intent and
prepare their own plans accordingly. Also during Phase III, command
personnel—
•  Methodically develop and expand effective CI and intelligence nets.
•  Observe and enforce strict OPSEC measures.
•  Determine what control measures the enemy has imposed on the
civilian population.
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•  Develop and implement programs of benefit to the populace  (for
example, developmental MCA projects), supported by PSYOP efforts to
counter enemy propaganda and help elevate the morale of guerrillas
and loyal civilians.
•  Execute training and well-planned operations to improve the
effectiveness of individuals and units.
•  Infiltrate supplies from external sources to augment existing military
equipment.
Figure 3-7. Typical Phase III Organization
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3-72. In addition, the guerrilla force, supported from an external source,
develops a cohesive military establishment able to firmly defend and strike
with substantial force at selected targets. General directives normally control
guerrilla activities during this phase. Typical organizational expansion
during Phase III may include—
•  Building existing units up to authorized strength.
•  Activating additional units.
•  Pre-positioning units closer to their tentative operational areas.
•  Increasing efforts to organize the civilian population into an effective
support mechanism.
3-73. The joint commander makes every effort to develop a balanced
guerrilla force, trained and ready to negate the threat and carry out these
activities assigned by the area command. The organization  of the guerrilla
force depends on existing threat conditions and operational  considerations
within the JSOA. If the threat is armor, then the force should task-organize
as an antiarmor force. When practical, the organization of the guerrilla force
should closely parallel the organization of a conventional force to enhance
mission C2. The single most important point about guerrilla forces is that
they cannot be arbitrarily located or pinpointed due to their use of tactics,
flexibility, and knowledge of the area. In turn, available guerrilla manpower
and material assets influence these missions and tactics. They must also be
careful not to reduce the inherent flexibility that the force requires.
Membership
3-74. The guerrilla force consists of people in different social classes and
ethnic groups, some of whom are often antagonistic toward each other. They
reflect a variety of educational and aptitude categories  with different
interests and inclinations. The guerrilla leader depends on volunteers to
increase the size of his force. If he is incompetent or unpopular, or if the
guerrillas suffer tactical reversals, he will have difficulties in getting more
recruits. The following quote serves as a good representation of the
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force relationship.
The people are the sea; the revolutionaries are the fish. The sea
supports the fish. It also hides them from predators. The revolutionaries
only want to show themselves when they are not themselves vulnerable.
Then they fade back into the sea, or the mountains, or the jungles.
Mao Tse-tung
AUXILIARY
3-75. The success or failure of the guerrilla force depends on its ability to
maintain logistic and intelligence support. The auxiliary fills these support
functions by organizing civilians and conducting coordinated support efforts.
Its organization and mission depend upon METT-TC. The assistance of the
civilian population is critical to  the success of the resistance movement.
Auxiliary units have their own combat, support, and underground units. The
auxiliary primarily provides security, intelligence, and logistic support for the
guerrilla force by using civilian supporters of the resistance. The auxiliary
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conducts clandestine support functions by organizing people on a regional,
district, or sector basis depending on the degree to which guerrilla forces are
organized. The auxiliary members screen all new potential underground
members. For OPSEC reasons, all auxiliary functions must  first section off
from each other and from the guerrilla forces they support through deadletter drops and other clandestine communications. The guerrilla force needs
the following clandestine support  functions to supplement its own
capabilities:
•  Air, land, or maritime reception support.
•  Internal systems for acquisition of supplies.
•  Internal systems to acquire operational information and intelligence.
•  Medical facilities for hospitalization, treatment, and rehabilitation of
sick and wounded.
•  CI systems to deter enemy penetration attempts.
•  Outer zone security for early warning to guerrilla forces.
•  Systems and procedures for recruitment of personnel.
•  Compartmented communication systems for various support functions.
•  Current information on terrain, weather, civilians, and local resources.
•  Direct intelligence support, especially in the outer security zone of the
guerrilla base camp.
•  Deception operations support.
•  Manufacture and maintenance of equipment.
•  Transportation systems.
Organization
3-76. An auxiliary command committee organizes civilian sympathizers into
subordinate elements or uses them individually. When possible, the
committee organizes subordinates into a functionally compartmented
structure (Figure 3-8, page 3-26). Historically, each subordinate auxiliary has
had to perform several functions because of a shortage of loyal personnel.
3-77. The auxiliary normally organizes to coincide with or parallel the
existing political system or administration. This system ensures that an
auxiliary unit assists each community and the surrounding countryside.
3-78. Organization of auxiliary forces starts at any level or at several levels
simultaneously. It is either centralized or decentralized. The auxiliary
establishes commands at each administrative level; for example, at the
regional, county, district, local community, or village level.
3-79. A command committee at each level controls and coordinates auxiliary
activities within its AOR. In this respect, the committee resembles the
command group and staff of a military unit. At the lowest  level, one
individual may perform two or three duties. Members of the command
committee are assigned specific duties, such as—
•  Security.
•  Intelligence.
•  Operations.
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•  Communications.
•  Transportation.
•  Supply.
•  Recruiting.
Figure 3-8. Auxiliary Cell
Membership
3-80. Members of the auxiliary are people who maintain a permanent
residence in the denied sector or AO and have identifiable and legitimate
means of livelihood. The auxiliary members must appear in all respects to be
“average citizens.” They must be loyal to the resistance cause. People who are
simply coerced or duped into supporting the resistance are not considered
auxiliary members. Auxiliary components in a sector or AO are normally
satellites of local guerrilla forces. They also provide support to other guerrilla
forces that normally do not operate within this JSOA or region.
3-81. Guerrilla forces depend on the civilian population for recruits to
replace operational losses and to expand their forces. Auxiliaries spot, screen,
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and recruit personnel for active guerrilla forces. If recruits are provided from
reliable auxiliary sources, the enemy’s chances of placing agents in the
guerrilla force are greatly reduced.
3-82. The two most important keys to the survival and effectiveness of
auxiliary members are maintaining an  “average citizen” image and being
extremely cautious about confiding in others. Examples of “what not to do”
include—
•  Failing to maintain an “average citizen” image.
•  Being repeatedly absent from work without good explanations.
•  Showing an unusual concern about enemy activities.
•  Failing to account for missing supplies.
•  Appearing unusually nervous or habitually tired.
•  Confiding too freely in strangers.
•  Asking questions and unusual favors of people of questionable loyalties.
•  Being too eager to recruit people without adequate security checks.
Security Support
3-83. Auxiliary members and units derive their protection by two principal
means—their compartmented structure and their mode of operation (under
cover). While enemy counterguerrilla activities often force the guerrillas to
move temporarily away from given  areas, the auxiliaries survive by
remaining in place and conducting their activities to avoid detection.
Individual auxiliary members carry on their normal, day-to-day routine while
secretly carrying out the many facets of resistance activities. Auxiliary units
frequently use passive or neutral elements of the population to provide active
support to the common cause. They usually use such people  on a one-time
basis because of the increased security risks involved.
3-84. The demonstrated success of the friendly forces further enhances the
ability of auxiliary forces to manipulate large segments  of the neutral
population. The organization and use of the auxiliary varies from country to
country or AO. Security must be the first thought when the auxiliary is
organized. The resistance movement depends heavily on the logistic support
and early warning systems the auxiliary provides. The resistance movement
cannot survive without the support of its greatest asset—the civilian
population.
3-85. Auxiliary members continue participating in the life of their
community. To all appearances, they present no break from their daily
routines and, at the same time, engage in resistance activities and
operations. Such personnel are, in fact, leading double lives, and their success
in the resistance depends on their ability to keep that side of their lives secret
from all, including family and friends. The “farmer by day, supporter by
night,” commonly called a “part-time guerrilla,” often is the forerunner to the
full-time guerrilla.
3-86. The auxiliary leader assigns tasks to groups or individuals according
to their capability, dependability, and the degree to which they are willing
and able to participate. Those who unwittingly give support or are coerced
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into giving support are not considered auxiliaries. Personnel who sympathize
strongly with the resistance movement but may be under surveillance by the
enemy provide little value as auxiliary members. Other examples of
personnel who might prove more dangerous than profitable are former
political leaders or technicians employed by the enemy. Functions that
require travel or transportation might be performed by such persons as
foresters, farmers, fishermen, or transportation workers. In addition, these
functions should, if possible, be covered by routine daily activities. Other
duties, such as security and warning, require a valid reason for remaining at
a given location over an extended period.
Intelligence Support
3-87. Auxiliary members can give considerable intelligence support due to
their at-home status and their freedom of movement throughout the AO. The
auxiliary organizes an extensive system of civilians who can keep enemy
forces under surveillance and provide early warning of their movements.
Individuals are selected because of advantageous locations that permit them
to monitor the enemy.
3-88. When engaged in specific intelligence operations, select personnel and
informants, because of their locations, can surveil virtually every overt enemy
activity. The auxiliary also aids the area command CI effort by maintaining
watch over transitory civilians, by screening recruits for guerrilla forces, and
by monitoring refugees and other personnel not indigenous to the area. Due
to their intimate knowledge of the civilian population, auxiliaries can identify
attempts by enemy agents and local civilians sympathetic to the opposition or
enemy forces in the area. They can also name those civilians whose loyalty to
the resistance might be suspect. Auxiliary units collect information to
support their own operations and those of the area command.  This
information provides direct intelligence support to guerrilla forces operating
within the AOR.
3-89. Because the auxiliary members  live and work among the civilian
population at large, they can inconspicuously observe enemy movements and
activities. They report sightings of interest to the guerrillas. Observers must
have good reasons to justify their activities. Simply loitering in an area where
the enemy is draws suspicion and causes the observer to be arrested and
interrogated. The best justification for an observer’s  activities is that he or
she works in the area. Examples are a sales clerk in a store near an enemy
facility, a gas station operator in a gas station used by the enemy, a street
cleaner near an enemy facility, and a farmer working in a field beside a road
where enemy convoys are moving. The auxiliary can be sensitive to CI
operations of the enemy, such as the attempt to infiltrate the guerrillas with
recruits who are actually spies.
3-90. The area command controls auxiliary activities. The auxiliary
members’ responsibilities relate to their civilian occupations, such as
construction workers with access to explosives and related supplies, doctors,
medical assistants, pharmacists, hardware store managers, transportation
workers, and communications technicians.
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3-91. Also, civil service employees are excellent sources of  information.
Functions are compartmented so that if a member of the auxiliary is
compromised, the information that he can reveal is limited and not time
sensitive.
3-92. The auxiliary also provides the  guerrillas goods and services that
relate to their civilian occupations. It provides guerrilla recruiters with the
names and addresses of prospective new guerrillas. It can also tell the
guerrillas of homes and places in the community that  favor the resistance
and can give support.
Logistic Support
3-93. Most missions of the auxiliary support the guerrilla forces in its area.
There are two methods—direct support or area command-directed support.
Normally, the auxiliary provides direct support missions for the guerrilla
forces in its area. The auxiliary supports guerrillas in all phases of logistic
operations. The auxiliary—
•  Provides transportation for supplies and equipment.
•  Cares for the sick and wounded.
•  Provides medical supplies.
•  Arranges for doctors and other medical personnel.
•  Collects food, clothing, and other supplies through a controlled system
of levy, barter, or contribution.
•  Sometimes provides essential services such as repair of clothing, shoes,
and other items of equipment.
•  Supplies personnel to help at reception sites.
3-94. The extent of the logistic support given by the auxiliary depends on
the resources of the area, the degree of influence it exerts on the population,
and enemy activities. When requisitioning support, the auxiliary must
emphasize the righteousness of the resistance objectives and the commonality
of resistance or population goals. The resistance depends on the goodwill of
the population and the steady “I don’t know” replies to enemy interrogators.
In cases where the population acts only halfheartedly for the resistance, some
civilians are willing to help by being observers, scouts, or messengers.
Home Guard
3-95. The home guard is the paramilitary arm of the auxiliary force. The
various command committees control home guards. All auxiliary elements do
not necessarily organize home guards. Home guards perform many missions
for the auxiliary forces, such as tactical missions, guarding of caches, and
training of recruits. Their degree of organization and training depends upon
the extent of effective enemy control in the area.
Psychological Operations
3-96. A very important mission in which auxiliary units assist is PSYOP,
which must be integrated and synchronized at all levels to achieve its full
force-multiplier potential. The spreading of rumors, leaflets, and posters is
timed with guerrilla tactical missions to deceive the enemy. The spreading of
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conveyed selected information usually involves little risk to the disseminator
and is very difficult for the enemy to control.
Populace and Resources Control
3-97. The auxiliary employs populace and resources control (PRC) measures
to minimize or eliminate black marketing and profiteering  and to
demonstrate to the enemy the power of the guerrilla movement. PRC consists
of the following two distinct, but related, concepts:
•  Populace controls provide security for the populace, mobilize human
resources, deny personnel to the enemy, and detect and reduce the
effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include
curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and
resettlement of villagers. DC operations and noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO) are two special categories of populace control that
require extensive planning and coordination among various military
and nonmilitary organizations.
•  R sources con ls regulate the movement or consumption of materiel
resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the
enemy. Resources control measures  include licensing, regulations or
guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls,
amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.
e tro
3-98. To perform PRC and give the enemy an impression of guerrilla power,
the auxiliary establishes a legal control system to help prevent black
marketing and profiteering. The auxiliary may use subtle coercion or other
stricter means to control collaborators.
Evasion and Recovery
3-99. The auxiliary is ideally suited for the support of  E&R mechanisms.
Contact with, and control over, segments of the civilian population provide
the area commander a secure means of aiding evaders.
3-100. The auxiliary members receive, conceal, and transport resistance
personnel who are infiltrating into, or exfiltrating out of, the JSOA. They also
receive and conceal guerrillas who have been wounded or separated from
their units during hostilities.
Other Support Missions
3-101. The auxiliary may be called upon to perform several other guerrilla
support missions, such as coordinating actions with the guerrillas against
their targets. For example, the auxiliary may conduct minor acts of sabotage,
such as cutting telephone lines, reversing street signs, giving false information,
and obstructing troop movements. It may also support guerrilla missions by—
•  Furnishing guides.
•  Operating courier systems.
•  Conducting active guerrilla-type operations on a limited basis.
•  Raising funds.
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UNDERGROUND
3-102. The underground supports the area command, auxiliary, and
guerrilla force, based on METT-TC. These personnel commit sabotage,
intelligence gathering, and acts of deception through the action arm,
intelligence, supply, and personnel sections. Trainers develop a guerrilla
METL after mission analysis and apply it to METT-TC.
Organization
3-103. The underground organizes into compartmented cells (Figures 3-9
and 3-10, page 3-32). It forms these cells within various political subdivisions
of the sector or area, such as the U.S. equivalents of counties, towns, and
neighborhoods. The underground environment may be urban or rural.
FM 3-05.220 includes further discussion on cell organization.
Figure 3-9. Underground Operations Cell
3-31 FM 3-05.201
Figure 3-10. Underground Intelligence Cell
3-104. If a member of the underground is compromised, the information that
he can reveal is limited. A command committee organizes and controls
underground activities. The committee members perform duties and
responsibilities based on their skills and the degree of risk they are willing to
accept.
3-105. For security reasons, the size of the underground is kept as small as
possible. The underground receives evaders, downed pilots, and other key
people. It hides people and moves them as needed or moves them out of the
JSOA entirely. The auxiliary also moves and hides people within its sector of
operation. However, the underground can move people across the entire area
complex. It has a system of “safe houses” that have been carefully selected
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and prepared to hide these people. It develops procedures so that people can
be moved along selected routes at the best times to avoid detection. The
underground moves them in false-bottom containers to include laundry carts,
fish crates, vehicles, furniture, and caskets. It also moves sensitive
documents and equipment in a similar manner.
3-106. To support other operations, particularly those involving the
smuggling of personnel and materials, the underground commits acts of
deception to steal bonafide documents  (identification [ID] cards, passes,
ration coupons, money, and passports) and use them under false pretenses. If
the underground cannot obtain the bona fide documents, it prepares
facsimiles.
Membership
3-107. The underground member needs to apply traditional behavior
patterns to create a positive image. He is frequently prohibited from taking
anything from the people without paying for it. He may even have to befriend
certain segments of the population to influence them in support of the
movement. He strives to conform to the normal behavior and daily activities
of his neighborhood. By appearing conventional and inconspicuous, he makes
it difficult for the security force to detect, identify, or find him. Without
records or physical evidence, he is difficult to link to  the organization.
Contact and communications between members are key survival and critical
points of subversive operations.
3-108. The underground normally contains more specialists and technicians
than either the guerrilla or auxiliary components. Ideally, they are able to
conduct combat operations in SR, DA, and UW. Also, they should possess the
ability, experience, and equipment necessary to prepare all types of
counterfeit documents and be able to produce counterfeit money.
3-109. To survive and be effective, a member of the underground must
exhibit many positive personality traits necessary to endure hardship and he
must be highly self-motivated. Among these traits, he must—
•  Be technically and tactically proficient in combat  skills, stealth, and
self-discipline.
•  Maintain and display an inconspicuous, “average citizen” image toward
the enemy.
•  Be very cautious about confiding in others. Secrecy and dedication to
the cause come before any personal benefit, allowing  for greater
longevity.
Nature of Operations
3-110. Underground operations can be clandestine, covert, and overt. These
operations have major similarities with those of both the guerrillas and the
auxiliary. Some involve overt and violent actions and others are passive. The
following paragraphs discuss the underground’s relationship to other
elements of the resistance.
3-111. Underground cells support the operations of the guerrillas and
auxiliary (within their sector commands) with acts of deception, sabotage,
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and movement of personnel and equipment. Underground cells cooperate
closely with other underground counterparts in their sectors and throughout
the area complex. Cooperation enables successful movement of personnel and
equipment in and out of the JSOA.
3-112. The guerrillas and auxiliary are more independent. Only in rare,
coordinated operations does the underground work with its counterparts in
other sectors.
3-113. The underground may commit acts of violence or sabotage to interdict
enemy operations and movements.
3-114. The underground may publish a resistance newsletter or newspaper
promoting the resistance cause among the civilian population. In countries
with a controlled media system, a private publication of this nature will be of
high interest. However, the underground must anticipate enemy reprisals for
possession of the paper. Also, the enemy will probably search for the printing
press. A defense against this threat is to print the paper outside the JSOA
and smuggle it into the country, storing the supply in various locations.
3-115. The underground may engage in covert operations to disseminate
embarrassing or incriminating information about the enemy or its officials.
These revelations may inflame existing problems in sensitive areas and
degrade the enemy’s rapport with the civilian population or cause dissension
in the enemy’s ranks.
TRAINING THE RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION
3-116. A major part of the SFOD’s mission is to plan, organize, conduct, and
evaluate training of selected resistance cadre. This work prepares the SFOD
to be trainers and force multipliers for the resistance organization. During
premission planning, the SFOD develops a tentative training plan based on
METT-TC. The SFOD members prepare the training plan, POI, and training
aids in the indigenous language, if possible. They include sand tables with
toy soldiers and vehicles as instruction aids. After commitment into the
JSOA, SFOD members evaluate the present level of the resistance forces’
training and update the initial training plan or modify it to ensure its
effectiveness.
TRAINING PLAN
3-117. The training plan outlines  how the SFOD will best accomplish its
training objective. SFOD members develop the training plan in isolation
based on an estimate of the training situation by the pilot team. Important
factors in developing the training plan are mission, personnel, time, facilities,
and organization for training. Other considerations are weather, climate, and
the enemy situation.
MISSION
3-118. Based on operational directives from higher HQ, the SFOD
determines the specific tasks, conditions, and standards the resistance forces
must accomplish. If the resistance force has to conduct multiple missions, the
SFOD must set up priorities for training. Because a guerrilla travels
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primarily on his feet, he must undergo rigorous physical training and
numerous cross-country marches.
TIME
3-119. The available training time is a critical factor. The shorter the
training time, the more time is taken to define the training objectives. SFOD
personnel will lose training time because of operational requirements. They
must include makeup training as an integral part of the training program.
FACILITIES
3-120. The SFOD will advise the area command and resistance  force on
selecting and establishing ranges, training areas, improvised classrooms,
training aids, and other training facilities. Security is of prime importance.
The SFOD locates ranges and training areas away from the base camp. It can
make a small valley with aerial concealment or a man-made tunnel into
single-lane ranges. Air and BB rifles  are excellent alternate, inexpensive,
training aids in lieu of full-caliber marksmanship training.
POLITICAL TRAINING
3-121. Politically or religiously extreme insurgents use  frequent criticism
and self-criticism sessions  as a form of catharsis (venting). These sessions
allow members to voice fears and problems and to hear from other members.
An individual who is disillusioned with the resistance movement will find it
difficult to conceal his true feelings in these sessions. He will become
influenced by what his friends and comrades think of him. Ideologically
oriented unit leaders are more cohesive and effective in their training. Cadres
in each unit must set the “politically correct” example during these daily
training sessions. They must continually reinforce rank-and-file members,
assuring them that what they are doing is needed to carry out the will of the
people. Such confidence will elevate morale and fighting spirit.
Equal importance should be attached to the military and political aspects
of the one-year consolidation and  training program, which has just
begun, and the two aspects should be integrated. At the start, stress
should be placed on the political aspect, on improving relations between
officers and men, enhancing internal unity and arousing a high level of
enthusiasm among the masses of cadres and fighters. Only thus will the
military consolidation and training  proceed smoothly and attain better
results.
Mao Tse-tung, 1945
TRAINING THE GUERRILLA FORCE
3-122. SFOD members evaluate how well the guerrillas are trained through
personal observations and inspections and the results of limited (easy)
combat missions. Characteristics of  the guerrilla force that may present
obstacles to training include—
•  A wide range of education and military experience.
•  Different personal motivation for joining the force.
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•  Possible language and dialect barriers requiring training through
interpreters.
TRAINING ORGANIZATION
3-123. The requirements for physical  security in the JSOA dictate that
guerrilla forces be dispersed over a wide area. Consequently, the system and
organization for training are decentralized and “hands-on” training is
emphasized. The SFOD must train the guerrilla cadre and later help this
cadre in additional training and  combat employment. Throughout the
organization, development, and training phases of guerrilla activities, the
guerrillas conduct limited combat operations. These actions support training,
instill confidence, and test the readiness of the force. The goals of these
combat operations are to—
•  Attract additional recruits to the guerrilla force.
•  Assist in gaining popular support from the civilian population.
•  Allow the area command and SFOD an opportunity to evaluate the
training.
•  Increase the morale and esprit de corps of the guerrilla  forces with
initial successful combat operations.
TRAINING METHODS
3-124. The SFOD generally uses the three-tier concept for training. This
concept is similar to the U.S. Army red, green, and amber training cycle. It
allows for one-third of the guerrilla forces in training, one-third providing
security for the training, and one-third providing support or doing small-scale
operations. The three-tier concept accommodates the training of any size
unit.
3-125. Generic POI development is the same anywhere. Trainers base all
training (basic, advanced, and specialized) on METT-TC and the current
combat skills of the guerrillas. They modify the training after contact with
the guerrilla force. Appendix J outlines a generic guerrilla POI.
3-126. Trainers base all training (basic, advanced, and  specialized) on
METT-TC and the current combat skills of the guerrillas. They may modify
the training after contact with the guerrilla force.
As for the training courses, the main objective should still be to raise the
level of technique in marksmanship, bayoneting, grenade-throwing and
the like and the secondary objective should be to raise the level of
tactics, while special emphasis should be laid on night operations.
Mao Tse-tung, 1946
Basic Training
3-127. METT-TC determines the need for base camps within the JSOA. All
guerrillas including the area command may receive basic training. Each base
camp may conduct its basic training in sectors independent of the other two,
or it may conduct a part of basic training and rotate to another camp for more
training. Either the SFOD or guerrillas may rotate. The base camps may
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construct ranges and training areas for their use, or one base camp may
construct a range and teach all marksmanship classes. Another base camp
may construct training areas for raids, and the other may construct areas for
ambushes and reconnaissance. The present combat abilities of the guerrillas
and the threat determine how much basic training is needed.
3-128. Basic training contains subjects on small arms, first aid, land
navigation, and political or PSYOP classes. The time allotted for training
needs to be flexible—between 21 and 31 days, depending on the knowledge
and abilities of the force.
Advanced Training
3-129. Each base camp conducts some advanced training or rotates to other
base camps for additional training. This concept is similar to basic training,
and the guerrillas or SFOD may rotate. Trainers can conduct medical and
demolitions training in one base camp; communications and intelligence in
another; and tactics, operations, and heavy weapons in the third. At the end
of the advanced training period, the guerrillas or SFOD would rotate to
another base camp for a new training cycle. For security reasons, all the
engineer, communications, medical, and intelligence sergeants should not be
in the same sector base camp at the same time.
3-130. Advanced training may last from 40 to 80 days. This phase consumes
the most time, but it also pays the most dividends. Some subjects covered in
greater depth include combat orders, machine guns, tactics, survival, and
MOSs of medical, communications, weapons, and demolitions.
Specialized Training
3-131. Specialized training is broadly subdivided into elementary and
advanced specialized training. Personnel and units assigned  to the theater
SF may have received elementary specialized training. If not, such training
becomes a responsibility of the theater SF commander. Specialized training,
elementary and advanced, is conducted by a training center operated by the
theater SF.
3-132. Elementary specialized training  consists of training individuals and
teams to carry out their assigned functions. Intensive courses are conducted
and include the following:
•  Map reading and sketching.
•  Patrolling.
•  Close combat.
•  Physical training.
•  Fieldcraft.
•  Tactics of both regular and guerrilla forces.
•  Demolitions and techniques of sabotage.
•  Use and care of weapons, including those of the enemy forces.
•  First aid.
•  Use of enemy and civilian motor transportation.
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•  Enemy organization and methods.
•  Methods of organizing and training guerrillas.
•  Security information.
•  Methods of supply to guerrilla forces.
3-133. Advanced specialized training prepares qualified individuals and
teams for specific missions in enemy territory. During this training,
individuals are organized into the teams in which they will be employed.
Thereafter the group trains, lives, and operates as a unit under simulated
conditions of the area where they are to be employed. Special techniques,
skills, and orientation are stressed to enable them to carry out their mission
and to weld them into efficient, mobile, and self-sufficient teams. Parachute
or amphibious training is given, depending on the contemplated means of
entering enemy territory.
3-134. Besides the training outlined above, technical training is given to
radio operators, medical technicians, demolition experts, and other
specialists.
TRAINING STAFF AND AUXILIARY OR UNDERGROUND
PERSONNEL
3-135. While the SFOD members are training the guerrilla force, the SFOD
commander, ADC, and team sergeant are training the area command and
staff, sector commander and staff, and selected members of the auxiliary or
underground. The area commander and his staff may train in the same base
camp with his guerrillas. Although the area command and auxiliary or
underground may be trained anywhere in the JSOA, it should be
compartmented for security reasons. FM 3-05.220 provides more information
on training the auxiliary and underground in advanced SO techniques.
TRAINING THROUGH INTERPRETERS
3-136. Historically, SFOD members in a UW environment have been faced
with a social and political power struggle when they tried to select an
interpreter to work with them. The struggle has not always been to their
advantage. The next few paragraphs discuss some tips on how  to select an
interpreter and avoid some of the often-repeated pitfalls.
Native Speaker
3-137. The ideal interpreter would be a native speaker from  the AO who
knows most of the area dialects. His speech, grammar, background, and
social mannerisms should be understandable to the students. If he fits this
ideal description, the students will listen to what he says, not how he says it.
The students will understand the interpreter.
Social Status
3-138. An interpreter often is limited in his effectiveness with students if his
social standing is considerably lower than that of his students. There may be
significant differences among the students and the interpreter in military
rank or memberships in ethnic or religious groups. When students are
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officers, it may be best to have an officer or civilian act as an interpreter. On
the other hand, if students are enlisted personnel, an officer interpreter
might intimidate the students and stifle class participation. An enlisted
interpreter would be the best choice in this case. Most cultures recognize
technical competence and international differences in military structure, so
there should be no problem for the SFOD. Despite personal feelings on social
status, the instructor’s job is to train all students equally, not act as an agent
of social reform in a foreign land. The instructor must accept local customs as
a way of life.
English Fluency
3-139. If the SFOD instructor and interpreter can communicate with each
other in English, the interpreter’s command of English is adequate. The
instructor can check the interpreter’s level of “understanding” by asking him
to paraphrase in English what the instructor has just said. If the interpreter
restates the comments correctly, both are “reading off the same sheet of
music.”
Intelligence
3-140. The interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing
conditions and situations. He must be able to grasp complex concepts and
discuss them without confusion in a logical sequence. Education does not
equate to intelligence, but better educated interpreters will be more effective
due to experience and maturity.
Technical Ability
3-141. If the interpreter has technical training or experience in the
instructor’s subject area, he will be more effective since  he will translate
“meaning” as well as “words.” A doctor could interpret for a medic, and
former military personnel could interpret best for the weapons and
intelligence sergeants.
Reliability
3-142. An instructor must be leery of any interpreter who arrives late for the
class. Many cultures operate on a “flexible clock,” where time is relatively
unimportant. The interpreter must understand the concept  of punctuality.
Also, it is safe to assume that any interpreter’s first loyalty is to his country,
not to the United States. The security implications are clear; the instructor
must be very cautious in explaining  concepts to give the interpreter “a
greater depth of understanding.” Also, some interpreters,  for political or
personal reasons, may have a “hidden agenda” when they apply for the job.
Compatibility
3-143. The instructor must establish rapport with his interpreter early in
their relationship and maintain compatibility throughout their joint effort.
Mutual respect and understanding are essential to effective instruction.
Some rapport-building subjects to discuss with the interpreter are history,
geography, ethnic groups, political system, prominent political figures,
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monetary system, business, agriculture, exports, and hobbies. The SFOD
member is building a friendship on a daily basis.
3-144. If several qualified interpreters are available, the instructor should
select at least two. The exhausting nature of the job makes a half-day of
active interpreting the maximum for  peak efficiency. One interpreter,
however skilled, will seldom be enough except for short-term courses
conducted at a leisurely pace. If two or more interpreters are available, one of
them can sit in the rear of the class and provide quality control of the
instruction by crosschecking the active  interpreter. Meanwhile, additional
interpreters can conduct rehearsals, grade examinations, and evaluate the
exercises. Mature judgment and a genuine concern that the students are
learning important skills go a long way toward accomplishing the mission.
3-145. Good instructors will tactfully ask about their interpreters’
background. With genuine concern, they ask about the interpreter’s family,
aspirations, career, and education. They can start with his home life; it’s very
important to him and is neutral territory. Instructors can follow up with a
discussion of cultural traditions to find out more about him and the land he
lives in.
3-146. The instructor should gain his interpreter’s trust and confidence
before embarking on sensitive issues such as sex, politics, and religion. He
must approach these areas carefully and tactfully. They may be useful and
revealing in the professional relationship between instructor and interpreter.
Once this stage is reached, the two are well on their way to a valuable
friendship and a firm, professional working relationship.
TRAINING THE INTERPRETERS
3-147. Very early on, the instructor conveys to the interpreter that he will
always direct the training. However, he must stress how important the
interpreter is as a link to the students. He can appeal to the interpreter’s
professional pride by describing how the quality and quantity of learning are
dependent on his interpreting skills and his ability to function as a conduit
between instructor and students. The instructor must also stress patriotism,
that the defense of his country is directly related to his ability to transfer the
instructor’s knowledge to the students.
3-148. Because of cultural differences, interpreters may attempt to “save
face” by concealing their lack of understanding. They may attempt to
translate what they think the instructor “meant” without  asking for a
clarification. Disinformation and  confusion result for the students.
Ultimately, when the students realize they have been misled, they question
the instructor’s credibility, not the interpreter’s. If the instructor has
established rapport with his interpreter, he is in a better position to appeal to
the interpreter’s sense of duty, honor, and country. A mutual understanding
allows for clarification when needed, leads to more accurate interpretation,
and keeps the instructor informed of any student difficulties.
Conducting the Training
3-149. To prepare for teaching, the instructor must have initial lesson plans
available for basic, advanced, and specialized training. He must also have on
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hand the available supporting documentation, such as FMs. When the class
begins, the instructor should—
•  Express the training objective in measurable performance terms.
•  Outline the course content with methods of instruction and the various
training aids to be demonstrated and then used by the students.
•  Supply and circulate all class handout material when needed.
•  M o d i f y   t h e   t r a i n i n g   s c h e d u l e   t o   a l l o w   m o r e   t i m e   t o  t r a i n   f o r e i g n
students due to language and translation constraints.
3-150. A glossary of terms is a valuable aid for the instructor and the
interpreter. Many English words and phrases do not translate literally into
many foreign languages. Technical terms need to be clearly defined well
ahead of class. A listing of the most common terms and their translated
meaning will be a useful product.
3-151. The instructor presents bite-sized information tailored to the student
audience. He talks directly to the students in a relaxed and confident
manner. The interpreter watches the instructor carefully and emulates his
style and delivery as he interprets for the students. During the translation,
the instructor observes the interpreter to detect any problems. The
interpreter will do some “editing” as a  function of the interpreting process,
but it is imperative that he transmits the instructor’s meaning without
additions or deletions. A well-coordinated effort is the key to success.
3-152. Although maximum improvisation must be used in all phases of
operations, the following items accompanying deployed detachments may
prove useful in conducting training:
•  Grease pencils and colored chalk.
•  Target cloth or ponchos (blackboard substitutes).
•  Basic manuals on weapons generally found in the area (in the language
of the country, if possible).
•  Graphic training aids improvised from parachutes or other such
material.
Student Questions
3-153. Whenever students have questions, the interpreter immediately
relays them to the instructor for an answer. The students then realize the
instructor, not the interpreter, is the SME and is in charge of the class. When
a problem occurs, neither the instructor nor the interpreter corrects each
other in front of the students. They must settle all differences in a
professional manner.
3-154. Rapport is as important between student and instructor as it is
between interpreter and instructor. When the interpreter and instructor
treat the students as mature, valuable people capable of learning, rapport
will build easily between the students and the instructor.
Communication
3-155. An instructor learns by experience that a way to communicate is
through an interpreter. Use of profanity, slang, colloquialisms, and military
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jargon with students is harmful. Often, these expressions cannot be
translated and do not come out with the desired meaning. If he must use a
technical term or expression, the instructor makes sure the interpreter
conveys the proper meaning in the indigenous language.
Transitional Phrases
3-156. Transitional phrases tend to confuse the learning process and waste
valuable time. Expressions such as “for example” and “in most cases” or
qualifiers such as “maybe” or “perhaps” are difficult to translate. Many native
interpreters have learned much of their English from reading rather than
hearing English spoken. The instructor keeps the class presentation as
simple as possible, using short words and phrases.
Taboo Gestures
3-157. Social and cultural restrictions will manifest themselves during class.
Gestures are learned behavior and vary from culture to culture. If the
instructor doesn’t know, he should ask the interpreter to relate the cultural
taboos before class and avoid them. The instructor should know before
class—
•  When it is proper to stand, sit, or cross legs.
•  If the index finger, chin, or eyes may be used for pointing.
•  If nodding of the head means yes or no.
Manner of Speaking
3-158. The instructor should try to look at the students and talk directly to
them, not the interpreter. He speaks slowly and clearly and repeats himself
as needed. The instructor should not address the students in the third person
through the interpreter. Instead, he should say something like, “I’m glad to
be your instructor,” and not “Tell them I’m glad to be their instructor.”
3-159. The instructor must speak to the students as if they will understand
every word he says. He must convey enthusiasm and use all of the gestures,
movements, voice intonations, and inflections he would use for an Englishspeaking audience. The students will reflect the same amount of energy,
interest, and enthusiasm that the instructor conveys to them. The instructor
must not let the interpreter “sabotage” training with a less than animated
delivery and presentation of the material.
3-160. When the interpreter is translating and the students are listening to
get the full meaning of the translation, the instructor should do nothing that
could be distracting. These distractions might be pacing the floor, writing on
the blackboard, drinking water, or carrying on with other distracting
activities.
3-161. The interpreter should be checked periodically to make sure the
students understand the instructor’s meaning. A cadre member, qualified in
the native language, may observe and comment on the interpreter’s
knowledge, skills, and abilities. When the instructor has been misunderstood,
the point needs to be made clear immediately. If further clarification is
needed, the instructor should phrase the instruction differently and illustrate
the point as necessary.
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COMBAT EMPLOYMENT
3-162. North Vietnamese General Giap wrote in his book, The Military Art
of People’s War, “We strike to win, strike only when success is certain; if it’s
not, then don’t strike.” This simple, straightforward idea for conducting
combat operations is the key concept an SFOD advising guerrillas should
never disregard.
OPERATIONS
3-163. The guerrilla force should carefully select, plan, and execute UW
combat operations to ensure success with a minimum number of casualties. A
combat defeat in the early stages of training demoralizes the guerrilla force.
Combat operations should be commensurate with the status of training and
equipment available to the resistance force. As training  is completed and
units are organized, guerrilla forces with SF assistance can plan and execute
small-scale combat operations against  “soft (easy) targets,” an important
confidence builder. Later, they progress to larger and more complex targets.
PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESS
3-164. Successful UW combat operations depend on five principles. Those
principles are speed of movement, surprise, low enemy morale, security, and
collaboration with the local population.
Speed of Movement
3-165. To achieve speed, guerrillas practice rapid force concentration and
rapid deployment from march formations. They also practice movements and
attacks during periods of limited visibility, pursuit of disorganized enemy
units with little time wasted on reorganization after an engagement, and fast
withdrawals. Guerrillas use an MSS  and travel light to increase their
element of speed and surprise.
Surprise
3-166. To surprise the enemy, guerrillas plan to conduct and  integrate
deception operations into every UW mission.
Low Enemy Morale
3-167. Guerrillas take advantage of every opportunity to undermine enemy
morale by including PSYOP.
Security
3-168. Guerrillas prepare the battlefield as far in advance as possible.
Reconnaissance elements gather all available information on  the terrain,
installations, enemy units, and civilian activities. They also reconnoiter
escape and withdrawal routes well in advance.
Collaboration With the Local Population
3-169. The auxiliary in the area provides the guerrillas information,
transportation, supplies, hideouts, and guides familiar with the objective.
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SECURITY WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
3-170. The AO requires special security measures that apply particularly to
insurgent forces. The survival of the insurgents depends upon constant
vigilance on the part of every member of the organization, plus the ability to
transmit warnings. Effective CI is also essential. Security measures must
prevent losses by enemy action, ensure freedom of action, and minimize
interruption of insurgent activities. Dependable security can be achieved by
intensive training in security discipline, establishment of warning systems,
and extensive CI.
Responsibility
3-171. The area commander is responsible for the overall security of the
insurgent forces, although commanders of subordinate units must take
individual measures for their own local protection. The chief of the security
section of the area command controls all security operations, except CI. He
prescribes necessary measures and coordinates those adopted by subordinate
commanders. CI is the responsibility of the chief of the intelligence section of
the area command. Again, subordinate commanders must establish local CI
for their own security.
Factors Affecting Security
3-172. Security measures developed by the chief of the security section of the
area command are affected by the following factors:
•  Mission.
•  Local situation of individual units.
•  Physical characteristics of the AO.
•  The enemy situation.
•  Capabilities and limitations of the insurgent forces.
•  Considerations affecting the civilian population.
•  Operations of conventional and coalition forces.
3-173. During the early phases of insurgent warfare, the mission of
insurgent forces will necessitate organization of a CI system alongside the
intelligence system, development of a communications system that will
facilitate warnings, and establishment of physical security for installations.
Particular attention should be directed toward the enemy’s state of internal
security formations and their intelligence and communications systems.
3-174. Military actions against the enemy initiated during the early phases
of operations should be planned and executed in such a way that they will not
lead to wholesale enemy anti-insurgent activity, reprisals against the civilian
population, or compromise of external logistical support in the latter stages of
insurgent warfare. Operations are not curtailed for security reasons, because
the established security system provides greater protection for the
insurgents. Also, insurgent control over the area may rival the enemy’s own
influence.
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Principles of Security
3-175.  Insurgent forces avoid a large concentration of troops.
Even though logistical conditions may permit large troop concentrations,
commands should be broken down into smaller units and widely dispersed.
The dispersion of forces facilitates concealment, mobility, and secrecy. Large
forces may be concentrated to perform a specific operation, but on completion
of the operation, they should again be quickly dispersed.
3-176. The principle of dispersion is applied to command, service, and
technical installations. A large insurgent HQ, for example, is divided into
several echelons and scattered over the area.
3-177. In the event of a well-conducted, large-scale enemy operation against
the insurgent force, the area commander may find it necessary to order the
division of units into smaller groups to achieve greater dispersion and
facilitate escape from encirclement. This action should be taken only when all
other means of evasive action are exhausted because such dispersion renders
the force inoperative for a considerable period of time, lowers the morale of
insurgents, and weakens the will of the civilians to resist. To assure
successful reassembly of dispersed units, emergency plans must include
alternate assembly areas.
3-178.  All insurgent installations and forces must have a high
degree of mobility. Their evacuation plans must ensure that all traces of
insurgent activity are eliminated before abandonment of the area.
3-179. Forces can maintain evacuation mobility by ensuring that equipment
that must be moved can be disassembled into one-man loads. The area
commander ensures suitable caches are provided for equipment that would
reduce mobility, materiel that could  provide intelligence for the enemy is
destroyed, the area is policed, and  signs of the route of withdrawal are
eliminated.
Security of Information
3-180.  Information concerning insurgent
operations is limited to those who need to know it. Only necessary copies are
made or maintained. Each person is given only that information that is
needed to accomplish his mission. Special efforts are made to restrict the
amount of information given to individuals who are exposed to capture.
3-181. Administrative records are kept to a minimum, are cached, and the
location made known only to a required few. Whenever possible, references to
names and places are coded, and the key to the code is given on a need-toknow basis. Records that are no longer of value to operations or for future
reports must be destroyed.
3-182.  Strict security discipline is necessary and all
security measures must be rigidly enforced. Security instruction of personnel
must be extensive. They must be impressed with the importance of not
divulging information concerning insurgent activities to persons not
requiring it. Individuals seeking such information must be reported to proper
authorities.
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3-183. Security violations are extremely serious and demand severe
punishment. All cases involving a possible breach of security must be
reported immediately.
3-184. The key to successful security of information, however, is the
individual insurgent himself who must always be security-conscious. One
careless individual can destroy the best security system devised.
3-185.  During the training phase, security consciousness must be
stressed. Special emphasis should be placed on safeguarding  documents,
security of information, and resistance against interrogation.
Security of Movement
3-186. Security of movement can be provided only by an accurate knowledge
of the enemy’s location and strength. Intelligence regarding enemy
disposition and activities is essential. The intelligence section of the area
command, informed through its various nets, must provide this vital
information for security of movement.
3-187. After the routes have been selected, the units must be briefed on
enemy activity, primary and alternate routes, dispersal and reassembly areas
along the way, and security measures to be observed en route. If the route
leads through areas outside insurgent influence, auxiliary civilian
organizations must provide security of movement for the insurgents.
Security of Installations
3-188. Most installations are located in isolated regions known as insurgent
base of operations or guerrilla base.  They are mobile and are secured by
guards and warning systems. Alternate locations are prepared in advance so
that any installation threatened by enemy action can be evacuated from the
endangered base area to a more secure area. Location of these alternate
areas is given to personnel only on a need-to-know basis.
3-189. Physical security of installations will include terrain CI. This may
vary from simple deceptive measures, such as camouflage or destruction and
reversal of road signs and mileposts, to the creation of physical barriers, such
as roadblocks and demolition of roadbeds and bridges. The use of civilian
guides to misdirect enemy troops (for example, into ambush) can also be
effective.
Tri-Zonal Security System
3-190. A typical means of providing adequate security for the insurgent base
area is a tri-zonal security system. This system provides the following series
of warning nets:
•  Zon  A is the insurgent base area itself. It is secured by a regular
guard system, but it largely depends for its safety upon advance
warnings received by clandestine agents in Zone C, or posted observers
in Zone B. If enemy action threatens, the insurgents move to another
location before the arrival of enemy forces.
e
•  Zon  B e , lying beyond the populated Zone C, is territory not well
controlled by the enemy in which the insurgent forces can operate
3-46 FM 3-05.201
overtly. It is usually open, rugged terrain, and the warning system
depends upon stationed observers, watching for enemy movements in
the area.
•  Zon  C, the farthest from the insurgent base area, is usually well
populated and is located inside  enemy-controlled territory. Enemy
security forces, police, and military units exercise relatively effective
control, and the populace may be predominately hostile to the
insurgents. At the same time, there are excellent and rapid LOCs,
whereby clandestine agents are able to warn the insurgents quickly of
enemy activity. This area is known as the clandestine zone and the
functions of the warning system are the responsibility of the
underground.
e
Security of Communications
3-191. Insurgent communications facilities are rigidly regulated by the SOI.
These measures include restriction on what may be transmitted; the use of
codes and ciphers; and means of concealment, deception, and authentication.
Particular emphasis is placed on restricting time and  number of radio
transmissions to the absolute minimum.
Counterintelligence
3-192. Insurgent security depends not  only on security measures taken to
safeguard information, installations,  and communications, but also on an
active CI program to neutralize the enemy’s intelligence system and
especially to prevent the penetration of insurgent forces by enemy agents.
3-193. The intelligence section of the area command implements the CI
program. Specially selected and trained CI personnel carefully screen all
members of the insurgent organization and protect the insurgents from
enemy infiltration. CI personnel also carry on an active campaign of
deception, disseminating false information to mislead the enemy.
3-194. CI personnel must keep a constant check on the civilian population of
the area through clandestine sources to ensure against the presence of enemy
agents within their midst. Civilians upon whom the insurgents depend
heavily for support may compromise the insurgent warfare effort as easily as
a disloyal insurgent may.
3-195. False rumors and false information concerning insurgent strength,
location, operations, training, and equipment can be disseminated by CI
through clandestine nets. Facts may be distorted intentionally to minimize or
exaggerate insurgent capabilities at any given time. Although such activities
are handled within the intelligence section, they must be coordinated with
the security section in order to prevent inadvertent violations of security.
Outlaw Bands
3-196. Outlaw bands, operating as insurgents, also endanger insurgent
security by alienating the civilian population through their depredation. The
area commander cannot tolerate outlaw bands, which are not willing to join
the organized insurgent effort. Every effort must be made to persuade these
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bands to join forces. If all other methods fail, it may be necessary to conduct
operations against these groups.
Reaction to Enemy Operations
3-197. Inexperienced insurgent commanders and troops are often inclined to
move too soon and too frequently to escape enemy troops conducting antiinsurgent operations. Unnecessary movement caused by the presence of the
enemy may expose insurgents to greater risks than remaining calm and
concealed. Such moves disrupt operations and reduce security by dislodging
previously established nets and exposing insurgents to enemy agents,
informants, and collaborators.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-198. Defensive operations are exceptional forms  of combat for guerrilla
forces. The guerrilla force may engage in defensive operations to—
•  Prevent enemy penetration of guerrilla-controlled areas.
•  Gain time for their forces to accomplish a specific mission.
•  Assemble their main forces for counterattacks.
3-199. Guerrillas normally lack supporting fire: artillery, antitank weapons,
and other weapons to face conventional  forces. Historically, guerrillas have
avoided a prolonged position type of defense. When committed, they modify
the principles of defensive operations to best meet their needs and offset the
difficulties. They are aware of their limitations. The guerrillas choose the
terrain that gives them every possible advantage. They seek terrain that
denies or restricts the enemy’s use of armor and complicates his logistic
support. In the guerrilla-position defense, they raid, ambush, and attack the
enemy’s LOCs, flanks, reserve units, and supporting arms and installations.
The guerrillas provide camouflaged sniper fire on officers, radio operators,
and other high-value targets. They mine or booby-trap approach and
departure routes.
3-200. Guerrillas may resort to defensive operations to contain enemy forces
in a position favorable for attacking their flanks or rear. They often begin or
intensify diversionary actions in adjacent areas to distract the enemy.
Guerrillas use skillful ruses to lure the attacking forces into dividing their
troops or hold objectives pending the arrival of conventional or allied coalition
forces.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-201. The degree to which the offensive operations of guerrilla forces can be
sustained depends, in the long run,  on the base camp support available to
them. When operating remotely from, or not with, conventional forces, the
guerrilla forces establish and hold bases of their own. They locate their bases,
if available, with a view to isolation and difficulty of approach by the
opposing forces. They also consider  strong defensive characteristics and
closeness to neighboring supporting states. The bases should be organized for
defense and tenaciously defended by  trained, motivated forces. FM 7-8,
Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, includes more information.
3-48 FM 3-05.201
RAIDS
3-202. A raid is a combat operation to attack a position  or installation
followed by a planned withdrawal.  SF and guerrilla or area sector
commanders must consider the nature of the terrain (METT-TC) and the
combat efficiency of the raid force. Commanders base target selection on a
decision matrix using CARVER. The SFOD assesses the criticality and
recuperability of various targets during the area study.  Accessibility and
vulnerability are situation-dependent and these assessments must be
supported by the most current area intelligence. CARVER factors are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
3-203.  Criticality is the importance of a system, subsystem, complex, or
component. A target is critical when its destruction  or damage has a
significant impact on the output of the targeted system,  subsystem, or
complex, and, at the highest level, on the threat’s ability to make or sustain
war. Criticality depends on several factors:
•  How rapidly will the impact of target destruction affect enemy
operations?
•  What percentage of output is curtailed by target damage?
•  Is there an existence of substitutes for the output product or service?
•  What is the number of targets and their position in the system or
complex flow diagram?
3-204.  Accessibility is the ease with which a target can be reached, either
physically or by fire. A target is  accessible when an action element can
physically infiltrate the target, or if the target can be hit by direct or indirect
fire. Accessibility varies with the infiltration and exfiltration, the survival
and evasion and security situation en route to and at the target, and the need
for barrier penetration, climbing, and so on, at the target. The use of standoff
weapons should always be considered when evaluating accessibility.
Survivability of the attacker is usually most closely correlated to a target’s
accessibility.
3-205.  Recuperabili y is a measure of the time required to replace, repair, or
bypass the destruction or damage inflicted on the target. Recuperability
varies with the sources and ages of targeted components and with the
availability of spare parts. The existence of economic embargoes and the
technical resources of the enemy nation will influence recuperability.
t
3-206.  Vulnerability is a measure of the ability of the action element to
damage the target using available assets (both men and material). A target is
vulnerable if the unit has the capability and expertise to successfully attack
it. Vulnerability depends on the—
•  Nature and construction of the target.
•  Amount of damage required.
•  Assets available (manpower, transportation, weapons, explosives, and
equipment).
3-207.  Effect is the positive or negative influence on the population as a
result of the action taken. Effect considers public reaction in the vicinity of
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the target, but also considers the domestic and international reaction as well.
Effects to consider include the following:
•  Will reprisals against friendlies result?
•  Will national PSYOP themes be reinforced or contradicted?
•  Will exfiltration or evasion be helped or hurt? What will be  the allied
and domestic reaction?
•  Will the enemy population be alienated from its government, or will it
become more supportive of the government?
NOTE: Effect is often neutral at the tactical level.
3-208.  Recognizability is the degree to which a target can be recognized
under varying weather, light, and seasonal conditions without confusion with
other targets or components. Factors that influence recognizability include
the size and complexity of the target, the existence of distinctive target
signatures, and the technical sophistication and training of the attackers.
3-209. Target selection factors may be used to construct a CARVER matrix.
The matrix is a decision tool for rating the relative desirability of potential
targets and for wisely allocating attack resources (Figure 3-11, page 3-51). To
construct the matrix, analysts list the potential targets in the left column.
For strategic-level analysis, analysts list the enemy’s systems or subsystems
(electric, power, rail). For tactical-level analysis, analysts list the complexes
or components of the subsystems selected for attack by their higher HQ.
3-210. Next, analysts develop concrete criteria for evaluating each CARVER
factor. For instance, time may be used  to evaluate criticality. If loss of a
component results in an immediate halt of output, then that component is
very critical. If loss of the component results in a halt of output, but only after
several days or weeks, then that component is less critical. Similarly,
percentage of output curtailed might be used as the evaluation criterion.
3-211. Once the evaluation criteria have been established, analysts use a
numerical rating system (for example, 1-to-5 or 1-to-10) to rank the CARVER
factors for each potential target. In a 1-to-10 numbering system, a score of 10
would indicate a very desirable rating (from the attacker’s point of view), and
a score of 1 would reflect an undesirable rating. The evaluation criteria and
numerical rating scheme shown are only included as examples. The analyst
must tailor the criteria and rating scheme to suit the particular strategic or
tactical situation and the particular targets being analyzed.
3-212. The area commander considers the possible adverse effects target
destruction will have on future operations and the civilian  population.
Targets that will hinder or hurt the civilian population may be attacked only
as a last resort. The goal is to diminish the enemy’s military potential, not
destroy the only footbridge in the area for civilians to go to work. However, an
improperly timed operation may provoke enemy counteraction for which
resistance units and the civilian population are unprepared. An unsuccessful
guerrilla attack often may have disastrous effects on troop morale. Successful
operations raise morale and increase prestige in the eyes of the civilians,
making them more willing to provide support. PSYOP exploit the impact of
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successful raids. If a raid is unsuccessful, PSYOP personnel need to diminish
the adverse effects on the friendly local indigenous force.
Figure 3-11. Sample CARVER Matrix
3-213. Although detailed, the plan for a raid must be practical and simple.
The raid force commander plans activities so that the target is not alerted.
He carefully considers time available, allowing enough time for assembly and
movement. The best hours for the operation are between midnight and dawn
when limited visibility ensures surprise. Personnel favor early dusk when
knowledge of the installation is limited or other factors require tight control
of the operation. A successful guerrilla withdrawal late in the day or at night
makes close, coordinated pursuit by the enemy much more difficult.
3-214. The commander must strictly enforce OPSEC measures during
planning. Only those personnel directly involved with the operation must be
informed. Civilian sympathizers should never be informed of upcoming
operations unless they provide support to the guerrilla forces. Personnel
should carefully rehearse all raids and contingencies using real-time and fullsize mock-ups. They must  also select and rehearse an alternate plan and
escape route for use in case of emergencies.
3-215. The raid unit must also plan  for medical support. Reactive planning
in the medical arena is predictably unsuccessful, resulting unnecessarily in
loss of life or limb. Adequate and visible medical planning has considerable
positive psychological effects on the  raid force’s morale. Personnel should
plan to handle anticipated casualties with aid and litter teams at the
objective, at planned rallying points (RPs), and in the base area.
Considerations should include evacuation routes at all levels and priorities
for evacuation, nonevacuation, and hospitalization. Personnel should
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coordinate with treatment facilities before a raid but not divulge the target or
timing of the mission.
ORGANIZATION
3-216. The size of the raid force depends on METT-TC. The raid force may
vary from a few personnel attacking a checkpoint to a battalion attacking a
large supply depot. Regardless of size, the raid force consists of four basic
elements: command, assault, security, and support with strategic placement
of medical personnel within all elements.
Command Element
3-217. The raid force commander and key personnel normally make up this
element. They provide general support to the raid, such as medical aidmen,
radio operators and, if a fire support element is part of the raid, a forward
observer. The command element is not normally assigned specific duties with
any element. Personnel may work with any of the major elements of the raid
force. The raid force commander locates himself where he may best control
and influence the action.
Assault Element
3-218. Applying METT-TC, the assault element is specifically task organized
by what is needed to accomplish the objective. If the raid objective is to attack
and render unusable critical elements of a target system, such as a bridge or
tunnel, the raid force assaults and demolishes the bridge or tunnel. If the
target is enemy personnel, the raid force conducts its attack with a high
proportion of automatic assault weapons, covered by mortar fire from the
support element. Usually the assault element physically moves on or into the
target. This method is the least preferred. A more preferred method is for the
assault element to complete its task  from a standoff distance. The assault
element attacks using lasers, antitank weapons, and other heavy weapons.
Security Element
3-219. The security element supports  the raid by securing withdrawal
routes, providing early warning of enemy approach, blocking avenues of
approach into the objective area, preventing enemy escape from the objective
area, and acting as the rear guard for the withdrawing raid force. The size of
the security element depends on the enemy’s capability to intervene and
disrupt the mission. If the threat has armor, then the  element needs
antiarmor weapons. Where the enemy is known to have aircraft, the security
element employs antiaircraft weapons. As the assault element moves into
position, the security element keeps the command group informed of all
enemy activities, firing only if detected and on order from  the command
group. Once the assault begins, the security element prevents enemy entry
into or escape from the objective area. As the raid force withdraws, the
security element, enhanced by sniper  teams, conducts a rearguard action to
disrupt and ambush any enemy counterattacks and pursuits.
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Support Element
3-220. The support element of the raid force conducts diversionary or
coordinated attacks at several points on the target to help the assault
element gain access to the target. It uses ambushes, roadblocks, and mortar
fire on the threat. Support personnel also execute complementary tasks in
eliminating guards, breaching and removing obstacles to the objective, and
conducting diversionary or holding actions. They assist by providing fire
support and acting as demolition teams to set charges and neutralize,
destroy, or render parts of the target unusable. Historically, the support
element has covered the withdrawal of the assault element from the immediate
area of the objective, and then withdrawn on order or prearranged signal.
INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
3-221. The raid force commander must have maximum intelligence on the
target site, enemy reaction forces (including routes, strength, and avenues of
approach), and the routine activities and attitudes of the indigenous
population in the area. Intelligence and reconnaissance personnel conduct a
premission survey of the routes to the target, locations for friendly support
weapons, enemy defenses (to include key weapons, minefields, and weak
points), critical nodes to be destroyed within the target site, and withdrawal
routes. The raid force gains access to the target site itself. Civilian supporters
may help in these attempts if they have a good cover for action. If tactically
feasible, personnel may conduct surveillance of the target  to learn lastminute requirements.
3-222. Intelligence and reconnaissance personnel conduct detailed
intelligence gathering and leader reconnaissance before  beginning the raid.
They construct a basic SALUTE report to include the following:
•  Strength and location of the threat and its combat effectiveness.
•  The threat’s armaments and its location.
•  Reaction time, security, and protection.
•  Positions of key and automatic weapons.
3-223. Intelligence gathering includes answers to the following questions:
•  Are reserve threat troops in the vicinity?
•  Are they waiting with armor or aircraft?
•  What are their strength, time to reinforce, and communication
abilities?
•  Is the terrain accessible?
•  Can it be blockaded or defended?
•  What are the locations and capabilities of local inhabitants?
•  What routes to and from the raid site provide cover, concealment, and
security and simplify movement?
•  Does the threat have armor or air support?
•  Where should key support weapons—antitank, antiair, sniper teams,
and machine guns—be placed?
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3-224. Additionally, intelligence and  reconnaissance personnel consult with
supporting CA team members to consider the nonmilitary threats to the
planned raid. They analyze the civilian component of the target area using
CASCOPE. Typical questions are as follows:
•  What civilian areas exist between the line of departure and the
objective? What activities are employed in these areas?
•  What civilian structures (permanent, semipermanent, or temporary)
may be encountered along the route? What protection status is
assigned to these structures?
•  What civilian capabilities exist that could intercede or support the raid
as part of a contingency? Is there a credible police capability?
•  What organizations (host nation [HN], UN, NGO, multinational
corporation, criminal, terrorist) exist in and around the objective area?
What activities are they engaged in? What assistance might we obtain
from them?
•  What types of civilians might we encounter in and around the objective
area? What general activities are they engaged in? What might be their
reaction to contact with raid forces? What might be their reaction to
combat operations?
•  Are there any civilian events that may affect the conduct of  the
military operation, such as call to prayer or church services, festival
celebrations, “rush hour” traffic, and planting or harvest  season
activities?
PARTICIPANT REHEARSALS
3-225. Raid participants conduct realistic, timely rehearsals for the
operation using terrain similar to the target area whenever possible.
Participants use sand tables, full-size mock-ups, sketches, and photographs,
to assist in briefings. They practice immediate action drills (IADs) along with
contingency and emergency actions. Guerrillas hold full-scale final rehearsals
under conditions and visibility realistically expected in the objective area at
the time of attack.
NIGHT RAIDS
3-226. The best time for a raid is during limited visibility. Darkness allows
units to maneuver even closer to the enemy. Enemy reinforcements will have
difficulty in moving to assist their troops under attack, and air assets will be
at a disadvantage. However, maneuvering at night is more difficult to
accomplish, and command, control,  and communications (C3) are more
difficult to maintain.
DAY RAIDS
3-227. Units conduct raids during daylight when the troops at the target
location are lacking in security, morale, or discipline. A key question is
whether they will get help from adjacent units, especially  under adverse
weather conditions of sandstorms, rain, or snowstorms.
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FINAL INSPECTION
3-228. The raid force commander conducts a final inspection of  personnel
and equipment before moving to the objective area. He ensures weapons are
test-fired, broken equipment is replaced, and the physical condition of each
man is checked. He checks personal belongings to ensure that no
incriminating documents are carried during the operation. This inspection
assures the raid force commander that his unit is equipped and ready for a
successful mission.
MOVEMENT
3-229. The raid force commander plans and conducts movement to the
objective area so that the raid force’s approach to the target is undetected
(Figure 3-12). Movement may be by single or multiple routes. The preselected
route or routes may end in assembly areas, one or more patrol bases, or
MSSs, which enhance mission success. The raid force makes every effort to
avoid contact with the enemy during movement. Upon reaching the objective
rallying point (ORP), security and leader reconnaissance parties deploy and
make final coordination before the assault force moves to the attack position.
Figure 3-12. Movement to and Withdrawal From the Objective Area
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ACTIONS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA
3-230. Support elements move to their positions and eliminate sentries,
breach or remove obstacles, and execute other tasks. The assault element
quickly follows the select soldiers into the target area. Once the objective of
the raid has been accomplished, the assault element and special troops
withdraw, covered by fire support on preselected targets. If the attack is
unsuccessful, the raid force ends the action to prevent undue  loss of
personnel, and the support elements withdraw according to plan. The assault
and support elements assemble at one or more RPs, while the  security
elements cover the withdrawal according to plan.
WITHDRAWAL
3-231. The raid force commander designs withdrawal to achieve maximum
deception against the enemy and minimum danger to the raid force. The
various elements of the raid force withdraw on order, or at a prearranged
time, but never the same way twice. The movement uses many doglegs over
the previously reconnoitered routes to the base camp through a series of RPs.
Should the enemy organize a close pursuit of the assault element, the
security element (covering force) assists by fire and movement, harassing the
enemy and slowing it down. Other elements of the raid force do not attempt
to reach the initial rallying point (IRP) but, on their own initiative, lead the
enemy away and attempt to lose them by evasive action in difficult terrain.
3-232. The raid force commander issues specific instructions concerning
contingencies. The commander decides which COA to follow  based on time
and distance to be traveled, firepower or fire support, and the raid force’s
physical condition. The raid force then attempts to reestablish contact with
the main force at other RPs or continues to the base camp as separate groups
IAW METT-TC.
BATTALION (LARGE) RAIDS
3-233. When a target is large and well guarded, a much larger raid force
conducts the mission to ensure a successful attack. Large raids involve the
use of a battalion-sized unit. Conduct is similar to that of smaller raids, but
C2 becomes more difficult as the force increases in size.
MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA
3-234. Surprise is a priority in all raids but is more difficult to achieve
during battalion operations. The number of troops to assemble and deploy
requires additional MSSs farther from the target to preserve secrecy. Also,
the force requires a longer route to the attack position. A large raid force
usually moves by small components over multiple routes to an MSS, then to
the objective (Figure 3-13, page 3-57).
CONTROL
3-235. Units need extensive radio communications equipment to coordinate
C2 operations in an active electronic warfare (EW) environment. Effective
coordination is difficult to achieve. Raid planners use pyrotechnics, audible
signals, or runners to coordinate action at designated times. Even under
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optimum conditions, massing of the raid force at the objective is extremely
difficult to control. Lights, armbands, or scarves enhance control. During
planning, the raid force commander considers the complexity of the plan and
the possibility of overall failure if subordinate elements do not arrive on time.
He plans for these possible contingencies to ensure mission success.
Figure 3-13. Movement to the Objective Area for a Battalion Raid
TRAINING
3-236. Executing a large raid requires a high degree of training and
discipline. Extensive rehearsals help prepare the force for the mission. In
particular, commanders and staffs learn how to use large numbers of troops
as a cohesive and coordinated fighting force.
FIRE SUPPORT
3-237. Raids usually require additional fire support. In  the JSOA, such
support may mean secretly caching ammunition in MSSs over a long period
before the raid. Each member of the raiding force carries  an extra mortar
round, recoilless rocket round, or a can of machine gun ammunition.
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TIMING
3-238. Timing is both crucial and much more difficult for a large raid. The
time of the raid takes on increased importance because of the large number of
personnel involved. More time is required to coordinate and move units, and
the main action element usually needs more time to do its mission. As a
result, larger raids require larger security elements to isolate the objective for
longer time periods. The element moves to the objective during limited
visibility, but due to fire support coordination requirements and the large
number of personnel, the mission begins during early daylight hours.
WITHDRAWAL
3-239. Elements usually best withdraw from a large raid in small groups,
over multiple routes, to deceive the enemy and discourage  enemy pursuit.
Dispersed withdrawal also denies a priority target to enemy air and fire
support elements. The raid force commander considers the possibility of an
alert and aggressive enemy counterattacking the dispersed elements of the
force. He carefully weighs all METT-TC factors before deciding how, when,
and where he will conduct his withdrawal.
AMBUSHES
3-240. The ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a
moving or temporarily halted target. It is one of the oldest and most effective
types of guerrilla tactics. An ambush is executed to  reduce the enemy’s
overall combat effectiveness by destroying or harassing his soldiers and their
will to win. An ambush may include an assault to close with and decisively
engage the target, or the attack may be by direct or indirect fire to harass the
enemy.
NOTE: The following article was originally serialized in  Red Thrust Star,
dated July and October 1995 and October 1996.
Afghanistan is not Europe, yet the Soviet  Army that occupied Afghanistan in late
December 1979 was trained to fight NATO on the northern European plain.
Consequently, the Soviet Army had to reequip, reform and retrain on-site to fight the
insurgent mujahideen [holy warrior] guerrillas. The Soviets were forced to revise their
tactics and tactical methodologies in order to meet the demands of this very different war.
One of the tactical areas which the Soviets thoroughly revised was the conduct of
ambushes. The Soviets planned to use ambushes in the European theater, but they were
primarily ambushes against attacking or withdrawing NATO armored columns. The
Soviets constructed most of their ambushes around tanks and tank units. They planned
to employ concealed individual tanks, tank platoons and tank companies along highspeed avenues of approach or withdrawal  to engage the enemy from the flank and then
to depart. Such ambushes were part of security zone defensive planning as well as
planning for the deep battle  and pursuit. The Soviets also trained their squad and
platoon-sized reconnaissance elements to  conduct dismounted ambushes to capture
prisoners and documents. They employed a command element, a snatch group and a fire
support group in these small-scale ambushes.
In Afghanistan, the mujahideen seldom used armored vehicles and seldom advanced
along high-speed avenues of approach. Instead, they infiltrated light-infantry forces
through some of the most inhospitable terrain  on the planet to mass for an attack or
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ambush. The Soviets soon discovered that they had difficulty maintaining control of the
limited road network, which constituted the Soviet lines of communication. The guerrillas
constantly cut the roads and ambushed convoys carrying material from the Soviet Union
to the base camps and cities in Afghanistan. The Soviet ability to maintain its presence in
the country depended on its ability to keep the roads open  and much of the Soviet
combat was a fight for control of the road network. During the war, the guerrillas
destroyed over 11,000 Soviet trucks (and  reportedly even more Afghan trucks) through
ambush. The Soviets learned from  mujahideen ambushes and used the ambush to
interdict the guerrilla supplies coming from Pakistan and Iran.  The Soviets conducted
ambushes mainly with reconnaissance and other special troops (airborne, air assault,
spetsnaz and elements from the two separate motorized rifle brigades which were
designed as counter-guerrilla forces). The composition and employment of ambush
forces differed with the units involved and the part of Afghanistan in which they were
employed.
DESTRUCTION
3-241. Destruction is the primary purpose of an ambush. The number of men
killed, wounded, or captured and loss of equipment and supplies critically
affect the enemy. Guerrillas benefit from the capture of equipment and
supplies through battlefield recovery.
HARASSMENT
3-242. Frequent ambushes harass the enemy and force him to divert men
from patrol operations to guard convoys, troop movements, and installations.
When enemy patrols fail to accomplish their missions because they are
ambushed, the enemy is deprived of the valuable contributions these patrols
make to its combat effort. A series of successful guerrilla ambushes cause the
enemy to be less aggressive and more defensive-minded. The enemy becomes
apprehensive and overly cautious and reluctant to go on patrols, to move in
convoys, or to move in small groups. The enemy wants to avoid night
operations, is more subject to confusion and panic if ambushed, and is
mentally defeated.
ELEMENT OF SURPRISE
3-243. Surprise allows the ambush force to seize control of  any situation.
The force achieves surprise by carefully planning, preparing, and executing
the ambush. Guerrillas attack the targets when, where, and in a manner for
which the enemy is least prepared.
COORDINATED FIRES
3-244. The ambush force commander positions and coordinates the use of all
weapons, mines, and demolitions. He coordinates all fires, including artillery
and mortars when available. Coordinated fire support ensures isolation of the
kill zone. This isolation prevents enemy escape or reinforcement due to the
large volume of accurate, concentrated fire.
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CONTROL MEASURES
3-245. The ambush force commander maintains close control measures
during the ambush operation. These control measures include provisions
for—
•  Early warning signals of target approach.
•  Withholding fire until the target has moved into the killing zone.
•  Opening, shifting, and halting fire at the proper time.
•  Initiating proper actions if the ambush is prematurely detected.
•  Timely and orderly withdrawal to a recognized RP.
CATEGORIES OF AMBUSHES
3-246. Ambushes have two general  categories: point and area. A point
ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, positions itself
along the target’s expected route of approach. It attacks a single kill zone.
When there is not sufficient intelligence for a point ambush, the commander
establishes an area ambush. An area ambush uses multiple point ambushes
around a central kill zone.
3-247. These two variations succeed best in situations  where routes of
approach by relieving or reinforcing units are limited  to those favorable for
ambush by the guerrillas. Both variations were used extensively by the North
Vietnamese guerrilla forces in Vietnam against U.S. forces in the Republic of
Vietnam.
POINT AMBUSH
3-248. A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, is
positioned along the target’s expected route of approach. Formation is
important because, to a great extent, it determines whether a point ambush
can deliver the heavy volume of highly concentrated fire necessary to isolate,
trap, and destroy the target.
3-249. The formation to be used is determined by carefully considering
possible formations and the advantages and disadvantages of each in relation
to terrain, conditions of visibility, forces, weapons and equipment, ease or
difficulty of control, target to be attacked, and overall combat situation.
3-250. The following paragraphs discuss a few formations that  have been
developed for the deployment of point ambushes. Those discussed are named
according to the general pattern formed on the ground by the deployment of
the attack element.
Line Formation
3-251. The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the target’s route
o f   m o v e m e n t   ( r o a d ,   t r a i l ,   s t r e a m ) .  This deployment positions the attack
element parallel to the long axis of the killing zone and subjects the target to
heavy flanking fire. The size of the target, which can be trapped in the killing
zone, is limited by the area the attack element can effectively cover with a
heavy volume of highly concentrated fire. The target is trapped in the killing
zone by natural obstacles, mines (claymore, antivehicular, antipersonnel),
demolitions, and direct and indirect fires (Figure 3-14, page 3-61). A
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disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that lateral dispersion of the
target may be too great for effective coverage. Line formation is appropriate
in close terrain that restricts target maneuver and in open terrain where one
flank is restricted by mines, demolitions, mantraps, or sharpened stakes.
Similar obstacles can be placed between the attack element and the killing
zone to provide protection from the target’s counterambush measures. When
a destruction ambush is deployed in this manner, access lanes are left so that
the target can be assaulted (Figure 3-15, page 3-62). The line formation can
be effectively used by a rise from the ground ambush in terrain seemingly
unsuitable for ambush. An advantage of the line formation is its relative ease
of control under all conditions of visibility.
Figure 3-14. Line Formation for Harassing or Destruction Ambush
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Figure 3-15. Line Formation for Destruction Ambush
L Formation
3-252. The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line formation. The long
side of the attack element is parallel to the killing zone and delivers flanking
fire. The short side is at the end of and at right angles to the killing zone and
delivers enfilading fire that links with fire from the other leg. This formation
is very flexible. It can be established on a straight stretch of a trail or stream
(Figure 3-16, page 3-63), or a sharp bend in a trail or stream (Figure 3-17,
page 3-63). When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to
parallel the long leg if the target tries to assault or escape in the opposite
direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape in the direction of attack
element and reinforcement from its direction (Figure 3-18, page 3-64).
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Figure 3-16. L Formation for Destruction Ambush
Figure 3-17. L Formation for Destruction Ambush on Bend of Trail or Stream
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Figure 3-18. L Formation Where Short Leg of Attack Element
Prevents Escape or Reinforcement
Z Formation
3-253. The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the line formation.
The attack force is deployed as in the L formation, but with an additional side
so that the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side (Figure 3-19,
page 3-65) may serve to—
•  Engage a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the target.
•  Seal the end of the killing zone.
•  Restrict a flank.
•  Prevent envelopment.
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Figure 3-19. Z Formation for Destruction Ambush
T Formation
3-254. In the T-shaped formation, the attack element is deployed across and
at right angles to the target’s route of movement so that it and the target
form the letter T. This formation can be used day or night to  establish a
purely harassing ambush and at night to establish an ambush to interdict
movement through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies).
3-255. A small group of persons can use the T formation to harass, slow, and
disorganize a larger force. When the lead elements of the target are engaged,
they will normally attempt to maneuver right or left to close with the
ambush. Mines, mantraps, and other obstacles placed to the flanks of the
killing zone slow the enemy’s movements and permit the ambush patrol to
deliver heavy fire and withdraw without becoming decisively engaged
(Figure 3-20, page 3-66).
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Figure 3-20. T Formation for Harassing Ambush
3-256. The attack element can also use the T formation to interdict small
groups attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the
attack element is deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second person
facing in the opposite direction. The  attack of a target approaching from
either direction requires only that every second person shift to the opposite
side of the dike. Each person fires only to his front and only when the target
is at very close range. Attack is by fire only and each person keeps the target
under fire as long as it remains on his front. If the target attempts to escape
in either direction along the dike, each man takes it under fire as it comes to
his vicinity. The T formation is very effective at halting infiltration. But it
has one chief disadvantage: while spread out, the ambush may engage a
superior force. Use of this formation must, therefore, fit the  local enemy
situation (Figure 3-21, page 3-67).
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Figure 3-21. T Formation for Harassing Ambush in Rice Paddy
V Formation
3-257. The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the
target’s route of movement so that it forms the letter V; care is taken to
ensure that neither group (nor leg) fires into the other. This formation
subjects the target to both enfilading and interlocking fire. The V formation is
best suited for fairly open terrain but can also be used in the jungle. When
established in the jungle, the legs of the V close in as the head elements of
the target approach the apex of the V; the attack element then opens fire
from close range. Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and
fire must be carefully coordinated and controlled to ensure that the fire of one
leg does not endanger the other. The wider separation of elements makes this
formation difficult to control, and there are fewer sites that favor its use. Its
main advantage is that it is difficult for the target to detect the ambush until
it has moved well into the killing zone (Figures 3-22, page 3-68, and 3-23,
page 3-69).
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Figure 3-22. V Formation for Open Mountain Terrain
Triangle Formation
3-258. This formation is a variation of the V and can be used  in three
different ways. One way is the closed triangle (Figure 3-24, page 3-69), in
which the attack element is deployed in three groups or parties, positioned so
that they form a triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each
point of the triangle and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to
interlock with either of the others. Men are positioned so that their fields of
fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When deployed in
this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small unit  strongpoint. It is
used to interdict night movement through rice paddies and other open areas
when target approach is likely to be from any direction.  The formation
provides all-around security, and security parties are deployed only when
they can be positioned so that if detected by an approaching target, they will
not compromise the ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is allowed
to approach within close range before fire is opened.
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Figure 3-23. V Formation for Jungle Terrain
Figure 3-24. Closed Triangle Formation for Night Harassing Ambush
3-259. Advantages of the triangle formation include ease of control and allaround security. In addition, a target approaching from any direction can be
brought under fire of at least two automatic weapons.
3-69 FM 3-05.201
3-260. There are several disadvantages. For example, an ambush patrolsized or larger is required to reduce the danger of being overrun by an
unexpectedly large target. One or more legs of the triangle may come under
enfilade fire. Lack of dispersion, particularly at the points, increases danger
from enemy mortar fire.
3-261. The open triangle (during a harassing ambush) is designed to enable
a small force to harass, slow, and inflict heavy casualties upon a larger force
without itself being decisively engaged. The attack element is deployed in
three parties, positioned so that each party becomes a corner of a triangle
containing the killing zone. When the target enters the killing zone, the party
to the target’s front opens fire on the leading element. When the target
counterattacks, the group withdraws and an assault party to the flank opens
fire. When this party is attacked, the party opposite flank opens fire. This
process is repeated until the target is pulled apart. Each party reoccupies its
position, if possible, and continues to inflict the maximum damage possible
without becoming decisively engaged (Figure 3-25, page 3-71).
3-262. In an open triangle (during a destruction ambush),  the attack
element is again deployed in three parties, positioned so that each party is a
point of the triangle, 200 to 300 meters apart. The killing  zone is the area
within the triangle. The target is allowed to enter the killing zone; the
nearest party attacks by fire. As the target attempts to maneuver or
withdraw, the other groups open fire. One or more assault parties, as
directed, assault or maneuver to envelop or destroy the target (Figure 3-25,
page 3-71). As a destruction ambush, this formation is suitable for platoonsized or larger forces. A unit smaller than a platoon would be in too great a
danger of being overrun.
3-263. The following are more disadvantages of the triangle:
•  In assaulting or maneuvering, control is very difficult. Very close
coordination and control are necessary to ensure that assaulting or
maneuvering assault parties are not fired on by another party.
•  The ambush site must be a fairly level, open area that provides (around
its border) concealment for the ambush patrol (unless it is a rise from
the ground ambush).
Box Formation
3-264. This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush. The
attack element is deployed in four parties, positioned so that each party
becomes a corner of a square or rectangle containing the killing zone (Figure
3-26, page 3-72). The box formation can be used as a harassing or destruction
ambush in the same manner as the two variations of the open triangle
ambush.
3-70 FM 3-05.201
3-71
Figure 3-25. Open Triangle Formation FM 3-05.201
3-72
Figure 3-26. Box Formation FM 3-05.201
AREA AMBUSH
3-265. The origin of the type of ambush now called area ambush is not
known. Hannibal used the area ambush against the Romans  in the second
century B.C. More recently, it was modified and perfected  by the British
Army in Malaya and, with several variations, used in Vietnam. The British
found that point ambushes often failed to produce heavy casualties. When
ambushed, the Communist guerrillas would immediately break contact and
disperse along escape routes leading away from the killing zone. The British
counteracted this tactic by blocking  escape routes leading away from the
killing zone with point ambushes. They called these multiple-related point
ambushes the area ambush.
British Version
3-266. The British Army version of the area ambush involves  a point
ambush that is established at a site  having several trails or other escape
routes leading away from it. The site may be a water hole, an enemy
campsite, a known rendezvous point, or along a frequently traveled trail. This
site is the central killing zone. Point ambushes are established along the
trails or other escape routes leading away from the central killing zone.
3-267. The target, whether a single group or several groups approaching
from different directions, is permitted  to move to the central killing zone.
Outlying ambushes do not attack unless discovered. The ambush is initiated
when the target moves into the central killing zone. When the target breaks
contact and attempts to disperse, escaping portions are intercepted and
destroyed by the outlying ambushes. The multiple contacts achieve increased
casualties, harassment, and confusion (Figure 3-27, page 3-74).
3-268. The British Army version of the area ambush is best suited to
counterguerrilla operations in terrain where movement is  largely restricted
to trails. It produces the best results when it is established as a deliberate
ambush.
3-269. When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate ambush, an
area ambush of opportunity may be established. The outlying ambushes are
permitted to attack targets approaching the central killing zone, if within
their capability. If too large for the particular outlying ambush, the target is
allowed to continue and is attacked in the central killing zone.
Baited Trap Version
3-270. A variation of the area ambush is the baited trap version
(Figure 3-28, page 3-74), where a central killing zone is established along the
target’s route of approach. Point ambushes are established along the routes
over which relieving or reinforcing units will have to approach. The target in
the central killing zone serves as bait to lure relieving or reinforcing units
into the killing zones of the outlying ambushes. The outlying point ambushes
need not be strong enough to destroy their targets. They  may be small,
harassing ambushes that delay, disorganize, and eat away the target by
successive contacts.
3-73 FM 3-05.201
Figure 3-27. Area Ambush, British Version
Figure 3-28. Area Ambush, Baited Trap Version
3-271. This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as bait to lure
relieving or reinforcing units into the killing zone of one or more of the
outlying ambushes. The installation replaces the central killing zone and is
attacked. The attack may intend to overcome the installation or may be only
a ruse.
3-74 FM 3-05.201
3-272. These two variations are best suited for situations where  routes of
approach for relieving or reinforcing units are limited to those favorable for
ambush. They are also best suited for use by guerrilla forces,  rather than
counterguerrilla forces. Communist guerrilla forces in Vietnam used both
variations extensively.
UNUSUAL AMBUSH TECHNIQUES
3-273. The ambush techniques described above are so well known and
widely used that they are considered standard. Other, less well known, less
frequently used techniques are considered unusual. Two such techniques are
described below.
Rise From the Ground Ambush
3-274. The attack element uses this type of ambush (Figure 3-29, page 3-76)
in open areas that lack the good cover and concealment and  other features
normally desirable in a good ambush site. The attack element is deployed in
the formation best suited to the overall situation. It is completely concealed
in the spider-hole type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and
positions expertly camouflaged.
3-275. When the ambush begins, the attack element throws back the covers
and literally rises from the ground to attack. This ambush takes advantage of
the tendency of patrols and other units to relax in areas that do not appear to
favor ambush. The chief disadvantage is that the ambush patrol is very
vulnerable if prematurely detected.
Demolition Ambush
3-276. Electrically detonated mines or demolition charges, or both, are
positioned in an area (Figure 3-30, page 3-77) over which a target is expected
to pass. This area may be a portion of a road or a trail, an open field, or any
location that can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are run to a
concealed observation point, which is sufficiently distant to ensure safety of
the ambushers.
3-277. As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine the area.
Two men remain to begin the ambush; others return to the unit. When a
target enters the mined area (killing zone), the two men remaining detonate
the explosives and withdraw immediately to avoid detection and pursuit.
3-75 FM 3-05.201
Figure 3-29. Unusual Techniques, Rise From the Ground Ambush
SPECIAL AMBUSH SITUATIONS
3-278. The following techniques are not considered standard ambush
scenarios and therefore require special considerations.
Columns Protected by Armor
3-279. Attacks against columns protected by armored vehicles depend on the
type and location of armored vehicles in a column and the weapons of the
ambush patrol. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or disabled by fire
of antitank weapons, landmines, Molotov cocktails, or by throwing hand
grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize armored vehicles
at a point where they are unable to give protection to the rest of the convoy
and where they will block the route of other supporting vehicles.
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Figure 3-30. Unusual Techniques, Demolition Ambush
Ambush of Trains
3-280. Moving trains may be subjected to harassing fire, but the most
effective ambush is derailment. Train derailment is desirable because the
wreckage remains on the tracks and delays traffic for long periods of time.
Derailment on a grade, at a sharp curve, or on a high bridge will cause most
of the cars to overturn and result in extensive casualties among the
passengers. Fire is directed on the exits of overturned coaches, and
designated parties, armed with automatic weapons, rush  forward to assault
coaches or cars still standing. Other parties take supplies from freight yards
and then set fire to the train. Rails are removed from the track at some
distance from the ambush site in each direction to delay the arrival of
reinforcements by train. In planning the ambush of a train, soldiers must
remember that the enemy may include armored railroad cars in the train for
its protection and that important trains may be preceded by advance guard
locomotives or inspection cars to check the track.
Ambush of Waterway Traffic
3-281. Waterway traffic, such as barges or ships, may be ambushed similar
to a vehicular column. The ambush patrol may be able to mine the waterway
and thus stop traffic. If mining is not feasible, fire  delivered by recoilless
weapons can damage or sink the craft. Fire should be directed at engine room
spaces, the waterline, and the bridge. Recovery of supplies may be possible if
the craft is beached on the banks of the waterway or grounded in shallow
water.
3-77 FM 3-05.201
AMBUSH PATROLS
3-282. An ambush patrol is a combat patrol whose mission is to—
•  Harass a target.
•  Destroy a target.
•  Capture personnel or equipment.
•  Execute any combination of these.
3-283. An ambush patrol is planned and prepared in the same general
manner as other patrols; that is, by using patrol steps  (troop leading
procedures). Each step is explained below.
Planning and Preparation
3-284. Planners must first consider whether the ambush is to be a deliberate
ambush or an ambush of opportunity. In a deliberate ambush, the greater
amount of target intelligence available permits planning for every COA at the
target. Plans for an ambush of opportunity must include consideration of the
types of targets that may be ambushed, as well as varying situations. In both,
plans must be flexible enough to allow modification, as appropriate, at the
ambush site. When planning, the principles discussed below apply. All plans
must be rehearsed in detail.
3-285.  Every person must thoroughly understand what he is to
do at every stage of the operation. In ambush more so than in other
operations, failure of even one person to perform exactly as planned can
cause failure.
3-286.  (point or area). Many factors affect the types of
ambush. They include organization, the number of men required, the
equipment and communications required, and all other aspects of the patrol.
3-287.  Each possible formation must be considered for its
advantages and disadvantages.
3-288.  An attack may be by fire only (harassing only) or
may include an assault of the target (destruction ambush).
3-289.  The patrol is tailored for its mission. Two men
may be adequate for a harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require
the entire unit (squad, platoon, company).
3-290.  An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as
other combat patrols to include a patrol HQ, an assault element, a support
element, and a security element (Figure 3-31, page 3-79). The  assault and
support elements are the attack force; the security element is the security
force. When appropriate, the attack force is further organized to provide a
reserve force. When an ambush site is to be occupied for an extended period,
double ambush patrols may be organized. One ambush patrol occupies the
site while the other rests, eats, and tends to personal needs at the ORP or
other concealed location. They alternate each 8 hours. If the waiting period is
more than 24 hours, three ambush patrols are organized (Figure 3-32,
page 3-79).
3-78 FM 3-05.201
Figure 3-31. Organization of Ambush Patrols, Example 1
Figure 3-32. Organization of Ambush Patrols, Example 2
3-79 FM 3-05.201
3-291.  The selection of accompanying equipment and supplies is
based on the—
•  Mission.
•  Enemy threat.
•  Size of the resistance force.
•  Means of transportation.
•  Distance and terrain.
•  Weight and bulk of equipment.
3-292.  A primary route is planned that will allow the patrol to enter
the ambush site from the rear. The killing zone is not entered if entry can be
avoided. If the killing zone must be entered to place mines  or explosives,
great care must be taken to remove any tracks and signs that might alert the
target and compromise the ambush. If mines, mantraps, or explosives are to
be placed on the far side, or if the appearance of the site from the target’s
viewpoint is to be checked, a wide detour around the killing zone is made.
Here, too, great care must be taken to remove any traces that might reveal
the ambush. An alternate route from the ambush site is planned, as in other
patrols.
3-293.  Maps and aerial photographs are used to analyze the terrain.
When possible, the patrol makes an on-the-ground reconnaissance. Against
an experienced enemy, so-called ideal  ambush sites should be avoided. An
alert enemy is suspicious of these areas, avoids them if  possible, and
increases vigilance and security when they must be entered. Surprise is even
more difficult to achieve in these areas. Instead, unlikely sites are chosen
that offer—
•  Favorable fields of fire.
•  Occupation and preparation of concealed positions.
•  Channelization of the target into the killing zone.
•  Covered routes of withdrawal to enable the ambush patrol to break
contact and avoid pursuit by effective fire.
3-294.  As a general rule, the ambush patrol occupies
the ambush site at the latest possible time permitted by the tactical situation
and by the amount of time required  to perform site preparation required.
This not only reduces the risk of discovery but also reduces  the time men
must remain still and quiet in position.
3-295.  The patrol moves into the ambush site from the rear as
discussed earlier. Security elements are positioned first to prevent surprise
while the ambush is being established. Automatic weapons are then
positioned so that each can fire along the entire killing zone. If this is not
possible, they are given overlapping sectors of fire so that the entire killing
zone is covered. The patrol leader then selects his position, located where he
can tell when to begin the ambush. Riflemen and grenadiers are then placed
to cover any dead space left by automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned
sectors of fire to provide mutual support. The patrol leader sets the position
3-80 FM 3-05.201
preparation time. The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All
men work at top speed during the allotted time.
3-296.  Camouflage is of utmost importance. Each man must be
hidden from the target. During preparation for the patrol, each man
camouflages himself and his equipment and secures his equipment to prevent
noise. At the ambush site, positions are prepared with minimum change in
the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting from preparation of
positions is concealed.
Execution
3-297. Effective C2 are essential to mission success. The patrol leader
establishes the communications plan and control measures for execution. As
the patrol leader makes contact, communications stand a good chance of
breaking down. He must plan using the primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency (PACE) method. Rehearsals are conducted to ensure  everyone
knows and understands the following crucial points.
3-298.  Three signals, often four, are needed to execute the ambush.
Audible and visual signals, such as  whistles and pyrotechnics, must be
changed often to avoid establishing patterns. Too frequently, use of the same
signals may result in their becoming known to the enemy. A target might
recognize a signal and be able to react in time to avoid the full effects of the
ambush. For example, if a white star cluster is habitually used to signal
withdrawal in a night ambush, an alert enemy may fire one and cause
premature withdrawal.
3-299. A signal by the security force to alert the patrol leader to the target’s
approach may be given by—
•  Arm and hand signals.
•  Radio (as a quiet voice message), by transmitting a prearranged
number of taps, or by signaling with the push-to-talk switch.
•  Field telephone, when there is no danger that wire between positions
will compromise the ambush.
3-300. A signal to begin the ambush, given by the patrol  leader or a
designated individual, may be a shot or the detonation of mines or explosives.
A signal for lifting or shifting fires, if the target is to be assaulted, may be
given by voice command, whistles, or pyrotechnics. All  fire must stop
immediately so that the assault can be made before the target can react. A
signal for withdrawal may also be by voice command, whistles, or
pyrotechnics.
3-301.  This is a key part of the ambush. Fire must be
withheld until the signal is given, then immediately delivered in the heaviest,
most accurate volume possible. Properly timed and delivered fires achieve
surprise as well as destruction of the target. When the target  is to be
assaulted, the lifting or shifting of fires must be equally precise. Otherwise,
the assault is delayed and the target has opportunity to recover and react.
3-302.  The ORP is located far enough from the
ambush site that it will not be overrun if the target attacks the ambush.
3-81 FM 3-05.201
Routes of withdrawal to the ORP are reconnoitered. Situation permitting,
each person walks the route he is to use and picks out checkpoints. When the
ambush is executed at night, each person must be able to follow his route in
the dark.
3-303. On signal, the patrol quickly but quietly withdraws to the ORP,
reorganizes, and begins its return march. If the ambush was not successful
and the patrol is pursued, withdrawal may be by bounds. The last group may
arm mines, previously placed along the withdrawal route, to further delay
pursuit.
3-304. Contingency plans should include removal of the wounded, both
friendly and hostile, under pursuit or at a more measured pace. Treatment
location and moves from the target site to a rearward position must be
flexible. Plans should also include insertion of medical assets within the
assault element, as well as within the HQ. Security and support elements
should be considered, depending on the mission.
MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS
3-305. Resistance forces may employ both mines and booby traps to enhance
their combat operations. In areas occupied and protected by the enemy, the
resistance should employ mines to impede, delay,  and disrupt traffic using
roads and trails. These actions cause the enemy to divert valuable forces to
guard and clear those routes. The personnel and equipment  patrolling the
roads to detect and remove mines are prime targets for guerrilla mines and
snipers. In congested areas where the enemy conducts offensive operations or
patrol activities, the guerrillas should employ mines and mechanical booby
traps. The mines and booby traps will inflict casualties, delay and channelize
movement, and damage or destroy equipment. Mines should be deployed to
reduce accidental injury of noncombatants. The resistance makes and uses
military homemade mines. Most guerrilla mines are handmade, using duds,
discarded ammunition, and materials thrown away by the enemy. Materials
discarded as trash, such as improperly destroyed rations, ammunition, beer
and soda cans, batteries, waterproof packing materials, and ammunition
bandoleers, provide the resistance a valuable source of supply for mining and
booby trap operations. FMs 5-34 and 20-32 contain more information on
mines.
SNIPER OPERATIONS
3-306. Sniping as an interdiction technique has a very demoralizing effect on
the enemy. Well-trained and properly used snipers can inflict many
casualties. They can hinder or temporarily deny the use of certain routes or
areas. Snipers also cause the enemy to use a disproportionate number of
troops to clear and secure the area. They must have mission orders outlining
priority targets to include key threat personnel. Snipers may cover an area
that has been mined to prevent removal or breaching of the minefield.
Snipers may be part of a raid or ambush to stop threat personnel from
escaping the area under attack. They may also prevent or impede the enemy
from reinforcing the objective. Besides their sniping mission, they may collect
information for the area command or sector commands. All tactical plans can
incorporate sniper missions. Provisions must be made for the sniper’s rest
3-82 FM 3-05.201
and recuperation after continuous operations to prevent fatigue. FM 3-05.222
provides more information on sniper operations.
MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS
3-307. The most recent and large-scale UW operation occurred in
Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and the Afghanistan freedom fighter
(Mujahideen). They were a formidable guerrilla force against Soviet airborne,
air assault, Spetsnaz, and ground forces. Initially, the U.S. Army supplied
the Mujahideen with Redeye missiles in the early 1980s but  soon followed
with improved man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), the Stinger.
With the new system the warhead did not have to get a direct hit; hitting
close would cause an explosion.
3-308. The premier Soviet helicopter (HIND-D) has a dual-role capability as
an air assault vehicle and a gunship platform. This helicopter was quickly
rendered out of action with a well-placed hit on the transmission. The Stinger
team easily found and exploited this weakness by aiming at and hitting the
large red star behind the cockpit. The Soviets had to alter some of their basic
tactical doctrine—use of vehicle-equipped ground forces in conjunction with
either a helicopter (HELO) assault or gun run on suspected  Mujahideen
targets.
3-309. Using MANPADS in a UW role can have a significant tactical and
operational impact. MANPADS are relatively new U.S. weapons, light and
very mobile. They can be concealed easily for movement or cached for future
operations. Most are relatively simple to operate. Guerrillas can quickly learn
how to use them, as demonstrated very effectively in Afghanistan. They
require little maintenance because the missile is self-contained. Personnel
can use these systems in various ways, from the traditional defensive
coverage to offensive tactics. Included are aerial ambushes, direct action or
attacks on specific targets, and harassment attacks meant either to produce a
psychological impact or to change enemy tactics. The degradation of the
enemy’s close air support pays great dividends, both tactically and
psychologically, for the guerrilla. FM 44-100,  U.S. Army Air and Missile
De en e Operations, provides additional information on air defense
employment.
f s
Considerations
3-310. There are four employment considerations for MANPADS: mass, mix,
mobility, and integration. Each of these considerations is discussed in the
following paragraphs.
3-311.  Units achieve mass employment by allocating enough
MANPADS to defend an asset. Soldiers move all the available MANPADS to
the key assets or operations that need them.
3-312.  Mix results from using different types of weapons; that is,
MANPADS and other weapons that may  be effective against aircraft. Air
defense operations are more effective when the guerrillas use  a mix of
weapons. This mix of weapons prevents almost any aircraft from countering
the weakness of a solitary system with overlapping and concentrated fire.
Although a guerrilla force is not likely to use ZSU-23-4s, Vulcans, and Hawks
3-83 FM 3-05.201
to any large extent, it will more than likely have some of the following or
similar weapons systems available:
•  ZSU-23s.
•  RPG-7s.
•  DSHKs.
•  M2 HB caliber .50 machine guns.
•  Redeyes.
•  Stingers.
•  Light machine guns and assault rifles.
3-313.  The guerrilla force must be able to move on short notice. Air
defense assets must also be able to displace quickly in a UW environment.
3-314.  Massing all air defense weapons in a common,
coordinated effort provides integration. Units can integrate MANPADS with
other weapons for the best effect based on terrain, enemy aerial tactics, and
desired effect of the air defense operation, using METT-TC. Air defense
personnel may use Stingers to force enemy aircraft to fly at lower altitudes.
At lower altitudes, personnel can shoot down the enemy using massed heavy
machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and Stingers.
Employment
3-315. Defensive and offensive uses of MANPADS provide for a balanced
defense, overlapping fires, weighted  coverage, mutual support, and early
engagement. Each use of MANPADS is described below.
3-316.  Critical guerrilla assets may be subject to enemy
attack as targets of opportunity. Since the attack can come from any
direction, it is desirable to have equal firepower in all directions. The best
COA is a balanced defense because the terrain may not favor a most probable
avenue of approach by the enemy.
3-317.  Teams should position MANPADS 2 to 3
kilometers apart, and one team should overlap another. Other types of
weapons should be mixed in to complement the MANPADS. This overlapping
prevents the MANPADS team from being overwhelmed by multiple aircraft
and increases the chances of their successful air defense against any enemy
aircraft.
3-318.  Teams can weight a defense in circumstances
where the terrain restricts low-level attacks to only particular avenues of
approach. They can also weight a defense when intelligence has established
that air attacks will come from a particular direction.  Balance may be
sacrificed with a weighted defense since most air defense weapons would be
positioned to cover the probable direction of approach. The weighted defense
then becomes the best COA.
3-319.  Support from another MANPADS team allows one
to fire into the dead space of the other. If the terrain or situation will not
allow covering each other’s dead space, teams should make use of similar
weapons to cover these areas using Stingers or Redeye missiles.
3-84 FM 3-05.201
3-320.  Teams should position MANPADS and other
similar systems well forward of the  guerrilla force’s main body or key
facilities. This early engagement provides the best opportunity to identify
and fix the enemy aircraft before they can attack the guerrillas.
Technical and Tactical Requirements
3-321. In addition to the principles  and guidelines previously discussed,
there are certain technical and tactical requirements that need to be
considered before employing MANPADS. Among the questions are—
•  What type of aircraft, ordnance, and electronic countermeasures (ECM)
has the threat been using in the area?
•  What aerial tactics have the enemy pilots been using in the area?
Terrain and Weather
3-322. Mountains and hills may present terrain-masking problems for
MANPADS. Whenever possible, MANPADS teams should position along the
commanding heights to detect and engage enemy aircraft effectively.
Weather can also adversely affect MANPADS that need an infrared source to
lock on. In addition, poor weather conditions, such as snow, fog, or rain, can
obscure the gunner’s vision.
Routes of Approach
3-323. There are two general categories of routes of approach: probable and
forced. A probable route of approach is the one the enemy is most likely to use
but to which he is not restricted. A pilot of an aircraft traveling at 500 knots
and 150 meters above the ground can see little detail on the ground. He can,
however, see large objects (highways, rivers, and buildings) and use them as
aids to navigation. If these landmarks lead to key assets, they may be
considered a sign of probable approach. A forced route of approach is the one
an aircraft will be forced to use and with no options. The forced route will be
to the advantage of the guerrilla because he knows the terrain and where he
can hide to best engage the aircraft.
Map Analysis and Planning
3-324. Terrain analysis is necessary to find good observation points, fields of
fire, routes of approach, and any terrain that may inhibit the full capabilities
of MANPADS. The ideal planning range for MANPADS is 3 to 5 kilometers
from the target. This positioning greatly enhances their survivability by
optimizing the lock-on range to enemy aircraft.
Position Selection
3-325. When selecting positions for MANPADS, personnel should consider
observation and fields of fire, communication position, physical security,
cover and concealment, alternate positions, and safety considerations.
3-85 FM 3-05.201
Offensive Operations
3-326. Aerial ambushes are similar  to the ground “baited trap” ambush
(Figure 3-33). If the enemy is known to reinforce outposts or  ground units
with air support, personnel select a target for a ground attack just to draw an
aerial response from the enemy. Personnel also select a target that causes a
probable or forced avenue of approach for the reinforcing aircraft. The
guerrilla MANPADS teams, together with other air defense  assets, are
positioned at key points along the aircraft’s probable approach route. This
pattern is very effective in mountainous terrain where valleys are the prime
flight routes. An early warning post  radios a timely, forewarning alert to
prepare an ambush for the aircraft.
Figure 3-33. MANPADS in Offensive Operation, Aerial Ambush
Direct Action
3-327. Units may use MANPADS in a DA role to take out a specific type of
aircraft or aircraft with key personnel. This operation is most effective when
employed around airfields. An aircraft is very vulnerable  when taking off
3-86 FM 3-05.201
and, to a lesser extent, when landing. The concept is to use at least two
MANPADS against the target. Personnel locate firing positions on a curve,
3 to 5 kilometers from the runway, within range and observation of the
probable flight path of the aircraft. Personnel must study carefully the flight
patterns to confirm this critical information. If the distance to the airfield is
kept to 3 kilometers, a centralized positioning can cover flight routes either
approaching or departing the airfield. With longer ranges and longer
airfields, the MANPADS team must  confirm the aircraft approach and
takeoff direction and position the MANPADS toward that end of the airfield.
The actual employment will depend heavily on the type of MANPADS
available and the terrain around the target. When in doubt, personnel should
use METT-TC.
Harassment
3-328. The harassment campaign focuses on disrupting the operational
procedures of the airport and aircrews. The intended results are to force the
pilots to lower their flight altitudes, making them more vulnerable to
guerrilla ground fire. Harassment also forces the enemy to decrease its air
reconnaissance and support effort.
Defensive Operations
3-329. In addition to the principles and guidelines of MANPADS
employment discussed previously, defense planners must take other
considerations into account. Personnel must establish air defense priorities
first. Developing a priority list is a  matter of assessing each asset to be
defended. Air defense priorities include criticality, vulnerability, and
recuperability.
3-330. Despite the type of defense used, the same principles, guidelines, and
air defense priorities still apply. Among the types are stationary point,
moving point, integrated, and pre-positioned defenses.
3-331.  The key to a stationary point defense is early
engagement so that the enemy force cannot destroy the target. If the target is
large, such as a series of facilities or units concentrated in a relatively small
area, personnel should use a “star”-type defense. This type of defense makes
use of interlocking fields of fire, bunkers, trenches, and concertina and
tanglefoot wire along with mines and machine guns. Each leg of the star has
central and alternate control capability to defend the base camp.
3-332.  In the past, units have used this defense to defend
march columns. In a UW environment, personnel and supplies may have to
move in march columns. These columns consist of vehicles, carts, pack
animals, bicycles, and personnel traveling on foot. Personnel use MANPADS
to defend the columns by integration or pre-positioning.
3-333.  If personnel decide to integrate MANPADS into the
march column, they should deploy them evenly along the length of the
column. This pattern ensures other  weapon systems are tied in to
complement the overall air defense plan. When only one MANPADS team of
two men is available, both men should only be gunners. A single MANPADS
should be placed in the column where it can provide the best air cover.
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3-334.  Personnel pre-position MANPADS to defend a march
column as it passes a critical point along the route. This method is preferred
for defending a march column. Personnel use it when the distance to be
traveled by the march column is relatively short. They also use it when air
defense is required at only a few locations along the route. The MANPADS
teams may join and integrate with the column after it passes the critical
point (Figure 3-34). The MANPADS teams may each receive orders,
positioning themselves at a given location. They are then given engagement
instructions for a specific window of time. This plan  allows both for
maintaining OPSEC and receiving air defense coverage. Pre-positioned teams
should be used only if the route to be used is relatively  secure from enemy
patrols (METT-TC) or current guerrilla intelligence reports reflect enemy
patrols are minimal.
Figure 3-34. MANPADS Pre-Positioning at Critical Point Defending a March Column
SUPPORT AND SUSTAINMENT
3-335. UW missions cannot be accomplished without adequate support and
sustainment. All units need food, clothing, water, medical, and personnel
services sustainment. The types, quantity, and phasing of supplies influence
the guerrillas, their capabilities and limitations, and the type of missions
they undertake. Supplies and equipment made available to  the guerrillas
may influence their morale since each shipment represents  encouragement
and assurance of support from the outside world. Once a channel of supply is
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established, the guerrillas will continue to rely on that  source for support.
Appendix E and Appendix K provide additional information.
INDICATORS OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS
3-336. Tactical counterguerrilla operations are conducted to reduce the
guerrilla threat or activity in the area. To effectively combat the enemy’s
counterguerrilla operations, soldiers must be familiar with the indicators of
counterguerrilla operations, effective offensive and defensive  tactics, and
countertracking methods.
3-337. Security of the UW JSOA requires guerrilla intelligence measures to
identify indications of impending counterguerrilla action, population control
measures, and guerrilla reaction to enemy counterguerrilla actions. Some
activities and conditions that may indicate impending  enemy
counterguerrilla actions are—
•  Suitable weather.
•  New enemy commander.
•  Changes in battle situation elsewhere.
•  Arrival of new enemy units with special training.
•  Extension of enemy outposts, increased patrolling, and aerial
reconnaissance.
•  Increased enemy intelligence effort.
•  Civilian pacification or control measures.
•  Increased PSYOP against guerrillas.
3-338. Some measures that may be used to control the population of an area
are—
•  Mass registration.
•  Curfews.
•  Intensive propaganda.
•  Compartmentation with cleared buffer zones.
•  Informant nets.
•  Party membership drives.
•  Land and housing reform.
•  Relocation of individuals, groups, and towns.
•  Rationing of food and goods.
DEFENSIVE TACTICS
3-339. The existence or indication of counterguerrilla operations requires the
SF and guerrilla force commanders to plan and use defensive tactics.
Discussed below are some of the defensive tactics applicable against
counterguerrilla operations.
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Diversion Activities
3-340. A sudden increase in guerrilla activities or a shift of such activities to
other areas assists in diverting enemy attention. For example, intensified
operations against enemy LOCs and installations require the enemy to divert
troops from counterguerrilla operations to security roles. Full use of
underground and auxiliary capabilities assists in creating diversions.
Defense of Fixed Positions
3-341. The rules for a guerrilla defense of fixed positions are the same as
those for conventional forces, except there are few supporting fires and
counterattacks are generally not practicable. In conjunction with their
position defense, elements of the guerrilla force conduct raids, ambushes, and
attacks against the enemy’s LOCs, flanks, reserve units, supporting arms,
and installations. Routes of approach are mined and camouflaged snipers
engage appropriate enemy targets. Diversionary actions by all elements of
the resistance movement are increased in adjacent areas.
Delay and Harassment Activities
3-342. The objective of delay and harassment tactics is to make the attack so
costly that the enemy eventually ends its operations. Defensive
characteristics of the terrain are used to the maximum, mines and snipers
are employed to harass the enemy, and ambushes are positioned to inflict
maximum casualties and delay.
3-343. As the enemy overruns various strong points, the guerrilla force
withdraws to successive defensive positions to again delay and harass. When
the situation permits, the guerrilla force attacks the enemy’s flanks, rear,
and LOCs. If the enemy continues its offensive, the guerrilla forces should
withdraw and leave the area. Under no circumstances should the guerrilla
force become so engaged that it loses its freedom of action and permits enemy
forces to encircle and destroy it.
Withdrawal
3-344. In preparing to meet enemy offensive action, the SF and guerrilla
force commanders may decide to withdraw to another  area not likely to be
included in the enemy offensive. Key installations within a guerrilla base are
moved to alternate bases, and essential records and supplies may be
transferred to new locations. Less essential items will be destroyed or cached
in dispersed locations. If the commander receives positive  intelligence about
the enemy’s plans for a major counterguerrilla operation, he may decide to
withdraw and leave his main base without delay.
3-345. When faced with an enemy offensive of overwhelming strength, the
commander may disperse his  force in either small units or as individuals to
avoid destruction. This COA, however, renders the guerrilla force ineffective
for an undetermined period of time and therefore should not be taken unless
absolutely necessary.
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COUNTERAMBUSH
3-346. The very nature of ambush—a surprise attack from a concealed
position—places the ambushed unit at  a disadvantage. Obviously, the best
defense is to avoid being ambushed, but this is not always possible. A unit
must, therefore, reduce its vulnerability to ambush and reduce the damage it
will sustain if ambushed. These measures must be supplemented by
measures to destroy or escape from an ambush. FM 7-8 contains more
detailed information on ambush and counterambush procedures.
Reduction of Vulnerability to Ambush
3-347. No single defensive measure or combination of measures can prevent
or effectively counter all ambushes in all situations. The  effectiveness of
counterambush measures is directly related to the state  of training of the
unit and the leadership ability of its leader.
3-348. In avoiding ambush, dismounted units have an advantage over
mounted units. They are less bound to the more obvious routes of movement,
such as roads and trails (as in armored units). However, dismounted units
are at a disadvantage when—
•  Terrain, such as heavy jungle, restricts or prohibits cross-country
movement.
•  The need for speed requires movement on roads, trails, or waterways.
Preparation for Movement
3-349. In preparing for movement,  the leader must use METT-TC and
OAKOC. In doing so, he studies maps of the area and if possible, makes an
aerial reconnaissance.
Map Reconnaissance
3-350. In studying maps of the terrain over which the leader will move his
unit, the leader first checks the map’s marginal data to determine reliability
at the time the map was made. If reliability is not good, or if the map is old,
he evaluates its reliability in light of all other information he can obtain. For
example, a 20-year-old map may not show several nearby roads and trails;
more recent building development in the area will not be shown. The leader
considers the terrain in relation to all available information of known or
suspected enemy positions and previous ambush sites. His map study
includes evaluation of the terrain from the enemy’s viewpoint: How would the
enemy use this terrain? Where could the enemy position troops, installations,
and ambushes?
Aerial Reconnaissance
3-351. If possible, the leader makes an aerial reconnaissance. The
information gained from the aerial  reconnaissance enables him to compare
the map and terrain. He also obtains current and more complete information
on roads, trails, man-made objects,  type and density of vegetation, and
seasonal condition of streams. An aerial reconnaissance reveals—
•  Movement or lack of movement in an area (friendly, enemy, civilian).
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•  Indications of enemy activity. Smoke may indicate locations of
campsites, patrols, or  patrol bases. Freshly  dug soil may indicate
positions or ambush sites. Shadows may aid in identifying objects.
Unusual shapes, sizes, shadows, shades, or colors may indicate faulty
camouflage.
3-352. Despite its many advantages, aerial reconnaissance has limitations.
Some examples include the following:
•  Strength of bridges cannot be determined.
•  Terrain surface may be misinterpreted.
•  Mines and booby traps cannot be seen.
•  Presence of aircraft may warn enemy.
ROUTE SELECTION
3-353. The factors the leader considers are the same whether he is selecting
a route or studying a route he has been directed to follow. Each factor is
discussed below.
Cover and Concealment
3-354. Cover and concealment are desirable, but a route with these features
may obstruct movement. Terrain that  provides a moving unit cover and
concealment also provides the enemy increased opportunities for ambush.
Identification of areas where ambushes may be concealed allows the leader to
develop plans for clearing these  areas. How the terrain affects  observation
and  fields of fire available to the unit and to the enemy will influence the
selection of and movement over a route, formations, rates of movement, and
methods of control.
Key Terrain
3-355. Key terrain is an earth feature that has a controlling effect on the
surrounding terrain. It must be identified and actions planned accordingly. If,
for example, a hill provides observation and fields of fire on any part of a
route, the leader must plan for taking the hill from the enemy or avoiding it
altogether.
Obstacles
3-356. Obstacles may impede movement or limit maneuver along a route.
They may also limit enemy action.
Current Intelligence
3-357. All available information is considered. This includes but is not
limited to—
•  Known, suspected, and previous ambush sites.
•  Weather and light data.
•  Reports of units or patrols that have recently operated in the area.
•  Size, location, activity, and capabilities of guerrilla forces in the area.
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•  Attitude of the civilian population and the extent to which they can be
expected to cooperate or interfere.
Counterintelligence
3-358. In counterguerrilla operations, in particular, a key feature of
preparing for movement is denying the enemy information. A unit is
especially vulnerable to ambush if the enemy knows the unit is to move, what
time it is to move, where it is to go, the route it is to follow, and the weapons
and equipment it is to carry. The efforts made to deny or delay enemy
acquisition of this information comprise the CI plan. As a minimum, the plan
restricts dissemination of information.
3-359. The leader gives out mission information only on a need-to-know
basis. This procedure is especially important when the native personnel
operating with the unit might possibly be planted informers. Once critical
information is given, personnel are isolated so that nothing can be passed
out. If it is likely that the enemy or enemy informers will observe the
departure of a unit, deception plans should be used.
Communications
3-360. The leader plans how he will communicate with elements of his unit;
with artillery, air, or other supporting units; and with higher HQ. On an
extended move, a radio relay or a field-expedient antenna may be necessary.
An aircraft might be used to help communicate with air, artillery support, or
other units on the ground.
Fire Support
3-361. The leader plans artillery and  mortar fires so they will deceive,
harass, or destroy the enemy. They may be planned as scheduled or on-call
fires.
3-362. Fires are planned—
•  On key terrain features along the route. These can serve as
navigational aids or to deceive, harass, or destroy the enemy.
•  On known enemy positions.
•  On known or suspected ambush sites.
•  On the flanks of identified danger areas.
•  Wherever a diversion appears desirable. For example, if the unit must
pass near an identified enemy position, artillery or mortar fires on the
position may distract the enemy and permit the unit to pass
undetected.
•  At intervals along the route, every 500 to 1000 meters for example.
With fires so planned, the unit is never far from a plotted concentration
from which a shift can be quickly made.
3-363. Coordination with the supporting unit includes—
•  Route to be followed.
•  Scheduled and on-call fires.
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•  Call signs and frequencies.
•  Checkpoints, phase lines, and other control measures.
•  Times of departure and return.
INTELLIGENCE
3-364. The unit must provide its own intelligence support. Members must be
alert to report information and leaders must be able to evaluate the
significance of this information in relation to the situation.
3-365. Obvious items from which intelligence may be gained are—
•  Signs of passage of groups, such as crushed grass, broken  branches,
footprints, cigarette butts, or trash. These may reveal identity, size,
direction of travel, and time of passage.
•  Workers in fields, which may indicate absence of the enemy.
•  Apparently normal activities in villages, which may indicate absence of
the enemy.
3-366. Less obvious items from which negative information  can be gained
are the absence of—
•  Workers in fields, which may indicate presence of the enemy.
•  Children in the village, which may indicate they are being protected
from impending action.
•  Young men in the village, which may indicate the enemy controls the
village.
3-367. Knowledge of enemy signaling devices is very helpful. Those listed
below are some that were used by communist guerrillas in Vietnam:
•  A farm cart moving at night shows one lantern to indicate  that no
government troops are on the road or trail behind. Two lanterns mean
that government troops are close behind.
•  A worker in the field stops to put on or take off his shirt. Either act can
signal the approach of government troops. This is relayed to the
insurgency.
•  A villager, fishing, holds his pole out straight to signal all clear and up
at an angle to signal that troops are approaching.
SECURITY
3-368. Security is obtained through  organization for movement, manner of
movement, and by every man keeping alert at all times. Some examples of
these security measures are as follows:
•  A two-man patrol can maintain security by organizing  into a security
team with sectors of responsibility.
•  A larger unit can use any standard formation (file, column, V) and
establish a reaction force. This reaction force can be positioned to the
front, rear, or flanks of the main body so that it does not come under
direct contact. Any unit of squad or larger, regardless of the formation
used, should have security forces to the front, flanks, and rear.
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•  A dismounted unit moves by the same methods as a motorized patrol.
These methods include continuous movement and traveling, traveling
overwatch, and bounding overwatch formations.
COUNTERTRACKING
3-369. To be more effective in combatting counterguerrilla operations,
soldiers should be familiar with countertracking techniques. If the person
tracking the soldier is not an experienced tracker, some of the following
techniques may throw him off.
Moving From a Thick Area to an Open Area
3-370. While moving in any given direction from a thick area to a more open
area, soldiers walk past a large (10-inch diameter or larger) tree toward the
open vegetation for five paces and then walk backward to the front of the tree
and change direction 90 degrees. Soldiers must step carefully and leave as
little sign as possible. If this is not the direction the soldiers want to travel,
they must change direction again at another large tree in the same manner.
The purpose is to draw the trackers into the open area where it is harder to
track. This technique may lead the trackers to search in the wrong area
before realizing they have lost the track.
3-371. When soldiers are being tracked by trained, persistent enemy
trackers (those the soldiers are unable to lose because the trackers keep
hearing or seeing them), the soldiers’ best COA is to outrun or outdistance
the trackers or double back and ambush them, depending on  their strength
compared to that of the soldiers.
Crossing a Road
3-372. Soldiers approach a trail from an angle and enter the trail in the
direction they want to be followed, leaving considerable signs of their
presence. After about 30 meters, soldiers walk backward to the  point they
entered the trail and exit in another direction leaving no sign. Soldiers move
off on an angle opposite the one they entered the trail on for about 100 meters
and change direction to their desired line of march.
Leaving Footprints
3-373. Soldiers walk backward over soft ground to leave reasonably clear
footprints. They try not to leave every footprint clear and do not leave an
impression of more than 1/4 inch deep. Soldiers continue this deception until
they are on hard ground. They select the ground carefully to ensure that they
have at least 20 to 30 meters of this deception. This technique should always
be used when exiting a river or stream and can be used in conjunction with
all other techniques as well. To add even further confusion to  the following
party, this tactic can be used several times to lay false trails before actually
leaving the stream.
Crossing a Stream
3-374. When approaching a stream, soldiers approach at an angle in the
same manner as a road. They move downstream for about 30 meters,
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3-96
backtrack, and move off into the intended direction. To delay the trackers,
soldiers set up false tracks leaving footprints as described above.
3-375. Below are some additional tactics that soldiers can use to aid in
eluding a following party:
•  Stay in the stream for 100 to 200 meters.
•  Keep in the center of the stream and in deep water.
•  Watch (near the banks) for rocks or roots that are not  covered with
moss or vegetation, and leave the stream at this point.
•  Walk out backward on soft ground.
•  Walk up small, vegetation-covered tributaries and replace the
vegetation, in its natural position.
•  Walk downstream until coming to the main river, and then depart on a
log or pre-positioned boat.
•  Enter the stream, having first carried out the above tactic, then exit at
the point of entry and make a large backward loop, crossing  and
checking it, and move off in a different direction.
NOTE: Using a stream as a deception technique is one of the best ways to
slow down and lose a following party. The deception starts 100 meters
from the stream and the successful completion of the tactic  is to ensure
that the following party does not know where to exit from the stream.
Camouflage Techniques
3-376. Walking backward to leave confusing footprints, brushing out trails,
and moving over rocky ground or  through streams are examples of
camouflage techniques that may be used to confuse the tracker. Moving on
hard surfaces or frequently traveled trails may also aid  in eluding the
tracker. Soldiers should avoid walking on moss-covered rocks as they can be
easily displaced.
Techniques Used to Confuse Dogs
3-377. Enemy tracking teams may use dogs to aid in tracking the soldiers.
Soldiers may confuse or delay dogs by—
•  Scattering black or red pepper or, if authorized, a riot  control agent
(such as CS powder) along the route.
•  Using silence-suppressed weapons against animals. Chapter 4
Postmission Activities
Upon mission completion, the guerrilla force may withdraw by  any
method and conduct a linkup with any friendly force or may be exfiltrated
to friendly training sites (Appendix L). SFODs should conduct
withdrawals immediately unless the  objective is key terrain and may
influence future operations. After  linkup, resistance forces revert to
national control. These forces may demobilize or reorganize as
conventional combat forces for use in economy-of-force missions.
TRANSITION
4-1. Transition refers to turning over an activity or task to a new indigenous
government, allied or coalition force or government, or to private sector
agencies. Examples include the—
•  Transfer of civil authority from military (guerrilla) forces to civil
government.
•  Establishment of indigenous police or security forces.
•  Privatization or return of facilities, such as public works and utilities,
airports, and seaports, to indigenous control.
•  Privatization of humanitarian demining operations.
4-2. Transition is as critical to a  U.S.-sponsored UW movement as the
combat operations that terminated the insurgency in favor of the insurgents.
The sustainment of a successfully terminated insurgency depends in large
part on how quickly and efficiently the posthostilities government can take
control and provide the sustainable stability and functioning infrastructure
required to support a population. Transition may begin in areas where
conflict has subsided, while combat operations continue elsewhere in the
JSOA. Planning and preparation for the transition, therefore, begin during
the preparation phase and continue throughout the subsequent phases.
4-3. When planning to transfer an activity or task to indigenous populations
or institutions, it is important to—
•  Know the capabilities and limitations  of the elements of the existing
infrastructure. Examples include—
ƒ Host governments.
ƒ Bilateral donors.
ƒ UN agencies.
ƒ International organizations, especially the International Crisis
Group (ICG) and the International Committee for the Red Cross
(ICRC).
  4-1 FM 3-05.201
ƒ NGOs by type; for example, assistance, advocacy, and indigenous
organizations.
•  Define the desired end state; for  example, continuity of current
operations or modification of current operations to some other format.
•  Identify the organizational structure required to perform the activity
or task.
•  Identify competent, trustworthy individuals to fill positions within the
incoming organizational structure.
•  Determine how to conduct demilitarization of indigenous forces and
incorporation of former belligerents into the private sector.
•  Attempt to fully understand implications of withdrawal as  well as
tribal or factional breakdown, to include historical boundaries and
differences not yet resolved.
•  Identify equipment and facilities required to perform the activity or
task, and who will provide them. Prepare the appropriate property
control paperwork if transferring equipment or facilities to the
relieving organization.
•  Create timelines that provide sufficient overlap between the outgoing
and incoming organizations.
•  Determine the criteria that will dictate when the incoming
organization will assume control of the activity or task; for example, a
target date, task standard, or level of understanding.
•  Orient the incoming organization to the activity or task, to  include
providing procedures, routine and recurring events, and other
information critical to the conduct of the activity or task. Demonstrate
the activity or task, if possible.
•  Supervise the incoming organization in performing the activity or task.
The departing organization retains control of the activity or task
during this process, providing critiques and guidance as needed.
•  Transfer the task according to the transition plan.
•  Provide continued support to the incoming organization, as required.
•  Bolster the image and prestige of the incoming organization in the eyes
of the populace and the international community.
DEMOBILIZATION
4-4. Demobilization is a major activity of transition. It involves
demilitarizing the combatants of a resistance movement and reorienting
them (or, in some cases, orienting them for the first time) from life as a
guerrilla to life as a peaceful, productive member of society. Demobilization
planning must be closely coordinated and synchronized with transition
planning. As the need for resistance fighters diminishes, the incoming
government decides whether to place guerrilla forces in a supporting role or
to begin demobilizing them.
4-5. How a guerrilla force is demobilized will affect the postwar attitudes of
the civilian population toward the “new” government. To ensure the guerrilla
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force is aligned with the new government, the combatant commanders,
through the SOC, coordinate between SOF, the area commander, and other
military organizations. When demobilizing the guerrilla force, the following
COAs could be considered:
•  Retain the force with weapons and equipment as a new military or
police force.
•  Integrate personnel, weapons, and equipment into new local, state, or
country public services and retrain personnel into new civil sector
occupations.
•  Turn in all weapons and equipment and return personnel to their
former occupations. (The collection of weapons is a time-consuming
and sensitive issue. An “arms for cash” reward system may  be
effective.)
•  Combine any of the above methods.
4-6. After the war is over, the guerrilla force’s hospitals will be kept
operational until patients can be transferred to military or civilian hospitals.
Permanently disabled patients should be granted pensions by the new
government. Rehabilitation assistance must be available to the guerrillas to
assure their place in the civilian community.
CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT
4-7. During combat operations, the SFOD and the guerrilla force conduct
postmission activities such as AARs, reconstitution, or preparing for the next
mission. CA forces participate by conducting a CA battle damage assessment
(BDA). This evaluation assesses the results of the mission on the factors of
CASCOPE, validates the CA and CMO CONOPS, and determines whether
the established MOEs for the operation have been met. It also helps the
SFOD and area commander decide when and how to adjust the plan, when to
develop new plans to address unforeseen consequences of operations, and
when to terminate or transition an operation.
4-8. In areas where conflict has subsided and conditions indicate a
successfully terminated insurgency, transition and demobilization activities
may begin. Transition and demobilization require the collaborative efforts of
many military and civilian, U.S. and  international, and government and
nongovernment agencies. CA participation is more prevalent in transition
and demobilization than in most other aspects of the UW campaign. CA
specialists provide the preponderance of CA support, although CA generalists
will still have an important role.
4-9. CA forces support transition by—
•  Addressing transition issues early in the planning stages of the UW
campaign, including establishment of MOEs and other indicators that
determine points at which to transition to different phases of the
operation.
•  Identifying individuals among the insurgency movement who  would
provide the experience, knowledge, and leadership required to create
and sustain a post-UW infrastructure. Individuals should be identified
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who can fill roles in government, economics and commerce, public
facilities, and special functions at the national, provincial, and local
levels.
•  Separating those individuals from the main body of guerrilla  forces
and, with the assistance of other government and nonmilitary
agencies, orienting and training the individuals to their future roles in
the post-UW infrastructure. Depending on METT-TC, this may occur
inside or outside the JSOA.
•  Refining the transition plan based on periodic assessments of the
situation within the JSOA, as well as among the international
community.
•  Observing and validating the MOEs and other indicators that help
determine when conditions are right to begin the transition phase.
•  Supporting transition operations by providing advisory support to civil
administration in a friendly territory.
•  Maintaining the CMOC to facilitate collaborative interagency
planning, coordination, and synchronization throughout all  phases of
the UW movement and contracting the CMOC according to the
transition plan.
•  Providing postredeployment oversight and support mechanisms for the
new indigenous government and  infrastructure (for example,
“reachback” points of contact, periodic visits, combatant commanders’
theater engagement programs).
4-10. CA forces support demobilization by—
•  Considering demobilization issues in transition plans, to include
interpreting the combatant commander’s policy on demobilization,
demilitarization, and disarming of the former warring factions.
•  Supporting SFOD FID missions.
•  Identifying civil sector manpower requirements in government,
economics and commerce, public facilities, and special functions at the
national, provincial, and local levels.
•  Establishing programs to screen  and identify candidates among the
demobilizing guerrilla force to fill required positions in the post-UW
infrastructure.
•  Establishing and overseeing training programs for former guerrillas to
gain new skills and knowledge and to make them peaceful, productive
members of the new indigenous society.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT
4-11. The SFOD establishes liaison with the PSYOP element before
demobilization. When supporting a UW mission, the supporting  PSYOP
element trains the indigenous personnel in the conduct of effective PSYOP,
assists in gaining converts and recruits for the resistance as they develop the
necessary governmental infrastructure, and conducts operations to create
popular support for the resistance movement.
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4-5
4-12. The senior PSYOP commander at the conventional force HQ plans
PSYOP to support the linkup and demobilization of the guerrillas. The
PSYOP commander prepares and coordinates linkup plans with PSYOP
personnel supporting the resistance movement. Because of their extreme
sensitivity and importance, demobilization plans must begin in the early
phases of operations and have continuous support.
4-13. PSYOP in the JSOA prepare the civilian population to cooperate fully
with the conventional tactical forces. PSYOP elements urge the civilian
population to remain in place and not hinder operations. PSYOP elements
brief the resistance organization’s leaders on the importance of cooperating
with the tactical force commanders and accepting the conventional force
leadership. PSYOP elements psychologically prepare the resistance
organization to assume whatever roles the legal government wants it to play.
These roles include, but are not limited to, their incorporation into the
national army, paramilitary organizations, national police, or demobilization.
PSYOP programs explain the demobilization process. They promote the
insurgents’ orderly transition to peaceful civilian life. PSYOP personnel
attempt to prevent the formation of quasi-military or political  groups
opposing the recognized government. Loyalty to the legitimate government is
the major concern.
DANGERS OF DEMOBILIZATION
4-14. The primary concern in any demobilization program is the guerrilla.
His personal and political motives vary. The resistance organization can
include peasants, laborers, bandits, criminals, merchants, and a few social
and intellectual leaders. During the conflict, some guerrillas may have
achieved status and leadership positions that they now are reluctant to
relinquish. Others may have found adventure in combat that they would not
now trade for peace or prosperity. Hostile groups may have clandestinely
infiltrated the guerrilla force to continue their own personal or political
agenda. They may take advantage of the demobilization program to organize
paramilitary or political groups that will be in conflict with the new
provisional government or U.S. authorities.
4-15. It is imperative that demobilization programs and procedures be
executed quickly and with major political support. The programs and
procedures begun are a direct result of decisions made by high-level civilian
and military authorities. Their successful implementation requires maximum
effort and coordination among SF, CA, and PSYOP.
4-16. Because of their knowledge and history of the guerrilla force, SFODs
initially remain in their operational areas to assist in demobilization. The
SFOD commanders and their supporting CA and PSYOP elements ensure
transfer of U.S. responsibility without loss of control, influence, or property
accountability. The key to long-term strategic success in UW is planning and
executing postmission responsibilities. Appendix M provides detailed
guidance on the SFOD’s responsibilities. Appendix A
Unconventional Warfare in an Urban Environment
In the current international political atmosphere, the emphasis of
insurgent activity has shifted from the rural to the urban  environment.
Therefore, the urban rather than the rural setting will be the battlefield
of the future. The phenomenon of urbanization is occurring with
increasing acceleration. In virtually every country of the world, urban
areas are rapidly expanding, both in area and population.  The U.S.
northeastern seaboard has become a vast, open megalopolis in only a few
short years. In the developing nations, the rate of urbanization is even
more pronounced. Their cities’ rate of population growth is much greater
than the general rate.
A-1. If the people support the guerrillas’ cause, are neutral, or have been
a l i e n a t e d   b y   g o v e r n m e n t   a c t i o n s ,   t h e   g u e r r i l l a s   w ill   b e   a b l e   t o   s u r v i v e .
Revolutionaries in Asia and Latin America have turned away from the classic
doctrines of rural insurgency as espoused by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara,
and devoted more attention to the struggle in the cities. Failure in the
countryside is one reason. Few of the guerrillas who took to the hills decades
ago could boast of much success beyond survival. The dramatic growth of
cities in the so-called Third World is another reason.
A-2. The upsurge in urban guerrilla warfare has caused worldwide concern
since it has not been confined to developing countries. Terrorist bombings,
kidnapping of government officials, street barricades, and open assaults have
become commonplace. Even in the United States, the recent terrorist attacks
using civilian aircraft and the biological threat within the postal system have
proven that we are not immune from this threat.
A-3. The growth of cities everywhere, along with the advent of television and
the transmission of news via satellite, provide an instant worldwide audience
for almost any act of violence. Like any other form of warfare, urban guerrilla
warfare is a form of political struggle. It can be a prelude, a substitute, or an
accompaniment to rural guerrilla warfare or to a conventional military
contest. Many of Asia’s revolutionaries regard the assault on cities as the
penultimate stage of takeover. According to their views, the struggle must
begin in the countryside.
The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the basis from
which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory.
Lin Piao
A-4. Initially, this pattern was followed by the Tupamaros in Uruguay who
operated briefly as rural guerrillas, finding their support among the workers
A-1 FM 3-05.201
on the sugar and rice plantations in the northern part of  the country. But
they soon realized that Uruguay has too little countryside.
A-5. As stated by one Tupamaro, “We do not have unassailable strongholds
in our country where a lasting guerrilla nucleus could be installed. On the
other hand, we have a large city with buildings covering more than 300
square kilometers and that allows the development of an urban struggle.”
A-6. Carlos Marighella, the posthumously famous Brazilian  author of the
Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla, saw urban guerrilla warfare as a means
of diverting government forces while rural guerrillas established themselves
in the countryside. In other parts of Latin America, urban guerrilla warfare
increased as rural guerrillas were chased into the cities by successful
government pacification campaigns in the countryside. Such was the case in
Guatemala.
A-7. Cities have always been centers of human activity. The result is a
greater centralization and consolidation of a country’s entire range of social,
political, cultural, and economic activities in the urban centers. In many
countries, these activities are centered in only one or two key cities.
A-8. In most cases, the capital city of the nation is the  primary area of
conflict. The capital city of practically  every national political entity is the
nerve center of the nation. Even in the democratic nations where
decentralization is more common, the capital city occupies the key position in
the political control of a country. This is even truer in the case of the
developing nations.
A-9. All present-day dissident groups are well aware of this situation and
realize they must center the insurgent and terrorist activities on the political
center of the country to be successful. The political institutions of a state are
centered in its capital, with controls emanating from this hub of sovereign
power. Communication media are located in a capital and other urban areas
to cover the area of densest population. National police and military forces
have their control HQ in the capital with subordinate  elements in other
urban centers.
A-10. In addition to the political power, most capital cities have symbolic
value in terms of custom, culture, traditions, and religion. An insurgent force
that can paralyze the capital can effectively paralyze the entire nation, and
one that can take over the city with its institutions intact can use these
institutions to exercise control over the remainder of the nation.
A-11. Each city is unique. It may be built on hillsides in a mountainous area
or lie on a plain. It can be located along a river or the  seashore or in the
middle of a jungle or desert. Wherever it is located, the site wholly or
partially limits or restricts its development and in some respects determines
the external form and dimensions of the city. No city is uniform in its internal
composition. Rather, just as no two cities are alike, each city varies widely
within itself. A city is composed of multiple nuclei—marked, distinct zones,
which differ greatly. These zones, quite disparate although the boundaries
between them may be blurred, can be  residential, ranging from the ghetto
A-2 FM 3-05.201
neighborhood to the comfortable, affluent suburbs. There are business,
service, and industrial areas and sometimes a combination of these. There
are often parks and large unbroken expanses of woods. Like activities tend to
cluster together while those that are incompatible, such  as high-pollutant
industries and nurseries, are widely separated.
A-12. The truly rural area is completely self-sustaining. A large urban area
never is. The material base on which the city is dependent is largely external
to it. The resources cities need and the goods and services it provides
determine the functions of the city. Some of the standard functions are:
economic, political, religious, educational, residential, or any combination of
these.
A-13. Most cities can be characterized as either preindustrial or industrial.
In preindustrial cities, the upper class lives at or near the city center and the
lower class lives on the outskirts. The reverse is usually true in the industrial
city. The preindustrial city tends to be polynuclear,  since it is based on a
bazaar-type economy, whereas the industrial city is more likely to have a
central business district and a distinct industrial zone. Internally, distinctive
street patterns place constraints on the type of construction within the city.
Preindustrial cities tend to be tightly knit with irregular street patterns and
buildings of a fairly uniform height. This height is usually three to six stories,
resulting from the limits imposed at the time of construction by lack of
technology, building materials available, or weak foundations. A low, nearly
uniform skyline characterizes this type  of city with buildings very densely
concentrated.
A-14. The industrial city presents a quite different form. The business
district is usually concentrated near the point of peak accessibility. In this
core, buildings are as high as possible to minimize the use of ground space.
The result is a cluster of high-rise buildings with the skyline falling away in
all directions. In larger cities, smaller versions of the downtown cluster
appear at other points throughout the city.
A-15. Despite their differences, urban areas have certain similarities that
provide us with some general characteristics of urban tactical operations.
These have special significance regardless of the nature or level of conflict.
A-16. Cities are complex and heterogeneous. The nature of the  cities
presents difficulty to the planner as well as the operator. Planning must be in
much greater detail than is normally  required. The use of large-scale city
plans and street maps is imperative. The texture of the city varies greatly
and often changes abruptly. Operators must function in the city core, open
suburbs, industrial areas, transportation centers, parks, woods, and
waterfronts.
A-17. The nature of the city favors the inhabitant and defender. The city
dweller is the man on the ground with an inherent knowledge of his daily
surroundings. These surroundings appear to the outsider as a hopelessly
tangled web of buildings, streets, and  alleyways, but are as familiar to the
inhabitant as his own living room. Buildings and street complexes restrict
A-3 FM 3-05.201
movement and reduce the attacker’s mobility, but provide fields of fire to the
defender. Obstacles are fairly easy to construct, as is the establishment of
population control measures, checkpoints, and traffic control points.
A-18. Small unit engagements will predominate. The normal building and
street patterns will reduce any operation to a series of small unit
engagements. The advantage of the principle of mass is greatly reduced.
Flexibility is decreased for larger units and increased for smaller ones. Cells
or teams operating in the city must be limited to no more than five or six
members.
A-19. The unique vertical dimension must be considered. The elevation of
the buildings provides a vertical dimension not normally encountered in
tactical operations. This vertical dimension is not only above the surface but
extends to the subterranean level in the form of subways, sewers, tunnels,
and basements. Elevated positions offer good observation  and fields of fire
plus cover and concealment, particularly effective for snipers. Subterranean
areas offer protected and concealed areas for storage, as well  as effective
routes of movement and communication.
A-20. Combat occurs at extremely short ranges, which limits or nullifies the
effectiveness of long-range weapons and increases the usefulness of
individual weapons. Operators must be proficient in the quick, accurate firing
of their personal weapons systems.
A-21. There will be a large number of noncombatants present, which can be
expected to restrict the use of firepower, munitions, and explosives on the
part of the operator. At the same time, the presence of large  numbers of
noncombatants can be used to the enemy’s advantage, such as the creation of
confusion. Large numbers of people also increase the operator’s blending-in
capability.
A-22. There will be collateral damage constraints. These constraints may
affect the selection of targets or the means by which the targets are attacked.
The limitations may be imposed by a higher HQ or could take the form of
moral constraints, as in the case of critical life-support services. Another form
of constraint is where an assigned task would have a significantly adverse
effect on the mission; for example, alienating a segment of the population on
which the operator’s existence depended.
A-23. Intelligence collection is difficult for the outsider. Accurate and timely
intelligence is of extreme value. For the inhabitant, day-to-day activities and
occurrences are routine and taken in stride, but these same activities could
provide a situation for which the operator is totally unprepared. In the final
analysis, there is no substitute for on-the-ground experience, training, and
conditioning.
NOTE: The following checklist and survey are good tools to develop and
assess the urban AO.
A-4 FM 3-05.201
URBAN OPERATIONS CHECKLIST
฀ Record point of entry, city, and country visited.
฀ List documentation required for entry.
฀ Document brief description of entry procedures and customs processing, to include
drawings of facility, uniforms worn by customs, and weapons.
฀ Provide name, address, cost, and phone of housing accommodations.
฀ Report public and private transportation used, to include cost, schedule, and routes.
฀ Report telephone, telex, and postal services used, to include cost, locations, and
restrictions.
฀ Report radio and television programs noted, to include language, format, and schedule.
฀ Report commercial power sources noted, to include type of plugs, frequency of current,
voltage, and stability.
฀ Report job opportunities noted in local commercial businesses, to include U.S. businesses.
List address, phone number, and name of company.
฀ Report exchange rates, both official and black market, to include locations, desired
currency, and hours of operation.
฀ Report ability to use credit cards and traveler’s checks.
฀ Report ration control procedures and documentation, if noted.
฀ Report any logistics services used, to include medical, mechanical, and food.
฀ Report any professional services used, to include secretarial, reproduction, interpreters,
and film processing.
฀ Report any installations visited, to include churches, libraries, theaters, embassies,
restaurants, public buildings, and schools. Include location, address, and phone.
฀ Report any recreation used, to include dive shops, golf courses, deep-sea fishing, sailing,
camping, shopping, prostitution, beaches, sports facilities, and museums. Include name,
address, phone, hours of operation, and personalities.
฀ Report any specific ethnic or religious distribution noted within the city or country
visited.
฀ Report any restricted off-limits areas observed.
฀ Report any nonindigenous military or civilian personnel observed, to include nationality,
activity, and location.
฀ Report exit procedures, to include location, documentation, and processing or customs
inspections.
A-5 FM 3-05.201
IN-DEPTH OPERATIONS SURVEY
GENERAL
•  What is the general political climate?
•  What is the official government attitude toward the United States?
•  What is the attitude of the general populace?
INTELLIGENCE AND CI SERVICES
•  What are the names and subordination of the intelligence and security services?
•  What are the names, locations, and descriptions of the—
ƒ HQ and administration centers?
ƒ Surveillance observation points and hangouts?
ƒ Detention facilities?
•  What personalities are associated with intelligence and security services?
•  What is the description of the following environments?
ƒ Weapons: Type, caliber, how carried.
ƒ Vehicles: Makes, models, distinctive markings, and aerials.
ƒ Communications: Type, frequencies, mobile or fixed.
ƒ Technical surveillance: Any equipment observed.
ƒ Uniform and clothing: Similarities and differences from police forces, badges, and
epaulets.
•  What is the modus operandi?
ƒ Informants:
♦  How are they recruited?
♦  How do they report?
ƒ Surveillance techniques.
ƒ Wiretaps:
♦  How are they used?
♦  Who is targeted?
♦  How is wiretapping approval gained?
ƒ Searches:
♦  How are they conducted?
♦  Must prior approval be obtained?
ƒ Successful operations:
♦  What types have been most successful?
♦  What methods were used?
•  What is the description of the training and cooperation with foreign services?
ƒ What type of training is received?
A-6 FM 3-05.201
ƒ Which country provides training?
ƒ What facilities are used?
FOREIGN OR HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
•  What is the name and subordination of foreign intelligence services operating in the HN?
•  Are current operations ongoing against the HN? Against the United States?
•  What are the essential elements of information of the services?
ƒ What cover organizations or positions are being used?
ƒ What are the locations and phone numbers of the—
♦  HQ and administration centers?
♦  Surveillance operations and hangouts?
•  What personalities are associated with foreign intelligence services?
•  What is the description of the following equipment?
ƒ Weapons: Type, caliber, how carried.
ƒ Vehicles: Makes, models, special equipment, aerials, special (diplomatic) license
plates.
ƒ Communications: Types, frequencies, with whom.
ƒ Technical surveillance: Any equipment observed.
ƒ Uniforms and clothing: Distinctive apparel, uniform markings, badges.
•  What is the modus operandi?
ƒ Informants:
♦  How are they recruited?
♦  Are they induced or willing?
♦  How do they report?
ƒ Surveillance techniques.
ƒ Wiretaps:
♦  How are they used?
♦  Do they have connections with telephone or communications employees?
ƒ Searches:
♦  What methods are used?
♦  Are they performed with permission of local authorities?
ƒ Successful operations:
♦  Who was targeted?
♦  What methods were used?
•  Is there cooperation with insurgent or terrorist groups?
ƒ What affiliations have been made?
ƒ What type of support has been provided (training, weapons, logistics, and
financing)?
A-7 FM 3-05.201
POLICE
•  What are the names and identification of HN police forces?
ƒ Is there a national police force?
ƒ Are there local or regional forces available? If so, who are these forces subordinate
to?
•  What are the names, locations, descriptions of the—
ƒ HQ and administration centers?
ƒ Operational facilities?
ƒ Detention facilities (if separate from operations facilities)?
•  What personalities are associated with police forces?
•  What is the description of the following equipment?
ƒ Weapons: Type, caliber, common and special situation weapons, how carried.
ƒ Vehicles: Makes, models, performance modifications, distinctive markings, and
communications equipment.
ƒ Communications: Mobile or fixed, frequencies, codes and cryptograph (crypto) used.
ƒ Technical surveillance.
ƒ Uniforms and clothing: Color; distinctive badges, buttons, apparel; rank insignia.
•  What is the modus operandi?
ƒ Arrest procedures:
♦  Are police governed by rules regarding apprehension?
♦  What procedures do police follow in a routine arrest?
ƒ Investigative procedures:
♦  Are scientific methods involved?
♦  Are investigators trained in a HN or foreign facility?
ƒ Patrol procedures and routes:
♦  Are there set patterns to procedures used?
♦  Are routes fixed or irregular?
♦  What areas receive special emphasis for police patrols?
ƒ Miscellaneous:
♦  Does local populace support police efforts and procedures?
♦  Is criminal justice system perceived as fair?
POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES
•  What identification or documentation is (or must be) carried?
ƒ Is photo displayed?
ƒ If so, is it black and white or color?
•  What are curfew hours? How and by whom are they enforced?
•  What checkpoints or roadblocks are in place?
ƒ Who mans them?
A-8 FM 3-05.201
ƒ What precipitates temporary checkpoints or roadblocks?
ƒ What is checked at these barriers?
•  Are there prohibited and contraband items?
ƒ What items are normally considered contraband or illegal?
ƒ What penalties are associated with possession of these items?
•  What are travel restrictions and off-limits areas?
ƒ What areas or roads are normally restricted from general populace?
ƒ What is the explanation for this designation?
TERRORIST OR INSURGENT GROUPS
•  What are the names and acronyms of the terrorist or insurgent groups?
•  What are their stated goals and objectives?
•  What is the affiliation of these groups with—
ƒ Countries?
ƒ External and internal terrorist groups?
ƒ Political parties?
ƒ Links with narcotics traffickers?
•  What personalities are associated with these groups?
•  What is the description of the locations of—
ƒ Operational areas: Rural, urban, combination?
ƒ Safe houses and support sites: Active, contingency?
ƒ HQ: National, regional, local?
ƒ Training areas?
ƒ Egress and ingress routes?
ƒ Facilities available (weapons ranges, hand-to-hand, classrooms, barracks)?
•  What is the description of the equipment?
ƒ What are the sources for terrorist or insurgent equipment?
ƒ What types of weapons are normally associated with these groups (make, caliber,
cycle, quantities)?
ƒ How are weapons delivered and dispersed?
ƒ What explosives and incendiary devices do they possess? How are they procured?
ƒ What vehicles are normally associated with these groups?
♦  Are they usually purchased or stolen?
♦  How often do they “trade” vehicles?
ƒ What communications equipment is usually found with these groups?
♦  Where is it obtained?
♦  How are they trained in the operation of this equipment?
•  What is the modus operandi?
ƒ What are typical U.S. targets for these groups?
A-9 FM 3-05.201
♦  HN targets?
♦  Other (business, corporation, foreign country representatives)?
ƒ What significant operations (murder, kidnapping, bombing) does this group
specialize in or claim responsibility for?
ƒ How do these groups negotiate?
♦  Do they deal with target face-to-face or through an intermediary?
♦  Are their demands usually reasonable or preposterous?
♦  Do they attempt to solicit media and public support during negotiations?
ƒ How does the group obtain its intelligence?
♦  Do they operate a formal intelligence network?
♦  Is there evidence of infiltration or HN intelligence services?
♦  U.S. and other diplomatic missions?
COUNTERTERRORISM FORCE
•  What is the HN counterterrorism (CT) force’s policy for dealing with terrorism?
•  Does the HN cooperate with the United States in dealing with terrorist situations?
•  What is the organization of the CT force?
ƒ How many personnel are assigned?
ƒ To whom is the CT force subordinate?
•  What is the mission of the CT force?
•  What are the locations of HQ, administration centers, and training areas?
•  What is the description of the following equipment?
ƒ Weapons: Make, caliber, quantity, special situation weapons.
ƒ Vehicles: Makes, models, performance modifications, distinctive markings.
ƒ Communications: Type, mobile or fixed, with whom.
ƒ Specialized equipment: Explosives, SCUBA, airborne or air-mobile.
•  What training is received?
ƒ Does the HN or foreign services conduct it?
ƒ Is the CT force trained in purely military operations?
•  Do they possess a PSYOP capability? Are they capable of conducting negotiations?
CRIME/LAW
•  What is the description of criminal activity?
ƒ What is the general level of criminal activity? Is it normally violent?
ƒ Is crime against foreigners more prevalent?
ƒ What are high-crime areas and what causes these areas to be crime-prone?
ƒ What is normal police response to crime?
♦  What activities cause increased police reaction?
♦  Do police tend to overreact?
•  What is the narcotics situation?
A-10 FM 3-05.201
A-11
ƒ What is official policy and attitude toward local narcotics traffic? International
traffic?
ƒ What is local populace reaction toward narcotics?
ƒ What is the narcotics infrastructure in regards to the—
♦  Type of drugs?
♦  Organizations associated with procurement and distribution?
ƒ What are the locations of high-drug trafficking and use?
ƒ What are the routes of entrance and distribution: Means of transport—air, cars,
trucks, “mules”?
ƒ What are the affiliations of traffickers with government agencies and personnel,
terrorist or insurgent groups, foreign missions, and other criminal figures?
ƒ What weapons do traffickers use: Type, caliber, quantity, and source?
•  What is the description of the HN legal system?
ƒ Is it perceived to be fair?
ƒ Is it effective?
ƒ What legal status do foreigners have? Are there status of forces agreements in
effect? With which countries?
ƒ What are court procedures?
ƒ Are there legal safeguards in place for defendants?
ƒ How are punishments determined? Are punishments commensurate with the
crimes?
ƒ Where are prisoners confined?
ƒ Is there a parole or probation system?
ƒ What are the laws on espionage and subversion?
ƒ Do persons accused of these crimes have the same legal protection as those accused
of other crimes?
ƒ What are the punishments for conviction of these crimes? Appendix B
Communications
Communications requirements are particularly critical in UW missions.
The SF team must be able to report near-real-time information directly to
the user of the information. Even more important, SF team members
must know what specific information the user requires and in what
priority.
PLANNING SYSTEM
B-1. Operating in a UW environment poses special problems for the SF
communicator. Communications between the SFOD in the JSOA and the
SFOB or FOB must be reliable and secure. To meet this demand,
communicators should use the PACE communications planning system. The
type of communications will be PACE planned along with times and mode of
scheduled contacts. Each segment of the communications net should be
PACE planned, to include mechanisms used for the communications
equipment, antenna systems, power sources, and encryption systems. With
this system of planning, communications are made more reliable and secure,
despite the tactical situation.
B-2. When a particular part of the communications system (such as a radio)
fails, communicators use the alternate  radio system. However, they should
continue to use the other primary parts of the system as long as they can
interface with the alternate equipment. The alternate mechanism may be
upgraded to the primary when equipment availability permits. Shortduration missions, such as raids and ambushes, may not need to be PACE
planned but should at least contain a  primary, alternate, and contingency
plan.
B-3. Communications within the JSOA  should also be PACE planned. No
one system described below will be useful in every situation. However, a
combination of the systems in the PACE plan will ensure that
communications will continue. Operator training and adherence to
communications security (COMSEC) procedures will make communications a
success.
PRIMARY
B-4. The primary communications system includes routine communications
between the SFOD and the SFOB or FOB. The primary usually consists of
radio communications in high frequency (HF) or tactical satellite (TACSAT)
modes IAW Standard Audiovisual Service Supplement (SAV SER  SUP) 6.
The primary communications system can handle the message traffic from the
SFODs and the base stations. The base station communicates with the
B-1 FM 3-05.201
deployed SFODs, transmitting and receiving messages in support of the
SFOB or FOB mission requirements.
ALTERNATE
B-5. Communicators plan and use the alternate communications system in
case of primary system failure. This  system consists of alternate radios,
frequencies, and times in open net  contacts IAW SAV SER SUP 6. Usually
the same type of encryption system will be used. In the event of a primary
encryption system compromise, communicators must plan, practice, and use
an alternate encryption system.
B-6. The alternate communications system should be able to handle the
same amount of traffic as the primary system. When initially used, it alerts
the SFOB or FOB to a potential problem. Communicators should use it until
the primary system is again operational or until exfiltration. As long as most
of the radio equipment used for the primary system is operational, this
equipment should be used for the alternate system. However, this system
should not remain operational for the duration of the mission. An alternate
HF or TACSAT radio must be infiltrated with the SFOD and kept available
in case of primary equipment failure. The alternate equipment may or may
not be of the same type but must be able to transmit and receive in the
required mode of operation (HF or TACSAT). Base station alternate
equipment should be installed in case the primary system fails.
CONTINGENCY
B-7. The SFOD plans and uses the contingency communications system in
case of primary and alternate systems failure. The contingency  system
should be able to provide the normal communications between the deployed
SFOD and the SFOB or FOB, but only for short durations. An example would
be battlefield recovery of equipment  able to transmit an HF signal or
continuous wave (CW). The guard net frequency, memorized by the SFOD
members while in isolation, would be  used as a contingency when loss or
compromise of the frequency encipher pad occurs. This communication, since
it is less secure, would only be used until the primary or alternate
communications equipment or system is operational.
B-8. Operating in this mode, the SFOD is in a communications-critical stage,
which increases its vulnerability to detection. Therefore, commanders at all
levels should take steps to bring the primary and alternate communications
systems on line as soon as possible. An emergency resupply of equipment to
the SFOD may be necessary. Meanwhile, communicators would use the
current “emergency crypto system” as a contingency encryption system. This
system could handle the normal amount of message traffic at least for short
durations. Communicators would use  a primary or alternate encryption
system as soon as possible.
EMERGENCY
B-9. The emergency communications system is a last resort medium for the
SFOD to inform the SFOB or FOB of its status. If the SFOD is operational,
but lacks necessary communications equipment, it uses the emergency
B-2FM 3-05.201
communications system to inform the SFOB or FOB of this fact. The SFOD
uses the emergency communications system if the emergency resupply is
compromised. The SFOD would also use the emergency communications
system to inform the SFOB or FOB that all of the SFOD’s communications
equipment is damaged or compromised and it is in the evasion mode. If the
SFOD is evading and has a higher system of communications, such as
primary, alternate, or contingency, then it uses those systems.
B-10. The SFOD and the SFOB or FOB prearranges in detail the emergency
communications system before infiltration. They also coordinate the
communication mechanism and the actions upon receipt. The plan could
come in a one- or two-word message exfiltrated by other resistance elements
or ground-to-air signals from a particular location. The emergency
communications system must be fail-safe, simple, secure, and reliable.
SECURITY
B-11. UW communications techniques and procedures cover the entire
spectrum of communications available to the SF communicator. However, as
stated above, radio communications dominate communications between the
SFOD and the SFOB or FOB. Between elements within the JSOA,
communications will be predominantly nontechnical in nature, at least until
the EPW threat has been considerably lessened. Security is the
communicator’s number one concern. Any communications within the JSOA
must be totally clandestine until a communications linkup is made with
conventional forces. The SFOD’s ability  to accomplish its mission could be
drastically affected if the enemy had knowledge of the—
•  Presence of the SFOD in the JSOA.
•  Amount of time spent on message traffic being sent and received.
•  Areas of concentration and message repetition.
•  Extent of the sophistication and size of the communications net.
B-12. Signals security (SIGSEC), which includes physical, transmission, and
cryptographic security, allows the SFOD to operate longer without detection.
SIGSEC denies the enemy any usable intelligence from traffic analysis or
radio direction finder (RDF) data. It also keeps the enemy from using
imitative deception against friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. For
SIGSEC efforts to be successful, all SFOD and guerrilla members must
follow COMSEC procedures.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
B-13. Physical security includes all measures taken to safeguard classified
materials and equipment from unauthorized persons. These measures have a
functional destruction plan for materials and equipment in anticipation of
capture of classified materials and equipment by the enemy. The SFOD
commander controls the encryption and decryption systems and  the
encryption and decryption of message traffic. Those personnel transmitting
or receiving message traffic should never know the contents of the messages
in case of capture and interrogation. Under no circumstance will indigenous
personnel be given access to the SFOD’s encryption systems or equipment
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used for communications with the SFOB and FOB. The communicator must
sterilize transmission sites after all transmissions.
B-14. Only SFOD members should have access into any area that has
classified materials, communications equipment, or communications logs and
other documentation. Indigenous personnel must be screened before being
trained in communications assistance within the JSOA.
TRANSMISSION SECURITY
B-15. Transmission security identifies measures taken to prevent
interception, traffic analysis, and imitative deception. It also limits the effect
of jamming the friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. To reduce
chances of detection, communicators  use directional antennas and terrain
masking from known RDF stations. They also adhere to the transmission
procedures IAW ACP-125 (E), Communications Instructions-Radiotelephone
Procedures, and SAV SER SUP 6 to lessen transmission time and the
possibility of threat detection. A safe  practice is to assume the threat has
intercepted the signal and has located the transmission site. The
communicator should keep transmissions short or risk the consequences.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY
B-16. Cryptographic security results through technically sound
cryptographic systems. It is imperative that communicators use only
authorized cryptographic systems for transmissions between the SFOD and
the SFOB or FOB. Sufficient quantities and types of cryptographic systems
should be infiltrated with the SFOD to ensure all message traffic is
encrypted and decrypted using one  of these authorized systems.
Communicators will not use these systems for encrypting message traffic
within the JSOA. The SFOD must infiltrate additional encryption techniques
to ensure communications within  the JSOA are secure. Under no
circumstances will “homemade” cryptographic systems be used for any type
of radio transmissions.
METHODS OF COMMUNICATIONS
B-17. Upon infiltration into the JSOA, the SFOD may find communications
systems of the guerrilla forces are of  low quality, lack reliability, and are
unsecured or nonexistent. The SFOD must take immediate steps to develop
secure, reliable communications between various guerrilla groups and within
the guerrilla elements themselves. Due to the likelihood of a high EPW
threat, especially in the initial phases of the resistance movement,
nontechnical communications should prevail.
MESSENGERS
B-18. Although slow, messengers are the most secure means of
communications. They can carry an encrypted message or signal or memorize
traffic to be delivered orally to the intended party. Messengers must be
absolutely loyal to the guerrilla organization and thoroughly familiar with
the terrain and the indigenous people. This familiarity allows them to
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operate without suspicion and move about freely to pick up and deliver
messages.
B-19. Messenger systems allow the flexibility to send written messages,
maps, charts, equipment, or other articles. However, distance, weather, and
the tactical situation in the area of the messenger service can decrease the
effectiveness of the messenger. The need for speed must be weighed against
the need for security since messengers are relatively slow. In addition,
information memorized may be forgotten or distorted and then delivered
inaccurately. Training for prospective messengers should include memory
enhancement, as well as basic movement techniques common to infantry
squads. FM 7-8 provides further information.
RADIOS
B-20. Radio communication is fast but the least secure of all  types of
communication. Radios provide timely and accurate communications from
one location to another. If radio communications have already been
incorporated, their effectiveness, reliability, and security must be evaluated.
Communicators must decide if the current radio nets should be maintained,
upgraded, or replaced with other systems. In addition, the EPW threat must
be evaluated to decide if using radio communications poses an undue risk to
the SFOD or the guerrilla elements. Communicators should use radio
communications only when the need for speed and accuracy outweighs the
need for security.
TELEPHONES
B-21. Communicators should limit the use of commercial telephone systems
in the JSOA during the initial phases of operations. The enemy can trace
telephone calls quickly and easily. Even conversations consisting of a few
code words are risky and should be avoided in favor of more secure systems of
communications. If telephone communications between guerrilla members
must be made, they should be kept to an absolute minimum. Wire
communications using field telephone and manual switchboards are also
risky in the JSOA. Wires are very easy to find and can be followed directly to
the points of termination. Even if  the points of termination are used
sporadically, the enemy can surveil wire for indefinite periods, rendering
them compromised and useless.
B-22. Communicators could use wire communications effectively at the OP
or LP net in a patrol base or guerrilla base complex. They could use
expedient ground return circuits and  existing conductors, such as barbed
wire fences or railroad rails. When they use the expedient ground return
circuit, they must ensure the appropriate parties are hooked to the circuit at
the proper time.
VISUAL SIGNALS
B-23. Visual signals can be seen by anyone who happens to be looking in the
wrong direction at the right time. Visual communication can relay
information using any device such as  lights, mirrors, and flags that can be
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seen from a distance. When communicators use these devices, detailed
planning and coordination are needed to ensure security. Visual signals need
an encryption system to ensure the meaning is discernible only to the
intended party and to secure the information. Signal operators  can achieve
long-distance communication in a relatively short time when they use
binoculars to send and receive messages in relay from hilltop to hilltop.
B-24. Communicators can use any device  or object as a signal that can be
displayed in a way to produce a specific meaning. A particular color bedsheet
hung on a clothesline at a particular time of day at a particular place could
mean, for example, that threat patrols were seen in the area within the last
24 hours. The important point is that a visual signal must have a unique way
of being identified, a way that is unmistakable, yet not unusual for the area,
and have a specific meaning known only to the receiver.
FLASHLIGHTS
B-25. Communicators can use flashlights equipped with lens  hoods and
expedient lightguns (a form of flashlight equipped with sights and a trigger
mechanism to turn the light on and off rapidly) to send manual Morse code.
Four trained operators are required: one at each end of the circuit for sending
and receiving the message, the other two for recording the message.
Experienced operators can use this method to send and receive up to 12
coded groups of characters per minute.
MIRRORS
B-26. Mirror reflections can be seen at great distances but are very
susceptible to interception. Communicators should use mirrors to send
messages only when bright sunlight is available. They use them in an area
where the sun reflecting from shiny surfaces is normal, such as wet brush
and leaves in the morning. The distance obtained using mirrors can vary by
many miles, depending on current weather conditions.
SINGLE-FLAG METHOD
B-27. Wigwag is a visual communication system that uses one single flag on
a staff to send manual Morse code messages. The communicator waves the
flag in a figure-eight fashion on the right side of his body to indicate a dot
and on the left side to indicate a dash. The communicator then repeats the
figure eights on the correct sides of  the body to produce a character. For
example, one figure eight on the right and one figure eight on the left
produces an “A” or dit-dah. The receiver observes the “A” and says “ALPHA”
to his buddy who records it. The communicator separates the characters by
holding the flag in a vertical position momentarily. The system is slow and
has limited usefulness; an experienced crew can only exchange five to seven
letters per minute.
DOUBLE-FLAG SYSTEM
B-28. The semaphore visual communications system uses two flags, one for
each hand, held in predetermined patterns to send letters of the  alphabet.
One flag is white with a red square in the center. The other flag is the
opposite: red flag with white square  in the center. Trained communicators
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B-7
are needed to operate the system, which can “transmit” 12 letters per minute.
The Navy used this system during World War II.
AUDIO SIGNALS
B-29. Anyone in the area whether or not they are paying attention can hear
unusual sounds. Audio signals should be totally natural to the area but easily
recognizable to the receiver, with the meaning clear yet natural and
meaningless to others, similar to using visual signals. The communicator
should send signals, not text, since Morse code sent from a horn or other
audio device would be instantly recognizable to anyone in the area regardless
of their training or cultural sophistication.
ANIMALS AND BIRDS
B-30. Communicators can use dogs to  carry messages from point to point,
but food, weather, and fear can easily distract them. Trainers must actually
use the routes to be traveled from the intended locations and acquaint the
dogs with personnel on both ends of the route. They make the dogs aware of
other personnel, including enemy soldiers and civilians. Dogs should be well
cared for and stay with their handlers or trainers. Although some dogs could
carry considerable weight, messages should be small and hidden in a collar or
similar device so the dog looks less suspicious from a distance.
B-31. Carrier pigeons are more effective and reliable messengers than dogs.
They must remain at a central message  location for a few days to acquire a
sense for the home roost. Pigeons carry messages best when the message
container is tied to the leg. The Army used pigeons during World War II in
Europe. Appendix C
Medical Aspects
Before a UW deployment, the SFOD  medic should acquire as much
medical information as possible at home station to ensure he has current
medical intelligence about the JSOA. An SFOD medic prepares a medical
area study of the JSOA as part of the overall area study. Some  of the
sources he will use to prepare this study include CA area studies
(available through the CA database), reports by UN agencies, and NGOs
operating in the area. Because the study is continuous, he updates it
whenever he receives new medical  intelligence. A general outline for a
medical area study follows.
MEDICAL AREA STUDY
C-1. This format is flexible to allow the medic to tailor it to the needs of the
SFOD by using METT-TC (Figure C-1).
General Provides a brief summary of the nation’s health status.
Environmental
Health Factors
Discusses the country’s topography and climate, to include effects on health, medical
evacuation, and logistics.
Demographics  Includes population, ethnic groups, life expectancy, and infant mortality.
Nutrition  Discusses nutrition and facilities for refrigeration and food inspection programs.
Water Supply  Discusses the method of supply, location, treatment, and health hazards as they
apply to drinking, bathing, and swimming.
Fauna of Medical
Importance
Focuses on disease vectors, hosts, reservoirs, poisonous mammals, reptiles, and
spiders.
Flora of Medical
Importance
Covers poisonous plants, plants with medical value, and edible plants used for
survival.
Epidemiology  Discusses prevalent diseases and their contributing factors. It focuses on diseases of
military importance, including communicable diseases and susceptibility to cold and
heat injury. It discusses the concerns of indigenous personnel such as physical
characteristics, their unique attitudes, dress, religious taboos, and psychological
attributes. It also discusses preventive veterinary medicine programs that deal with
prevalent animal diseases and their diseases that can be transmitted to man.
Public Health and
Military Medical
Services
Focuses on public health and military medical services.
Village Organization  Covers such important village concerns as social, physical, and family organization;
housing, diet, water and waste disposal, and local medical practices; and rapport with
neighboring tribes.
Domestic Animals  Discusses the types and uses of domesticated animals and any possible religious
symbolism or taboos associated with these animals.
Figure C-1. Medical Area Study Format
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MEDICAL AREA ASSESSMENT
C-2. The initial medical area assessment begins immediately upon
infiltration. The medic establishes rapport (using his impressive medical
skills) with the local population and guerrillas. He gains  a valuable
opportunity to receive intelligence and  information not available elsewhere.
This information may include captured medical order of battle  intelligence
from medical supplies and documents through battlefield recovery and from
indigenous sources. It assesses the actual extent of medical training for the
resistance force, availability of medical supplies and facilities, and the state
of the sanitation and health within the JSOA. Medics should consider the
following when conducting the initial medical area assessment:
•  Physical condition and morale of the SFOD.
•  Medical status of the guerrilla forces.
•  Identification of any immediate threats to the health of the command,
to include epidemics and environmental conditions, weather, terrain,
lack of sanitation, food, and water problems.
C-3. The medical area assessment is a continuous process based on
observations and firsthand factual reports by the deployed SFOD medic. The
medical area assessment is a continuation of the initial medical area
assessment. It confirms, refutes, or clarifies previously researched
information in the medical area study. The medical area assessment provides
intelligence to other units, supplements and supports area studies, and forms
the basis of the AAR. Results of, and information on, the medical area
assessment should not be transmitted  out of the JSOA unless significant
differences exist between previous intelligence reports and impact on current
or planned operations. The following are suggestions and questions to guide
SFOD medics in making a medical area assessment.
INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL
C-4. SFOD medics indicate the name of the tribe or native group and
describe them in terms of height, build, and color and texture of skin and
hair. Medics describe the native group’s endurance and ability to carry heavy
loads while performing physical labor and determine if they need more
physical training.
C-5. SFOD medics describe clothing and adornments. Are shoes or other
footgear worn? What symbolism is attached to various articles of clothing and
jewelry, if any? Are amulets worn? What do they symbolize? Medics should
furnish photographs if possible.
C-6. SFOD medics describe attitudes toward birth, puberty, marriage
(monogamy or polygamy), old age, sickness, death, and so on. They consider
any rituals associated with these events. They describe principal taboos,
especially those about food, animals, and water. They determine what the
attitudes are toward doctors and western medicine. Medics describe rites
and/or practices by witch doctors during illnesses. What do the practices
symbolize? Do the natives respond to events in the same manner as the
medics would? Do they show appropriate feelings of sadness, happiness,
anger, fear, and love from the medic’s point of view?
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VILLAGE ORGANIZATION
C-7. SFOD medics determine the status of priests, witch doctors, and chiefs.
What is their relationship with  the people? How do other community
specialists, such as carpenters, weavers, and hunters, fit in socially? Medics
describe the physical layout of the community.
FAMILY ORGANIZATION
C-8. SFOD medics determine whether intermarriage occurs outside the clan
or between neighboring villages or tribes. Do males or females leave home
when they marry? What are the attitudes toward old men and women,
children, and deceased ancestors?
RELIGION
C-9. SFOD medics describe their religious beliefs. Are they Buddhist, Hindu,
Christian, or animist? Do they worship the sun, moon, or inanimate objects?
What role do good and evil spirits play? Are sicknesses, deaths, or births
ascribed to evil spirits? Does a priesthood exist, and what influence does it
have? Are witch doctors and priests synonymous or different?
HOUSING
C-10. SFOD medics describe construction and materials used. They describe
infestations, ectoparasites, and vermin. How many persons inhabit a
dwelling? Are there community houses?  Are animals housed in the same
dwelling? Medics provide photos and diagrams if possible.
FOOD
C-11. SFOD medics describe the native diet. They describe agricultural
practices, such as slash-and-burn or permanent farms. Is human excrement
used for fertilizer? What domestic crops contribute significantly to the diet?
What wild vegetables are consumed? How is food prepared? What foods are
cooked, pickled, smoked, or eaten raw? How are foods preserved? At what age
are children weaned? What is fed to weaned infants? Which family member
is given preference at the table? Are there food taboos and why? Does
migration in search of food occur? What food, provided by U.S. personnel, do
indigenous personnel prefer or reject?
WATER
C-12. SFOD medics determine the primary sources of potable water (river,
spring, and well). Is the water used  for bathing, washing, drinking, and
cooking? How far is the water source from the village? Is water plentiful or
scarce? What is the seasonal relationship to water availability? Is water
boiled, filtered, or subjected to other purification process before consumption?
What are native attitudes toward standard U.S. purification methods (iodine
and bleach)?
WASTE DISPOSAL
C-13. SFOD medics describe the system used for disposal of human
excrement, offal, dead animals, and human bodies. Is any excrement
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collected for fertilizer? What scavengers assist in the process of disposal?
What is the relationship of disposal sites to primary watering sites? What are
the attitudes of indigenous personnel to standard U.S. methods, such as sitdown latrines?
SOURCE OF INCOME
C-14. SFOD medics determine if there is a monetary system or exchange in
the form of barter or if property and service are communal. What items have
monetary value or are equivalent to money (food, jewelry, pelts, and drugs)?
LOCAL MEDICAL PRACTICES
C-15. SFOD medics describe the types  of local medical practitioners. Are
there conventional doctors available, to include missionaries and other
nonindigenous personnel? What is their level of formal training and
specialization? Do their techniques conform to American practices? Do they
have government support or affiliation? Who is the local medical leader? Is
he a licensed doctor, witch doctor, or herbalist? What is his status in the
community? How do his practices relate to local religious practices or taboos?
What drugs or herbs does he use? Does he use surgical techniques? What is
the attitude of the local medical leader toward SFOD medics or aidmen?
What status does he accord the SFOD medic?
C-16. SFOD medics determine the location of the nearest dispensary,
hospital, or laboratory. They describe capabilities, if known, for surgery,
radiology, and pharmacy. Do local hospitals accept indigenous personnel
from the AO? What pharmaceuticals or biologicals are produced and used
locally? What is the overall level of medical supplies, where are they
manufactured, what is the quality,  who provides them, and how are they
delivered?
C-17. SFOD medics describe practices associated with childbirth. Do
midwives attend the patient? Is there a period of confinement or banishment
before or after delivery? What is the attitude of the father during pregnancy,
at delivery, and after birth? How are the placenta and cord treated? What
rituals accompany the birth process, and will natives request the assistance
of SFOD medics?
LANGUAGE
C-18. SFOD medics describe language,  dialect, and speech variants of the
basic tongue from village to village. What other tongue does the tribe
understand?
RELATIONSHIPS
C-19. SFOD medics describe the relationships with neighboring tribes. Does
intermarriage occur? Are the general characteristics of language, dress, and
physique the same? What other forms of cooperation occur and for what
purpose?
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FAUNA
C-20. SFOD medics record species of  wild animals, birds, reptiles, and
arthropods found on the march, around  campsites, and in villages. If their
names are unknown, medics describe them. Medics note relationships among
these species, including burrows and nesting sites to human habitation, food
supplies, and watering sites.
C-21. SFOD medics note the occurrence of dead or dying animals, especially
if they involve large numbers of a given species. They note the relationship of
any die-off to the occurrence of human diseases.
C-22. SFOD medics report any methods  used by indigenous personnel to
defend against local ectoparasites (leeches). How effective are these methods
compared to standard U.S. protective measures (insect repellent)?
ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL ELEMENTS WITHIN THE JSOA
C-23. The goals of medical operations in support of UW are to conserve the
fighting strength of guerrilla forces  and to help secure local population
support for U.S. and guerrilla forces operating within the JSOA. Medical
requirements within the JSOA differ  from those posed by a conventional
force doing operations for two reasons: guerrilla forces normally suffer fewer
battle casualties and their incidence of diseases and malnutrition is often
higher.
C-24. In UW, commanders tailor the organization of medical elements to fit
the particular situation. Depending on the skills required, organizers might
be able to bring personnel from other medical units into the JSOA. The basic
medical organization can expand by using guerrilla force members and
recruiting professional medical personnel to establish and operate guerrilla
hospitals.
C-25. Clandestine facilities are at first confined to emergency and expedient
care with minimum preventive medicine. Once the area command develops
sufficiently, the clandestine facilities can expand and become part of the
unit’s medical organization. A wounded guerrilla allowed to  fall into enemy
hands can be forced to reveal what he knows and may compromise the
mission. Patients with appropriate cover stories can be infiltrated into
civilian or enemy military hospitals to receive the care not otherwise
available.
MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS
C-26. Guerrilla forces frequently ignore minor injuries and illness due to
high motivation and adaptation to frequent hardship and discomfort.
Historically, the lack of proper medical attention has led to serious illness
and disability causing reduced unit combat effectiveness.
C-27. Health standards in many areas will be below those of the United
States. Indigenous personnel may not accept treatment that is desirable for
U.S. personnel because of religious beliefs or superstitions. Also, natives may
have an acquired immunity to certain diseases of the area.
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C-28. A broad range of medical support may be available in the JSOA,
although at first, treatment may  be limited to rudimentary medical
procedures, such as first aid and personal hygiene. Some guerrillas in the
past have developed highly organized and effective medical support units and
installations. Their organizations paralleled those of conventional forces, to
include field hospitals in inaccessible areas.
C-29. Medical elements supporting the  resistance forces  must be mobile,
responsive, and effective in preventing disease and restoring the  sick and
wounded to duty. There may be no safe rear area where the guerrilla can
take casualties for treatment. Wounded and sick personnel become a tactical
problem rather than a logistics problem; medical support is a major tactical
consideration in all operations. The civilian infrastructure  of the guerrillas
contributes to medical support by setting up and operating medical facilities.
Medical personnel help during combat operations by starting casualty
collection points, permitting the remaining members of the guerrillas to keep
fighting. Casualties at these points  are evacuated to a guerrilla base or
civilian care facility.
C-30. In UW, the attitude of the sick and wounded is extremely  important.
The emotional importance the individual soldier attributes to the medical
service goes a long way in his care and treatment. Because the sick and
wounded can find themselves in difficult conditions, they have simple wants
for shelter, food, and medical treatment. Standards of care are not lowered;
these soldiers may just be unaware of any shortcomings in the medical care
they receive. Experience has shown that a soldier may have major surgery
under extreme hardship conditions and yet demonstrate remarkable
recuperative power.
MEDICAL NET
C-31. The medical net in the JSOA is kept as simple as possible, just enough
to provide security and fit the estimated needs of future expansion of the
JSOA. Medical personnel refine and modify the net after it is functioning and
secure. When setting up a medical net, personnel must consider  the
following:
•  Scale of activities already in existence and those planned.
•  Potential increase in strength, activities, and operations.
•  Physical factors, including topography, climate, and geography, plus
transportation and communications.
•  The number, availability, and dependability of medically qualified and
semiqualified personnel in the JSOA.
•  The attitude of the population, government, and guerrilla toward
medical problems and the medical standards accepted in the area.
•  Existing nonmedical operational facilities of the area command.
C-32. Medical personnel may use the existing intelligence and security nets
to start a separate medical net for collecting medical intelligence. They can
also use the existing logistics net to transport medical supplies.
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AID STATION
C-33. Overall, mission planning includes locating and operating an aid
station. Medical personnel provide emergency medical treatment at this
location. Evacuation of wounded personnel from the battle area begins here.
Because the condition of the wounded may preclude movement to the unit
base, they are hidden in secure locations and the auxiliary  is notified. The
auxiliary will care for and hide the wounded or evacuate them to a treatment
facility.
C-34. The evacuation of the dead is important for security reasons. If the
enemy identifies the dead, the safety of the guerrilla families may be
jeopardized. Personnel evacuate and cache the bodies of those killed in action
until they can be properly buried or disposed of IAW the customs of the local
population. Removal and burial of the dead will deny the enemy valuable
intelligence concerning indigenous casualties.
C-35. As the operational area develops and the situation favors the sponsor,
evacuation of the more seriously injured or diseased personnel to friendly
areas may become possible. This action will lighten the burden on local
facilities and provide a higher standard of medical care for  the remaining
patients. Air evacuation is the most logical evacuation means but the
disadvantage is its inherent threat to security. Landing sites must be located
well away from sensitive areas, and guerrilla forces must secure and control
the surrounding area until the aircraft leaves.
CONVALESCENT FACILITY
C-36. The area where patients are sent to recuperate is called a convalescent
facility. These patients are discharged as soon as possible. A convalescent
facility may be a safe house in which one or two convalescents are
recuperating with their necessary cover stories, or it could be in any base
camp in guerrilla-controlled areas.
GUERRILLA HOSPITAL
C-37. The guerrilla hospital is a medical treatment facility or complex of
smaller facilities providing inpatient medical support to the guerrilla force. A
guerrilla hospital is established during the organization and buildup phase of
a resistance organization, must be ready for operation at the start of combat
operations, and must continue to provide medical support until directed
otherwise. The hospital is generally in the JSOA it supports  but
considerations of METT-TC may dictate otherwise. An indigenous medical
officer with advice and assistance of the U.S. SF group or battalion surgeon
will usually command the guerrilla hospital. However, depending on
circumstances within the JSOA, the group or battalion surgeon may be the
commander.
C-38. The guerrilla hospital rarely, if ever, outwardly resembles a
conventional hospital. The requirement  for strict security, flexibility, and
rapid mobility precludes visible comparison with conventional military or
any civilian medical facilities. As the guerrilla force consolidates its hold on
the JSOA, all medical support functions will tend to consolidate. Safe areas
allow the establishment of a centralized system of medical care.
C-7 FM 3-05.201
Sophisticated hospitals permit care that is more elaborate because they
provide a wider selection of trained personnel, specialized equipment, and
the capability of more extensive and prolonged treatment. Hospital
considerations will depend on the following factors.
Location
C-39. The guerrilla hospital staff conducts a reconnaissance for possible
hospital sites and coordinates the training of guerrilla members who will
support hospital operations. The hospital should be in a secure area but
accessible to casualties. Site planners must consider security, topography,
distance, mobility, and enemy counterguerrilla activities. A sanctuary across
an international border is ideal for a guerrilla hospital.
Security
C-40. There must be strict security measures to protect the covert nature of
the guerrilla hospital operations. Security compromises can lead to the
capture of the hospital staff, patients, and supplies, which may compromise
members of the auxiliary or underground or jeopardize the entire operation.
Communications
C-41. Rapid communications are essential between the hospital  command
and the area or sector commander to maintain adequate medical support and
ensure survival. Coordinating hospital movement, receiving casualties and
supplies, requesting support, and disseminating intelligence all depend on
rapid and secure communications.
Medical Supplies
C-42. After infiltration, the SFOD requests adequate medical supplies for
initial hospital operations. Plans must provide for automatic and on-call
medical resupply, although the staff should make maximum use of locally
available supplies. The staff coordinates with the guerrilla  force to acquire
food and rations for the hospital patients.
Sections
C-43. A guerrilla hospital has several sections. Some sections are collocated;
others should be dispersed for security reasons. Staffing a guerrilla hospital
depends on the mission and availability of trained medical  personnel.
Personnel must be attached to the hospital to provide security,
communications, and logistic support. There are seven recommended sections
of a guerrilla hospital.
C-44.  The C2 section provides command over
hospital personnel and supervision of hospital functions. It maintains
communications with the area or sector commander of the hospital. It
coordinates security for the hospital.
C-45.  Security is primarily a function of location, early warning,
and movement. The guerrilla hospital should be located in an area where the
local populace is friendly or sympathetic to U.S. personnel and the guerrillas.
C-8FM 3-05.201
Security should rely heavily on early warning, diversionary tactics, and
movement to alternate locations.
C-46.  This section provides logistic support, to include supply,
transportation, and graves registration.
C-47.  Personnel in this section establish and maintain one or more
sites that serve as staging areas for  limited medical care and movement of
patients and supplies to the treatment  section. For security reasons, these
sites are the only contact the guerrilla force has with the hospital.
C-48.  Medical, surgical, and immediate postoperative care comes
from this section. It is the central  activity of the hospital, and all other
sections support it. Individuals staffing triage sites should not be told the
location of the treatment center. Only treatment center staff members will
pick up patients at triage sites to take them to the central treatment center.
C-49.  This section establishes facilities to care for patients no
longer requiring the intensive support  provided by the treatment section.
Such facilities increase the dispersion of patients. Depending on the condition
of the patients placed in convalescent facilities, hospital personnel may not
be required to continually staff this area.
C-50.  This section establishes sites where patients may be
transported once they have received maximum benefits from hospitalization.
These sites are basically unmanned geographic points used as drop-off
locations where patients may be returned to their units ready for combat.
MEDICAL TRAINING OF GUERRILLA FORCES
C-51. The SFOD medic begins medical training of guerrilla forces at the
earliest possible opportunity. He selects the personnel to be trained and
screens them for their abilities. Those with potential are trained as company
medics or nurses. He then develops  the training program for each of the
different functions needed within the  guerrilla medical system. He teaches
the principles of “self help” and “buddy aid” to the entire guerrilla force.
Other training includes preventive medicine procedures, basic sanitation,
personal hygiene, and individual protective measures. He also ensures
immunizations of the guerrilla force and their families.
C-52. The newly trained medical personnel should make maximum use of all
medical facilities. They also help the medic train additional medical
personnel. The amount and quality of the training depends on the situation,
facilities, and instructors. However, the knowledge and ability of the SFOD
medic will ultimately decide the success of the program.
PERIODIC MEDICAL REPORTS
C-53. Depending on the tactical and medical situations in the JSOA, the
SFOB or FOB will determine the frequency and contents of periodic medical
reports. Before infiltration, the SFOB or FOB briefs the SFOD on the health
of the guerrilla forces, casualty rate (wounds or diseases), and overall
guerrilla medical condition.
C-54. The training status report will include—
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C-10
•  New training programs since last report.
•  Change in number of trainees.
•  Change in number of graduates from training programs.
•  Adequacy of training aids.
C-55. The medical program report will include—
•  Medical supply status, to include the following:
ƒ Supplies reduced to critical level.
ƒ Success rate with supply procurement within the AO.
ƒ General condition of supplies and equipment following air
resupply operations.
•  New projects and facilities since the last report and any losses due to
enemy activity.
•  Any serious medical problems that may exist and the level of  care
patients are receiving in facilities of friendly forces.
•  Whether other medical personnel are aiding friendly forces more than
expected.
•  Number of new guerrilla personnel (both full- and part-time) and their
skills and combat effectiveness.
•  Any special medical problems unique to the area.
•  Any knowledge of enemy medical situation, such as—
ƒ Standards of medical care.
ƒ Attitudes or actions toward wounded guerrillas and U.S.
personnel.
ƒ Antiguerrilla activities toward medical facilities. Appendix D
Legal Principles
Seven basic legal principles forged from the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, the International Declaration of Human Rights, and the
customary laws of war govern all U.S. military operations. They are as
follows:
•  Observance of fundamental human rights will recognize the
dignity and worth of the individual and the fundamental freedom
of all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Human rights violations will not be tolerated. As with violations
of the law of war, U.S. soldiers will report human rights
violations when they become aware of them.
•  Civilians shall be treated humanely and may not be used to
shield military operations.
•  EPWs and civilian detainees will be treated humanely and IAW
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
•  U.S. soldiers are entitled to similar humane treatment should
they fall into the enemy’s hands.
•  Orders to commit war crimes  and must be disobeyed.
•  Soldiers who violate the law of war will be held responsible for
their actions. Superiors who order violations of the law of war
are criminally and personally responsible for such orders, as are
subordinates who carry out the orders.
•  Weapons, munitions, and techniques calculated to cause
unnecessary pain and suffering are forbidden.
GROUP JUDGE ADVOCATE
D-1. All Army special operations forces (ARSOF) operations will comply with
U.S. and international law, national policy, DOD directives, and ARs
whether SF operations are conducted during war or stability operations and
support operations.
D-2. Department of the Army requires that a judge advocate (JA)  be
consulted throughout the operational planning process. The JA reviews SO
plans to ensure they comply with all applicable laws providing maximum
protection to SFOD members in the event they are captured or detained.
RESPONSIBILITIES
D-3. The group JA assigned to the SFOD provides legal advice  that an SF
group commander requires to perform his assigned mission. SO missions are
politically sensitive, particularly  in stability operations and support
operations, and are fraught with many potential legal pitfalls. During
mission planning, the commander considers traditional law  of war
D-1 FM 3-05.201
requirements, domestic U.S. law (such as security assistance and intelligence
statutes), and international law in mutual defense treaties and HN support
agreements. Failure to comply with such legal and policy demands could
cause embarrassment and even criminal investigation and prosecution for
the commander and his staff. In consultation with a CA International Law
Officer (ILO), the JA also reviews any international agreements,  treaties,
and other legal documents that may affect or be affected by the UW
operation.
QUALIFICATIONS
D-4. The JA provides legal advice to the commander. He knows not only the
applicable laws but also the missions of his client. The JA  must have a
working knowledge of the force structure, missions, doctrine, and tactics of
the SFOD he advises. This knowledge should come from prior ARSOF
training, experience, and close working relationships with commanders and
staffs. In ideal situations, the JA would be at least an SF-qualified major. He
would also have at least a Top Secret clearance and access to the information
he requires to do his job effectively.
INCIDENTAL ROLES
D-5. The JA serves on the SFOD’s targeting panel to review legitimacy of the
target, methods used against the target, and the legal implications of civilian
and collateral damage. He would participate in traditional staff functions and
observe or participate in training. He must demonstrate to the command that
he is a soldier as well as an attorney and can carry his  own weight as an
SFOD member. He must not lose sight of the fact he is an attorney with
special obligations and responsibilities, such as dispensing objective and
well-reasoned legal advice.
USE OF FORCE
D-6. Force means physical violence, such as terrorist strikes or invasion, not
other forms of coercion. International  law contains a general prohibition on
the use of force; that is, physical violence or the threat of physical violence.
This prohibition is memorialized  in the UN Charter Article 2(4): “All
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state.”
D-7. The UN Charter also outlaws aggressive war. Aggression is the use of
armed force, bombardment, or blockade inconsistent with the UN Charter.
The sponsoring of terrorists, mercenaries, or irregular combatants is also
considered aggression.
D-8. The International Court of Justice in Nicaragua versus United States
has ruled a state is not permitted to resort to “self-defense” against
aggression unless it is subjected to an armed attack. The state may be able to
take “proportionate countermeasures.” It is U.S. policy that once a terrorist
or other attack occurs or is expected to occur, the United States can use force
to prevent or deter attacks unless reasonable grounds exist to believe that no
further attack will be undertaken. The United States is committed to using
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force in its self-defense only when necessary and only to the extent it is
proportionate to the specific threat.
D-9. A recognized exception to the prohibition on the use of force is the law
of self-defense. This inherent right of self-defense is also codified in the UN
Charter, Article 51. This article states “Nothing in the present charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until  the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.” Also recognized by customary  international law is the doctrine of
“anticipatory self-defense,” that is, defensive action taken in response to an
imminent armed attack by another State or recognized international state.
ABDUCTIONS
D-10. Abduction is the forcible, nonconsensual removal of a person by one
state from the territory of another state. American law enforcement officials
refer to such abductions as “arrests.” To be acceptable under international
law, abduction must satisfy more exacting standards than the availability of
an arrest warrant issued by the state responsible for the action. Abduction
may be considered criminal conduct in the state from which a person was
taken. Additionally, regardless of whether the state from which an individual
was taken is hostile to the abducting state, abductions constitute an
extremely sensitive operation that can significantly affect international
relations. The United States reserves the right to engage in nonconsensual
abductions for three specific reasons:
•  If a state for internal political reasons may be unwilling to extradite a
target or give its public consent to the target’s removal. Unofficially,
the state may be prepared to have the target removed without
granting formal consent and may even offer some cooperation in
carrying out the action.
•  When the target is an extremely dangerous individual and is accused
of grave violations of international law, such as air piracy.
•  To prevent terrorists, other dangerous individuals, and their state
supporters from assuming they are safe from such unilateral action.
D-11. A 1989 abduction of a Mexican national from Mexico by other Mexican
nationals was in response to an offer by the United States to pay his bounty
upon delivery to the United States. The U.S. trial court judged this action an
illegal acquisition of jurisdiction. The charges that led to the U.S. offer were
dismissed for lack of legally acquired custody over the accused. Under U.S.
law, custody of the accused cannot be obtained in such a way as to shock the
sensitivities of the court.
ATTACKS ON TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST CAMPS
D-12. The United States recognizes and strongly supports the principle that
a state, subject to continuing terrorist attacks, may respond with appropriate
use of force to actively defend against further attacks. This policy complies
with the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the UN Charter.
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D-4
USE OF OTHER FORCE
D-13. Presidential Executive Order 12333 states, “No person employed by or
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire
to engage in, assassination.” Article 23B of the Hague Conventions of 1907
essentially prohibits wartime assassination, outlawing the “treacherous
wounding or killing” of the enemy, or offering a reward for an enemy “dead or
alive.” Neither Executive Order nor the Hague Conventions prohibit attacks
on individual soldiers or officers  of the enemy whether in the zone of
hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere. An individual combatant can be
targeted lawfully whether he or she is directly involved in combat, providing
support, or acting as a staff planner. A harsh but accepted consequence of
such military operations is the collateral death of noncombatants following
lawful attacks.
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR
D-14. The SFOD captures a prisoner and is now at an immediate
disadvantage. One or two men must guard the EPWs, which reduces the
strength of the SFOD and impacts on its capability to complete the mission.
EPWs will hamper the movement of the SFOD and increase the likelihood of
the SFOD’s compromise.
TREATMENT OF AN EPW
D-15. The SFOD must treat the EPWs humanely and afford them all rights
and privileges required under the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of
Prisoners of War. EPWs will not be  targeted, even if their presence
jeopardizes the mission. The SFOD has four options with regard to EPWs:
•  Take the individuals into custody and evacuate them later.
•  Take the individuals into custody, hold them, and later leave them
where they are likely to be found. While in U.S. custody, they must be
treated IAW the Geneva Conventions.
•  Take the individuals into custody and later turn them in to an allied
power. The allied power must be a signatory to the Geneva
Conventions and willing to treat the EPWs as required by the Geneva
Conventions.
•  take the individuals into custody; just let them walk away.
USE OF THE ENEMY’S UNIFORM
D-16. Article 23F of the Hague Conventions of 1907 prohibits the improper
use of the enemy’s uniform, that is, wearing its uniform while  engaged in
combat. The difficult issue is that of finding a proper use of the uniform.
Although wearing the uniform while engaged in actual combat  is unlawful,
U.S. forces may wear it to allow movement into and through the enemy’s
territory. U.S. policy states that the enemy’s uniform may be used for
infiltration behind enemy lines. However, Article 39 of Protocol I  to the
Geneva Conventions prohibits this and other uses of the enemy’s uniform. An
enemy nation party to Protocol I may consider the use of its uniform by U.S.
forces as a war crime and take remedial action. Appendix E
Logistics Considerations
The types, quantity, and phasing of supplies influence the guerrillas,
their capabilities and limitations, and the type of missions they
undertake. Supplies and equipment made available to the guerrillas may
influence their morale since each shipment represents encouragement
and assurance of support from the outside world. Once a channel of
supply is established, the guerrillas will continue to rely on that source
for support.
RESOURCES
E-1. Historically, guerrillas have lived off the land. The resources of a
country and distribution of these resources affect the size and number of
guerrillas that may be organized and maintained in a JSOA. The area
command provides supplies to the guerrillas within the JSOA. The command
must consider resources in food-producing areas when it organizes additional
guerrillas. Guerrillas in the JSOA at  first depend heavily on these local
sources for their support. Logistic plans are based on an equitable system
that limits potential hardships to civilians and does not alienate them. This
system gives the SFOD strong leverage to guide and mentor the guerrilla
leaders.
LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE GUERRILLA FORCES
E-2. Logistic support of guerrilla forces includes the same functions as those
of conventional forces: labor, maintenance, construction, hospitalization,
evacuation, supply, and transportation. Problems of transporting supplies
and equipment over or through territory under enemy control complicate this
support. It creates a requirement for  clandestine delivery, which limits the
amount of external logistic support for the JSOA. External sources have not
always furnished extensive transportation, maintenance, hospitalization,
evacuation, and construction to the JSOA. METT-TC and the delivery means
available determine the nature and extent of external logistic support.
External support will eventually end, and the guerrillas must be prepared to
continue without these supplies.
LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE THEATER
E-3. Logistic preparation of the theater (LPT) combines peacetime planning
actions to maximize means of providing logistic support to the commander’s
plan. LPT would reduce the time and resources required to support the UW
operation in-theater by maximizing the use of contracting and war reserves
strategic lift resources. Three primary considerations that affect support for
the guerrilla forces are explained below.
E-1 FM 3-05.201
Geographic Location
E-4. Geographic location determines the type and extent of the logistic
support needed. In agriculturally productive areas, the guerrilla’s need for an
external source of food will be less than in those areas unsuitable for
agriculture. Location affects the type and amount of personal clothing,
equipment, and life expectancy of these items. It also has a bearing on
diseases and noncombat injuries. The geography of an area and the enemy
situation influence the type of targets to be attacked.
Size of Force
E-5. When local food procurement is only adequate for the existing force,
food supply problems will limit the size of forces. Intelligence in the JSOA
enables the SFOD and the area commanders to forecast needs and plan
appropriate procurement in advance.
Type of Operation
E-6. Available support determines the type of operation that can be
conducted. Support for various operations can range from a rifle for one
sniper to weapons, communications, food, and medicine for a company
raiding an enemy supply depot or troop installation. The expected
nonavailability of these logistics in the early phases will dictate doing small,
easy combat operations.
PLANNING
E-7. Logistic plans traditionally have provided support to the guerrilla forces
on an increasing scale within the limits and capabilities of the sponsoring
power. Initial plans are based on forecasts prepared by the staff of the
theater SO commander. The ability to meet requirements for any protracted
operation depends on the validity of the initial assessment made during
isolation.
E-8. The organizations and agencies that execute logistic plans must be able
to adjust rapidly to changes. Higher HQ, enemy action, weather, and
unforeseen developments within the JSOA may impose changes. The support
provided the guerrilla forces should be continuous, and plans to provide that
support must be kept flexible to meet changing conditions. Flexibility is
achieved by—
•  Having primary, alternate, and contingency plans.
•  Locating installations throughout the area to reduce to the minimum
the travel time of guerrilla forces.
•  Providing adequate reserves of supplies, personnel, equipment,
communication, and transportation assets from which prompt
deliveries can be made.
•  Having several principal and alternate points and routes for delivery
of equipment and supplies for the guerrilla forces.
E-9. The time between planning and executing and the time involved in
executing an operation expose the  logistic situation to unforeseen
developments. To be successful, the entire logistic scheme must be highly
E-2FM 3-05.201
flexible. During joint planning, the SFOB or FOB and the SFOD develop
tentative supply plans for each JSOA. The SFOD may alter these plans based
on its area assessment.
E-10. The guerrilla force has two sources of logistic support. Those sources
are either internal—from within the  JSOA—or they are external, from the
sponsor.
Internal Support
E-11. The JSOA must first provide the  required internal logistic support.
The area command must develop an effective internal logistic system tailored
to the needs of the operation. It must balance its support requirements
against the need to gain and maintain civilian goodwill and cooperation.
Imposing excessive demands on the civilian population may adversely affect
this cooperation.
E-12. Battlefield recovery is the primary method of resupply in the JSOA
using enemy equipment and supplies.  Through offensive operations, the
guerrilla force can satisfy its logistic requirements and at the same time deny
the enemy’s use of these supplies.  With good intelligence and proper
planning, guerrillas can conduct raids and ambushes against small, isolated
enemy installations and unescorted convoys to capture the needed items from
these targets of opportunity.
E-13. Personnel may use currency to purchase supplies from internal
sources. Money may be of the area or be a suitable substitute, such as gold or
promissory notes. Procurement through purchase is usually restricted to
critical or scarce items not available elsewhere. The guerrilla force must
ensure that the infusion of outside currency does not disrupt the local
economy, unless economic disruption is also a goal.
E-14. The guerrilla force may organize a levy system based on the ability of
each family or group to contribute. This system ensures that  the burden of
supplying the guerrillas is distributed evenly throughout  the civilian
population. The local population is told that payment will eventually be made
for the supplies taken. The area command supply officer may give receipts to
individuals. He also keeps records of the transactions. When establishing the
levy system, the commander considers many obstacles that could affect
procurement in his operational area. Among them are—
•  Chronic food shortages.
•  Enemy interference or competition for supplies.
•  Impact of combat actions, such as “scorched earth” policies  and
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) or radioactive contamination.
•  Competition from other rival guerrilla units.
E-15. The area command may not want to engage in barter with the civilian
population because of possible adverse effects on the levy system. Sometimes
it is mutually beneficial to exchange critical items; for example, medical
supplies for food, clothing, or services.
E-16. Guerrilla forces cut off from most civilian production facilities and
support often find it necessary to improvise their own field expedients. They
E-3 FM 3-05.201
may have to plant and raise some of their own foodstuff and livestock. Based
on the percentage of supplies available from external sources and  those
available internally, the area commander may consider establishing farms
and even factories for the production and repair of hard-to-find items.
E-17. Confiscation is a supply method  that the guerrilla force may use to
fulfill requirements that cannot be met by other methods of internal supply.
It often confiscates items when civilians refuse to cooperate or are actively
collaborating with the enemy. Confiscation alienates the civilian population.
The guerrilla force uses this method  only in emergencies or to punish
collaborators. The area command must strictly control confiscation to be sure
it does not deteriorate into indiscriminate looting. Confiscation is the least
desirable method of gaining internal logistic support.
External Support
E-18. The area command normally limits supplies from an external sponsor
to items essential for support of combat operations. These items usually
consist of standard arms, ammunition, demolitions, and communications
equipment. Under certain conditions,  a sponsor may expand its logistic
support to include evacuation of the sick and wounded, food, clothing,
medicine, and nonstandard items unavailable in the area.
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOGISTICS
E-19. Various services and organizations under theater control render their
support to SF through theater directives. The theater supplies requirements
peculiar to SF from local sources and agencies within the JSOA. The plans
and preparations for combat operations include many difficult logistic
problems. Theater command, lower commands under theater, and the JSOA
must wrestle with these problems.
E-20. The Army supply system provides logistics support for deployed
SFODs with funds allocated to the SF commander for local purchase and
contract, or both. The existence and capability of Army support activities in
the area, the mission, and duration of the mission determine the level of
support. An allocation of funds is required to support deployment for critical
or unprogrammed requirements in areas where the Army supply  system
cannot provide support. The guerrilla force uses these funds for barter, local
purchase, local hire, and contractual services in support  of the SFODs.
Sometimes, funds are required to support indigenous paramilitary or
irregular units organized by the SFOD.
E-21. Once the SFOD is assigned or attached to a command for employment,
the operational base (SFOD, FOB, or AOB) provides logistics support. The
base then contacts the special operations support element (SOSE). A SOSE
coordinates external logistics support and sustainment for the operational
bases in the rear area. This support  follows conventional logistics support
procedures, and provisions for it are  included in existing unified command
UW plans. The theater SOC serves as the agency to prepare UW logistics
support estimates, which the SFOB or FOB coordinates and
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processes. The quantity and types of  supplies and equipment carried by SF
on their infiltration (accompanying supply) are determined by—
•  Physical capabilities.
•  Responsiveness to friendly control.
•  Contacts existing with guerrilla forces.
•  Size and status of training.
•  Enemy capabilities.
•  Infiltration agency limitations.
•  Land and sea infiltration limitations.
•  Requirements for survival.
•  Available resources in the JSOA.
E-22. Preparation for logistics support of the guerrilla forces requires much
time. It is often necessary to move men and equipment to start the buildup of
needed facilities and supplies before assigning detailed tasks. In these
circumstances, the logistics support  activities are based on the broad
missions assigned to the SF elements. Time, distance, and enemy action and
capabilities affect all logistic activities. The projected JSOA and the enemy’s
dispositions and capabilities may require special transportation facilities and
close coordination with other forces within the theater.
PHASES OF SUPPLY
E-23. Included in phases of supply  are accompanying, resupply (automatic
and emergency), and on-call or routine. Each of these is discussed in the
following paragraphs.
ACCOMPANYING
E-24. The SFOD may take accompanying supplies into the JSOA at the time
of infiltration. It receives these supplies in isolation at the SFOB or FOB.
While undergoing mission preparation in isolation, the SFOD prepares and
rigs its accompanying supply for delivery. The threat in the JSOA dictates
the quantity and type of supplies and equipment to be included. Other
influences are the—
•  Capabilities, size, and responsiveness of the guerrilla force to sponsor
assistance.
•  Enemy capabilities and situation (METT-TC).
•  Method of infiltration (air, land, or sea).
•  Requirements for SERE.
•  Available resources in the JSOA.
•  Size and capability of the reception committee.
•  Requirements for sustaining operations pending receipt of an
automatic resupply.
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•  Need for key items of equipment to partially equip a cadre nucleus of
the guerrilla force when a reception committee is expected on
infiltration.
•  Other items of equipment and supplies to help establish rapport with
the guerrillas.
RESUPPLY
E-25. The SFOD preselects resupply items in isolation to replenish or
supplement consumed supplies. The SFOD receives these items after
infiltration. In the past, these items were called follow-up supplies because
they followed infiltration. Resupply is delivered automatically on a time
schedule or CONPLAN when an event happens or does not happen.
E-26. The SFOB or FOB schedules the delivery of automatic and emergency
resupply to the SFODs. Preplanned automatic resupply provides  the
guerrilla force with immediate supplies and equipment until on-call or
routine resupply procedures are established. Supply personnel normally pack
equipment and supplies in appropriate aerial delivery containers that have a
cargo capacity of 500 pounds or less to ease handling and transportation
within the JSOA. Packers mark door bundles for easy ID once they arrive on
the DZ. To allow rapid clearance of the DZ, the contents of each container are
further packaged in man-portable units of about 50 pounds each. Packers
must brief DZ parties on these man-portable containers. If the containers are
to be carried long distances, the SFOD must arrange transportation assets
with the guerrilla support arm (auxiliary).
Automatic Resupply
E-27. The SFOD plans for automatic resupply before infiltration for delivery
time, location, contents, and the ID marking system or authentication.
Automatic resupply is delivered after  the SFOD successfully infiltrates and
establishes radio contact unless the SFOD cancels, modifies, or reschedules
the delivery. Automatic resupply augments equipment that could not be
carried in on the initial infiltration. Automatic resupply also reinforces U.S.
support of the guerrillas. In addition, it fulfills the need for selected items to
equip a nucleus of the guerrilla force should the reception committee not
appear on infiltration.
Emergency Resupply
E-28. Emergency resupply items include mission-essential equipment and
supplies to restore operational capability and survivability of the SFOD. The
detachment plans delivery times, methods, and locations and contents of
emergency resupply before infiltration.
E-29. As a minimum, resupply should consist of communications equipment
and enough mission-essential supplies to establish base contact. Emergency
resupply may contain a complete table of organization and equipment (TOE)
issue with contents to be determined in isolation.
E-30. Arrangements for emergency resupply delivery begin when radio
contact has not been established between the deployed SFOD and the SFOB
or FOB within 144 hours. The process is started after 72 hours of no radio
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contact. It then takes the United States Air Force (USAF) 72 more hours to
drop supplies on the DZ. Another triggering event is when a deployed SFOD
loses communications with the SFOB or FOB for a predetermined,
consecutive number of scheduled call-ups.
ON-CALL OR ROUTINE
E-31. When communications have been established between the SFOD and
the SFOB or FOB, external supply begins on-call. Personnel use the
abbreviated code in the catalog supply system contained in the SOI to
request supplies based on operational need. These supplies consist of major
equipment items that are not consumed at a predictable rate. They are held
in readiness at theater Army area command (TAACOM) depots or at the
SFOB or FOB for immediate delivery on a specific mission-request basis.
E-32. To determine the quantity of supplies to request, the SFOD considers
the guerrilla force’s rate of expansion; the anticipated tempo of operations;
and its ability to receive, transport, store, and secure incoming supplies.
E-33. The SFOD also anticipates its operational needs for supplies and
equipment in the JSOA. The MOC at the SFOB or FOB packs and rigs the
supplies into man-portable loads and color codes them before infiltration. The
MOC color codes the supplies IAW the type of supplies in the load so they
will not have to be opened for identification.
E-34. As the guerrilla force expands  and logistic requirements increase,
internal popular support can no longer provide subsistence without creating
hardships or lowering the living standards of the civilians. At this point, the
force must obtain logistics support from an external source. This dependence
on the external source requires a routine supply system. As the JSOA grows,
the need for external supply normally outgrows the on-call method of
requesting supplies.
ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLY
E-35. The area command, with advice from the SFOD, plans, develops,
operates, and controls the guerrilla force’s logistics system. Each element of
the area command has a specific role in the logistics system, and each system
is developed to meet the specific needs and peculiarities of the JSOA. Supply
organization systems may be centralized or decentralized. During the
organizational and buildup phase, the command may centralize logistic
operations. All supplies are moved into one collection area. The SFOD
procures logistics from throughout the JSOA, processes them through a
centralized or decentralized collection point, and distributes to all units of the
guerrilla force.
E-36. As the JSOA matures, subordinate units take over a sector where they
are responsible for establishing a separate and decentralized supply
procurement system. They distribute all supplies throughout  the JSOA to
several distribution centers. This decentralization improves security since
the compromise or destruction of the procurement system in one sector will
not destroy the entire apparatus. Another advantage of this system is that it
permits an equitable distribution of the logistics burden on  the civilian
population. Movement of supplies between sectors is kept to a minimum, and
E-7 FM 3-05.201
names, storage sites, and caches are not passed from sector to  sector. The
area commander delegates supply operations to sector commanders. He
retains the responsibility for the overall plans. He also reports supply needs
to the sponsoring power and issues directives covering operations. Plans and
directives may include—
•  Organization of supply and service support units.
•  Organization and employment of civilian support units.
•  Systems of levy and barter on civilians.
•  Receipt of payment for supplies.
•  Collection, storage, transportation, and distribution of supplies.
•  Quantity and type of supplies to be maintained.
•  Allocation of supplies to major lower commands.
E-37. The area commander provides all supply items to the sector
commander. The sector commanders supply their units and conduct supply
operations according to the plans, directives, and orders of higher HQ.
Individual units within their assigned sectors conduct decentralized supply
operations. The sector commander makes his needs known to the next-higher
HQ for supplies and equipment not available within his area. He distributes
all supplies and equipment received from higher HQ. Besides supplying his
sector, he may be charged with supplying adjacent sectors as directed by
higher HQ.
TYPES OF SUPPLIES
E-38. When compared to a similar-sized conventional force, a guerrilla force
has fewer supplies but an even greater need for more basic logistic
requirements and equipment for combat operations. These needs consist of
food, clothing, shelter, weapons, and ammunition.
E-39. Areas suitable for guerrilla base camps may have some natural foods
such as berries, edible plants, and small game. These foods are not sufficient
to sustain the energy of active guerrillas. They need high-calorie foods such
as rice, sugar, and protein.
E-40. Guerrillas must have seasonal clothing for areas where radical
climatic changes occur. Warm and waterproof clothing is a necessity; GoreTex is a nice-to-have item for the guerrilla because SFOD members will be
wearing their issued Gore-Tex. A guerrilla depends on his feet as the primary
mode of transportation. He needs high-quality, well-fitting boots.
E-41. Shelters such as natural caves offer the best protection from the
elements and enemy observation. Guerrillas can build sturdy, weatherproof
huts from boughs and branches, but they should build them under living
foliage for long-term concealment from air observation.
EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS
E-42. During mission planning, command personnel identify threat weapons
and request and issue similar rifles  and ammunition. At first, captured
weapons provide the primary source of weapons resupply and replacement
E-8FM 3-05.201
parts. In addition, personnel may set up underground facilities to
manufacture or repair weapons. They establish accountability  by weapon
type and quantity to find the rate of ammunition consumption and resupply.
E-43. Usually no replacement of weapons exists except for those captured
and provided by the SFOB or FOB. Procedures need to be set up to acquire
PLL stock, replace burned out machine gun barrels, and provide armorer
repair parts and cleaning kits.
AMMUNITION
E-44. In the early stages of organization and development, ammunition
resupply requirements are limited. Once committed to full-scale  combat
operations, guerrillas will use more ammunition and must determine
resupply rates more accurately. Personnel should draw ammunition for
combat operations from a cache system. The guerrilla support element
normally draws ammunition from the area command or sector command
supply caches. Ammunition is distributed on a regular basis. The schedule
for distribution is consistent with the tempo of combat operations. Personnel
may obtain resupply by setting up caches at preselected RPs or MSSs. They
must consider the following when deciding ammunition requirements:
•  Each engagement is influenced by the rate of ammunition
expenditure—measured in the basic load carried and expenditure per
weapon.
•  Guerrillas, because they fight on their terms, may use less
ammunition than conventional forces. Strict fire discipline should be
imposed to conserve the limited amount of ammunition initially
available.
•  Guerrilla forces are projected to fire one-half to two-thirds of their
basic load in any one engagement.
•  For planning considerations, guerrilla forces will engage in combat
operations once a month.
EXPLOSIVES
E-45. Personnel calculate the amount and type of explosives needed
depending on the target. Interdicting complex target systems  by multiple
attacks at different locations throughout the JSOA requires vast amounts
and different kinds of explosives.
INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
E-46. To determine priorities for supplying individual equipment, personnel
must study climatic conditions, topography, ethnic groups, and the morale of
the guerrillas. Items that are highly  ranked include good quality footgear,
warm Gore-Tex clothing, ponchos, and  first-aid kits. Intermediate priority
items may be uniforms, extreme weather clothing, sleeping gear, missionoriented protective posture (MOPP) gear, load-bearing equipment, PLL, and
petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) requirements for all weapons and
equipment. Normally, 6 months after infiltration, replacement items may be
a pair of boots, two or three pairs of woolen socks, and one pair of trousers for
E-9 FM 3-05.201
each guerrilla. Later, another pair of boots, more pairs of woolen socks, and a
uniform for each guerrilla could be expected (METT-TC).
MEDICAL SUPPLIES
E-47. Providing medical supplies and medical treatment is a strong morale
factor. Units require basic medicines and supplies to treat sick and wounded
guerrillas and the local population. The most important medical supplies are
preventive medicines such as antimalaria pills, sulfa, iodine, and various
serums for protection against contagious diseases. Also, each platoon-sized
element needs at least one first-aid kit. Replacement medical supplies may
be made for planning purposes: one third of basic issue after 6 months and
one third of total issue after 12 months in the JSOA. Appendix C includes
medical aspects.
TRANSPORTATION
E-48. The local auxiliary provides transportation support to the guerrilla
forces. In remote or underdeveloped areas, the means of transportation will
be on foot or by pack animal. More sophisticated environments will normally
have modern forms of transportation available. The guerrilla force may find
it advantageous to first acquire and then later operate its own fleet of
vehicles. It also requires a supply of PLL and POL.
STORAGE
E-49. The guerrilla force carefully preserves, packs, transports, and stores
its equipment as soon as possible to prevent its discovery and loss. It
disperses similar equipment throughout cache sites to prevent a complete
loss if one cache would be found. Excellent locations are cellars of factories,
underground passages, sewers, empty buildings, gardens, and even churches.
In Palestine after World War II, small weapons cache sites were concealed
within double walls of houses. They also were buried and sealed inside lead
pipes. The force usually constructs larger underground caches with special
material to withstand the rigors of long-term storage.
CACHES
E-50. The protected storage of supplies and equipment is important to the
area command logistics plan. Caches may be used to support  current or
future operations or be reserved for emergencies. Supplies in excess of
current requirements are carefully packaged to prevent damage from
exposure. They are then cached in a number of isolated locations known only
to the area commander, SFOD members, and key personnel who have access
to the cache site map.
E-51. The guerrilla force may establish caches in friendly areas or in
enemy-held areas after hostilities have begun. The guerrilla force may locate
them in caves, swamps, forests, cemeteries, rivers, or lakes. Dispersed cache
systems permit the guerrilla force to operate throughout the JSOA
independent of their base areas. Four major considerations for caches are—
•  Locations that will help all operations.
•  Probability that the particular cache will be needed.
E-10FM 3-05.201
•  Maximum storage life of the items involved.
•  Problems of providing security to or from the cache.
E-52. SFOD members hide their supplies  in remote rural areas to ensure
their survival in case of compromise. Possible cache sites are wells, caves,
hollow trees, cisterns, unused culverts, and banks below water level of lakes,
streams, or rivers. SFOD members must properly prepare the cache site;
otherwise, the supplies may be damaged or discovered. They must choose
ground that affords adequate drainage of ground water. When caching
supplies for more than a few days, the SFOD must be sure the cache is
camouflaged, ventilated, and insulated against dampness.  It is very
important to camouflage the ventilators. SFOD members must also properly
preserve the equipment to protect against rust and mildew. Appendix K
provides additional guidance on caching.
MISSION SUPPORT SITES
E-53. Guerrillas set up a temporary base or MSS to use when away from
their primary base camp during an operation for extended periods. Guerrillas
use the MSS for food, shelter, medical support, ammunition, or  explosives.
Using an MSS eliminates unnecessary movement of supplies and allows the
guerrilla force to move rapidly to and  from target sites. When selecting an
MSS, SFOD members consider cover and concealment, distance to the
objective and supply sources, and the presence of enemy security forces in the
area.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS
E-54. The SFOD obtains materials from the local civilian economy or
through combat operations against the  enemy. At first, basic maintenance
and minor repair of equipment is limited to operator maintenance. As the
movement expands, personnel establish clandestine, makeshift ordnance and
repair facilities. The sponsor-provided supply packages contain necessary
maintenance and repair items, such as tools, small arms repair kits,
replacement parts, and POL cleaning materials. SFOD members must
consider the use of special or high-speed equipment that may only complicate
the maintenance system by requiring highly trained technicians.
DELIVERY SYSTEMS
E-55. The SFOD in the JSOA delivers all external supplies and equipment
to the guerrilla force. It is essential that sensitive items, such as weapons,
ammunition, demolitions, radios, drugs, or special equipment, be controlled.
An SFOD member must be present at all deliveries of external supplies to
ensure positive control and accountability. Usually, sponsor-provided
supplies are delivered directly to the individual user. If direct delivery to the
user is not desirable or possible, supplies will be delivered to a designated
location where they are distributed. Although this system takes much time
and effort, it permits centralized control over sponsor-provided supplies and
may be the preferred method.
E-11 FM 3-05.201
E-12
DELIVERY MEANS
E-56. The preferred mission delivery method is by sponsor aircraft, surface
ship, or submarine. At first, aerial  delivery by parachute may be the best
means of supply to a JSOA. Free-drop  techniques may be used for certain
hardy items. Later, as the JSOA expands and comes under greater friendly
control, SFOD members use air-landed supply missions. Supply personnel
normally use surface ships or submarines when JSOAs are next to
waterways or seas. Resupply operations require secrecy to protect the
resupply platform and the reception element. These operations are normally
conducted during limited visibility.
PACKAGING
E-57. The SFOB or FOB SPTCEN  personnel prepare supplies and
equipment for delivery to a JSOA. The size of the package and the number of
packages to be transported determines the delivery means. The packaging
system is based on man-portable packages weighing about 50 pounds. With
this weight limitation, members of  the reception committee transportation
party can easily move the packages from the supply point to  safe sites.
Man-portable packages are equipped with carrying straps and are mounted
on packboards. The transportation party color codes the packages so
personnel can easily identify their contents upon arrival. The SFOB or FOB
SPTCEN personnel ensure each package is—
•  Waterproofed to permit aboveground and limited underground or
underwater cache.
•  Packed with instructions (in indigenous language) for all equipment.
•  Marked with a prearranged code to identify the contents.
•  Packed with an inventory list to aid in identifying lost or  damaged
material.
•  Packed to protect sensitive communications and medical items by
using clothing, blankets, or other padding.
E-58. The SFOB or FOB SPTCEN personnel may put combat and morale
supply items in the same container. They package ammunition and cleaning
equipment with weapons and batteries  with flashlights. Additional small
arms ammunition, by caliber, may be included as an individual package.
SUPPLY PROCEDURES
E-59. SFOD members use a catalog supply system code to speed up on-call
resupply requests and ensure accurate equipment ID and supply items. The
system also reduces radio transmission time. To permit maximum user
flexibility, the system identifies single major equipment items or several
associated items by code words. Personnel catalog these items by class of
supplies and group them in individual packaged items or several associated
unit items packed together. The catalog supply system is—
•  Not secured by itself but reduces message length and transmission
time when a variety of supplies are requested.
•  Based on mission requirements, CONPLANs, and SOP.
•  Prepared under the staff supervision of the group S-4.
•  Reproduced in miniature form for operational missions and published
in the SOI by the SF group signal officer. Appendix F
Infiltration
An SF pilot team may infiltrate into the JSOA before the SFOD. The
preferred method is for a resistance reception committee to receive the
pilot team. Blind infiltrations may be considered, based on METT-TC. The
number and type of pilot team personnel will be very dependent on the
METT-TC factors. The pilot team may establish contact with the area
command element, assess resistance potential, and perform other
missions as specified by higher HQ. Based on these factors, an SFOD may
be infiltrated later into the JSOA to conduct UW or other SO. The pilot
team may exfiltrate on order, according to the OPORD, or at the
discretion of the team leader. Pilot team members may exfiltrate anytime
before the SFOD’s scheduled infiltration, or they may remain in the JSOA
as the reception committee for a planned SFOD infiltration. They could
also remain and act as an AOB for the infiltration of two or more SFODs.
ARRIVAL SITE
F-1. At the infiltration site, SFOD members must put the sterilization plan
into effect and ensure the site is clean and secure. The resistance may
execute deception plans if required.
F-2. After infiltration, all personnel must know the assembly and contact
plans. The assembly area and the contact point should be close to the DZ
(Figure F-1, page F-2). The SFOD’s assembly time after infiltration is
dependent on the threat reaction time. A minimum number of personnel
make contact. The SFOD must employ correct verbal, light, and visual
signals. SFOD members must enforce noise, light, and camouflage discipline
and keep time spent in the area to a minimum. They must use stealth with
proper movement techniques and know their RPs. If enemy contact is made,
the SFOD members use IADs, based on METT-TC. A workable alternative
CONPLAN, especially on the DZ or LZ, is imperative.
F-3. Movement from the contact site to a “safe area” should be toward the
guerrilla base camp. Transportation, if available, would save valuable time;
however, movement on foot is always an option.
F-4. During initial assessment, security principles that must be adhered to
are—
•  Noise and light discipline during transportation or movement.
•  Route and halt security (camouflage and IADs are used while
maintaining stealth).
•  Primary and alternate RPs.
F-1 FM 3-05.201
Figure F-1. Assembly Areas and Contact Points
F-5. During movement, SFOD members  must anticipate their reaction to
orders from the area commander. The SFOD commander conducts
observation and security checks during all movement. He also keeps the
SFOD oriented to its location and aware of any immediate actions to take in
case of enemy confrontation. The SFOD commander must—
•  Know the location of key weapons and heavy equipment in the column.
•  Begin plans to reestablish contact with the resistance force if the
enemy separates the column and the SFOD.
•  Check the physical condition of SFOD members during halts.
F-2 FM 3-05.201
•  Establish initial communications with the SFOB and submit the IER
(ANGUS) if possible.
METHODS OF MOVEMENT
F-6. For UW, mission success depends on secrecy. Speed is secondary.
Enemy capabilities, disposition, reaction time, and security measures, as well
as the CASCOPE factors, affect the selected infiltration method. A heavily
guarded border may preclude land infiltration; a strongly  defended and
patrolled coastline may eliminate infiltration by water; and the enemy’s air
detection and defense systems may reduce air insertion potential. METT-TC
is always an influencing factor.
F-7. SFODs must consider geographic formations when selecting the
infiltration method. Terrain affects the selection of an aircraft’s altitude,
approach and exit routes, landing areas, or parachute operations for any
mission aircraft. Mountains could force  aircraft to fly higher than desired
altitudes, resulting in early aircraft acquisition by enemy radar and
increasing its vulnerability.
F-8. Seasonal weather conditions also affect infiltrations. Factors to consider
include temperature, precipitation, visibility, clouds, and wind. High altitude
or surface winds and their  effects on surf conditions or periods of reduced
visibility may prohibit the use of parachutes, inflatable boats, or surface and
subsurface swimming as entry or recovery techniques. These same conditions
generally favor a land infiltration.  The adverse weather aerial delivery
system (AWADS) reduces the impact of adverse weather as a limiting factor
on air infiltrations. Hydrography is the science of describing the sea and
marginal land areas and the effect on water operations. The hydrographic
conditions on the far-shore and the near-shore sea approach influence water
infiltration. These conditions include the offshore water depth, beach
gradients, tide, surf, currents, sea bottom, and the location of reefs, sandbars,
seaweed, or natural and man-made obstacles.
F-9. Other considerations for UW infiltrations include—
•  Light data (periods of twilight, beginning morning nautical twilight
[BMNT], early evening nautical twilight [EENT], nautical sunrise,
sunset, moon phase, moonrise, and moonset).
•  The distance to the contact site, possible base camps, and enemy
locations.
•  Plans for fire support, deception, E&R, and countermeasures against
fratricide. Commanders should use METT-TC as a planning guide.
F-10. The SFOD uses one of three methods to infiltrate into the JSOA—air,
land, or water. A combination of the three may also be used. A matrix can be
used to determine the type and infiltration method best  suited for the
mission.
AIR INFILTRATION
F-11. Commanders often consider using air infiltration by  Army special
operations aviation (ARSOA). Parachute operations are one of the most rapid
infiltration methods used by the SFODs. It provides less exposure and risk to
F-3 FM 3-05.201
the aircraft. Usually standard troop carrier fixed-wing aircraft are well
equipped and satisfy airdrop requirements. Some circumstances may require
nonstandard aircraft. These situations  may require an aircraft capable of
parachute delivery of equipment and  personnel from high altitudes using
MFF parachute techniques. Other techniques include static-line operations
on small, unsurveyed DZs or hazardous, tree-covered terrain. Assault aircraft
and amphibious or utility aircraft may  be available. During infiltration,
certain conditions may require that these aircraft conduct air-landing
operations on relatively short, unprepared airstrips. Under other
circumstances, longer-range tactical aircraft may be used. FM 3-05.210
(currently TC 31-24),  Special Forces Air Operations, and FM 3-05.211
(currently FM 31-19), Special Forces Military Free-Fall Operations, provide
detailed planning information on air infiltration.
LAND INFILTRATION
F-12. During land infiltration, the SFOD should move from the launch site
clandestinely to an assembly area short of the JSOA border and establish
local security. In this scenario, the SFOD will move to the assembly area,
conduct a reconnaissance of the crossover point, and conduct the infiltration,
preferably during periods of low visibility. The assembly area should provide
cover, concealment, and security. The reception committee, through prior
coordination, may meet the SFOD at the assembly area to conduct final
coordination. It must establish liaison from higher HQ beforehand, in the
event friendly forces occupy the border area. The liaison element should
remain near the crossover point until  the SFOB or FOB has received the
initial entry report.
WATER INFILTRATION
F-13. Waterborne operations provide an expanded capability for all SFODs.
Through premission analysis, detailed planning, and a unit sustainment
training program, the SFOD can deploy for a successful waterborne
infiltration. A thorough understanding of all factors affecting successful
waterborne-related missions is essential due to the inherently high risk
associated with even the most routine waterborne operations. FM 3-05.212
(currently TC 31-25),  Special Force  Waterborne Operations, provides
detailed planning information on waterborne operations.
s
SFOD EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
F-14. The quantity and type of accompanying equipment and supplies
carried by the SFOD on initial infiltration are influenced by the—
•  Infiltration and resupply airframes  available. The aircraft used to
infiltrate the SFOD may be by ARSOA aircraft (MH-60K/L and  the
MH-47D/E), U.S. Air Force (USAF) aircraft (MC-130, MH-53, or
CV-22), or other locally contracted assets.
•  Political, psychological, and military threat situation in the JSOA.
•  Size and training of the resistance force.
•  Infiltration time and site location.
•  Contingency operations in the JSOA.
F-4 FM 3-05.201
F-5
INITIAL ENTRY REPORT
F-15. Infiltration into the JSOA is not complete until the SFOD transmits
the IER (ANGUS) by radio to the SFOB or FOB. The SFOB or FOB sends an
acknowledgement back to the deployed SFOD. If the SFOD fails to receive
the acknowledgment with the primary communication asset (TACSAT radio),
SFOD personnel should use HF radio equipment as an alternate means of
communicating. Upon receipt of the message, the SFOB will send the SFOD’s
acknowledgment at the next scheduled call-up, using the alternate HF radio
equipment.
F-16. The SFOD should send the IER (ANGUS) within 24 hours after its
infiltration time. If the SFOB or FOB does not receive the IER within 72
hours after infiltration, another 72  hours will pass before the emergency
resupply is dropped. This procedure gives the SFOD the necessary flexibility
to carry out CONPLANs precipitated by enemy action. If possible, it will
attempt to contact the SFOB. This flexibility gives the USAF the necessary
planning and reaction time. Another option may be to have a preplanned
recovery operation on alert for a predesignated recovery site for any
survivors. Launch and recovery depend on METT-TC.
EMERGENCY RESUPPLY
F-17. If the deployed SFOD fails to send its IER (ANGUS) to  the SFOD or
FOB by radio within 72 hours after scheduled deployment, it may, according
to the OPORD, start emergency resupply procedures. The SFOD is now
assumed to be in an evasion mode. The emergency resupply may be flown by
any aircraft and airdropped or airlanded in the JSOA. Any waterborne vessel
may transport an emergency resupply to a beach landing site (BLS). The
resupply may also be pre-positioned in the evasion corridor by various U.S.
agencies.
F-18. When the evasion corridor is long, more than one resupply mission
may be needed. SFODs must plan these resupply missions with realistic
times and distances traveled. When wounded SFOD members need to be
transported, security is difficult but must be maintained. The resupply
bundle is dropped primarily to reequip the SFOD for  mission
accomplishment. The resupply bundle may consist of just enough supplies for
the SFOD to establish communications with higher HQ and request further
instructions. The resupply bundle might also contain a complete issue of all
TOE supplies and weapons for every SFOD member. G-1
Appendix G
Special Forces Area Assessment
This appendix provides an outline format for an area assessment. This
format provides a systematic means for compiling and retaining
essential information to support SF operations. Although the basic
outline is general, it is flexible enough to permit detailed coverage of a
given JSOA.
IMMEDIATE—INITIAL ASSESSMENT
G-1. Initial assessment includes those items deemed essential to the operational
detachment immediately following infiltration. These requirements must be
satisfied as soon as possible after the detachment arrives in the  JSOA and
should include the—
• Location and orientation.
• Detachment’s physical condition.
• Overall security, to include the—
§ Immediate area.
§ Attitude of the local populace.
§ Local enemy situation.
• Status of the local resistance element.
SUBSEQUENT—PRINCIPAL ASSESSMENT
G-2. Principal assessment, a continuous operation, includes those  collection
efforts  that support the continued planning and conduct of operations. It forms
the basis for all of the detachment’s subsequent activities in the  JSOA. The
principal assessment  should encompass the  areas discussed in the following
paragraphs.
THE ENEMY
• Disposition.
• Composition, identification, and strength.
• Organization, armament, and equipment.
• Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
• Operations:
§ Recent and current activities of the unit.
§ Counterguerrilla activities and capabilities with particular attention
to reconnaissance units, special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger),
rotary-wing or vertical-lift aviation units, CI units, and units having
a mass  chemical, biological, and radiological  (CBR) delivery
capability.FM 3-05.201
G-2
• Unit AORs.
• Daily routine of the units.
• Logistics support to include the following:
§ Installations and facilities.
§ Supply routes.
§ Methods of troop movement.
• Past and current reprisal actions.
SECURITY AND POLICE UNITS
• Dependability and reliability to the existing regime or the occupying
power.
• Disposition.
• Composition, identification, and strength.
• Organization, armament, and equipment.
• Degree of training, morale, and efficiency.
• Use and effectiveness of informers.
• Influence on, and relations with, the local populace.
• Security measures over public utilities and government installations.
CIVIL GOVERNMENT
• Control and restrictions, such as—
§ Documentation.
§ Rationing.
§ Travel and movement restrictions.
§ Blackouts and curfews.
• Current value of money, wage scales.
• The extent and effect of the black market.
• Political restrictions.
• Religious restrictions.
• The control and operation of industry, utilities, agriculture, and
transportation.
CIVILIAN POPULACE
• Attitudes toward the existing regime or occupying power.
• Attitudes toward the resistance movement.
• Reaction to U.S. support of the resistance.
• Reaction to enemy activities in the country, specifically that portion in
the unconventional warfare operating area (UWOA).
• General health and well-being. FM 3-05.201
G-3
POTENTIAL TARGETS
• Railroads.
• Telecommunication.
• POL.
• Electric power.
• Military storage and supply.
• Military HQ and installations.
• Radar and electronic devices.
• Highways.
• Inland waterways and canals.
• Seaports.
• Natural and synthetic gas lines.
• Industrial plants.
• Key personalities.
WEATHER
• Precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, visibility, and seasonal changes.
• Wind speed and direction.
• Light data (BMNT, EENT, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset).
TERRAIN
• Location of areas suitable for guerrilla bases, units, and other
installations.
• Potential LZs, DZs, and other reception sites.
• Routes suitable for—
§ Guerrillas.
§ Enemy forces.
• Barriers to movement.
• The seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and visibility.
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
• Guerrillas:
§ Disposition, strength, and composition.
§ Organization, armament, and equipment.
§ Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
§ Operations to date.
§ Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups.
§ General attitude toward the United States, the enemy, and various
elements of the civilian populace.FM 3-05.201
G-4
§ Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity to U.S.
presence.
§ Caliber of senior and subordinate leadership.
§ Health of guerrillas.
• Auxiliaries and the underground:
§ Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
§ General effectiveness and type of support.
§ Motivation and reliability.
§ Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance leaders.
§ General attitude toward the United States, the enemy, and various
guerrilla groups.
LOGISTICS CAPABILITY OF THE AREA
• Availability of food stocks and water, to include any restrictions for
reasons of health.
• Agricultural capability.
• Type and availability of transportation of all categories.
• Types and location of civilian services available for manufacture and
repair of equipment and clothing.
• Supplies locally available, to include type and amount.
• Medical facilities, to include personnel, medical supplies, and equipment.
• Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance.
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
• Weather:
§ Is the weather cold enough to put emphasis on causes, treatment, and
prevention of cold weather injuries?
§ Is the weather hot enough to put emphasis on causes, treatment, and
prevention of hot weather injuries?
• Terrain: How does the terrain affect evacuation and medical resupply?
• Indigenous personnel:
§ Physical characteristics.  Endurance, ability to carry loads, and
performance of other physical feats.
§ Dress. What symbolism is attached to various articles of clothing and
jewelry, such as amulets, if any?
§ Attitudes:
♦ What taboos and other psychological attributes are present in the
society?
♦ What rites and practices are used  by witch doctors during
illness? What do these rites symbolize? Does the practitioner use
Western medicines?FM 3-05.201
G-5
♦ How do indigenous personnel respond to events such as fear,
happiness, anger, and sadness?
• Housing:
§ Analyze physical layout of the community.
§ Determine infestation with ectoparasites and vermin.
• Food:
§ Is food cultivated for consumption? What foods?
§ How do the seasons of  the AO influence diet? Does migration in
search of food occur?
§ What foods provided by U.S. personnel do the indigenous personnel
prefer or reject?
§ What cash crops are raised?
• Water supply, urban. What kind of water treatment plants are used (if
any)?
• Water supply, rural:
§ What are the numbers and types of rural water supplies?
§ What treatment is given to water in rural areas? Give attitudes of the
indigenous personnel toward standard U.S. purification methods.
• Sewage disposal (when applicable):
§ What are the types and locations of sewage treatment plants?
§ In remote areas, what system is used for disposal of human
excrement, offal, and dead animals or humans?
§ What are the attitudes of the indigenous personnel to standard U.S.
methods, such as the use of latrines?
• Epidemiology. What specific diseases in each of the three following major
categories are present among the guerrillas, their dependents, or their
animals?
• Domestic animals:
§ What domestic animals are present?
§ Describe the normal forage.
♦ Do owners supplement the food supply? What food supplements
are given, if any?
♦ Are animals penned or allowed to roam?
§ Is any religious symbolism or taboo associated with animals (sacred
cows)? Are animals sacrificed for religious purposes?
§ Are local veterinarians available for animal treatment and ante- and
post-mortem inspections of meats? What is their training?
• Local fauna. Record species of birds, large and small mammals, reptiles,
and arthropods present in the area. If names are unknown, describe
(survival purposes).FM 3-05.201
G-6
• Poisonous plants. Record those species that are known to be toxic through
contact with the skin, inhalation of smoke from burning
vegetation, or through ingestion.Appendix H
Area Study Outline Format
Copy ___ of ___ Copies  _____SFG(A)
Location
Date
1.
a. Purpose. Delineate the area being studied.
b. Mission. State the mission the area study supports.
c. Limiting Factors. Identify factors that limit the completeness or accuracy of the area
study.
2.  Divide the operational area into its
various definable subdivisions and analyze each subdivision using the subdivisions shown
below.
a. Areas and Dimensions.
b. Strategic Locations.
(1) Neighboring countries and boundaries.
(2) Natural defenses including frontiers.
(3) Points of entry and strategic routes.
c. Climate. Note variations from the norm and the months in which they occur. Note any
extremes in climate that would affect operations.
(1) Temperature.
(2) Rainfall and snow.
(3) Wind and visibility.
(4) Light data. Include BMNT, EENT, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset.
(5) Seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and visibility.
d. Relief.
(1) General direction of mountain ranges or ridgelines and whether hills and ridges are
dissected.
(2) General degree of slope.
(3) Characteristics of valleys and plains.
(4) Natural routes for and natural obstacles to cross-country movement.
(5) Location of area suitable for guerrilla bases, units, and other installations.
H-1 FM 3-05.201
(6) Potential LZs, DZs,  and other reception sites.
e. Land Use. Note any peculiarities especially in the following:
(1) Former heavily forested land areas subjected to widespread cutting or dissected
bypaths and roads. Also note the reverse: pastureland or wasteland that has been
reforested.
(2) Former wasteland or pastureland that has been resettled and cultivated and is now
being farmed. Also note the reverse: former rural countryside that has been
depopulated and allowed to return to wasteland.
(3) Former swampland or marshland that has been drained, former desert or wasteland
now irrigated and cultivated, and lakes created by dams.
f. Drainage (General Pattern).
(1) Main rivers, direction of flow.
(2) Characteristics of rivers and streams. Include widths, currents, banks, depths, kinds
of bottoms, and obstacles.
(3) Seasonal variations. Note dry beds, flash floods.
(4) Large lakes or areas with many ponds or swamps. Include potential LZs for
amphibious aircraft.
g. Coast. Examine primarily for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply points.
(1) Tides and waves. Include winds and current.
(2) Beach footing and covered exit routes.
(3) Quiet coves and shallow inlets or estuaries.
h. Geological Basics. Identify types of soil and rock formations. Include areas for potential
LZs for light aircraft.
i. Forests and Other Vegetation.
(1) Natural or cultivated.
(2) Types, characteristics, and significant variations from the norm at different
elevations.
(3) Cover and Concealment. Include density and seasonal variations.
j. Water. Note ground, surface, seasonal, potability.
k. Subsistence.
(1) Seasonal or year round.
(2) Cultivated. Include vegetables, grains, fruits, and nuts.
(3) Natural. Include berries, fruits, nuts, and herbs.
(4) Wildlife. Include animals, fish, and fowl.
3.  Identify friendly and hostile political powers and analyze
their capabilities, intentions, and activities that influence mission execution.
H-2 FM 3-05.201
a. Hostile Power.
(1) Number and status of nonnational personnel.
(2) Influence, organization, and mechanisms of control.
b. National Government (Indigenous).
(1) Government, international political orientation, and degree of popular support.
(2) Identifiable segments of the population with varying attitudes and probable behavior
toward the United States, its allies, and the hostile power.
(3) National historical background.
(4) Foreign dependence or allies.
(5) National capital and significant political, military, and economic concentrations.
c. Political Parties.
(1) Leadership and organizational structure.
(2) Nationalistic origin and foreign ties (if single dominant party exists).
(3) Major legal parties with their policies and goals.
(4) Illegal or underground parties and their policies and goals.
(5) Violent opposition factions within major political organizations.
d. Control and Restrictions.
(1) Documentation.
(2) Rationing.
(3) Travel and movement restrictions.
(4) Blackouts and curfews.
(5) Political restrictions.
(6) Religious restrictions.
4.  Identify those economic factors that influence mission
execution.
a. Technological Standards.
b. Natural Resources and Degree of Self-Sufficiency.
c. Financial Structure and Dependence on Foreign Aid.
d. Monetary System.
(1) Value of money, rate of inflation.
(2) Wage scales.
(3) Currency controls.
e. Black Market Activities. Note the extent and effect of those activities.
H-3 FM 3-05.201
f. Agriculture and Domestic Food Supply.
g. Industry and Level of Production.
h. Manufacture and Demand for Consumer Goods.
i. Foreign and Domestic Trade and Facilities.
j. Fuels and Power.
k. Telecommunications Adequacy by U.S. Standards.
l. Transportation Adequacy by U.S. Standards.
(1) Railroads.
(2) Highways.
(3) Waterways.
(4) Commercial air installations.
m. Industry, Utilities, Agriculture, and Transportation. Note the control and operation of
each.
5.  Pay particular attention to those inhabitants in the AO who have
peculiarities and who vary considerably from the normal national way of life.
a. Total and Density.
b. Basic Racial Stock and Physical Characteristics.
(1) Types, features, dress, and habits.
(2) Significant variations from the norm.
c. Ethnic and/or Religious Groups. Analyze these groups to determine if they are of
sufficient size, cohesion, and power to constitute a dissident minority of some
consequence.
(1) Location or concentration.
(2) Basis for discontent and motivation for change.
(3) Opposition to the majority or the political regime.
(4) Any external or foreign ties of significance.
d. Attitudes. Determine the attitudes of the populace toward the existing regime or hostile
o power, the resistance m vement, and the United States and its allies.
e. Division Between Urban, Rural, or Nomadic Groups.
(1) Large cities and population centers.
(2) Rural settlement patterns.
(3) Area and movement patterns of nomads.
f. Standard of Living and Cultural (Educational) Levels.
(1) Extremes away from the national average.
(2) Class structure. Identify degree of established social stratification and
percentage of populace in each class.
H-4 FM 3-05.201
g. Health and Medical Standards.
(1) General health and well-being.
(2) Common diseases.
(3) Standard of public health.
(4) Medical facilities and personnel.
(5) Potable water supply.
(6) Sufficiency of medical supplies and equipment.
h. Traditions and Customs (Particularly Taboos). Note wherever traditions and customs
are so strong and established that they  may influence an individual’s actions or
attitude even during a war situation.
6.  Identify friendly and hostile conven-tional
military forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force)  and internal security forces (including
border guards) that can influence mission execution. Analyze nonnational (indigenous)
forces using the subdivisions shown below.
a. Morale, Discipline, and Political Reliability.
b. Personnel Strength.
c. Organization and Basic Deployment.
d. Uniforms and Unit Designations.
e. Ordinary and Special Insignia.
f. Overall Control Mechanism.
g. Chain of Command and Communication.
h. Leadership. Note officer and noncommissioned officer corps.
i. Nonnational Surveillance and Control Over Indigenous Security Forces.
j. Training and Doctrine.
k. Tactics. Note seasonal and terrain variations.
l. Equipment, Transportation, and Degree of Mobility.
m. Logistics.
n. Effectiveness. Note any unusual capabilities or weaknesses.
o. Vulnerabilities in the Internal Security System.
p. Past and Current Reprisal Actions.
q. Use and Effectiveness of Informers.
r. Influence on and Relations With the Local Populace.
s. Psychological Vulnerabilities.
t. Recent and Current Unit Activities.
H-5 FM 3-05.201
u. Counterinsurgency Activities and Capabilities.  Pay particular attention to
reconnaissance units, special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or
vertical-lift aviation units, counterintelligence units, and units having a mass NBC
delivery capability.
v. Guard Posts and Wartime Security Coverage. Note the location of all known guard
posts or expected wartime security coverage along the main LOC  (railroads,
highways, and telecommunications lines) and along electrical power and POL lines.
w. Forced Labor and/or Detention Camps. Note exact location and description of the
physical arrangement (particularly the security arrangements).
x. PRC Measures. Note locations, types, and effectiveness of internal security controls.
Include checkpoints, identification cards, passports, and travel permits.
7.  Identify the organizational elements and key
personalities of the resistance organization. Note each group’s attitude toward the
United States, the hostile power, various elements of the civil populace, and friendly
political groups.
a. Guerrillas.
(1) Disposition, strength, and composition.
(2) Organization, armament, and equipment.
(3) Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
(4) Operations to date.
(5) Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups.
(6) Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity.
(7) Quality of senior and subordinate leadership.
(8) General health.
b. Auxiliaries and the Underground.
(1) Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
(2) General effectiveness and type of support.
(3) Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance leaders.
c. Logistics Capability.
(1) Availability of food stocks and water. Include any restrictions for reasons of
health.
(2) Agricultural capability.
(3) Type and availability of transportation of all categories.
(4) Types and location of civilian services available for manufacture and repair of
equipment and clothing.
(5) Medical facilities, to include personnel, medical supplies, and equipment.
(6) Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance.
H-6 FM 3-05.201
H-7
8.  (The objective in target selection is to infli t maximum damage on the hostil
power with minimum expenditures of men and materiel. Initially, a guerrilla force may
have limited operational capabilities to  interdict or destroy hostile targets.) Study the
target areas. Identify and analyze points of attack. List targets in order of priority by
system and IAW mission requirements. As appropriate, address both fixed and mobile
(generic) targets.
c e
9.  State conclusions reached through analysis of the
facts developed in the previous paragraphs.
a. Effects on Hostile COAs.
b. Effects on Friendly COAs.Appendix I
Administrative Procedures
Based on preinfiltration intelligence, the SFOD makes tentative plans for
formalizing administrative machinery to support a resistance force during
UW operations in the JSOA. Before the SFOD’s infiltration and contact by
the Secretary of Defense or DOD agencies with the government-in-exile or
area command, the SFOB or FOB can guide the establishment of pay
scales, rank structure, codes, and legal systems. This guidance will ensure
uniformity in all AOs throughout the  country and will preclude inflated
rank structures, unrealistic pay scales, and kangaroo courts. Necessary
forms to support this administrative machinery may be drafted and
printed during the SFOD isolation phase. Final decisions on the
administrative organization must be delayed until after infiltration. By
then the area commander, in concert with the SFOD, will have resolved
the majority of outstanding issues.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
I-1. Administrative systems can be established early in the planning stages
of deployment and finalized in the JSOA. They should be simple and effective
and, as a minimum, include—
•  Accountability of sensitive items, to include weapons, radios, cryptographic material, and drugs.
•  Accurate and updated personnel files on the guerrillas. Fingerprints
and photos can be used for ID. ID cards can serve as a pay receipt.
•  Records of the sick, wounded, and deceased.
•  Records of awards, decorations, schools, and special skills.
•  A daily staff journal. Written OPORDs and reports will be kept to a
minimum, coded for security, and issued on a need-to-know basis.
RECORDS
I-2. Each guerrilla base camp must have an administrative section to
maintain essential records. As the  area complex develops, personnel can
centralize administration and duplicate information and records that could
compromise the operation. These records should be forwarded to the
administrative section of the area command for miniaturization,
classification, and disposition.
I-3. Because of its ultimate historical importance, personnel should
maintain an operational journal. Reports of combat engagements must
include the following information concerning the guerrilla force—the
designation and commander, the type of action, approximate strength, and
I-1 FM 3-05.201
casualties. This data should be made available to PSYOP and CA personnel
for their operations.
I-4. The command structure record should reflect the designation  of the
various units within the guerrilla  force (similar to an MTOE) and the
auxiliary. It should also include the names and designation of key personnel.
I-5. The personnel dossier should list members of the various organizations
within the area command, and it must be kept current. In the initial stages of
individual unit development, duplicate  copies of their dossier can be sent
forward to the next-higher command when feasible.
I-6. Personnel records should be maintained on guerrillas and other key
personnel in the resistance movement to prove or refute posthostility claims
for wartime service. Opposition may be expected when someone recommends
to the area commander that all personnel be photographed and fingerprinted.
Such opposition can be overcome, however, with assurances that a viable,
secure system can be established and that the records will be exfiltrated from
the JSOA and maintained at the SFOB or FOB. Records may be microfilmed
and placed in a secure cache in the JSOA as an alternate means to
exfiltration. Photographing these documents and subsequently  caching or
exfiltrating the negatives provides a method of preserving and  securing
records not obtainable by other means. The SFOD will find its  organic
photographic equipment useful in making ID photographs for population
control. Photographs are also helpful in organizing and controlling resistance
forces. Personnel should take photographs at frequent intervals to send
forward and avoid having a lot of  sensitive material on hand. After
processing the negatives and determining their acceptability, personnel may
destroy the originals of unit records or send them to higher HQ.
I-7. The information placed on personnel records should include the full
name of the individual and—
•  His home village or city.
•  The date he joined the resistance force.
•  Whether an oath of enlistment was taken.
•  The date he was discharged.
•  Promotions and demotions.
•  Acts of bravery.
•  Awards and decorations.
•  Rank or position attained in the resistance force.
•  Any disciplinary action taken against him.
I-8. Posting to the initial records may be by serial number; thus, there is no
reference to individuals by name and no incriminating data to associate them
with the resistance organization. Code names and simulated records should
be maintained to prevent any possibility of compromise if captured.
OATH OF ENLISTMENT
I-9. Resistance leaders must be convinced of the need for a formal oath of
loyalty to the resistance movement. This formality will solidify the union of
I-2 FM 3-05.201
U.S. and indigenous troops to a common goal: the “freedom” of their country.
At an appropriate ceremony, the local  indigenous leader may administer an
oath of enlistment to each new member of the resistance force. After
hostilities, the local government can  then recognize the jurisdictional
authority commanded by guerrilla leaders over individual guerrillas.
I-10. Personnel must sign the oath. It will become a part of the individual
personnel record. It should be secured accordingly. Ideally, the oath refers to
the guerrilla code and to punishment for violations.
OTHER DOCUMENTS
I-11. Casualty records include the  names of personnel killed, wounded,
missing in action, or separated from the guerrilla force because of illness or
for other reasons. Grave registration  information, at a minimum, should
include name, date, cause of death, and location of the remains as accurately
plotted as possible.
I-12. Medical records must include data on the type of prevalent diseases,
preventive medicine actions taken, types of wounds, and general information
on the organization of the medical structure for the area command.
I-13. The administrative section must maintain appropriate payroll records
to support any commitment made to members of the resistance force for
services rendered. The area command should maintain sufficient  records to
help settle claims after hostilities.
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
I-14. Guerrillas should formalize and establish valorous actions and
meritorious acts and service within the force. Sometimes, U.S. awards may
be recommended; however, the group S-1  is responsible for guidance in this
area. He can provide such guidance in the isolation phase. A government-inexile or the area command may wish to act as the final approving authority
and can provide general guidelines for  the establishment of an awards and
decorations program. Once the S-1 approves an award or decoration, it is
awarded at an appropriate ceremony consistent with security regulations.
DISCIPLINE
I-15. Strict discipline is an integral part of C2 procedures instigated over
any paramilitary force. Without discipline, the force cannot survive, let alone
carry out effective operations against the enemy. Since guerrillas are usually
not in similar uniforms and often appear dirty or bedraggled, an impression
persists that discipline is loose in guerrilla units. Discipline must be hard but
fair in guerrilla units. Orders should be executed without delay or question.
Minor infractions of orders, especially during the conduct of operations, may
have broad negative consequences for guerrillas and supporting resistance
elements.
I-16. More often than not, a guerrilla force will have a code, possibly not in
writing, but certainly an understanding of what is expected of all guerrillas.
The resistance leader, with assistance from the SFOD, can develop a written
code. Each new recruit must know and understand its provisions and the
I-3 FM 3-05.201
I-4
penalties for treason, desertion, and dereliction of duty. Codes for guerrilla
forces are usually simple but call for extreme punishment for what would be
called minor infractions in conventional forces.
I-17. Any legal code for guerrilla forces  should, if possible, be in line with
the one that existed for the regular military forces of that country. If this
code is impractical, the area commander and his staff may draft a new code.
I-18. Provisions must exist for punishments similar to those imposed under
Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and for more severe
punishments. The area commander will be advised to establish a
court-martial or tribunal to try cases rather than arbitrarily decide the fate
of the alleged perpetrator.
I-19. As soon as possible after infiltration, all parties must reach an
understanding concerning the exercise of disciplinary and judicial authority
over the SFOD. The SF commander will not give up his disciplinary or
judicial authority to the area commander or to any other resistance official,
unless directed by U.S. higher HQ.
I-20. With decentralization of command and widely dispersed operations,
individuals are habitually given mission orders with little guidance or
supervision. They are expected to complete their missions. No excuses are
accepted. Therefore, guerrillas must understand that their personal conduct
has to be above reproach when interacting with the civilian population.
Every act that loses civilian supporters is harmful to the  resistance
movement. PSYOP forces impress on the  resistance organization’s leaders
that producing favorable reactions among the populace is vital. Such
programs must stress proper individual and official conduct toward the
populace. They must also point out the need for stringent disciplinary action
against offenders.
I-21. The area commander ensures discipline is maintained. The SF
commander normally provides advice that will ensure fair and consistent
discipline. The ethnic culture of a group may indicate the most effective way
to encourage self-discipline. Appendix J
Example of Training Program
of Instruction for Resistance Forces
Section I. Example of Master Training Program
for a 10-Day Leadership School
The master training program for the 10-day leadership school was developed to provide the
indigenous leaders and potential leaders with a general knowledge of the subjects to be taught to
all indigenous personnel. Primary emphasis is placed on the role of the leader or commander to
prepare these leaders to supervise the activities of their subordinates. It is assumed that most of
these personnel have had prior military service and, therefore, should already possess a basic
knowledge of the subjects to be covered. Upon  completion of the 10-day leadership school, the
leaders will return to their units of work and train with their units, thus expanding their own
knowledge of the subject covered. Following is an example of a 10-day master training program
for a leadership school for selected indigenous personnel.
 
Map Reading and
Compass
Same general scope as in 30-day program.
Include how to read scale and coordinates.
4 2 6 (4)
Field Aid, Field
Sanitation, and
Survival
Same general scope as in 30-day program.
Emphasis on field sanitation and
responsibility of commanders.
4  4 (1)
Individual Tactical
Training (Day and
Night)
Same general scope as in 30-day program.
Emphasis on security of operational bases,
movements, formations, control measures
at night, and duties and responsibilities of
commanders.
10 9 19 (16)
Patrols, Small-Unit
Tactics, Raids,
Ambushes (Day and
Night)
Same general scope as in 30-day program.
Emphasis on planning, organization,
preparation, command, control, security,
execution of patrols, ambushes and raids.
10 29 39 (25)
Weapons (U.S. and
Foreign)
Same general scope as in 30-day program.
Familiarization firing. Primary emphasis
on employment of weapons.
8 2 10 (7)
Intelligence Same general scope as in 30-day program.
Primary and counterintelligence. Night
visions.
6 4 10 (8)
J-1 FM 3-05.201
 
Air Operations Same general scope as in 30-day program.
Primary emphasis on selection and
reporting of DZs, organization of reception
committee, duties and responsibilities of
commanders.
6 8 14 (11)
Demolition  Familiarization with demolition
procedures; demonstrating, planning,
safety.
5  5 (3)
Communications Communication means, available systems,
communication security, simple
cryptographic systems.
4  4 (2)
Leadership
Principles and
Techniques
Military leadership, traits, principles,
indications, actions, and orders.
Responsibilities and duties of the
commander. Human behavior problem
areas and problem-solving process.
Selection of junior leaders. Span of control
and chain of command. Combat leadership.
6  6 (4)
Tactics and
Operations
Characteristics of guerrilla warfare,
guerrilla operations, principles,
capabilities, and limitations, organization
of operational bases, security, civilian
support, logistics, counterintelligence,
combat employment, missions, tactical
control measures, target selection, mission
support site, and defensive measures.
Responsibilities and duties of indigenous
leaders.
7 5 12 (9)
 Total Hours in Master Program 70 59 129 (90)
Notes:
1. Identify those personnel whose leadership ability, knowledge, skill, or desire is below
acceptable standards.
2. Upon completion of leadership school, one additional day may be scheduled for coordinating
and planning future operations.
3. A suggested arrangement of scheduling is as follows:
 29 April - 4 May: Preparation for training and selection of leaders.
 5 May - 14 May: Leadership training.
 16 May - 14 June: Troop training.
J-2FM 3-05.201
Section II. Example of a 30-Day Master Training Program
Following is an example of a 30-day master training program that may be used as a basis for
preparing individual master training programs for each separate indigenous unit.
 
Map Familiarization and Use
of Compass
How to read a map, orientation of map with
compass, how to locate oneself, determine
azimuth, and day and night use of compass.
14 10 24 (20)
First Aid, Field Basic treatment of wounds, prevention of
infection, simple bandaging, pressure
points, prevention of shock, splints, litter
construction and use; field sanitation
measures regarding water supply, waste
disposal, and personal hygiene.
6 4 10 (7)
Individual
Tactical
Training (Day
and Night)
Camouflage, cover, concealment, movement,
observation, reporting, discipline, sounds,
hand-to-hand combat, combat formations,
night movement, night camouflage,
preparation of equipment and clothing,
night visions, sounds and observation, night
security and formations, message writing,
immediate action drills, and security of
operational bases.
26 9 35 (31)
Patrols, SmallUnit Tactics,
Raids,
Ambushes (Day
and Night)
Planning, organization, preparation,
formations, commands, control, security,
communications and reporting of patrols;
objectives, target selection, organization of
raid forces; reconnaissance and intelligence;
planning, preparation, movement,
deployment, conduct of raids,
disengagement, and withdrawal of raiding
forces; characteristics, definition, objectives
of ambushes, selection of ambush sites,
organization of ambush forces, phases of
ambush operation, planning, preparation
movement, deployment, execution,
disengagement, and withdrawal of ambush
forces. All subjects covered for both day and
night operations.
26 44 70 (60)
Weapons
(Foreign and
U.S.)
Carbine, M1, submachine gun, automatic
rifle; pistol, caliber .45 machine guns;
foreign weapons to include care and
cleaning, loading, aiming, stoppages, range
firing; familiarization firing of all weapons;
and day and night firing.
28 10 38 (32)
J-3 FM 3-05.201
 
Intelligence Security measures, how to obtain and
report information, captured documents,
and material; interrogation and handling of
prisoners; and counterintelligence
procedures.
8  8 (5)
Air Operations  Establishment of DZ, marking and
identification of DZ, security of DZ,
receiving and transporting supplies and
equipment.
16 15 31 (25)
Demolitions  Nonelectric and electric firing systems,
calculation and placement of charges, rail
and bridge destruction, booby traps, and
expedient devices.
21 8 29 (24)
Squad Tests  Review and exercise covering all
instruction.
23 16 39 (37)
Platoon Tests Review and exercise covering all
instruction.
42 24 66 (63)
 Total Hours in Master Training Program  210 140 350 (304)
Notes:
1. Maximum number of trained, indigenous personnel will be used to assist in training others.
Identify those personnel who may qualify as potential cadre or potential leaders.
2. Intelligence, compass, map familiarization, observing and reporting, tactical training of the
individual, patrolling, weapons, demolitions, and field sanitation will be integrated
whenever possible.
3. Classes to be broken down into platoon-sized groups whenever possible.
4. Practical work exercise, demonstrations, and conferences to be used in lieu of lectures to the
maximum extent possible.
5. Stress small-unit training (patrol, squad, and platoon). Develop teamwork and esprit de
corps.
J-4FM 3-05.201
Section III. Data Card—Personnel and Training Record
The following is an example of a personnel data card that may also serve as a training record.
This simplifies and holds to a minimum the number of records that may be required to be
maintained in an AO. The type and amount of information to be recorded will vary with each AO
to include the degree of security to be afforded resistance personnel.
1.
a. JSOA______________ FULL NAME________________________ SN______________
b. RANK______________ DOB_____________ POB________________________________
c. UNIT____________________ DATE OF ENLISTMENT_________________________
d. LAST CIVILIAN ADDRESS_________________________________________________
e. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION___________________________________________________
f. LANGUAGES______________________________________________________________
g. SPECIAL SKILLS AND APTITUDES (CIVILIAN)_____________________________
 _______________________________________________________________________________
h. FINANCIAL DATA:
  __________________ DATE ________________ AMOUNT PAID ___________________
  __________________ DATE ________________ AMOUNT PAID ___________________
  __________________ DATE ________________ AMOUNT PAID ___________________
i. LEFT THUMB PRINT    RIGHT THUMB PRINT
j. PHOTOGRAPH
k. DATE OF DISCHARGE OR DEMOBILIZATION ________________________________
J-5 FM 3-05.201
2.            SUBJECTS    DATES
 a. Basic Training:              ____________________          __________
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 b. Advanced/specialist training:            ____________________          __________
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
c.  MOS specialties:       DEGREE
          AREA OF       OF
                                      INTEREST             PROFICIENCY
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
            DEGREE OF
 d. Weapon qualifications:       WEAPON          SKILL
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 __________          ____________________              
 e. Combat operations:  __________________________________________________________
J-6FM 3-05.201
J-7
 _____________________________________________________________________________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________
f. Awards and decorations:  ________________________________________________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________
g. Wounds or injuries:       TYPE       DATE
 ________________  ________________      
 ________________  ________________      
 ________________  ________________      
 ________________  ________________      
3.
        DATE  OFFENSE       TYPE OF TRIAL  PUNISHMENT
 ________________  ______________________________  _______________________  _____________
 ________________  ______________________________  _______________________  _____________
 ________________  ______________________________  _______________________  _____________
 ________________  ______________________________  _______________________  _____________Appendix K
Special Forces Caching
Caching is the process of hiding equipment or materials in a secure
storage place with the view to future recovery for operational use. The
ultimate success of caching may well depend upon attention to detail; that
is, professional competence that may seem of minor importance to the
untrained eye. Security factors, such as cover for the caching party,
sterility of the items cached, and removal of even the slightest trace of the
caching operations are vital. Highly important, too, are the  technical
factors that govern the preservation of the items in usable condition and
the recording of data essential for  recovery. Successful caching entails
careful adherence to the basic principles of clandestine operations, as well
as familiarity with the technicalities of caching.
CACHING CONSIDERATIONS
K-1. Caching considerations that are vital to the success of the caching
operation may be done in a variety of operational situations (Figure K-1,
page K-2). For example, cached supplies can meet the emergency needs of
personnel who may be barred from their normal supply sources by sudden
developments or who may need travel documents and extra funds for quick
escape. Caching can help solve the supply problems of long-term operations
conducted far from a secure base. Caching can also provide for anticipated
needs of wartime operations in areas likely to be overrun by the enemy.
PLANNING FOR A CACHING OPERATION
K-2. Caching involves selecting items  to be cached, procuring those items,
and selecting a cache site. Selection of the items to be cached requires a close
estimate of what will be needed by particular units for particular operations.
Procurement of the items usually presents no special problems. In fact, the
relative ease of procurement before an emergency arises is one of the prime
considerations in favor of caching.  When selecting a cache site, planners
should always ensure that the site is accessible not only for emplacement, but
also for recovery. When planning a caching operation, the planner must
consider the following six basic factors.
PURPOSE AND CONTENTS OF THE CACHE
K-3. Planners must determine the purpose and contents of each cache
because these basic factors influence the location of the cache, as well as the
method of hiding. For instance, small barter items can be cached at any
accessible and secure site because they can be concealed easily on the person
once recovered. However, it would be difficult to conceal rifles for a guerrilla
band once recovered. Therefore, this site must be in an isolated area where
K-1 FM 3-05.201
the band can establish at least temporary control. Certain items, such as
medical stock, have limited shelf life and require rotation periodically or
special storage considerations, necessitating easy access to service these
items. Sometimes it is impossible to locate a cache in the most convenient
place for an intended user. Planners must compromise between logistical
objectives and actual possibilities when selecting a cache site. Security is
always the overriding consideration.
Figure K-1. Logistics Cell
ANTICIPATED ENEMY ACTION
K-4. In planning the caching operation, planners must consider the
capabilities of any intelligence or security services not participating in the
operation. They should also consider the potential hazards the enemy and its
witting or unwitting accomplices present. If caching is done for wartime
operational purposes, its ultimate success will depend largely on whether the
planners anticipate the various obstacles to recovery, which the enemy and
its accomplices will create if the enemy occupies the area.  What are the
possibilities that the enemy will preempt an ideal site for one reason or
another and deny access to it? A vacant field surrounded by brush may seem
ideal for a particular cache because it is near several highways. But such a
location may also invite the enemy to locate an ordnance depot where the
cache is buried.
K-2 FM 3-05.201
ACTIVITIES OF THE LOCAL POPULATION
K-5. Probably more dangerous than deliberate enemy action are all of the
chance circumstances that may result in the discovery of the cache. Normal
activity, such as construction of a new building, may uncover the cache site or
impede access to it. Unlucky circumstances cannot be anticipated, but it can
probably be avoided by careful and imaginative observation of the prospective
cache site and of the people who live near the site. If the cache is intended for
wartime use, the planners must project how the residents will react to the
pressures of war and conquest. For example, one of the more likely reactions
is that many residents may resort to caching to avoid having their personal
funds and valuables seized by the enemy. If caching becomes popular, any
likely cache site will receive more than normal attention.
INTENDED ACTIONS BY ALLIED FORCES
K-6. Using one cache site for several clandestine operations involves a risk of
mutual compromise. Therefore, some planners should rule out otherwise
suitable caching sites if they have  been selected for other clandestine
purposes, such as drops or safe houses. A site should not be located where it
may be destroyed or rendered inaccessible by bombing or other allied military
action, should the area be occupied by the enemy. For example, installations
likely to be objects of special protective efforts by the occupying enemy are
certain to be inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. Therefore, if the cache is
intended for wartime use, the caching party should avoid areas such as those
near key bridges, railroad intersections, power plants, and munitions
factories.
PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION
K-7. Asset planners should assess the security needs and all of the potential
obstacles and hazards that a prospective cache site can present. They should
also consider whether the operational assets could be used for packaging and
transporting the package to the site. Best results are obtained when experts
at a packaging center do the packaging. The first question, therefore, is to
decide whether the package can be transported from the HQ or the field
packaging center to the cache site securely and soon enough to meet the
operational schedules. If not, the packaging must be done locally, perhaps in
a safe house located within a few miles of the cache site.  If such an
arrangement is necessary, the choice of cache sites may be restricted by
limited safe house possibilities.
PERSONNEL ASSETS
K-8. All who participate directly in emplacement will know where the cache
is located. Therefore, only the fewest possible and the most reliable persons
should be used. Planners must consider the distance from the person’s
residence to the prospective cache site. Consideration must be given to the
reason or story of why someone is involved in conducting this activity.
Sometimes transportation and cover difficulties require the cache site to be
within a limited distance of the person’s residence. The above considerations
also apply to the recovery personnel.
K-3 FM 3-05.201
CACHING METHODS
K-9. Which cache method to use depends on the situation. It is therefore
unsound to lay down any general rules, with one exception: Planners should
always think in terms of suitability; for example, the method most suitable for
each cache, considering its specific  purpose; the actual situation in the
particular locality; and the changes that may occur if the enemy gains control.
CONCEALMENT
K-10. Concealment requires the use of permanent man-made or natural
features to hide or disguise the cache. Concealment has several advantages.
Both employment and recovery can usually be done with minimum time and
labor, and cached items concealed inside a building or dry cave are protected
from the elements. Thus, they require less elaborate packaging. Also, in some
cases, a concealed cache can be readily inspected from time to time to ensure
that it is still usable. However, there is always the chance of accidental
discovery in addition to all the hazards of wartime that may result in
discovery or destruction of a concealed cache or denial of access to the site.
The concealment method, therefore, is most suitable in cases where an
exceptionally secure site is available or where a need for quick access to the
cache justifies a calculated sacrifice in security. Concealment may range from
securing small gold coins under a tile in the floor to walling up artillery in
caves.
BURIAL
K-11. Adequate burial sites can be found almost anywhere (Figures K-2 and
K-3, page K-5). Once in place, a properly buried cache is generally the best
way of achieving lasting security. In contrast to concealment, however, burial
in the ground is a laborious and time-consuming method of caching. The
disadvantages of burial are that—
•  Burial almost always requires a high-quality container or special
wrapping to protect the cache from moisture, chemicals, and bacteria
in the soil.
•  Emplacement or recovery of a buried cache usually takes so long that
the operation must be done after dark unless the site is exceptionally
secluded.
•  It is especially difficult to identify and locate a buried cache
(Figures K-2 and K-3).
K-4 FM 3-05.201
Figure K-2. Cache Locations
Figure K-3. Cache Location (Adjacent to Southwest Corner
of Church on South Side)
SUBMERSION
K-12. Submersion sites that are suitable for secure concealment of a
submerged cache are few and far between. Also, the container of a submerged
cache must meet such high standards  for waterproofing and resistance to
external pressure that the use of field expedients is seldom workable. To
ensure that a submerged cache remains dry and in place,  planners must
determine not only the depth of the water, but the type of bottom, the
K-5 FM 3-05.201
currents, and other facts that are relatively difficult for nonspecialists to
obtain (Figures K-4 and K-5).
Figure K-4. Submersible Cache, Example 1
Figure K-5. Submersible Cache, Example 2
EMPLACEMENT
K-13. Emplacement, likewise, requires a  high degree of skill. At least two
persons are needed for emplacement, and it requires additional equipment.
In view of the difficulties—especially the difficulty of recovery—the
K-6 FM 3-05.201
submersion method is suitable only on rare occasions. The most noteworthy
usage is the relatively rare maritime resupply operation where it is
impossible to deliver supplies directly to a reception  committee. Caching
supplies offshore by submersion is often preferable to sending a landing party
ashore to bury a cache.
SELECTION OF THE SITE
K-14. The most careful estimates of future operational conditions cannot
ensure that a cache will be accessible when it is needed. The following
paragraphs address site selection considerations.
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION
K-15. Criteria for a site selection can be met when the  following three
questions are answered: (1) Can the site be located by simple instructions
that are unmistakably clear to someone who has never visited the location? A
site may be ideal in every respect, but if it has no distinct, permanent
landmarks within a readily measurable distance it must be ruled out. (2) Are
there at least two secure routes to and from the site? Both  primary and
alternate routes should provide natural concealment so that the
emplacement party and the recovery party can visit the site without being
seen by anyone normally in the vicinity. (3) Can the cache be emplaced and
recovered at the chosen site in all seasons of the year?  Snow and frozen
ground create special problems. Snow on the ground is a hazard because it is
impossible to erase a trail in the snow. Planners must consider whether
seasonal changes in the foliage will leave the site and the route dangerously
exposed.
MAP SURVEY
K-16. Finding a cache site is often difficult. Usually, a thorough systematic
survey of the general area designated for the cache is required. The survey is
best done with a large-scale map of the area, if available. By scrutinizing the
map, the planners can determine whether a particular sector must be ruled
out because of its nearness to factories, homes, busy thoroughfares, or
probable military targets in wartime. A good military-type map will show the
positive features in the topography, proximity to adequate roads or trails,
natural concealment (for example, surrounding woods or groves), and
adequate drainage. A map will also show the natural and man-made features
in the landscape. A map will provide the indispensable reference points for
locating a cache site: confluences of  streams, dams and waterfalls, road
junctures and distance markers, villages, bridges, churches, and cemeteries.
PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE
K-17. A map survey should normally show the location of several promising
sites within the general area designated for the cache. To select and pinpoint
the best site, however, a well-qualified observer must examine each site
firsthand. If possible, whoever examines the site should carry adequate maps,
a compass, a drawing pad or board for making sketch maps or tracings, and a
metallic measuring line. (A wire knotted at regular intervals is adequate for
measuring. Twine or cloth measuring tapes should not be  used because
K-7 FM 3-05.201
stretching or shrinking will make them inaccurate if they get wet.) The
observer should also carry a probe rod for probing prospective burial sites, if
the rod can be carried securely.
K-18. Since the observer seldom completes a field survey without being
noticed by local residents, his story for his actions is of great importance. The
observer’s story must offer a natural explanation for his exploratory activity
in the area. Ordinarily, this means that an observer who  is not a known
resident of the area can pose as a tourist or a newcomer with some reason for
visiting the area. However, his story must be developed over an extended
period before he undertakes the actual reconnaissance. If the observer is a
known resident of the area, he cannot suddenly take up hunting, fishing, or
wildlife photography without arousing interest and perhaps  suspicion. The
observer must build up a reputation for being a devotee of his sport or hobby.
REFERENCE POINTS
K-19. When the observer finds a suitable cache site, he prepares simple and
unmistakable instructions for locating the reference points (Figure K-6,
page K-9). These instructions must identify the general area (the names of
general recognizable places, from the country down to the  nearest village)
and an immediate reference point. Any durable landmark that is identified
by its title or simple description can  be an immediate reference point (for
example, the only Roman Catholic church in a certain village or the only
bridge on a named road between two villages). The instructions must also
include a final reference point (FRP), which must meet the following four
requirements. The FRP—
•  Must be identifiable, including at least one feature that can be used as
a precise reference point.
•  Must be an object that will remain fixed as long as the cache may be
used.
•  Must be near enough to the cache to pinpoint the exact location of the
cache by precise linear measurements from the FRP to the cache.
•  Should be related to the immediate reference point by a simple route
description, which proceeds from the immediate reference point to the
FRP.
K-20. Since the route description should be reduced to the  minimum
essential, the ideal solution for locating the cache is to combine the
immediate reference point and the FRP into one landmark readily
identifiable, but sufficiently secluded.
K-21. The following objects, when available, are sometimes ideal reference
points:
•  Small, unfrequented bridges and dams.
•  Boundary markers.
•  Kilometer markers and culverts along unfrequented roads.
•  A geodetic survey marker.
•  Battle monuments and wayside shrines.
K-8 FM 3-05.201
K-22. When such reference points are not available at an otherwise suitable
cache site, natural or man-made objects may serve as FRPs: distinct rocks,
posts for power or telephone lines, intersections in stone fences or hedgerows,
and gravestones in isolated cemeteries.
Figure K-6. Reference Points
PINPOINTING TECHNIQUES
K-23. Recovery instructions must identify the exact location  of the cache.
These instructions must describe the point where the cache is placed in terms
that relate it to the FRP. When the concealment method is used, the cache is
ordinarily placed inside the FRP, pinpointed by a precise description of the
FRP. A submerged cache is usually pinpointed by describing exactly how the
moorings are attached to the FRP (Figure K-7, page K-10). With a buried
cache, any of the following techniques may be used.
Placing the Cache Directly Beside the FRP
K-24. The simplest method is to place the cache directly  beside the FRP.
Then pinpointing is reduced to specifying the precise reference point of the
FRP.
Sighting the Cache by Projection
K-25. This method may be used if the FRP has one flat side long enough to
permit precise sighting by projecting a line along the side of the object. The
burial party places the cache a measured distance along the sighted line. This
method may also be used if two precise FRPs are available, by projecting a
line sighted between the two objects. In either case, the instructions for
finding the cache must state the approximate direction of the cache from the
FRP. Since small errors in sighting are magnified as the sighted line is
extended, the cache should be placed as close to the FRP as other factors
K-9 FM 3-05.201
permit. Ordinarily this method becomes unreliable if the sighted line is
extended beyond 50 meters.
Figure K-7. Pinpointing Techniques
Placing the Cache at the Intersection of Measured Lines
K-26. If two FRPs are available within several paces, the cache can be one
line projected from each of the FRPs. If this method is used, the approximate
direction of the cache from each FRP must be stated. To ensure accuracy,
neither of the projected lines (from the FRPs to the point of emplacement)
should be more than twice as long as the base line (between the two FRPs). If
this proportion is maintained, the only limitation upon the length of the
projected lines is the length of the measuring line that the recovery party is
K-10 FM 3-05.201
expected to carry. The recovery party should carry two measuring lines when
this method is used.
Sighting the Cache by Compass Azimuth
K-27. If the above methods of sighting are not feasible, one measured line
may be projected by taking a compass azimuth from the FRP to the point
where the cache is placed. To avoid confusion, an azimuth to a cardinal point
of the compass (north, east, south, or west) is used. Since compass sightings
are likely to be inaccurate, a cache that is pinpointed by this method should
not be placed more than 10 meters from the FRP.
MEASURING DISTANCES
K-28. The observer should express all measured distances in a linear system
that the recovery party is sure to understand—ordinarily, the standard
system for the country where the cache is located. He should use whole
numbers (6 meters, not 6.3 or 6.5) to keep his instructions as brief and as
simple as possible. To get an exact location for the cache in whole numbers,
the observer should take sightings and measurements first.
K-29. If the surface of the ground between the points to be measured is
uneven, the linear distance should be measured on a direct line from point to
point, rather than by following the contour of the ground. This method
requires a measuring line long enough to reach the full distance from point to
point and strong enough to be pulled taut without breaking.
MARKING TECHNIQUES
K-30. The emplacement operation can be simplified and critical time saved if
the point where the cache is to be buried is marked during  the
reconnaissance. If a night burial is planned, the point of emplacement may
have to be marked during a daylight reconnaissance. This method should be
used whenever operational conditions permit. The marker must be an object
that is easily recognizable but that is meaningless to an unwitting observer.
For example, a small rock or a branch with its butt placed at the point
selected for the emplacement may be used.
K-31. Since marking information is also essential to the recovery operation,
it must be compiled after emplacement and included in the final cache report.
Therefore, the observer should be thoroughly familiar with the Twelve-Point
Cache Report before he starts a personal reconnaissance. This report is a
checklist for the observer to record as much information as possible. Points 6
through 11 are particularly important. The personal reconnaissance also
provides an excellent opportunity for a preliminary estimate of the time
required for getting to the site.
ALTERNATE SITE
K-32. As a general rule, planners should select an alternate site in case
unforeseen difficulties prevent use of the best site. Unless the primary site is
i n   a   c o m p l e t e l y   d e s e r t e d   a r e a ,   t h e r e   i s   a l w a y s   s o me  d a n g e r   t h a t   t h e
emplacement party will find it occupied as they approach, or that the party
will be observed as they near the site. The alternate site should be far enough
K-11 FM 3-05.201
away to be screened from view from the primary site, but near enough so that
the party can reach it without making a second trip.
CONCEALMENT SITE
K-33. A site that looks ideal for concealment may be revealed to the enemy
for that very reason. Such a site may be equally attractive to a native of an
occupied country to hide his valuables. The only real key to the ideal
concealment site is careful casing of the area combined with great familiarity
with local residents and their customs. The following is a list of likely
concealment sites:
•  Walls (hidden behind loose bricks or stones or a plastered surface).
•  Abandoned buildings.
•  Infrequently used structures (stadiums and other recreational
facilities, railroad facilities on spur lines).
•  Memorial edifices (mausoleums, crypts, monuments).
•  Public buildings (museums, churches, libraries).
•  Ruins of historical interest.
•  Culverts.
•  Natural caves and caverns, and abandoned mines and quarries.
•  Sewers.
•  Cable conduits.
K-34. The concealment site must be  equally accessible to the person
emplacing and the person recovering. However, visits by both persons to
certain interior sites may be incompatible with the story. For instance, a site
in a house owned by a relative of the emplacer may be unsuitable because
there is no adequate excuse for the recovery person to enter the house if he
has no connection with the owner.
K-35. The site must remain accessible as long as the cache  is needed. If
access to a building depends upon a personal relationship with the owner, the
death of the owner or the sale of the property might render it inaccessible.
K-36. Persons involved in the operation should not be compromised if the
cache is discovered on the site. Even if a cache is completely sterile, as every
cache should be, the mere fact that it has been placed in a particular site may
compromise certain persons. If the police discovered the cache, they might
suspect the emplacer because it was found in his relative’s house.
K-37. The site must not be located where potentially  hostile persons
frequently  visit.  For  instance,  a  site  in  a  museum  is  not  secure  if  police
guards or curious visitors frequently enter the museum.
K-38. To preserve the cache material, the emplacer must ensure the site is
physically secure for the preservation of the cached material. For example,
most buildings involve a risk that the cache may be destroyed or damaged by
fire, especially in wartime. The emplacer should consider all risks and weigh
them against the advantages of an interior site.
K-12 FM 3-05.201
K-39. A custodian may serve to ease access to a building or to guard a cache.
However, the use of such a person is  inadvisable, as a custodian poses an
additional security risk. He may use the contents of the cache for personal
profit or reveal its location.
BURIAL SITE
K-40. In selecting a burial site, consider the following factors along with the
basic considerations of suitability and accessibility.
DRAINAGE
K-41. Drainage considerations include the elevation of the site and the type
o f   s o i l .   T h e   i m p o r t a n c e   o f   g o o d   d r a i n a g e   m a k e s   a   sit e   o n   h i g h   g r o u n d
preferable unless other factors rule it out. Moisture is one of the greatest
natural threats to the contents of a cache. Swamp muck is the most difficult
soil to work in. If the site is near a stream or river, the  emplacer should
ensure that the cache is well above the all-year-high-water mark so that the
cache will not be uncovered if the soil is washed away.
GROUND COVER
K-42. The types of vegetation at the site will influence the choice. Roots of
deciduous trees make digging very difficult. Coniferous trees have less
extensive root systems. Also, the presence of coniferous trees usually means
that the site is well drained. Does  the vegetation show paths or other
indications that the site is frequented too much for secure caching? Can the
ground cover be easily restored to its normal appearance when burial is
completed? Tall grass reveals that it has been trampled, but an overlay of
leaves and humus can be replaced easily and will effectively conceal a freshly
refilled hole.
NATURAL CONCEALMENT
K-43. The vegetation or the surrounding terrain should offer natural
concealment for the burial and recovery parties working at the site. Planners
should carefully consider seasonal variations in the foliage.
TYPES OF SOIL
K-44. Sandy loam is ideal because it is easy to dig and drains well. Clay soil
should be avoided because it becomes quite sticky in wet weather and in dry
weather it may become so hard that it is almost impossible to dig.
SNOWFALL AND FREEZING
K-45. If the cache must be buried or recovered in winter, data on the normal
snowfall, the depth to which the ground freezes in winter,  and the usual
dates of freezing and thawing will influence the choice of  the site. Frozen
ground impedes digging and requires additional time for burial and recovery.
Snow on the ground is especially hazardous for the burial operation. It is
practically impossible to restore the snow over the burial site to its normal
appearance unless there is more snowfall or a brisk wind. Also, it is very
K-13 FM 3-05.201
difficult to ensure that no traces of the operation are left after the snow has
melted.
ROCKS AND OTHER SUBSURFACE OBSTRUCTIONS
K-46. Large obstructions that might prevent use of a particular site can be
located to some extent before digging by probing with a rod or stake at the
exact spot selected for the cache.
SUBMERSION SITE
K-47. To be suitable for a submerged cache, a body of water must have
certain characteristics. The presence of these characteristics can be
determined only by a thorough survey of the site. Their importance will be
understood after familiarization with the technicalities of submersion.
EMPLACEMENT
K-48. Submersion usually requires a boat, first for reconnoitering, then for
emplacement. Thus, the accessibility problems involved in  submersion
usually narrow down to the availability of a boat and the story for using it. If
there is no fishing or pleasure boating at the site, the story for this peculiartype boating may be a real problem. In tropical areas, the course of streams
or rivers is frequently changed by  seasonal rainfall and can cause many
problems. Planners should keep this fact in mind when choosing the site and
when selecting reference points.
RECOVERY
K-49. Since the method for recovering a cache is generally similar to that for
emplacing a cache, it need not be  described in full. However, several
important considerations should be  stressed in training for a recovery
operation.
CACHE RECOVERY
K-50. The following paragraphs discuss considerations for recovery
operations.
PRACTICAL EXERCISES
K-51. Anyone who is expected to serve as a recovery person should have the
experience of actually recovering dummy caches, if field exercises can be
arranged securely. It is especially desirable for the recovery person to be able
to master the pinpointing techniques. Mastery is best attained by practice in
selecting points of emplacement and in drafting, as well as in following
instructions.
EQUIPMENT
K-52. Although the equipment used in recovery is generally the same as that
used in emplacement, it is important to include any additional items that
may be required in recovery in the cache report. A probe rod may not be
essential for emplacement, but it is necessary to have some object roughly the
K-14 FM 3-05.201
same size as the cache container to fill the cavity left in the ground by
removal of a buried cache. Some sort of container of wrapping material may
be needed to conceal the recovered cache while it is being carried from the
cache site to a safe house. Recovery of a submerged cache may require
grappling lines and hooks, especially if it is heavy.
SKETCH OF THE SITE
K-53. If possible, the observer should provide the recovery person with
sketches of the cache site and the route to the cache site. If the recovery
person must rely exclusively on verbal instructions, as in  the case when
communications are limited to radio-telephone (RT) messages, he should
draw a sketch of the site before starting on the recovery operation. He should
use all the data in the verbal instructions to make the sketch as realistic as
possible. Drawing a sketch will help to clarify any misunderstanding of the
instructions. Also, a sketch can be  followed more easily than verbal
instructions. It may also be helpful for the recovery person to draw a sketch
of the route from the immediate reference point to the site. But he should not
carry this sketch on him because if he were apprehended the sketch might
direct the enemy to the cache.
PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE
K-54. Checking the instructions for locating the cache may be advisable,
especially when the recovery operation must be performed under stringent
enemy controls or when there is no extra time for searching. Careful analysis
of the best available map can minimize reconnoitering activity in the vicinity
of the cache and thus reduce the danger of arousing suspicion. If recovery
must be done at night, the recovery person should find the cache by daylight
and place an unnoticeable marker directly over it.
PROBE ROD
K-55. The recovery person can avoid digging at the wrong spot  by using a
probe rod before starting to dig. He should push and turn the probe rod into
the ground by hand, so that it will not puncture the cache’s container. The
recovery person should never pound the probe rod with a hammer.
K-56. The recovery procedure is the same as for the burial,  except for the
following two points:
•  First, a pick should never be used for digging the hole because it might
puncture the container and damage the cached items.
•  Second, it may be necessary to fill the hole with other objects in
addition to soil after the cache is removed.
K-57. Sometimes it is possible to fill the hole with rocks, sticks, or other
readily available objects at the site. If no such objects are found during the
preliminary reconnaissance, the recovery person should carry to the site an
object roughly the same size as the cache container.
STERILIZATION OF THE SITE
K-58. As with emplacement, the recovery operation must be preformed in
such a way that no traces of the operation are left. Although sterilization is
K-15 FM 3-05.201
not as important for recovery as for  emplacement, it should be done as
thoroughly as time permits. Evidence that a cache has been recovered might
alert the enemy to clandestine activity in the area and provoke
countermeasures.
PACKAGING
K-59. Packaging usually involves packing the items to be cached, as well as
the additional processing in protecting these items from adverse storage
conditions. Proper packaging is important because inadequate packaging
very likely will render the items unusable. Since special equipment and
skilled technicians are needed for best results, packaging should be done at
HQ or a field packaging center whenever possible. However,  to familiarize
operational personnel with the fundamentals of packaging so that they can
improvise field expedients for emergency use, this section discusses
determining factors, steps in packaging, wrapping materials, and criteria for
the container.
DETERMINING FACTORS
K-60. The first rule of packaging is that all processing is  tailored to fit the
specific requirements of each cache. The method of packaging, as well as the
size, shape, and weight of the package is determined by the items to be
cached, by the method of caching, and especially, by the way the cache is
recovered and used. For instance, if circumstances require one man to recover
the cache by himself, the container should be no larger than a small suitcase,
and the total weight of the container and contents no more than 30 pounds.
Of course, these limits must be exceeded with some equipment, but the need
for larger packages should be weighed against the difficulties and risks in
handling them. Even if more than one person is available for recovery, the
material should be divided whenever possible into separate packages of a size
and weight readily portable by one man.
K-61. Another very important factor in packaging concerns adverse storage
conditions. Any or all of the following  conditions may be present: moisture,
external pressure, freezing temperatures, and the bacteria and corrosive
chemicals found in some soil and water. Animal life may present a hazard;
insects and rodents may attack the package. If the cache  is concealed in an
exterior site, larger animals also may threaten it. Whether the packaging is
adequate usually depends upon how carefully the conditions at the site were
analyzed in designing the cache. Thus, the method of caching (burial,
concealment, or submersion) should be determined before the packaging is
done.
K-62. It is equally important to consider how long the cache is to be used.
Since one seldom knows when a cache will be needed, a sound rule is to
design the packaging to withstand adverse storage conditions for at least as
long as the normal shelf life of the contents to be cached.
K-16 FM 3-05.201
STEPS IN PACKAGING
K-63. The exact procedure for packaging depends upon the specific
requirements for the cache and upon the packaging equipment available. The
following eight steps are almost always necessary in packaging.
Inspecting
K-64. The items to be cached must be inspected immediately before
packaging to ensure they are complete, in serviceable condition, and free of
all corrosive or contaminated substances.
Cleaning
K-65. All corrodible items must be cleaned thoroughly immediately before
the final preservative coating is applied. All foreign matter, including any
preservative applied before the item  was shipped to the field, should be
removed completely. Throughout the packaging operation, all contents of the
cache should be handled with rubber or freshly cleaned cotton gloves. Special
handling is important because even minute particles of human sweat will
corrode metallic equipment. Also, any fingerprints on the contents of the
cache may enable the enemy to identify those who did the packaging.
Drying
K-66. When cleaning is completed, every trace of moisture must be removed
from all corrodible items. Methods of drying include wiping with a highly
absorbent cloth, heating, or applying desiccant. Usually, heating is best
unless the item can be damaged by heat. To dry by heating, the item to be
cached should be placed in an oven for at least 3 hours at a  temperature of
about 110 degrees Fahrenheit (F). An oven can be improvised from a large
metal can or drum. In humid climates, it is especially important to dry the
oven thoroughly before using it by preheating it to at least 212 degrees F.
Then, the equipment to be cached is inserted as soon as the oven cools down
to about 110 degrees F. If a desiccant is used, it should not touch any metallic
surface. Silica gel is a satisfactory desiccant and it is commonly available.
Coating With a Preservative
K-67. A light coat of oil may be applied to weapons, tools, and other items
with unpainted metallic surfaces. A coat of paint may suffice for other metal
items.
Wrapping
K-68. When drying and coating are completed, the items to be cached are
wrapped in a suitable material. The wrapping should be as nearly waterproof
as possible. Each item should be wrapped separately, so that one perforation
in the wrapping will not expose all items in the cache. The wrapping should
fit tightly to each item to eliminate air pockets, and all folds should be sealed
with a waterproof substance.
K-17 FM 3-05.201
Packing
K-69. The following rules must be observed when packing items in the
container:
•  All moisture must be removed from the interior of the container by
heating or applying desiccant. A long-lasting desiccant should be
packed inside the container to absorb any residual moisture. If silica
gel is used, the required amount can be calculated by using the ratio of
15 kilograms of silica gel to 1 cubic meter of storage space within the
container. (This figure is based on two assumptions: the container is
completely moisture proof and the contents are slightly moist when
inserted.) Therefore, the ratio allows an ample margin for incomplete
drying and can be reduced if the drying process is known to be highly
effective.
•  Air pockets should be eliminated as much as possible by tight packing.
Thoroughly dried padding should be used liberally to fill air pockets
and to protect the contents from shock. Clothing and other items,
which will be useful to the recovery party, should be used for padding
if possible. Items made of different metals should never touch, since
continued contact may cause corrosion through electrolytic action.
Enclosing Instructions for Using Cached Equipment
K-70. Written instructions and diagrams should be included if they facilitate
assembly or use of the cached items. Instructions must be written in a
language that recovery personnel can understand. The wording should be as
simple as possible and unmistakably clear. Diagrams should be
self-explanatory since the eventual user may not be able to comprehend
written instructions because of language barriers.
Sealing and Testing Seals by Submersion
K-71. When packing is completed, the lid of the container must be sealed to
make it watertight. Testing can be done by entirely submerging the container
in water and watching for escaping air bubbles. Hot water should be used if
possible because hot water will bring out leaks that would not be revealed by
a cold-water test.
WRAPPING MATERIALS
K-72. The most important requirement for wrapping material is that it be
moisture-proof. Also, it should be self-sealing or adhesive to a sealing
material; it should be pliable enough to fit closely, with tight folds; and it
should be tough enough to resist tearing and puncturing. Pliability and
toughness may be combined by using two wrappings: an inner one that is
thin and pliable and an outer one  of heavier material. A tough outer
wrapping is essential unless the container and the padding are adequate to
prevent items from scraping together inside the cache. Five wrapping
materials are recommended for field expedient use because they often can be
obtained locally and used effectively by unskilled personnel.
K-18 FM 3-05.201
Aluminum Foil for Use as an Inner Wrapping
K-73. Aluminum foil is the best of the widely available materials. It is
moisture-proof as long as it does not become perforated and provided the
folds are adequately sealed. The drawbacks to its use for caching are that the
thin foils perforate easily, while the heavy ones (over 2 millimeters thick)
tend to admit moisture through the folds. The heavy-duty grade of aluminum
foil generally sold for kitchen use is adequate when used with an outer
wrapping. Scrim-backed foil, which is heat-sealable, is widely used
commercially to package articles for shipment or storage. Portable heat
sealers that are easy to use are available commercially or sealing can be done
with a standard household iron.
Moisture-Resistant Papers
K-74. Several brands of commercial wrapping papers are resistant to water
and grease. They do not provide lasting protection against moisture when
used alone, but they are effective as an inner wrapping to prevent rubber,
wax, and similar substances from sticking to the items in the cache.
Rubber Repair Gum
K-75. This is a self-sealing compound generally used for repairing tires; it
makes an excellent outer wrapping. Standard commercial brands come in
several thicknesses; 2 millimeters is  the most satisfactory for caching. A
watertight seal is produced easily by placing two rubber surfaces together
and applying pressure manually. The seal should be at least 1/2 inch wide.
Since rubber repair gum has a tendency to adhere to items, an inner
wrapping of non-adhesive material must be used with it, and the backing
should be left on the rubber material to keep it from sticking to other items in
the cache.
Grade C Barrier Material
K-76. This is a cloth impregnated with microcrystalline wax that is used
extensively when packing for storage of items for overseas shipment. Thus, it
is generally available and it has the additional advantage of being selfsealing. Although it is not as effective as rubber repair gum, it may be used
as an outer wrapping over aluminum foil to prevent perforation of the foil.
Used without an inner wrapping, three layers of grade C barrier material
may keep the contents dry for as long as three months, but  it is highly
vulnerable to insects and rodents. Also, the wax wrapping has a low melting
point and will adhere to many items, so it should not be used without an
inner wrapping except in emergencies.
Wax Coating
K-77. If no wrapping material is available, an outer coating of
microcrystalline wax, paraffin, or a similar waxy substance can be used to
protect the contents against moisture. A wax coating will not provide
protection against insects and rodents. The package should be hot-dipped in
the waxy substance, or the wax can be heated to molten form and applied
with a brush.
K-19 FM 3-05.201
CONTAINER CRITERIA
K-78. The outer container serves to protect the contents from shock,
moisture, and other natural hazards to which the cache may be exposed. The
ideal container should be as follows:
•  Completely watertight and airtight after sealing.
•  Noiseless when handled; its handles should not rattle against the body
of the container.
•  Resistant to shock and abrasion.
•  Able to withstand crushing pressure.
•  Lightweight in construction.
•  Able to withstand rodents, insects, and bacteria.
•  Equipped with a sealing device that can be closed and reopened easily
and repeatedly.
•  Capable of withstanding highly acidic or alkaline soil or water.
STANDARD STAINLESS STEEL CONTAINER
K-79. The standard stainless steel container comes in several sizes. Since
the stainless steel container is more  satisfactory than any that could be
improvised in the field, it should be used whenever possible. Ideally, it should
be packed at HQ or at a field packaging center. If the items to be cached must
be obtained locally, it is still advisable to use the stainless steel container
because its high resistance to moisture eliminates the need for an outer
wrapping. Packers should, however, use a single wrapping even with the
stainless steel container to protect the contents from any residual moisture
that may be present in the container when it is sealed.
FIELD-EXPEDIENT CONTAINER
K-80. The ideal container cannot be improvised in the field, but the standard
military and commercial containers discussed below can meet caching
requirements if they are adapted with care and resourcefulness. First, a
container must be sufficiently sturdy to remain unpunctured and retain its
shape through whatever rough handling or crushing pressure it may
encounter. (Even a slight warping may cause a joint around the lid to leak.)
Second, if the lid is not already watertight and airtight, packers can make it
so by improvising a sealing device. The most common type of sealing device
includes a rubber-composition gasket or lining and a sharp, flat metal rim
that is pressed against a threaded lid. Applying heavy grease to the threads
can increase its effectiveness. (Metallic solder should not be used for sealing
because it corrodes metal surfaces when exposed to moisture.) Whenever any
nonstainless metal container is used, it is important to apply several coats of
high-quality paint to all exterior surfaces.
Instrument Containers
K-81. Ordinarily, aircraft and other precision instruments are shipped in
steel containers with a waterproof sealing device. The standard instrument
containers range from 1/2-gallon to 10-gallon sizes. If one of suitable size can
be found, only minimum modifications may be needed. In the most common
K-20 FM 3-05.201
type of instrument container, the only weak point is the nut and bolt that
tighten the locking band around the lid. These should be replaced with a
stainless steel nut and bolt.
Ammunition Boxes
K-82. Several types and sizes of steel ammunition boxes that have a rubbergasket closing device are satisfactory for buried caches. An advantage of
using ammunition boxes as a cache container is that they  are usually
available at a military depot.
Steel Drums
K-83. A caching container of suitable size may be found among  the
commercially used steel drums for shipping oil, grease, nails, soap, and other
products. The most common types, however, lack an adequate sealing device,
so a waterproof material should be used around the lid. Fully removable head
drums with lock-ring closures generally give a satisfactory seal.
Glass Jars
K-84. The advantage of using glass is that it is waterproof and does not
allow chemicals, bacteria, and insects to pass through it. Although glass is
highly vulnerable to shock, glass jars of a sturdy quality can withstand the
crushing pressure normally encountered  in caching. However, none of the
available glass containers have an adequate sealing device for the joint
around the lid. The standard commercial canning jar with a spring clamp and
a rubber washer is watertight, but the metal clamp is vulnerable to corrosion.
Therefore, a glass jar with a spring clamp and a rubber washer is an
adequate expedient for short-term caching of small items, but it should not be
relied upon to resist moisture for more than a year.
Paint Cans
K-85. Standard cans with reusable lids require a waterproof adhesive
around the lids. It is especially important to apply several coats of paint to
the exterior of standard commercial cans because the metal  in these cans is
not as heavy as that in metal drums. Even when the exterior is thoroughly
painted, paint cans will not resist moisture for more than a few months.
METHODS OF EMPLACEMENT
K-86. Since burial is the most frequently used method of emplacement, this
section describes first the complete procedure for burial, followed by a
discussion of emplacement procedures peculiar to submersion and
concealment. The last area discussed is the preparation of the cache report—
a vital part of a caching operation.
BURIAL
K-87. When planners have designed a cache and selected the items for
caching, they must carefully work out every step of the burial operation in
advance.
K-21 FM 3-05.201
Horizontal and Vertical Caches
K-88. Ordinarily, the hole for a buried  cache is vertical (the hole is dug
straight down from the surface). Sometimes a horizontal cache, with the hole
dug into the side of a steep hill or bank, provides a workable solution when a
suitable site on level or slightly sloping ground is not available. A horizontal
cache may provide better drainage in areas of heavy rainfall, but is more
likely to be exposed by soil erosion and more difficult to refill and restore to
normal appearance (Figure K-8).
Figure K-8. Burial Procedures for Horizontal and Vertical Caches
Dimensions of the Hole
K-89. The exact dimensions of the hole, either vertical or horizontal, depend
on the size and shape of the cache container. As a general rule, the hole
should be large enough for the container to be inserted easily. The horizontal
dimensions of the hole should be about 30 centimeters longer and wider than
the container. Most importantly, it should be deep enough to permit covering
the container with soil to about 45 centimeters. This figure is recommended
for normal usage because a more shallow burial risks exposure of the cache
through soil erosion or inadvertent uncovering by normal indigenous activity.
K-22 FM 3-05.201
A deeper hole makes probing for recovery more difficult and unnecessarily
prolongs the time required for burial and recovery.
Excavation Shoring
K-90. If there is a risk that the surrounding soil will  cave in during
excavation, boards or bags filled with subsoil may be used to shore the sides
of the hole. Permanent shoring may be needed to protect an  improvised
container from pressure or shock.
Equipment
K-91. The following items of equipment may be helpful or  indispensable in
burying a cache, depending upon the conditions at the site:
•  Measuring instruments (a wire or metal tape and compass) for
pinpointing the site.
•  Paper and pencil for recording the measurements.
•  A probe rod for locating rocks, large roots, or other obstacles in the
subsoil.
•  Two ground sheets on which to place sod and loose soil. An article of
clothing may be used for small excavation if nothing else is available.
•  Sacks (sandbags, flour sacks, trash bags) for holding subsoil.
•  A spade or pickax if the ground is too hard for spading.
•  A hatchet for cutting roots.
•  A crowbar for prying rocks.
•  A flashlight or lamp if burial is to be done at night.
BURIAL PARTY
K-92. Aside from locating, digging, and refilling the hole, the most important
factor in this part of the emplacement operation may be expressed with one
word: personnel. Since it is almost impossible to prevent every member of the
burial party from knowing the location of the cache, each member is a prime
security problem as long as the cache remains intact. Thus, planners must
keep the burial party as small as possible and select each member with
utmost care. Once selected, each member must have an adequate story to
explain his absence from home or work during the operation, his trip to and
from the site, and his possession of whatever equipment cannot be concealed
on the way. Transportation for the burial party may be a problem, depending
on the number of persons, how far they must go, and what equipment they
must take. When planners have worked out all details of the operation, they
must brief each member of the burial party on exactly what he is to do from
start to finish.
OPERATIONAL SCHEDULE
K-93. The final step in planning the emplacement operation is to make a
schedule to set the date, time, and place for every step of the operation that
requires advance coordination. The schedule will depend mainly on the
K-23 FM 3-05.201
circumstances, but to be practical it must include a realistic estimate of how
long it will take to complete the burial. Here, generalizations are worthless,
and the only sure guide is actual  experience under similar conditions.
Planners should consider the following with respect to scheduling.
K-94. A careful burial job probably will  take longer than most novices will
expect. Therefore, if circumstances require a tight schedule, a dry run or test
exercise before taking the package to the site may be advisable. Unless the
site is exceptionally well concealed or isolated, night burial will be required to
avoid detection. Because of the difficulties of working in the dark, a nighttime
practice exercise is especially advisable.
K-95. The schedule should permit waiting for advantageous weather
conditions. The difficulties of snow  have already been mentioned. Rainy
weather increases the problems of digging and complicates the story. If the
b u r i a l   i s   t o   b e   d o n e   a t   n i g h t ,   a   m o o n l e s s   o r   a   h e avy   o v e r c a s t   n i g h t   i s
desirable.
SITE APPROACH
K-96. Regardless of how effective the individual’s story is during the trip to
the cache site, the immediate approach must be completely unobserved to
avoid detection of the burial. To reduce the risk of the party being observed,
planners must carefully select the point where the burial party disappears,
perhaps by turning off a road into woods. They should just as carefully select
the reappearance point. In addition, the return trip should be by a different
route. The burial party should strictly observe the rule for concealed
movement. The party should proceed cautiously and silently along a route
that makes the best use of natural concealment. Concealed movement
requires foresight, with special attention to using natural concealment while
reconnoitering the route and to preventing rattles when preparing the
package and contents.
Security Measures at the Site
K-97. The burial party must maintain maximum vigilance at the cache site
since detection can be disastrous. The time spent at the site is the most
critical. At least one lookout should be on guard constantly. If one man must
do the burial by himself, he should pause frequently to look and listen. The
burial party should use flashlights or lanterns as little as possible, and
should take special care to mask  the glare. Planning should include
emergency actions in case the burial party is interrupted. The party should
be so thoroughly briefed that it will respond instantly to any sign of danger.
Planners should also consider the various escape routes  and whether the
party will attempt to retain the package or conceal it along the escape route.
Steps in Digging and Refilling
K-98. Although procedures will vary slightly with the design of the cache,
persons involved in caching operations must never overlook certain basic
steps. The whole procedure is designed to restore the site to normal as far as
possible.
K-24 FM 3-05.201
Site Sterilization
K-99. When the hole is refilled, a special effort should be made to ensure
that the site is left sterile and restored to normal in every way, with no clues
left to indicate burial or the burial party’s visit to the  vicinity. Since
sterilization is most important for the security of the operation, the schedule
should allow ample time to complete these final steps in an  unhurried,
thorough manner. These final steps are to—
•  Dispose of any excess soil far enough away from the site to avoid
attracting attention to the site. Flushing the excess soil into a stream
is the ideal solution.
•  Check all tools and equipment against a checklist to ensure that
nothing is left behind. This checklist should include all  personnel
items that may drop from pockets. To keep this risk to a minimum,
members of the burial party should carry nothing on their persons
except the essentials for doing the job and disguising their actions.
•  Make a final inspection of the site for any traces of the burial. Because
this step is more difficult on a dark night, use of a carefully prepared
checklist is essential. With a night burial, returning to the site in the
daytime to inspect it for telltale evidence may be advisable if this can
be done safely.
SUBMERSION
K-100. Emplacing a submerged cache  always involves two basic steps:
weighting the container to keep it from floating to the surface and mooring it
to keep it in place.
K-101. Ordinarily, container weights rest on the bottom of the lake or river
and function as anchors, and the moorings connect the anchors to the
container. The moorings must also serve a second function,  which is to
provide a handle for pulling the cache to the surface when it is recovered. If
the moorings are not accessible for recovery, another line must extend from
the cache to a fixed, accessible object in the water or on shore. There are four
types of moorings.
Spider Web Mooring
K-102. The container is attached to several mooring cables that radiate to
anchors placed around it to form a web. The container must be buoyant so
that it lifts the cables far enough off the bottom to be readily secured by
grappling. The site must be located exactly at the time of emplacement by
visual sightings to fixed  landmarks in the water, or along the shore using
several FRPs to establish a point where two sighted lines intersect. For
recovery, the site is located by taking sightings on the reference points when
a mooring cable is engaged by dragging the bottom while diving. This method
of mooring is most difficult for recovery. It can be used only where the bottom
is smooth and firm enough for dragging, or where the water is not too deep,
cold, or murky for diving.
K-25 FM 3-05.201
Line-to-Shore Mooring
K-103. A line is run from the weighted container to an immovable object
along the shore. The section of the line that extends from the shore to the
container must be buried in the ground or otherwise well concealed.
Buoy Mooring
K-104. A line is run from the weighted container to a buoy or other fixed,
floating marker, and fastened well below the waterline. This method is secure
only as long as the buoy is left in place. Buoys are generally inspected and
repainted every six months or so. The inspection schedule should be
determined before a buoy is used.
Structural Mooring
K-105. A line for retrieving the weighted container is run to a bridge pier or
other solid structure in the water. This line must be fastened well below the
low-water mark.
ESSENTIAL DATA FOR SUBMERSION
K-106. Whatever method of mooring is used, planners must carefully
consider certain data before designing a submerged cache. The cache very
likely will be lost if any of the following critical factors are overlooked.
Buoyancy
K-107. Many containers are buoyant even when filled, so the container must
be weighted sufficiently to submerge it and keep it in place. If the contents do
not provide enough weight, emplacers must make up the balance by
attaching a weight to the container. The approximate weight needed to attain
zero buoyancy is shown in Table K-1.
Table K-1. Buoyancy Chart
Container Dimensions
(Inches)
Empty Container Weight
(Pounds)
Approximate Weight That
Must Be Added to Empty
Container Weight to Attain
Zero Buoyancy (Pounds)
7 x 9 x 8 1/2 5 15
7 x 9 x 16 1/2 8 31
7 x 9 x 40 16 77
7 x 9 x 45 17 1/2 88
7 x 9 x 50 19 97
K-108. This table applies to several sizes of stainless steel containers. The
weighting required for any container can be calculated theoretically if the
displacement of the container and the gross weight of the container plus its
contents are known. This calculation may be useful for designing an anchor,
but it should not be relied upon for actual emplacement. To avoid hurried
improvisation during emplacement, emplacers should always test the
K-26 FM 3-05.201
buoyancy in advance by actually submerging the weighted  container. This
test determines only that a submerged cache will not float to the surface.
Additional weighting may be required to keep it from drifting along the
bottom. As a general rule, the additional weight should be at least one-tenth
of the gross weight required to make the container sink; more weight is
advisable if strong currents are present.
Submersion Depth
K-109. Planners must first determine the depth that the container is to be
submerged to calculate the water pressure that the container must
withstand. The greater the depth, the greater the danger that the container
will be crushed by water pressure. For instance, the standard stainless steel
burial container will buckle at a depth of approximately  4.3 meters. The
difficulty of waterproofing also increases with depth. Thus, the container
should not be submerged any deeper than necessary to avoid detection. As a
general rule, 2.2 meters is the maximum advisable depth for caching. If
seasonal or tidal variations in the water level require deeper submersion, the
container should be tested by actual submersion to the maximum depth it
must withstand.
Depth of the Water
K-110. Emplacers must measure accurately the depth of the water at the
point where the cache is to be placed. This depth will be the submersion
depth if the cache is designed so that the container rests on the bottom of the
lake or river. The container may be suspended some distance above the
bottom, but the depth of the water must be known to determine the length of
moorings connecting the containers to the anchors.
High- and Low-Water Marks
K-111. Any tidal or seasonal changes in the depth of the water should be
estimated as accurately as possible. Emplacers must consider the low-water
mark to ensure that low water will not leave cache exposed. The high-water
mark should also be considered to ensure that the increased depth will not
crush the container or prevent recovery.
Type of Bottom
K-112. Emplacers should probe as thoroughly as possible the bed of the lake
or river in the vicinity of the cache. If the bottom is soft and silty, the cache
may sink into the muck, become covered with sediment, or drift out of place.
If the bottom is rocky or covered with debris, the moorings may become
snagged. Any of these conditions may make recovery very difficult.
Water Motion
K-113. Emplacers should consider tides, currents, and waves because any
water motion will put additional strain on the moorings of the cache.
Moorings must be strong enough to withstand the greatest possible strain. If
the water motion tends to rock the cache, emplacers must take special care to
prevent the moorings from rubbing and fraying.
K-27 FM 3-05.201
Clearness of the Water
K-114. When deciding how deep to submerge the cache, emplacers must first
determine how far the cache can be seen through the water. If  the water is
clear, the cache may need to be camouflaged by painting the container to
match the bottom. (Shiny metallic fixtures should always be painted a dull
color.) Very murky water makes recovery by divers more difficult.
Water Temperature
K-115. Planners must consider seasonal changes in the temperature of the
water. Recovery may be impossible in the winter if the water freezes. The
dates when the lake or river usually freezes and thaws should be determined
as accurately as possible.
Salt Water
K-116. Since seawater is much more corrosive than fresh water, tidal
estuaries and lagoons should not be used for caching. The only exception is
the maritime resupply operation, where equipment may be submerged
temporarily along the seacoast until it can be recovered by a shore party.
CONCEALMENT
K-117. There are many different ways to conceal a cache in natural or readymade hiding places. For instance, if a caching party was hiding weapons and
ammunition in a cave and was relying entirely on natural concealment, the
emplacement operation would be reduced to simply locating the site. No tools
would be needed except paper, a pencil, and a flashlight. On the other hand,
if the party was sealing a packet of jewels in a brick wall, a skilled mason
would be needed, along with his kit of tools and a supply of mortar expertly
mixed to match the original brick wall.
K-118. When planning for concealment, planners must know the  local
residents and their customs. During the actual emplacement, the caching
party must ensure the operation is not observed. The final sterilization of the
site is especially important since a concealment site is usually open to
frequent observation.
CACHING COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
K-119. As a general rule, all equipment for a particular purpose (demolitions,
survival) should be included in one container. Some equipment, however, is
so sensitive from a security standpoint that it should be packed in several
containers and cached in different locations to minimize the danger of
discovery by the enemy. This is particularly true of communications
equipment since, under some circumstances, anyone who acquires a whole
RT set with a signal plan and cryptographic material would be able to play
back the set. An especially dangerous type of penetration would result. In the
face of this danger, the signal plan and the cryptographic material must
never be placed in the same container. Ideally, a communications kit should
K-28 FM 3-05.201
be distributed among three containers and cached in different locations. If
three containers are used, the distribution may be as follows:
•  Container 1: The RT set, including the crystals.
•  Container 2: The signal plan and operational supplies for the RT
operator, such as currency, barter, and small arms.
•  Container 3: The cryptographic material.
K-120. When several containers are used for one set of equipment, they must
be placed far enough apart so that if one is discovered, the others will not be
detected in the immediate vicinity. On the other hand, they should be located
close enough together so that they can be recovered conveniently in one
operation. The distance between containers will depend on the particular
situation, but ordinarily they should be at least 10 meters apart. One final
reference point ordinarily is used for a multiple cache. The caching party
should be careful to avoid placing multiple caches in a  repeated pattern.
Discovery of one multiple cache would give the opposition a guide for probing
others placed in a similar pattern.
CACHING MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
K-121. A feasibility study must be performed to determine the need for the
caching of medical supplies. The purpose of caches is to store excess medical
supplies to maintain mobility and deny access to the enemy. Also caching
large stockpiles of medical supplies allows pre-positioning vital supplies in
anticipation of future-planned operations.
TWELVE-POINT CACHE REPORT
K-122. The final step, which is vital in every emplacement operation, is the
preparation of a cache report. This report records the essential data for
recovery. The cache report must provide all of the information that someone
unfamiliar with the locality needs to find his way to the site, recover the
cache, and return safely. The report  is intended merely to point out the
minimum essential data. Whatever format is used, the importance of
attention to detail cannot be overemphasized. A careless error or omission in
the cache report may prevent recovery of the cache when it is needed.
CONTENT
K-123. The most important parts of the cache report must include
instructions for finding and recovering the cache. It should also include any
other information that will ease planning the recovery operation. Since the
details will depend upon the situation and the particular needs of each
organization, the exact format of the report may vary slightly. A format for a
cache report and a sample message is included in the SAV SER SUP 6.
PROCEDURES
K-124. The observer should collect as much data as possible during the
personal reconnaissance  to assist in selecting a site and planning
emplacement and recovery operations.  Drafting the cache report before
emplacement is also advisable. Following these procedures will reveal the
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K-30
omissions. Then the missing data can be obtained at the site. If this
procedure is followed, the preparation of the final cache report will be
reduced to an after-action check. This check ensures that the cache actually
was placed precisely where planned and that all other descriptive details are
accurate. Although this ideal may seldom be realized, two procedures always
should be followed:
•  The caching party should complete the final cache report as  soon as
possible after emplacement, as details are fresh in mind.
•  Someone who has not visited the site should check the instructions by
using them to lead the party to the site. When no such person is
available, someone should visit the site shortly after emplacement,
provided he can do so securely. If the cache has been emplaced at
night, a visit to the site in daylight may also provide an opportunity to
check on the sterilization of the site. Appendix L
Linkup Operations
The JSOA commander plans and coordinates linkup operations if the
JSOA is coming under the operational control (OPCON) of a conventional
force. A physical juncture is necessary between the conventional and
guerrilla forces. The mission of the conventional force may require SF and
guerrilla force personnel to support  conventional combat operations. All
elements involved must conduct detailed centralized planning.  The
conventional force commander, in coordination with the SFOB, prepares
an OPLAN and coordinates a PSYOP program to simplify the linkup of
forces within the JSOA. Linkup planning involves the JSOA command,
the conventional force or SOF commands, and any adjacent JSOA
commands.
LIAISON
L-1. The SFOD and guerrilla leaders coordinate the plans for linkup. If
linkup is with SOF, guerrilla liaison  personnel coordinate with the senior
SOF commander, his staff, and leaders of the linkup element. When the
linkup is with a guerrilla force in an adjacent JSOA, both area commands
provide liaison coordination.
L-2. The conventional and guerrilla forces coordinate communications
between them. An obvious requirement is for all communications equipment
to be compatible. The SFOD will ensure that the radios and SOI used for
linkup remain under its control.
L-3. A liaison party consisting of SFOD members and area commanders may
exfiltrate from the JSOA and assist  in linkup planning. Conventional forces
do not infiltrate into the JSOA to conduct their own liaison planning. SOF or
designated U.S. agencies infiltrate the JSOA to conduct linkup planning and
coordination. The SFOB or FOB monitors the linkup and provides
administrative and logistic support to the guerrilla force until physical
linkup is complete. After linkup, the OPCON element assumes a support
responsibility.
PHYSICAL AND NONPHYSICAL LINKUPS
L-4. Normally, a joint or allied force uses a physical linkup when operating
in the JSOA. A physical linkup is difficult to plan, conduct, and control. It
requires detailed, centralized coordination and a planning conference
between those involved. Commanders  conduct physical linkups for the
following reasons:
•  Joint tactical operations.
•  Resupply and logistic operations.
L-1 FM 3-05.201
•  Intelligence operations.
•  Exfiltration of sick and wounded U.S. and indigenous personnel.
•  Exfiltration of very important persons and EPWs.
•  Infiltration of U.S. and indigenous personnel.
•  Transfer of guides and liaison personnel to the conventional forces.
L-5. Forces must establish a nonphysical linkup when operations are
conducted in a JSOA and a physical linkup is not required or desirable. The
conventional force is the attacking force and the guerrillas are in support. A
nonphysical linkup also requires coordination between the linkup forces.
Commanders must state procedures before operations begin and when joint
communications are established. Compatible communications equipment and
current SOI must be available to the participants. Commanders use
nonphysical linkups when the conventional force conducts a deep raid and
guerrillas conduct security missions. Commanders also use these linkups
when the conventional force attacks and guerrillas—
•  Serve as a blocking force.
•  Screen flanks and block threats.
•  Conduct deception operations.
•  Conduct reconnaissance or surveillance.
LINKUP WITH AIRBORNE OR AIR ASSAULT FORCES
L-6. Command linkup plans for airborne or air assault forces depend on the
ground tactical plan. (FM 7-20,  The Infantry Battalion, provides detailed
linkup planning.) The airborne or air assault task force commander, the area
command liaison personnel, and the SOCCE conduct a planning conference.
Either an SFOD or a SOCCE remains with the guerrilla force in the JSOA as
an advisor for all postlinkup operations.
L-7. Precise timing of the airborne operation with the supporting guerrilla
operation is desirable. Premature commitment of the guerrilla force may stop
the surprise effect of the conventional force mission and lead to its defeat. If
committed late, the desired effects from the guerrilla force may not  occur.
Guerrilla forces may have to secure DZs or LZs, seize objectives within the
airhead, occupy reconnaissance and security positions, or delay or harass
enemy movements toward the objective area.
L-8. The guerrilla force may act as a reception committee and mark the DZ
and LZ. The reception committee links up with airborne or air assault force
personnel at one of the designated LZ or DZ markers and guides them to the
area commander. Linkup is complete when the airborne or air assault force
commander establishes contact with the area commander.
L-9. Concurrent with the landing of the airborne or air assault elements, the
guerrilla force furnishes current intelligence data, provides guides, and
conducts reconnaissance and security missions. The guerrilla force interdicts
approaches, controls areas between separate airheads, and attacks enemy
reserve units and installations. It also helps control the civilian population
within the objective area.
L-2FM 3-05.201
LINKUP WITH AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
L-10. Timing is critical when the guerrilla force supports an amphibious
operation. Premature commitment may alert the enemy and lead to  the
possible defeat of the guerrilla force. Late employment may not produce the
desired effects. A SOCCE deploys early  for the amphibious task force to
ensure joint planning is complete and  attempts to participate in the beach
landing. The element establishes command relationships and support during
the planning conference. During an amphibious assault or linkup, the task
force commander assumes OPCON of the guerrilla forces. When the
amphibious force commander links with the area commander, the  linkup
operation is complete.
MULTIPLE LINKUPS
L-11. Linkups can occur at several points and at separate times. Planning
and conducting multiple linkups simultaneously is difficult. All guerrilla
forces should not be involved in the linkup because deception and
interdictions should continue during  the linkup. A physical linkup with a
large guerrilla force may not even be required or desired. A small reception
committee can conduct the linkup and act as guides or liaisons with the
linkup force. Conventional forces may  conduct a relief in place after the
guerrillas have conducted a raid or seized key terrain. (FM 7-20 provides
detailed relief planning.) The SOCCE may remain with SOF forces in the
JSOA or region.
CONDUCT OF LINKUP
L-12. When a linkup appears imminent, the SOCCE deploys to the
conventional force HQ and begins detailed, centralized planning to involve all
parties. The involvement of the SOCCE  in the linkup planning process is
especially critical as it coordinates  the actions between external forces and
the area command in the JSOA. The SOCCE plans and coordinates at all
levels, especially with the units conducting the linkup. Units develop linkup
planning and contingencies during premission training. The initial planning
conference establishes command relationships. Planners consider  the
following linkup factors:
•  The guerrilla force may continue to conduct UW operations under the
umbrella of the unified commander.
•  The guerrilla force may be under control of the joint task force (JTF)
unified commander or national command of the guerrilla force
(shadow government or area commander).
•  The conventional force commander will be advised of the capabilities
and limitations of the guerrilla force, which may conduct combat
operations and rear area security.
•  The guerrilla force may be under tactical control (TACON) to SOF in
support of SO.
•  An adjacent JSOA guerrilla force may link with the internal guerrilla
force and conduct joint UW operations. The guerrilla force is under the
L-3 FM 3-05.201
control of the unified commander, or both forces may be under TACON
to a conventional force or SOF.
•  The guerrilla force may be under TACON to SOF temporarily, and
then revert to the relationships described above.
L-13. The SFOD coordinates operations, control measures, and  the scheme
of maneuver with the conventional and guerrilla forces. The SFOD
coordinates TACON measures with the guerrilla force commanders to assist
linkup. In addition, it establishes fire control measures to provide support for
the linkup. Both forces must understand the plans for securing objectives and
have access to dedicated assets to ensure mission success. Before physical
linkup occurs, the guerrilla force first  confirms the location of the linkup
contact point and secures it. The SFOD  ensures security is emplaced and
maintained at this location until the linkup is complete.
CONTACT PROCEDURES
L-14. The participating forces establish simple primary and  alternate
contact procedures and mutual control measures for physical and
nonphysical linkups. At the initial planning conference, participating forces
can modify the primary, alternate, and contingency plans developed during
premission training, based on METT-TC.
L-15. At a coordinated date and time, the conventional and guerrilla forces
move toward the contact point on a specific azimuth. The contact point is
near a well-defined, easy-to-locate terrain feature. Both forces stop about 500
meters short of the contact point and send a small element forward. The
elements display distinct, mutual, and simple recognition signals. They
provide security for the person making the contact. The smallest possible
contact element makes contact to preclude unnecessary personnel losses. The
SFOD and the guerrilla force begin the linkup by displaying prearranged
recognition signals to identify themselves to the conventional force. The
conventional force responds with its  own prearranged signal. Radio contact
before this action is highly advisable to decrease the chances for any
mistaken identity and fratricide. These additional principles apply:
•  SF may be included in both contact elements.
•  Guerrillas dispatched during the planning conference may guide the
conventional force to the contact point.
•  Both forces will establish and maintain communications not later than
(NLT) 24 hours before linkup.
•  Deception and feints may be used to cover linkup operations.
POSTLINKUP OPERATIONS
L-16. After linkup, guerrilla forces  convert to national control and
reorganize into conventional forces or demobilize. The unified commander, in
coordination with U.S. and allied officials, determines the further use of
guerrilla forces following linkup. With this guidance, the tactical commander
may employ these guerrilla forces. The SFOD stays with and helps them
become an effective combat unit operating under the JTF or higher
commanders.
L-4FM 3-05.201
POSTLINKUP EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
L-17. Conventional force commanders should be aware of several important
factors when they employ guerrilla forces following linkup. Some of those
factors are as follows:
•  Know the guerrillas, their organization, concepts of operation,
capabilities, and limitations.
•  Make sure the subordinate leaders understand the value of guerrilla
forces and know how to use them.
•  Anticipate the problems of providing administrative, logistic, and
operational support to attached guerrilla forces.
•  Anticipate possible language and political problems in establishing
liaison.
•  Know that the high value of guerrilla forces is limited to those
operations conducted in areas familiar to them.
•  Maintain guerrilla force integrity as much as possible.
•  Work through existing channels of the guerrilla command. (Imposing
a new organizational structure may hamper their effectiveness.)
•  Respect guerrilla leaders. (Give  them the same consideration as
officers of the conventional forces.)
•  Maintain guerrilla morale by awarding decorations and letters of
commendation. (Express appreciation whenever such action is
justified and warranted.)
•  Do not make political commitments or promises to guerrilla forces
unless authorized by higher HQ.
•  Recognize when the value of the guerrilla forces has ended and
promptly return them to the control of the unified commander.
POSTLINKUP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
L-18. If the guerrilla force is to be employed as light infantry, it must
undergo a period of retraining and reequipping before its commitment in the
new combat role. Also, commanders may reorganize, retrain, and reequip SFadvised guerrilla forces to conduct reconnaissance, airmobile, or other similar
light infantry operations. Guerrilla, paramilitary, or irregular forces
supporting conventional forces may conduct the following missions.
RECONNAISSANCE
L-19. Familiarity with the terrain and  people qualifies guerrilla forces for
reconnaissance missions. Guerrilla forces provide the principal sources of
intelligence on the enemy. They can patrol difficult terrain and gaps between
units, establish roadblocks and OPs, screen flanks, and provide guides.
L-5 FM 3-05.201
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
L-20. Control of terrain is rarely critical for the guerrilla. These guerrilla
forces, with relatively light weapons and equipment, are normally inferior to
the organized enemy forces in manpower, firepower, mobility, and
communications. Guerrilla forces do  not undertake defensive operations
unless forced to prevent enemy penetration of guerrilla-controlled areas or
gain time for their forces to accomplish a specific mission. Guerrilla forces
may defend key terrain or installations for a limited time in support of
conventional forces. When the guerrilla does defend an area, he modifies the
principles of conventional defensive combat to maximize his specific assets
and minimize any deficiencies. He demonstrates his best-planned efforts
using METT-TC.
COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS
L-21. The experience and training of guerrilla forces make them very useful
for counterguerrilla operations. They detect enemy sympathizers in villages
and towns and implement control measures in unfriendly areas. Tactical
commanders should exploit their knowledge of, and experience with,
guerrilla techniques, language, terrain, and population. When properly
supported, the guerrilla forces may be given complete responsibility for
counterguerrilla operations in selected areas.
REAR AREA SECURITY
L-22. Guerrilla forces may act as security forces within the TAACOM.
Tactical commanders assign these forces to a rear area security role based on
their knowledge and experience. Whenever possible, guerrilla forces should
be assigned on an area basis to guard lines of communications, supply depots,
airfields, pipelines, railroad yards, or port facilities. They also patrol terrain
that contains bypassed enemy units  or stragglers, aid in recovering
prisoners, help control civilians and  refugees, and police towns and cities.
When provided with appropriate transportation, guerrilla forces may act as a
mobile security force in their JSOA.
CIVIL SUPPORT
L-23. Because of their area knowledge and experience, guerrilla forces help
restore an area to its “normal state.” They perform DC collection and control
duties. They assist in PSYOP campaigns in rear areas, apprehend
collaborators and spies, recruit labor, and guard key installations and public
buildings.
CONVENTIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS
L-24. Guerrilla forces conduct combat  operations and augment, relieve, or
replace conventional forces in the rear area. However, guerrilla forces usually
cannot complete the same size mission a conventional force can. The
operations or tactical commander considers the guerrillas’ capabilities and
takes advantage of their special expertise and area knowledge.
L-25. Shortages of adequate voice communications and transportation may
severely limit the use of guerrilla  forces for conventional force combat
L-6FM 3-05.201
L-7
operations. The strength, organization, leadership, training, equipment, and
extent of civilian support for guerrilla forces affect their combat capability.
L-26. After linkup with guerrilla forces, the SFOD may have to retrain HN
forces. The SFOD can retrain and reconstitute HN forces that have suffered
reversals in combat actions. The goal is to rapidly train the units’ cadres in
leadership, operations, and combat tactics, techniques, and procedures. Appendix M
Demobilization of Guerrilla Forces
This appendix provides guidance to operational detachments engaged in
UW during the demobilization phase. During the demobilization phase of
UW, all members of the SFOD perform duties and assume responsibilities
as outlined in subsequent paragraphs. In addition, detachment members
not mentioned perform duties as directed by their immediate supervisor,
the operations sergeant, or the detachment commander. Users may
deviate from the guidance provided  in this appendix as required by
special mission considerations or peculiarities of a UW JSOA.
DETACHMENT COMMANDER
M-1. The SFOD commander commands and controls detachment members
and directs, advises, and gives guidance to all staff and special staff sections
and resistance force leaders in accomplishing the following:
•  Conducting inventory, inspection, and check of—
ƒ Weapons and other serial-numbered items.
ƒ Rosters of tactical and logistical units.
ƒ Rosters of auxiliary units and all other supporters.
ƒ Rosters of leaders, staff, and special staff sections.
ƒ Administrative records; for example, war records for decorations
and awards pay, and personnel records.
ƒ All equipment, ammunition, supplies, and material in storage,
cache sites, or in the possession of resistance force units and
personnel.
ƒ Minefield, obstacle, and hazardous material data and records.
•  Compiling, posting, correcting, and making available—
ƒ The principal area assessment.
ƒ Supply records and inventory documents.
ƒ Personnel and pay records.
ƒ Intelligence and security files.
ƒ E&R files.
ƒ Operation plans, orders, and estimates.
ƒ Communication records and cryptographic material.
ƒ Medical records.
ƒ Rosters of potential political assistance personnel.
M-1FM 3-05.201
M-2. In addition, the detachment  commander directs and coordinates
detailed briefings for resistance force personnel to ensure that everyone
understands—
•  The need for demobilization.
•  Demobilization requirements on the part of commanders and
individuals.
•  The importance of remaining in preselected assembly areas.
•  Police and sanitation functions.
•  Collection of arms, ammunition, and equipment.
•  Immediate care for and processing of sick and wounded.
•  The CA team’s requirements, to include—
ƒ Necessary records and rosters:
♦  Roster of legal survivors of killed in action (KIA) or missing
in action (MIA) soldiers as a direct result of hostile action.
♦  Roster of resistance force personnel.
♦  Other supporters who are auxiliary, bartering assets,
doctors, and persons holding levy receipts.
ƒ Combat records for preparation of decorations and awards.
ƒ Pay records.
ƒ Medical records.
ƒ Personnel records for preparation of and discharge.
ƒ Preparation and conduction of ceremonies.
ƒ Implementation of rehabilitation procedures as planned within
stipulations by higher HQ.
ƒ Preparation for exfiltration of SFOD members.
ASSISTANT DETACHMENT COMMANDER
M-3. The ADC supervises and assists in the preparation of the following:
•  Rosters of all resistance force personnel, guerrillas, and auxiliary.
•  Rosters of other known supporters, such as bartering and levy assets
or doctors.
•  Rosters of persons who possess potential assistance qualifications, to
include—
ƒ Outstanding political attitudes.
ƒ Leadership ability (political).
ƒ Administrators.
ƒ Police and security qualifications.
•  Inventory documents and records  of the following supplies and
equipment reflecting serial number, amount, and location:
ƒ Weapons.
ƒ Other serial-numbered items and sensitive items.
M-2FM 3-05.201
ƒ Ammunition and munitions.
ƒ Clothing.
ƒ Field equipment.
ƒ Rations.
M-4. The ADC also makes available to CA personnel all records and rosters
necessary to accomplish their mission. He assists the CA team in the
administration of resistance force personnel. The ADC prepares SFOD
members for briefing and debriefing by CA officers. He provides guidance for
and assists in the—
•  Preparation and completion of principal area assessment.
•  Preparation of intelligence and security files.
•  Collection and accountability of cryptographic and other sensitive
communication material.
M-5. The ADC assists CA personnel in execution of demobilization plans. He
provides guidance and assistance to SFOD members in preparation for
exfiltration.
INTELLIGENCE SERGEANT
M-6. The intelligence sergeant prepares all classified documents and
material for destruction or exfiltration as directed by the detachment
commander. The intelligence sergeant compiles and prepares intelligence
and security files for the ADC or for use in briefing the CA team and
subsequent exfiltration. The intelligence sergeant should be prepared to
present the—
•  Intelligence and security briefing to the CA team.
•  Security briefing to SFOD members.
M-7. The intelligence sergeant also prepares and presents to the SFOD ADC
files on and rosters of potential political assistance personnel as follows:
•  Persons with outstanding political attitudes and qualifications.
•  Political leadership ability and experience.
•  Potential administrators.
•  Police and security assets.
•  Other favorable assets.
M-8. The intelligence sergeant also assists SFOD members in—
•  Police and sanitation functions.
•  Demobilization procedures.
•  Collecting arms, ammunition, munitions, supplies, and equipment.
•  Preparing for exfiltration.
M-3 FM 3-05.201
OPERATIONS SERGEANT
M-9. The operations sergeant selects assembly areas for resistance force CPs
or units. He assists the SFOD commander in directing, supervising, and
coordinating the collection of—
•  Personnel.
•  Resistance force units.
•  Weapons.
•  Ammunition and munitions.
•  Clothing and equipment.
•  Records and rosters.
•  Equipment and supplies.
•  Classified material.
M-10. The operations sergeant directs and advises conduct of assembly,
briefings, and control of resistance force personnel.  He completes and
compiles the—
•  Principal area assessment.
•  Operation orders and plans.
•  Estimates.
•  Damage assessments.
M-11. The operations sergeant plans and conducts briefings of the CA team.
He assists CA personnel in the conduct of demobilization procedures and
advises on a rehabilitation program. The operations sergeant also plans
SFOD exfiltration as follows:
•  Selects and secures landing site.
•  Reports and confirms landing site.
•  Directs and supervises preparation of detachment members,
documents, and supplies for exfiltration.
•  Organizes brief and rehearses reception committee.
•  Plans and conducts demobilization ceremony.
MEDICAL SUPERVISOR
M-12. The medical supervisor prepares, posts, and makes the following
information available to the ADC:
•  All medical records.
•  Immunization records.
•  Plans for continued treatment of patients.
•  Medical rehabilitation programs.
•  Recommendations for awards and decorations for both detachment
and guerrilla medical personnel.
M-4FM 3-05.201
M-13. The medical supervisor prepares, posts, and makes the following
information available to the S-4 sergeant:
•  Plans for collection, use, storage, issue, exfiltration, or destruction of
medical supplies and equipment.
•  Inventory documents and records reflecting serial number, location,
type, and amount of—
ƒ Medical equipment.
ƒ Instruments.
ƒ Installations and facilities.
ƒ Medicine.
ƒ Other equipment.
M-14. The medical supervisor executes plans for medical treatment,
hospitalization, and evacuation during demobilization. Guerrilla hospitals
are kept in operation until the patients can be taken over by  military
hospitals or civilian institutions. He  briefs and assists CA personnel. The
medical supervisor executes plans for the disposition of medical supplies,
equipment, facilities, instruments, and installations. He  also assists SFOD
members in preparation of personnel and equipment for exfiltration. The
medical supervisor coordinates the—
•  Final contribution of medical intelligence to S-2.
•  Latest contribution to the medical portion of the principal area
assessment (S-3).
•  Assistance in sanitation, police, and sterilization functions.
The medical supervisor also supervises the final discharge physical
examinations.
SENIOR WEAPONS LEADER
M-15. The senior weapons leader assists the SFOD ADC in the preparation
of administrative matters. The senior weapons leader advises the
detachment commander on the future disposition of weapons, ammunition,
and explosives, to include—
•  Use.
•  Issue.
•  Storage.
•  Exfiltration.
•  Destruction.
•  Methods of collecting and accounting.
M-16. The senior weapons leader advises and assists the operations sergeant
in the—
•  Selection, reconnaissance, and occupation of unit assembly areas.
•  Selection and reconnaissance of exfiltration landing sites.
•  Organization and rehearsals of exfiltration committee.
M-5 FM 3-05.201
M-17. The senior weapons leader plans, organizes, and conducts briefings of
the CA team as directed by the operations sergeant. The senior weapons
leader assists the CA team in the conduct of demobilization procedures. He
also assists SFOD members in plans and preparation of equipment for—
•  Use.
•  Issue.
•  Storage.
•  Infiltration.
•  Exfiltration.
•  Destruction.
M-18. The senior weapons leader makes final contribution to the principal
area assessment. He also continues to assist in, direct, and supervise—
•  Police functions.
•  Sanitation measures.
•  Sterilization requirements.
COMMUNICATIONS SUPERVISOR
M-19. The communications supervisor provides necessary communications
for—
•  Administrative contact with the following:
ƒ SFOB.
ƒ Conventional linkup command.
ƒ Resistance and auxiliary force units during demobilization.
ƒ Supporting naval and air units.
ƒ Exfiltration activities.
•  Population control by the following:
ƒ Police units.
ƒ Other security elements.
ƒ CA team use.
M-20. The communications supervisor  advises the detachment commander
on amount and type of equipment necessary to accomplish demobilization
mission, number of personnel required for operation of equipment, and
number and location of sites to be occupied.
M-21.  The communications supervisor collects, inventories, and accounts for
all classified documents and material and makes them available to the
intelligence sergeant (S-2) for future—
•  Use.
•  Exfiltration.
•  Destruction.
M-22. The communications supervisor plans for collection and disposition of
communication equipment and supplies. He inventories, documents, and
M-6FM 3-05.201
M-7
records up-to-date information reflecting serial number, amount, and location
of all communication equipment and supplies. He also executes plans for—
•  Collection.
•  Issue.
•  Use.
•  Storage.
•  Exfiltration.
•  Destruction.
ENGINEER SERGEANT
M-23. The engineer sergeant collects all demolitions and engineer equipment
and prepares it for turn-in. He inventories mine, obstacle, and  hazardous
material data and makes sure it is properly recorded. He assists the ADC in
preparing inventories and supply documents and in readying equipment and
weapons for exfiltration or turnover to civil authorities. The engineer
sergeant presents engineer portions of briefings as directed. He also assists
the operations sergeant in preparing assigned portions of the area
assessment.
It’s more than a game.
JMEA Glossary
 after-action report
 assistant detachment commander
 area of operations
 advanced operational base
 area of responsibility
 Army regulation
 The collection of specific information about the general situation
encountered by the SFOD immediately after infiltration. The area
assessment is expanded throughout the deployment, concluding
in the debriefing after exfiltration. The area assessment confirms,
corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from
area studies and other sources prior to infiltration.
In unconventional warfare, the organizational structure
established within a joint special operations area to command and
control resistance forces. An area command consists of the area
commander, his staff, and representatives of the resistance
element, to include Special Forces after infiltration.
A clandestine, dispersed network of facilities to support
resistance activities. It is a “liberated zone” designed to achieve
security, control, dispersion, and flexibility.
 Army special operations aviation
 Army special operations forces
 Army Training and Evaluation Program
 advanced special operations
 Any resource—person, group, relationship, instrument,
installation, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence
organization for use in an operational or support role. Often used
with a qualifying term such as agent asset or propaganda asset.
(JP 1-02)
In unconventional warfare, that element of the resistance force
established to provide the organized civilian support of the
resistance movement. (AR 310-25)
 adverse weather aerial delivery system
 battle damage assessment
 battle focus analysis
brigadier general
Glossary-1  FM 3-05.201
 beach landing site
 beginning morning nautical twilight
 battlefield operating systems
 command and control
command, control, and communications
 command, control, communications, and intelligence
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
 Civil Affairs
A group of planned activities in support of military operations
that enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian
authorities and population and which promote the development of
favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or
hostile groups.
caliber
 criticality,  accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and
recognizability
close air support
 civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and
events
chemical, biological, and radiological
—The CCIR is a
prioritized list incorporating all information requirements
identified by the commander as being critical in developing his
timely information management, tactical decision process, and his
actions and reactions, which affect successful mission
accomplishment.
 Combat Diver Qualification Course
communications facility
—Information gathered and activities
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 2-0)
An activity to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and
other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental
departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or
concealment.
centimeter(s)
—The activities of a commander that
establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between
military forces and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral,
Glossary-2 FM 3-05.201
or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military
operations and consolidate operational objectives. CA may include
performance by military forces of activities and functions
normally the responsibility of the local government. These
activities may occur, if directed, in absence of other military
operations. (JP 3-57)
—The joint force commander’s
nerve center for CMO and coordination with other non-DOD
agencies. CMOC members are primarily CA personnel augmented
by other DOD and non-DOD (for example, Department of State,
United States Agency for International Development, Federal
Emergency Management Agency) liaison personnel.
 course of action
1) Establishment and management of an organization so that
information about the personnel, internal organization, or
activities of one component is made available to any other
component only to the extent required for the performance of
assigned duties. (JP 1-02) 2) In unconventional warfare, the
division of an organization or activity into functional segments or
cells to restrict communication between them and prevent
knowledge of the identity or activities of other segments except on
a need-to-know basis. (AR 310-25)
 communications security
concept of operations
 CONPLAN contingency plan
continental United States
A non-SOF force supported by SOF. It is normally a conventional
military organization; however, it may or may not be military,
and it may not be U.S. forces.
command post
cryptograph
 combat support
 command sergeant major
 combat service support
counterterrorism
 continuous wave
 direct action
 designated area of recovery
dislocated civilian
Glossary-3  FM 3-05.201
A primary area for SOF. An area that is operationally unsuitable
to the conventional force for political, tactical, environmental, or
geographical reasons.
 Department of Defense
 drop zone
 evasion and recovery
—That division of electronic warfare
involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective
use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
 early evening nautical twilight
That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to
 ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum
  despite the enemy’s use of electronic warfare.
 enemy prisoner of war
 electronic warfare
The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy
control by stealth, deception,  surprise, or clandestine means.
(JP 1-02)
Fahrenheit
 feasibility assessment
 foreign internal defense
 field manual
 forward operational base
Any foreign government (regardless of whether recognized by the
United States), foreign-based political party (or faction  thereof),
foreign military force, foreign-based terrorist group, or any
organization composed, in major part, of any such entity  or
entities. (AR 381-10) Foreign powers may be classified as friendly,
neutral, or hostile.
final reference point
graphic training aid
—Military and paramilitary operations
conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular,
predominantly indigenous forces. (JP 1-02)
 high altitude low opening
 helicopter
 high frequency
—A nation in which representatives or organizations
of another state are present because of government invitation or
Glossary-4 FM 3-05.201
international agreement. The term particularly refers to a nation
receiving assistance relevant to its national security.
headquarters
humanitarian relief organization
A category of intelligence derived from information collected and
provided by human sources. (JP 1-02)
—A collective action rapidly executed
without applying a deliberate decision-making process. Drills
provide swift and positive small unit reaction to enemy visual or
physical contact. They are simple COAs in which all men are so
well trained that minimum signals or commands are required to
initiate action.
 in accordance with
 International Crisis Group
 International Committee for the Red Cross
 ID identification
 initial entry report
intelligence and electronic warfare
International Law Officer
Native, originating in, or intrinsic to an area or region.
(FM 3-05.20)
1) The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by
either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement
is made either by small groups or by individuals at extended or
irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy,  it
infers that contact is avoided. 2) In intelligence usage, placing an
agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory. Usually
involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. (JP 1-02)
An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through use of subversion and armed conflict.
(JP 1-02)
Member of a political party who rebels against established
leadership. (JP 1-02)
1) The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (JP 1-02)
2) The prevention of action against United States resources,
industries, and institutions; and the protection of life and
property in the event of a domestic emergency by the employment
of all measures, in peace or war, other than military defense.
3) Condition resulting from the measures taken within a
command to safeguard defense information coming under its
cognizance, including physical security of documents and
materials. (AR 310-25)
Glossary-5  FM 3-05.201
 intelligence summary
intelligence preparation of the battlespace
 IR information requirement
 initial rallying point
 isolation facility
information warfare
 judge advocate
Operations carried on by two or more of the Armed Forces of the
United States (Army, Navy, Air Force). (AR 310-25)
 joint publication
 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
—A restricted area of land, sea, and
airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander
of a joint special operations force to conduct SO activities.
 joint special operations task force
 joint task force
killed in action
kilometer(s)
pound(s)
line of communications
 listening post
 logistic preparation of the theater
 landing zone
medic; meter(s)
 man-portable air defense system
military civic action
military decision-making process
METL mission-essential task list
 mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available and civil considerations
 MFF military free-fall
 military intelligence
missing in action
 mission concept
—(Formerly known as area specialist
team.) The MOC is made up of a pool of SF-qualified soldiers that
Glossary-6 FM 3-05.201
support high-priority mission planning. The MOC officers  and
NCOs operate on the three principles of compartmentation,
replaceability, and deconfliction.
 measure of effectiveness
 mission-oriented protective posture
 military occupational specialty
 MPA mission planning agent
 mission support package
—A preselected area used as a temporary
base or stopover point. The MSS is used to increase the
operational range within the JSOA. The MSS can be used before
and after an operation for resupply, resting, and coordination,
based on METT-TC. The site is occupied for short periods of time,
seldom longer than a 24-hour period. The MSS should be
reconnoitered and outposted.
 modified table of organization and equipment
 MTP mission tasking package
—All forms of personnel
recovery conducted by an entity, group of entities, or
organizations that are trained and directed to contact,
authenticate, support, move, and  exfiltrate U.S. military and
other designated personnel from enemy-held or hostile areas to
friendly control through established infrastructure or procedures.
NAR includes unconventional assisted recovery conducted by
special operations forces. (DOD Directive 2310.2)
The art and science of developing and using the political,
economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its
armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives.
(JP 1-02)
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 nuclear, biological, and chemical
 noncommissioned officer
 noncombatant evacuation operation
no-fire area
 NGO nongovernmental organization
 not later than
 O&I operations and intelligence
 observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain,
obstacles, and cover and concealment
 Organization of American States
Glossary-7  FM 3-05.201
other government agency
 observation post
 operational control
 operation plan
 operation order
 operations security
 objective rallying point
An operation conducted openly, without concealment. (JP 1-02)
 primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (plan)
 Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any
country, but resembling them in organization, equipment,
training, or mission. (JP 1-02)
 peacetime campaign plan
practical exercise
 priority intelligence requirements
 prescribed load list
 plan of execution
 program of instruction
 petroleum, oils, and lubricants
 populace and resources control
 personnel service support
The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions
having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions,
attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as
to support the achievement of national objectives. (JP 1-02)
—Planned operations to convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the
behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and
individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce
or reinforce foreign attitudes  and behavior favorable to the
originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02)
 radio direction finder
An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a
country to resist the legally established government or an
occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 1-02)
restricted fire area
 request for information
Glossary-8 FM 3-05.201
 request for intelligence information
 rules of engagement
rallying point
 rocket-propelled grenade
 radio-telephone
battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
battalion or brigade operations staff officer
battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
civil-military operations officer
An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the
national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying,
or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war
materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural
resources. (JP 1-02)
selected area for evasion
A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or
escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving
until he can be evacuated. (JP 1-02)
 size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
 Standard Audiovisual Services Supplement
That portion of a JSOA assigned by a joint SO commander to a
subordinate SO commander for the conduct of a specific SO
mission.
 survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
—Military personnel with cross training in basic
skills, organized into small, multiple-purpose detachments with
the mission to train, organize, supply, direct, and control
indigenous forces in guerrilla  warfare and counterinsurgency
operations, and to conduct unconventional warfare operations.
 Special Forces evasion and recovery plan
Special Forces group (airborne)
 Special Forces operational base
 Special Forces operational detachment
Special Forces operational detachment A
Special Forces operational detachment B
 sergeant major
 signal security
Glossary-9  FM 3-05.201
 subject-matter expert
—Operations conducted by specially organized,
trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve
military, political, economic, or informational objectives  by
unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically
sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full
range of military operations, independently or in coordination
with operations of conventional non-SO forces. Political-military
considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring
clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques, and oversight at
the national level. Special operations differ from conventional
operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational
techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly
support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and
indigenous assets. (JP 3-05)
 special operations command
 special operations command and control element
 Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and  Threat
Evaluation System
 special operations forces
 signal operating instructions
 special operations mission planning folder
 standing operating procedure
 special operations support element
 special operations team A
 support center
 special reconnaissance
 soldier readiness processing
Someone who takes the place of or acts for another. (FM 3-05.20)
 theater Army area command
 tactical control
 tactical satellite
 tasking order
 target intelligence packet
 table of organization and equipment
 unconventional assisted recovery
 unconventional assisted recovery mechanism
 unconventional assisted recovery team
 Uniform Code of Military Justice
Glossary-10 FM 3-05.201
Glossary-11
 United Nations
A covert unconventional warfare organization established to
operate in areas denied to the guerrilla forces or conduct
operations not suitable for guerrilla forces. (AR 310-25)
 United States .
 United States Air Force
 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School
United States Army Reserve
 United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne)
 United States Government
—A broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration,
predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who
are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in
varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla
warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or
clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of
subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and
escape. (JP 3-05.5)
unconventional warfare operating area
 warrant officer (senior and master)
 executive officer Bibliography
ACP 125 (E). Communications Instructions—Radiotelephone Procedures. 1 August 1987.
AR 40-562. Immunizations and Chemoprophylaxis. 1 November 1995.
AR 220-10. Preparation for Oversea Movement of Units (POM). 15 June 1973.
AR 310-25. Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title: AD). 21 May 1986.
AR 600-8-101. Personnel Processing (In-and-Out and Mobilization Processing).
       1 March 1997.
Article 39 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
DOD Directive 2310.2. Personnel Recovery. 22 December 2000.
Executive Order 12333. U.S. Intelligence Activities.
FM 3-0. Operations. 14 June 2001.
FM 3-05.20. Special Forces Operations. 26 June 2001.
FM 3-05.30. Psychological Operations. 19 June 2000.
FM 3-05.220. (S/NF) Special Forces Advanced Special Operations (U). 13 February 2003.
FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data. 30 August 1999 (Change 2, 1 October 2002).
FM 7-0. Training the Force. 22 October 2002.
FM 7-8. Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 22 April 1992 (Change 1, 1 March 2001).
FM 7-10. The Infantry Rifle Company. 14 December 1990 (Change 1, 31 October 2000).
Bibliography-1FM 3-05.201
FM 7-20. The Infantry Battalion. 6 April 1992 (Change 1, 29 December 2000).
FM 20-32. Mine/Countermine Operations. 29 May 1998 (Change 3, 1 October 2002).
FM 22-100. Army Leadership. 31 August 1999.
FM 25-101. Battle Focused Training. 30 September 1990.
FM 31-19. Military Free-Fall Parachuting Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 1 October 1999.
FM 31-23. Special Forces Mounted Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 5 May 1999.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000.
FM 44-100. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 15 June 2000.
FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 August 1999.
FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.
GTA 31-1-3. Detachment Mission Planning Guide. 29 May 1997.
Hague Conventions of 1907.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.
JP 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 April 1998.
JP 3-05.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force
       Operations. 19 December 2001.
JP 3-05.5. Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.
       10 August 1993.
Bibliography-2 FM 31-XX
Bibliography-3
JP 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998.
JP 3-13. Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. 9 October 1998.
JP 3-57. Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. 8 February 2001.
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1969.
Special Operations Targeting Handbook. Edition 8.
Standard Audiovisual Services Supplement (SAV SER SUP) 6.
TC 31-24. Special Forces Air Operations. 9 September 1988.
TC 31-25. Special Forces Waterborne Operations. 3 October 1988.
TC 31-32. Special Operations Sniper Training and Employment. 29 September 1997.
Tse-tung, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1978.
United Nations Charter.
USASFC(A) Reg 350-1. Component Training, 28 June 2001 (Change 1, 22 October 2001).
USASOC Reg 350-1. Training. 28 July 1995. Index
A  F
advanced operational base
(AOB), 2-5, 2-9, 2-15, 2-17,
E-4, F-1
advanced special operations
(ASO), 2-5, 3-2
ambush, 1-10, 3-9, 3-18, 3-21,
3-37, 3-53, 3-58, 3-70, 3-73
through 3-83, 3-86, 3-90
through 3-93, 3-95, E-3, J-1,
J-3
area assessment, 1-15, 2-9,
2-27, 3-1, 3-2, C-2, E-3, G-1
through G-5, M-1 through
M-7
area commander, 1-17, 1-18,
1-20, 1-24, 2-29, 3-1, 3-3
through 3-8, 3-15, 3-17
through 3-22, 3-30, 3-38,
3-44, 3-45, 3-47, 3-50, 4-3,
E-2, E-4, E-8, E-10, F-2, I-1,
I-2, I-4
area complex, 3-3, 3-6, 3-8
through 3-11, 3-17, 3-32,
3-34, I-1
area of operations (AO), 1-14,
1-19, 2-8, 2-9, 2-23, 2-29,
3-3, 3-26, 3-44
area studies, 2-2, 2-4, 2-10,
2-24, 3-3, C-1, C-2, H-1
through H-7
auxiliary, 3-4, 3-5, 3-14, 3-15,
3-18, 3-23 through 3-34,
3-38, 3-43, 3-90, C-6, C-8,
E-6, E-10, H-6, M-2
B
battle focus analysis (BFA), 2-3
briefback, 2-11, 2-12, 2-20,
2-21, 2-22, 2-27
C
civil affairs (CA), 1-13 through
1-18, 2-5, 2-8, 2-11, 2-18,
2-27, 2-28, 3-18, 3-20, 3-54,
4-3 through 4-5, C-1, I-2,
M-2 through M-6
feasibility assessment (FA),
2-12, 2-13, 2-14 through
2-16
civil areas, structures,
capabilities, organizations,
people, and events
(CASCOPE), 1-14, 1-17,
2-8, 2-28, 3-2, 3-54, 4-3, F-3
fire support, 2-15, 2-27, 3-52,
3-53, 3-57 through 3-59,
3-93, F-3
civil-military operations center
(CMOC), 1-14, 1-18, 4-4
forward operational base
(FOB), 1-5, 2-14, 2-16, 2-25,
2-26, B-1 through B-4, C-9,
E-3 through E-7, E-12, F-5,
I-1, L-1
clandestine operations, 1-2,
1-7, 1-15, 3-18, 3-25, 3-33,
C-5, K-1, K-3
command and control (C2),
1-15, 3-8, 3-56, 3-81, C-8,
I-3
G
guerrilla, 1-2, 1-4, 1-7, 1-9,
1-20, 3-1, 3-3, 3-8, 3-9, 3-14
through 3-31, 3-35 through
3-38, 3-43, 3-48, 3-59, 3-83
through 3-90, 4-1 through
4-5, A-1, A-2, B-4, B-5, C-5
through C-10, E-1 through
E-11, G-3 through G-5, H-6,
I-1 through I-4, L-1 through
L-7, M-1, M-2, M-4, M-5
commander’s critical
information requirements
(CCIR), 2-4, 2-10, 2-11, 2-26
communications, 1-16, 1-18,
1-24, 2-9, 2-10, 2-15, 2-16,
2-22, 2-24, 2-25, 2-28, 3-8,
3-19, 3-37, 3-47, 3-81, 3-93,
A-6 through A-10, B-1
through B-7, C-8, E-7, J-2,
K-28, M-6
guerrilla base, 3-8, 3-10, 3-11,
3-13, 3-25, 3-46, B-5, C-6,
E-8, F-1
counterguerrilla, 3-1, 3-27,
3-73, 3-75, 3-89, 3-90, 3-93,
3-95, C-8, G-1
guerrilla warfare, 1-1, 1-3, 1-7,
counterintelligence (CI), 3-7,  1-8, 1-10, 3-2, 3-4, A-1, A-2
3-8, 3-17, 3-21, 3-25, 3-28,
3-44, 3-47, A-6
H
criticality, accessibility,
recuperability, vulnerability,
effect, and recognizability
(CARVER), 1-2, 3-49
through 3-51
humanitarian relief organization
(HRO), 1-22
I
information requirement (IR),
2-4, 2-7, 2-10, 2-11, 2-23,
2-27
D
demobilization, 1-11, 1-17,
1-18, 3-1, 3-15, 4-2 through
4-5, M-1 through M-7
insurgency, 1-3 through 1-13,
1-20, 4-1, 4-3, A-1
designated area of recovery
(DAR), 1-2
dislocated civilian (DC), 1-17,
1-18, 3-30
 latent or incipient, 1-7
Index-1 FM 3-05.201
intelligence, 1-2, 1-24, 2-4, 2-7,  O
2-13, 2-23 through 2-25,
2-27, 2-29, 3-7, 3-28, 3-32,
3-39, 3-53, 3-92, 3-94, A-4,
A-6, A-7, J-1, J-4, M-3
operation plan (OPLAN), 2-2,
2-3, 2-10 through 2-12, 2-17,
2-18, 2-20, 2-26 through
2-28, L-1
intelligence activities, 1-1, 1-2
operations security (OPSEC),
1-24, 2-8 through 2-10, 2-27,
3-25, 3-51, 3-88
isolation facility (ISOFAC),  2-9,
2-17, 2-22
J
joint special operations area
(JSOA), 1-2, 1-13 through
1-20, 2-5, 2-7, 2-11, 2-25,
2-27 through 2-29, 3-1, 3-3
through 3-6, 3-11, 3-18
through 3-21, 3-34, 4-1, 4-4,
4-5, B-1, B-3 through B-5,
C-1, C-2, C-5 through C-9,
E-1, F-1, F-3 through F-5,
G-1, H-1, I-1, L-1 through
L-3, L-6, M-1
joint special operations task
force (JSOTF), 1-19, 2-3,
2-6, 2-24, 3-2,
Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan (JSCP), 2-3
M
man-portable air defense
system (MANPADS), 3-83
through 3-88
military intelligence (MI), 2-4
military occupational specialty
(MOS), 2-4, 3-37, J-6
mission concept (MICON),
2-11, 2-17, 2-19, 2-20
mission planning agent (MPA),
2-13, 2-22
mission tasking package
(MTP), 2-3, 2-13
modified table of organization
and equipment (MTOE), 2-5,
2-7, 2-8, 2-16, I-2
N
noncombatant evacuation
operation (NEO), 3-30
nongovernmental organization,
(NGO), 1-18, 1-21, 1-22,
2-9, 4-2, C-1
P
peacetime campaign plan
(PCP), 2-3
plan of execution (POE), 2-4,
2-16, 2-21, 2-22
populace and resources control
(PRC), 3-30
priority intelligence
requirements (PIR), 2-4,
2-11, 2-23, 2-27
psychological operations
(PSYOP), 1-6, 1-13 through
1-20, 2-5, 2-27, 3-9, 3-20,
3-50, 4-4, 4-5, I-2, I-4, L-1
R
reconnaissance, 1-2, 1-3, 3-53
through 3-55, 3-91, 3-92,
K-7, K-8, K-11, K-15, L-5,
M-5
recruitment, 1-13, 1-16, 3-15
request for information (RFI),
2-7, 2-18
resistance, 1-1 through 1-4,
1-7, 1-8, 1-11 through 1-20,
1-24, 3-1 through 3-9, 3-15
through 3-18, 3-27 through
3-30, 3-34, 3-35, 3-82, 4-2,
4-4, 4-5, M-1 through M-4,
M-6
S
sabotage, 1-1, 1-3, 1-7, 3-3,
3-18, 3-19, 3-21, 3-30, 3-31,
3-33, 3-34, 3-37, 3-42
sector command, 3-3 through
3-5, 3-7, 3-8, 3-11, 3-18,
3-21 through 3-23, 3-33,
3-82, E-9
security, 1-24, 1-25, 2-29, 3-3,
3-6 through 3-13, 3-27, 3-35
through 3-39, 3-43 through
3-49, 3-52, 3-78, 3-80, 3-94,
B-3 through B-5, C-8, F-1
through F-5, K-1 through
K-4, K-24, K-25, K-28, L-6,
M-3
security zone, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9
through 3-11, 3-25, 3-58
selected area for evasion
(SAFE), 1-2
shadow government, 1-7, 3-4,
3-5, L-3
signal operating instructions
(SOI), 2-28, 3-47, E-7, E-12,
L-1, L-2
sniper, 3-48, 3-52, 3-53, 3-82,
3-83, 3-90, A-4, E-2
Special Forces operational
base (SFOB), 1-15, 2-14,
3-19, B-1 through B-4, E-3,
E-6, E-7, E-9, E-12, F-3
through F-5, I-1, I-2, L-1
special operations command
(SOC), 1-14, 2-3, 2-12, 2-24,
E-4
special operations command
and control element
(SOCCE), 2-5, 2-9, 2-15,
L-2, L-3
Special Operations Command,
Research, Analysis, and
Threat Evaluation System
(SOCRATES), 2-24
special operations mission
planning folder (SOMPF),
2-12, 2-13, 2-16 through
2-18, 2-22, 2-25
special operations team A
(SOT-A), 2-4
statement of requirement
(SOR), 1-2
subversion, 1-1 through 1-3,
1-18, 3-18
surrogate force, 1-1, 1-2
surveillance, 3-15, 3-28, 3-53,
A-6 through A-8
T
target intelligence package
(TIP), 2-12, 2-13, 2-25
Index-2 FM 3-05.201
Index-3
targeting, 1-2, 1-13, 1-14, 1-17,
2-1
tasking order (TASKORD), 2-2,
2-3, 2-12 through 2-14, 2-16
through 2-18, 2-22, 2-23,
2-25
transition, 1-8, 1-14, 1-17,
1-18, 4-1 through 4-5
U
unconventional assisted
recovery (UAR), 1-1, 1-2,
3-18
unconventional assisted
recovery mechanism
(UARM), 1-2
unconventional assisted
recovery team (UART), 1-2
underground, 1-1, 3-4, 3-5,
3-18, 3-23 through 3-25,
3-31 through 3-34, 3-38, H-6
United States Army Special
Forces Command (Airborne)
(USASFC[A]), 2-3
urban environment, 1-6, 3-2,
3-31, A-1 through A-5
urban operations, 1-6, 3-2, A-3,
A-5 FM 3-05-201
30 APRIL 2003
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
   ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
    
           JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
       Secretary of the Army
                                0309909
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number XXXXXX, requirements for
FM 3-05.201.PIN:  080766-000